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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a study of international intervention that takes as its analytical starting point 
the subjectivities of those who are supposed to reap the benefits of liberal intervention 
projects.  
  
The thesis combines (1) a focus on the connection between subjectivity and liberal power 
offered by governmentality approaches with (2) an ethnographic orientation that 
problematises any bounded conception of subjectivity. The ethnographic methodology 
developed in the thesis is employed to explore two fields of intervention in Serbia: 
agricultural governance and non-formal youth education.  
  
This reorientation engenders analytical disruptions to the concepts of international 
intervention and liberal governmentality in three ways. First, it uncovers subject positions 
more varied than a universal homo oeconomicus. Second, it shows that power can be 
simultaneously violent and silencing as well as dispersed and productive. Third, the thesis 
points to fields of visibility far wider than those imagined in project documents of 
interveners. In theorising from these disruptions, the thesis argues that the concept of 
intervention itself stands at the heart of our analytical problems: it essentialises conceptions 
of local and international and it occludes the coevalness of spaces and processes. 
  
In the end, the thesis presents politics of improvement as a more productive way of exploring 
these encounters that seek to build peace and democracy around the world. This approach 
advocates engagement with lived experience not only as an interesting ethnographic 
travelogue, but as a prompt for a more fundamental rethinking of how power and inequality 
make international politics. As such, the thesis contributes both to the scholarship on 
international interventions, and to the ongoing project of reorienting IR’s analytical and 
methodological frameworks to include subjects and perspectives missing from the discipline.
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Introduction  
 
In June 2015, I travelled to Istanbul to attend my first fieldwork trip—a week-long 
event for youth from Yugoslavia’s successor states under the name Youth for Peace.1 This small 
peacebuilding intervention sought to deal with both the legacy and causes of the 1990s wars 
that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The event’s goals were seemingly simple: to 
“raise the future leaders who are respectful towards diversity.”2 I was there because I was 
interested in how these “soft” international interventions in which there is no military and no 
coercion are experienced by participants, in their everyday working. The specific project in 
Istanbul was an international effort between a Turkish and a British university, and it 
specifically targeted young people that I was considering as one of the policy fields I might 
engage for the rest of my fieldwork. Yet, I was also eligible for participation as a young 
person “affected by war.”3  
In this Introduction, I will use my research experience from Youth for Peace to explore 
the trouble with interventions—their aims, their practices, and the ways of studying them— 
because it is precisely these experiences of being intervened upon that are missing from current 
accounts of interventions. In so doing, I will indicate the main questions that the thesis asks 
and why. First, I will situate the issues of the governing intent of these projects and their 
reception within literature on governmentality, the local turn, and ethnographic 
methodologies. I will then summarise the research puzzle and the settings in which I pursued 
it. Finally, the last section of this chapter will illustrate the main argument of the thesis, 
briefly present the structure of the thesis, and introduce some limitations to the questions 
asked.  
I Intent: Intervention, governmentality and the local  
The Youth for Peace event is held every year at the same university in Turkey. It aims 
to showcase “pioneering work in a new age of conflict resolution” and traces its origin to “the 
idea of dissecting the roots of prejudice and bringing together communities, that have 
historically experienced conflict from regional dynamics.”4 In 2015, it focused on the theme 
                                               
1 All persons, events, and organisations in the thesis have been anonymised.  
2 Fieldwork journal, Call for Applications for Youth for Peace. 
3 Fieldwork journal, Call for Applications for Youth for Peace. 
4 Fieldwork journal, Call for Applications for Youth for Peace. 
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What Happened to Yugoslavia? Participation was limited to young people between 20 and 30 
years of age from former Yugoslav republics, and it specifically targeted “[c]andidates that 
have first-hand been affected by the conflict or have close family that has [sic] experienced the 
war.”5 The one-day conference invited renowned experts on the region, and it was followed 
by a three-day conflict resolution workshop led by Dr Ben Howard, a United Kingdom 
(UK)-based conflict resolution expert. 
The workshop embodied the types of interventions that this thesis studies: there is no 
military presence, there are no challenges to sovereignty. On the contrary, the 
transformations are supposed to arrive from the bottom up by accomplishing seemingly 
modest goals like individual reconciliation and personal development.  But despite their 
micro targets and humble means, these interventions are paradoxically ambitious—while the 
five days in Istanbul with ordinary youth might seem banal, the aim was nothing less than 
helping regional transformation towards peace imagined as democracy and free markets.  
These types of encounters stand in contrast to the more orthodox understanding of 
international intervention as a coercive interference that has as its aim the prevention of 
atrocities.6 As the Youth for Peace week shows, both scholarship and practice expanded this 
definition significantly in the last decades. Today interventions involve a variety of acts and 
goals: they build peace, states, democracies, and economic development with tools ranging 
from political conditionality to personal skill building. And, as we shall see next, these 
transformations are meant to begin from the subjectivities of participants themselves.  
While the most obvious objective of Youth for Peace was moving beyond conflict by 
educating a new generation of leaders, the workshop also had therapeutic and self-
improvement elements. It specifically invited “youth that was [sic] personally affected by the 
conflict to share their experience and help [them] with analysing the conflict and overcoming 
it through the Workshop.” We were further enticed by a combination of “inspiring speeches, 
panel discussions as well as entrepreneurial talks” to be held at the conference. Moreover, 
the three-day workshop was facilitated by Dr Howard who was to “mentor young leaders 
coming from former Yugoslav countries.” These young leaders, with the help of Dr Howard, 
were to “engage in an interactive, intensive workshop aiming to overcome the dimensions of 
prejudice currently entrenched in regional dynamics.”7 We were obviously doing multiple 
                                               
5 Emphasis in the original. 
6 Welsh, ‘Introduction’, 3. This emphasis on force and coercion are now mostly reserved for debates around 
humanitarian intervention. See the rest of the edited volume for more on this. Welsh, Humanitarian Intervention 
and International Relations. 
7 Fieldwork journal, Call for Applications for Youth for Peace. 
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things at the same time: overcoming prejudice and conflict that we carry as a birth-right from 
“post-conflict” countries (it was unclear whether this prejudice was the cause or the outcome 
of the 1990s wars), we were building entrepreneurial skills and networks that will enable us 
to use them, and we were becoming “the future leaders who are respectful towards diversity.”  
There is a striking idiosyncrasy in the temporal imagination of these goals—we are 
there because we already are the solution, but we are also imagined needing to undertake a 
transformation to be able to become that solution.8 In this transformation, we are supposed to 
shed the shackles of “entrenched prejudice” and become the leaders that we appeared to 
already be in our application forms. We were at the same time treated as both the cause and 
the cure to the quagmire of 1990s wars. In addition to this curious conception of our agency 
in peace-making, the workshop mixed in narratives of entrepreneurship, contacts, 
networking and skills that will enhance our personal future prospects. In the Call for 
Applications, peace seemed to arrive with entrepreneurship; progress with competition in the 
market; and the “good life” in the Balkans with embracing ideals that are seemingly universal.  
This ambiguity of aims points to a more general bewilderment around the goals of 
this comprehensive project that flew us all to a mini-holiday in Istanbul. In the introductory 
session, people listed differing reasons for participation—gaining skills, free holidays, 
learning about different historical perspectives that notoriously diverge in the region’s 
history textbooks, making friends and contacts, exchanging knowledge and ideas, 
developing CVs. In itself, this was not surprising: the notorious “lack of opportunities in the 
region” and the deteriorating economic situation, made both travelling and experiencing new 
styles of education an exciting prospect. 
In my notes after the workshop, I paraphrased the conclusion of our closing 
discussion, “what is the point?” Is it to learn “what happened to Yugoslavia?” and reach 
some objective truth that should guard against repeating the past? Is it to think about how 
not to let it happen again? Are we aiming for skills-building for our professional careers to 
tap into the popular connection between economic development and peace? Is it skills for 
civil society, the regional dear of international donors, that we are supposed to develop and 
thus “build capacity”? Or are we there to holiday in Turkey?  
In trying to figure out the point of the week, it is useful to contextualise the workshop 
within larger narratives of international interventions. Interventions denote a wide range of 
                                               
8 For more on the temporal peculiarities of programs that seek to empower youth, see Eliasoph, Making 
Volunteers, chap. 4. 
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practices, mostly of various Western or Northern organisations and their partners, 
undertaking an array of projects and programs to produce, or fund the production of, peace, 
democracy, and development through political, economic, and social engineering around the 
world.9 Here, I want to emphasise three defining characteristics of intervention that unify 
the existing literature: the agents of intervention, its acts, and its overarching goal.  
In accounts of intervention that are found across peacebuilding, statebuilding, 
democracy promotion, and development literatures, it is implied that the agents of 
intervention are “someone else” than those who are supposed to reap the benefits of the 
intervention.10 This difference is usually understood in nation-state terms: the intervener is 
either a foreign power, or the under-defined “international community.” Even when the 
transformation is supposed to be happening within local actors, like during Youth for Peace, it 
is the international community that needs to act as a catalyst for the desired change. 
Besides the agents of intervention, the second defining feature is the act itself. It is 
understood that the intervention proceeds in what John MacMillan refers to as “discrete 
acts.”11 Such a vision implies practices that are ordered within pre-defined fields of action 
and time. This is why most intervention studies, including my fieldwork in Istanbul, rely on 
specific programs implemented by the international actors described above. Choosing a field 
of action is often the first step of approaching intervention, both in practice and scholarly 
analysis. 
Third, these interventions seemingly have as their goal the promotion of liberalism 
itself. This is captured most clearly in the liberal peace literature that gathers both problem-
solving and critical voices around the project of building peace understood as “democracy, 
rule of law, and market economics.”12 But under these three simple concepts, a spate of aims 
emerge: free elections, transparent institutions, respect for human rights, limited state, a 
functioning and strong civil society, privatisation of public goods and institutions, rollback 
of the welfare state, the deregulation of capital and labour markets, and many more.13 Even 
                                               
9 Throughout the thesis, I will often refer to power-centres as “the West,” even though I realise both the more 
complicated topographies of power that prevent simple geographical division, and the importance of the North-
South division. I do so to reference generally those countries that are usually seen as having the will and the 
skill to intervene, and since in Serbia they are termed “the West,” I also keep this formulation. 
10 For example, even in Audra Mitchell’s definition of intervention as a “wide array of action through which 
humans try to change the trajectories of events by ‘acting into them,’” we are still working within international 
intervention as the title of the book. Mitchell, International Intervention in a Secular Age, 3. 
11 MacMillan, ‘Intervention and the Ordering of the Modern World’, 1041. 
12 Campbell, Chandler, and Sabaratnam, ‘Introduction: The Politics of Liberal Peace’, 1. 
13 Selby, ‘The Myth of Liberal Peace-Building’. 
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though the idea of intervention as a coherent liberal program is contested, as we will discuss 
in Chapter 1, there is a wide understanding that such an idea exists.14  
Youth for Peace then presents one such international intervention. It is imagined as an 
international effort to change local circumstances, as an act it is confined to one week, and its 
specified outcomes should contribute to a liberal transformation of the region. Yet it is offered 
without coercion, involves ordinary people, and it is relatively modest in scope when 
compared to NATO bombings or to organised UN peacekeeping missions.  
In these projects, it has by now become common sense to focus on local individuals—
in this case, the 30 young people that travelled to Istanbul—as both the cause and the cure 
for the problem at hand. The problem, it has become obvious, cannot be easily pin-pointed: 
any peace effort must be supported by economic strengthening, any economic program has 
to consider social characteristics, and every project in the end has to be both accepted and 
enacted in the individuals themselves. Hence such strangely simultaneous targeting of the 
Youth for Peace program as both specific and general: we will share our experiences and heal, 
we will gain skills and thus become economically empowered, we will learn to be more open, 
and we will thus save our region: economically, socially, and politically. Without us, there 
can simply be no change.  
This idea of empowering individuals to take change in their own hands captures what 
is now known in literature as the local turn.15 As top-down interventions proved 
unsustainable and often had negative effects, the local turn emerged as the alternative. If 
interventions failed because the interveners lack the authority to intervene, why not give 
ownership to those who already have the social capital and legitimacy? If interventions fail 
because their international designs are insensitive to specific local contexts, what better 
solution than to transfer the agency of transformation to those having all the context-specific 
skills and knowledge acquired by living there?16 Hence, ideas like participation, 
                                               
14 For example, Selby. In this article, Selby finds agreement on this “liberal” goal and aims of peacebuilding 
across the critical/problem solving divide. However, in the article itself, Selby points out that this is a misleading 
analytical starting point because peacebuilding interventions themselves are a lot less liberal—they are still 
“quasi realist” in that they are shaped by geopolitics and “states, power and strategy within world politics” 
(p.59). I make a reference to liberalism not because I “buy into” the seemingly coherently liberal goals and 
practices of interventions, but because the representative democracy and free markets underpin and were 
presented as the goals of the projects that I observed. Here, I do not examine their “hidden” aims, “illiberal” 
practices, nor “varied” effects—I come back to these in a manner significantly different than that of Selby in 
Chapter 6.   
15 Even though the questioning of such terms as “the local” animates the whole thesis, I refrain from using 
quotation marks around them to ease reading. 
16 Kappler, ‘The Dynamic Local’; MacGinty and Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building’; Richmond, 
‘Peace Formation and Local Infrastructures for Peace’. 
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empowerment, local ownership, and an overall valorisation of the local came to be. Healing 
cannot be accomplished by the interveners coming to Yugoslavia and doing it for us. On the 
contrary, the job of the interveners is to “help us to help ourselves.”  
Besides shifting the conceptualisation of agency away from the international and onto 
the local, this also implies a more general change in the rationality that guides intervention. 
The week in Istanbul was not to only teach us new skills, but to enact a transformation in 
how we relate to ourselves and those around us—it sought to shape us as subjects, to affect 
subjectivity. This explains the wide array of goals that range from helping us overcome 
personal trauma to offering entrepreneurial and business skills—if we thoroughly change as 
people, every aspect of the social life that we make will accordingly transform. It thus 
becomes hard to separate practices of peacebuilding, statebuilding, democracy promotion, 
and development—the expansion of goals and tools to achieve them necessarily blurs the 
lines between different projects that seek to improve the lives of whole populations.17  
This all-encompassing transformation opens up the consideration of interventions as 
pursuits of a particular form of government in the Foucauldian sense—a concern with life 
itself that transcends the boundaries between social, political, and economic spheres 
examined around the concept of governmentality. This “concern for life,” or “government,” 
was the topic that Michel Foucault pursued in his lectures in 1978 and 1979—Security, 
Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics.18  His ideas on government help us make sense 
of “the point” of the Youth for Peace workshop.  
In talking about government, Foucault invoked the basic assumption that all 
government is “economic government.” In this formulation, governing is expanded to include 
governing oneself, others, souls, children, etc. “Economic,” on the other hand, refers to 
government “in the best possible way” and moves from the realm of the household where it 
was the father who governed the family in the best possible way, to the modern state that 
governs its population. In this rendition, “to govern” means to be responsible for every aspect 
of life: welfare, happiness, health, etc., just as the father was responsible for all parts of the 
household.19 With this view, it becomes easier to understand how the Istanbul event was 
concerned with such varied aspects of our lives: mental health, personal values, business 
skills, and career prospects. It was a small illustration of what it means to seek to govern life 
                                               
17 Williams, ‘Development, Intervention, and International Order’; Woodward, ‘The Long Intervention’; Siani-
Davies, International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995.  
18 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population; Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics.  
19 Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, 89–99. 
Katarina Kušić 
 Introduction | 16 
as a whole.  Accordingly, this thesis will use Foucault’s concept of governmentality to inquire 
further in the relationship between interventions and subjectivities they engage. 
Governmentality does not imply only the expansion of the fields of government, but 
it also specifically makes sense of how individuals govern themselves—power here is not 
coercive, but a productive effect that creates subjects within the matrices of permissible 
actions and thought. In its famous formulation, it is the “conduct of conduct.”20 More than 
helping us understand the rationality of these interventions, governmentality then provides 
a specific critique of the local turn that uncovers how the focus on individuals, rather than 
institutions, is a subtler, but a vastly more intrusive tool of intervention. Instead of targeting 
institutions and structures that might bring economic growth and peace, interventions today 
focus on individual behaviours, values, and thoughts of the people who they are supposed to 
be helping.21  The nurturing and empowerment in projects like the one in Istanbul are far 
from the emancipation and freedom of liberal theory: they are moulding subjects to 
voluntarily fit their lives into preconceived ideas about what freedom is. In other words, 
power is still here, but it is a more sophisticated form of liberal discipline that uses the 
subject’s sense of self, rather than institutions, in achieving the goal of governing.  
Governmentality as a form of rule raises two points that will be pursued throughout 
the thesis. First, it emphasises the dangers of practices that seemingly promote freedom and 
emancipation. Despite the recent controversies surrounding Foucault’s own political 
positions, I agree with those who see governmentality primarily as a critique of 
(neo)liberalism.22 A good example is Barbara Cruikshank’s early work on democracy in 
which she showed how empowerment in the form of democratic citizenship is not a solution 
to contemporary problems, but in fact a “strategy of government.” In her account, 
democracy, far from being the best way to organise politics, is a form of government that 
results in a “faceless power” that is impossible to find, or contest, because it is at the same 
time everywhere and nowhere.23 From this Foucauldian perspective then, all action might 
not be bad, but it is definitely dangerous.24  
                                               
20 The phrase was popularised by Gordon's use in The Foucault Effect. Gordon, ‘Governmental Rationality: An 
Introduction’, 2.  
21 A clear formulation can be found in Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, 42. 
22 Here I refer to public debates on the articles that preceded the translation of Zamora, Behrent, and Foucault, 
Foucault and Neoliberalism. 
23 Cruikshank, The Will to Empower, 15. 
24 Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics’. 
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Second, governmentality is ultimately interested in the relationship between 
capitalism and forms of rule—it was developed by Foucault to specifically examine the rise 
of liberal rule, and its transformation under market rationality to neoliberalism. Although 
Foucault wrote against his contemporary Marxists and their reliance on economic 
determinism, neoliberal governmentality is very much based on a market rationality that 
governs conduct.25 As Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval emphasise, this market rationality 
becomes crucial in the way we relate to ourselves—as a personal enterprise, and to others—
always in relation of competition.26 Yet these personal, subjective relations—economisation 
of life itself—are defining features of common political life.27 In the words of Wendy Brown, 
the demos itself is being undone by this neoliberal reason that replaces the political character 
of liberal democracy with an economic one. This eradicates institutions, cultures, and citizens 
needed for both liberal and radical democratic imaginaries.28 
Governmentality thus changes the way we interpret the meaning of the local turn. 
Instead of being a technique of emancipation, the local turn becomes a governmental 
technique that relocates discussion from the political issues of distribution and power, to 
matters of individual behaviour.29 It becomes a part of what James Ferguson has famously 
termed the anti-politics machine.30 Neoliberalism then stops being limited to a culture, 
system, a policy framework, or an ideology. It is seen as a “multi vocal and contradictory 
phenomena” that encompasses both “political discourses about the nature of rule and a set 
of practices that facilitate government of individuals from distance.”31 Thus, using 
                                               
25 Here, I draw on three lectures from Birth of Biopolitics that define the move from liberalism to neoliberalism 
(Lectures Four, Five, and Six). In short, neoliberalism changes the way we understand the market, the state, 
and the subject(s). First, the market does not only limit the state, but becomes its “organising and regulating 
principle” (p. 116). Second, the subject is understood as a bearer of responsibility, rather than rights (I will 
come back to this in Chapter 2). And third, government then is not “a counterpoint […] between society and 
economic processes. It has to intervene on society as such, in its fabric and depth” (p. 145). See note 31 below 
for more on understanding neoliberalism as an ideology, culture, policy, or governmentality.  
26 Dardot and Laval, The New Way of the World, 320. 
27 It is important to note that economisation here does not automatically imply monetization—these different 
spheres of life like family, education, or relationships are not necessarily monetized (even though this is an 
important function of neoliberalism in other spheres), but they are subjected to the model of the market that 
“configures human beings exhaustively as market actors, always, only, and everywhere as homo oeconomicus.”  
Brown, Undoing the Demos, 31. 
28 Brown, Undoing the Demos. 
29 Chandler, ‘“Human-Centred” Development?’ See also the debate between Chandler and Richmond in 
‘Contesting Postliberalism’. 
30 Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine. 
31 Larner, ‘Neo-Liberalism’, 6, 21. She sees neoliberalism as a policy framework, ideology, and governmentality, 
Hilgers distils approaches that see it as a culture, a system, and governmentality, see Hilgers, ‘The Three 
Anthropological Approaches to Neoliberalism’. 
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governmentality to examine these projects allows us to better appreciate interventions that 
blur the lines between economy, society and politics. 
Reading that first encounter of my fieldwork along with governmentality literature 
uncovers important dynamics of projects of peace and development. The agency of change 
is attached firmly to local subjectivities, while the change implies transformation in how those 
subjectivities make the social, political, and economic landscape of the region. The added 
value of Foucauldian governmentality studies here is seeing how these seemingly micro and 
less intrusive techniques function along with increasingly comprehensive views on what 
good life is: visions of economics, politics, and subjective technologies come together in an 
ideal pursued by contemporary interventions. Governmentality helps us pry open the subtle 
techniques that are seemingly devoid of power and function with praise-worthy ideals of 
emancipation, empowerment, and ownership. It is these governmentalised individuals, who 
are supposedly being emancipated, transformed and empowered, that the following pages 
focus on. This approach leads to some of the question that will be tackled subsequently: How 
are the local subjects imagined? How is their transformation supposed to happen? What 
kind of people are they supposed to become and why? Through which practices is the 
transformation encouraged? 
However, my questions do not stop there. Noticeably, all the above questions are 
oriented towards the governing intent—they probe the rationalities of these projects and ask 
how the projects are imagined, advertised, and rationalised. During my time in Istanbul, it 
became obvious that the intent and the reception of governing are intimately connected, but 
vastly different.32 
II Reception: Beyond the local and governmentality 
On the last day of the Youth for Peace week, we were unexpectedly told that we will 
participate in something called Empathy Studio: One question workshop. One of the facilitators 
started by saying that “there was an elephant in the room during the week.” We looked at 
each other confusedly—we had been sharing rooms, meals, transport, exhaustion and 
excitement all week and we did not think it likely that we missed anything. Yet, the facilitator 
spoke with confidence as she was telling us that we will be put in pairs (always from different 
countries) and allowed to ask one question to each other. She elaborated: “There’s an 
elephant in the room that you’ve avoided the whole time, now you’ll have the opportunity to 
                                               
32 I borrow the analytical distinction between intent and reception from Hemment, Youth Politics in Putin’s Russia. 
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ask the question that is the elephant in the room.” The instructions were short, but thorough: 
“We count on you to exercise some self-censorship and not let things get out of control;” 
“there will be no discussion, you can discuss all day after the workshop;” “you will be filmed, 
if you prefer your face not to be filmed, we will film your hands and feet.”33 
Examining the intent of the Empathy Studio would allow me to analyse it as a 
“psychosocial intervention” that is criticised by Vanessa Pupavac and Caroline Hughes.34 It 
would also point to the local as ambiguously positioned as the problem—we bring the 
elephant, and the solution to the problem—only we can get rid of the elephant. 
Governmentality sheds lights on how we are not coerced into new behaviour patterns but 
nurtured into developing them ourselves through self-reflection and devising new ways of 
seeing ourselves and our relations to others.  
However, the critique voiced by my colleagues at the workshop was different. If the 
goal of the workshop was to create a group, the collective anger that this announcement 
provoked proved that we really became one—the dissatisfaction was expressed communally, 
and everyone’s complaints were supported by this group dynamic. To explore these 
critiques, the thesis moves beyond governing intention and delves in the reception of these 
interventions to complicate and build onto these relatively straightforward readings.  
The idea of the local as separated from the logics of governing was challenged when 
participants who studied psychology emphasised that it is dangerous to uncover possible 
traumas and then not offer the time or the expertise to deal with them. For a moment, the 
binary dynamic of the unskilled local helped by international experts was overturned. The 
conceptualisations of us as beneficiaries were questioned. Participants protested that “they 
did not apply for a ‘healing process’” and compared the exercise to rehab programs that they 
found insulting. The economic rationalities were both practiced and resisted. Some 
denounced the marketing goals and pronounced that they will not allow themselves to be 
used as marketing props. At the same time, others looked forward to adding the resulting 
video as a line in their entrepreneurial CVs. Moreover, the ways that we were imagined as 
“Balkan subjects” of peacebuilding were probed: do they assume that we spent a week 
together while secretly hating each other? Do they expect us to attack each other if only 
given a chance? Someone shortly summarized the feeling: “I don’t think that we have been 
dealing with the Balkans, but with the discourse on the Balkans. None of us feel very 
                                               
33 Fieldwork journal. 
34 Hughes and Pupavac, ‘Framing Post-Conflict Societies’; Pupavac, ‘Securing the Community?’ 
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Balkan.”35 The comment captures the problem well. It was obvious that the images of the 
local and the design for its transformation were present, but none of us “felt very local.” 
These challenges require thinking further about the local in interventions and the 
ways that governmentality literature allows us to deal with the local turn. The literature on 
the local turn and its categories did not help me make sense of the experiences that I 
encountered. The first difficulty was defining and specifying what/who the local is.36 Oliver 
Richmond, for example, qualifies the concept with the label “local-local”37 or what Gearoid 
Millar calls the “non-elite local.”38 These, “more real” locals, instead of buying into the 
intervention’s discourse, experience its consequences without necessarily supporting its 
aims. In Istanbul, these distinctions were not so clear-cut—we obviously all supported peace, 
but the visions of what that peace might look like differed greatly. Similarly, there were 
obvious differences in our positionalities, but it was impossible to create a hierarchy of 
“elitism” that would take into consideration class differences, religious identities, sexual 
orientations, or ethnicities and nationalities that we had to fit in.  
A rich literature has already uncovered the problematic uses of the local—that it is 
binary, essentialist, and static; depoliticised and romanticised; and it serves as an apologia 
for the failures of interventions.39 Taking these critiques into account, Séverine Autesserre 
states that all micro approaches are connected by their aim to “look at peacekeeping 
processes beyond international, national or capital-based dynamics.”40 In this view then, the 
local might be interpreted as that which is not the international, national, nor directly part 
of global capitalism. My fellow participants, however, did not consider themselves separated 
from the international, and even in the cases in which they did, they evaluated this separation 
as a problem to be resolved, not an identity marker to work with.  
Governmentality was similarly complicated. What I interpreted as a neoliberal focus 
on the local through governmental techniques was problematised from the introduction 
session onward. Many people there were obviously not “buying into” these discourses of 
reconciliation and entrepreneurship, they were there for the free flight or to smoke shisha in 
cafés. Other people were already oriented towards the goals we were supposed to be 
transforming to. Some were there specifically for the promised contacts and networks, well 
                                               
35 Comment by one of the participants in a group conversation about the Empathy Studio.  
36 MacGinty and Richmond, ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building’, 769. 
37 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace; Richmond, ‘Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism’. 
38 Millar, An Ethnographic Approach to Peacebuilding. 
39 Paffenholz, ‘Unpacking the Local Turn in Peacebuilding’; Kappler, ‘The Dynamic Local’; Nadarajah and 
Rampton, ‘The Limits of Hybridity’; Chandler, ‘Race, Culture and Civil Society’. 
40 Autesserre, ‘Going Micro’, 492. 
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versed in the market rationality that we were being taught. Others were explicitly leftist and 
came prepared for deflecting these narratives and pursuing their own agendas—thus 
developing their politics through supposedly anti-political practices of civil society and 
entrepreneurship. Many were engaged in civil societies in their home countries and came to 
seek very specific skills. Moreover, everyone was aware that the skills that they were 
learning might not work back home where connections, nepotism, and party affiliation 
matter more than CVs and well-developed entrepreneurial selves. In all these different 
experiences, it was obvious to us that none of us were going to leave the workshop as well 
functioning homo oeconomicus described in governmentality studies.  
These observations pointed to larger debates within governmentality studies in 
International Relations (IR). As governmentality was increasingly used to explain 
international politics, a number of critics like Jan Selby, David Chandler, and Jonathan 
Joseph started questioning such appropriation of the concept that Foucault developed 
primarily while investigating domestic matters.41  In addressing their critique, Wanda Vrasti 
summarises it in three points. First, they argue that governmentality cannot be simply “scaled 
up.” Second, governmentality cannot “work” in spaces that are not governed by advanced 
liberal rule. And third, they raise the point that by a focus on freedom used in governing, 
governmentality studies lose sight of imperialism and constraints that are still present in 
international politics.42  
These theoretical critiques fit my empirical observations—while the practices I 
witnessed in Istanbul might mean something for the domestic order, those practices and their 
effects cannot be directly applied to the international. We might change our “home societies” 
upon return, but does this change anything between Serbia as a state and states that make 
the “international community”? Moreover, it was obvious that even if we are transformed by 
our experiences in Istanbul, we are going home to societies that do not function as advanced 
liberal democracies described by scholars of governmentality. While the practices I observed 
in Istanbul might be neoliberal governmentality of international peacebuilding and 
statebuilding, by going back into societies lacking democracy we are inevitably going back 
to “something else.”  
This thesis is animated by these tensions: what can this discrepancy between intent 
and reception tell us about intervention? Is it a case of a simple failure? Is there more to 
                                               
41 Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault’; Chandler, ‘Globalising Foucault’; Joseph, ‘What Can Governmentality Do for 
IR?’; Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’; Joseph, ‘Governmentality of What?’ 
42 Vrasti, ‘Universal but Not Truly “Global”’, 50. 
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governmentality than “depoliticisation”? Are there wider effects that go beyond what is 
intended? Is governmentality “defeated” if we arrive thinking about holidays instead of 
improving ourselves? Is it somehow different if we are already implicated in global 
neoliberalism by participating in a professionalised civil society? Is it somehow overrun if 
our flexible citizenship is vanquished in an encounter with corrupt bureaucracies in our 
home countries? How are these experiences of a governmental local turn related to the 
rationalities I found in the application forms and program descriptions? And perhaps most 
importantly, if I am to make sense of these experiences, where exactly do I have to look when 
the intervention rationale does not provide any answers that fit? 
III Subjectivity and ethnography as methodology 
In exploring these problematisations of the local and its governmentality 
interpretations, I use an ethnographic orientation toward experience. In trying to access the 
experiences of interventions that are usually neglected, ethnography comes out as especially 
useful. It is “grounded,” able to appreciate the experiential, and oriented towards those who 
are usually erased from the study of world politics. Contrary to approaches that study 
interveners themselves or the governmental rationalities that they promote, what brought 
me to Istanbul was a desire to go beyond the intent of government and consider its 
reception.43 In the vocabulary of governmentality studies, I did not seek to inquire into the 
political rationality that shapes subjectivities, but how subjectivities experience the practices 
of that rule.  
Ethnography here responds to a particular problem in intervention scholarship—lack 
of engagement with the experiences of those targeted by projects that seek to improve and 
transform. In her evaluation of liberal peace critiques, Meera Sabaratnam emphasises the 
importance of a more general change in who the subjects of IR are.44 She argues that while 
the critics of intervention and the local turn proliferate, these scathing critiques of 
interventions still ignore the targets of these projects: by analytically and methodologically 
bypassing them; and by casting them as ontologically different. Put simply, in the efforts to 
unearth the violence committed by (neo)liberal ideologies and global capitalism during 
                                               
43 Here I join a number of ethnographers who have similarly explored governmentality in various state and 
international intervention: Li, The Will to Improve; Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine; Hemment, Youth Politics 
in Putin’s Russia.  
44 Sabaratnam, ‘IR in Dialogue … but Can We Change the Subjects?’ 
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interventions, these critiques once more erase the local subjecthood under the weight of 
political economy or powerful discourses of liberal peace.45  Subjects become mere “mute 
objects or data points.”46 
In her latest work, Sabaratnam proposes to ameliorate these problems by 
decolonising intervention. The exclusion of the voices of the targets of intervention is not 
accidental, “but [is] emblematic of diverse forms of intellectual Eurocentrism within 
scholarly research.”47 This Eurocentric orientation of intervention scholarship obscures, 
avoids, and erases the target subjects of interventions.48 They are seen as subjects that cannot 
“generate their own meaningful terms of engagement with interveners, nor critically evaluate 
the problems of modernity and development.”49 This critique might seem paradoxical after 
the local turn—at a time where both the problem and the solution to the world’s problems 
are located in individuals, Sabaratnam’s work highlights how the subjecthood of precisely 
those individuals is erased. While these erasures will be further investigated in Chapter 1, 
for now it is enough to point out that there are no Bosnians in David Chandler’s critique of 
European Union’s (EU’s) involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), there are no 
subjects in Milja Kurki’s interpretation of EU democracy promotion as governmentality, and 
the sociological turn in intervention scholarship refers to the sociology of the interveners, not 
those intervened upon.50   
In response, Sabaratnam’s book “builds an alternative explanation of the 
international phenomenon of intervention upwards from the experiences, interpretations and 
historical conditions of these targets.”51 This thesis builds on that project and uses 
ethnography as a starting point for theorising from the experiences of subjects who are 
supposed to reap the benefits of interventions.  
The rationale for starting from the experiences of those targeted by interventions is 
then twofold.52 First, it is a political move to include the voices that are usually erased. This 
                                               
45 Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism’. 
46 Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention, 17. 
47 Sabaratnam, 6. 
48 Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention; Sabaratnam, ‘IR in Dialogue … but Can We Change the Subjects?’; 
Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism’. 
49 Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention, 23. She identifies five specific avatars of Eurocentrism as it relates to 
the targets of interventions. See p. 23-34, and also Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism’. 
50 Chandler, Empire in Denial; Chandler, Bosnia; Kurki, ‘Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion’; 
Goetze, The Distinction of Peace. 
51 Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention, 6. 
52 Sabaratnam makes similar points when she talks about her objectives when including the targets: one is the 
need for “recognition and humanisation” and the other is an “intellectual and analytic” aim. Sabaratnam, 43. 
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decolonial dimension refers to creating space for engagement with different subjects of IR 
that are erased in scholarship—those who are targeted by, rather than those who launch, 
international interventions. This move works towards “recognition and humanisation” of the 
subjects of intervention.53 And second, it is a methodological and analytical project of 
incorporating the study of subjectivities—those that are usually seen as mundane and 
everyday—into IR.54 My own approach seeks to start from people’s “critical evaluations” and 
explore effects of intervention as experienced beyond civil society, and party and 
institutional politics. To do so, this thesis is not concerned with adding ethnographic detail 
to the usual subjects of IR like the military, diplomats, or security discourses.55 Nor is it 
concerned with adding ethnographic details to the lives of the interveners, as has been done 
exceptionally well in development;56 humanitarianism;57 and peacebuilding.58  It takes a 
different direction: instead of researching the everyday of the high politics of the 
international, the thesis examines how the international is present in the local everyday. 
Contrary to those who argue for the separation of governmentality from 
ethnography, I see ethnography as complementary to studies of governmentality. Foucault 
famously removed himself from the “witches brew” of governing in “real life” (in the prison) 
and focused on political rationalities, rather than actual practices of government and their 
effects in real life.59 This tension will be addressed in Chapter 2, but I broadly follow Tania 
Li’s insistence on including practice into governmentality research.60 Ethnography starts 
from experiences (as opposed to political rationalities) and complicates any idea of a smooth 
operation of power as a one-directional creation of subjects—thus proving useful not only 
for approaching local experiences, but also as a counter-balance to governmentality studies 
that usually stay out of the “witches brew” of real life. 
                                               
53 Sabaratnam, 43. 
54 This project of theorising from “the everyday” is already underway in IR. For example, see the forum in 
International Political Sociology: Guillaume, ‘Forum: The International as an Everyday Practice’. However, in 
my own work I do not try to theorise the everyday itself, as is the case with the literature inspired by Michel 
de Certeau’ The Practice of Everyday Life. For an example of such work, see the recent PhD dissertation de 
Figueiredo Summa, ‘Enacting Everyday Boundaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. 
55 Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases; Neumann, At Home with the Diplomats; Cohn, ‘Motives and Methods’; Cohn, 
‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals’. 
56 This sub-literature is known as aidnographies, it was first popularised by Mosse, Cultivating Development; 
Lewis and Mosse, Development Brokers and Translators. See also Mosse, Adventures in Aidland; Mosse, ‘The 
Anthropology of International Development’; In Eastern Europe, Wedel has done most important work on 
that flows of ideas and money through what she calls brokers, see Wedel, ‘“Studying Through” a Globalizing 
World’; Wedel, Collision and Collusion. 
57 Malkki, The Need to Help. 
58 Autesserre, Peaceland; Goetze, The Distinction of Peace. 
59 Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, 81–82. 
60 Li, ‘Governmentality’; Li, ‘Beyond “The State” and Failed Schemes’. 
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With these limitations of the local turn literature and governmentality studies, an 
ethnographic focus on lived experience of the targets of intervention becomes a fruitful field 
of study. What can the expectations of my colleagues in Istanbul tell us about how 
interventions are practiced? What can they tell us about transformations in the Balkans in 
the past 20 years? What do their experiences in the week tell us about the way that rationality 
of the project approaches the local? What can they tell us about international politics?  
IV Research puzzle and setting 
In short, this thesis aims to learn from those who are supposed to be transformed by 
practices of international intervention—it seeks to change who the subjects of intervention 
scholarship are. Such a reorientation will lead to new analytical insights for the study of 
interventions and IR scholarship more generally. However, before learning from the 
experiences of these subjects, it is also necessary to take stock of the current efforts to 
introduce them to IR and develop new tools that reflectively tackle the problems that might 
arise. Thus, the central research question of the thesis is: How can we approach subjectivities 
targeted by international interventions, and what can we learn by doing so?  
In asking this question, the thesis moves beyond the local turn literature that seeks to 
“employ” the local for the goals of interventions, and it sidesteps governmentality discussions 
that aim to adjudicate what the true rationality of the local turn is. Instead of debating the 
liberal nature of these interventions or the lack thereof, the thesis approaches liberalism 
implicit in projects that seek to modernise and empower as a lived reality observed in the 
field and retold by my interlocutors. It asks how we might re-think the way that we study 
interventions so that we make space for these experiences in our research projects. 
The above definitions of the local enable the argument that focusing on the local 
should be done to recover the sense of subjecthood of the targets; better evaluate the 
intervention itself; or improve it by enabling “more genuine local ownership.”61 My own 
strategy, however, seeks to engage these experiences beyond seeing them as necessarily 
concerned with peace, separated from the regional, national, and international, or divided 
into those who “buy into” and “resist” intervention. In pursuing this research strategy, I 
define local subjectivities as people I encountered during fieldwork who are seen and see 
themselves to be the targets of interventions. Thus, the thesis builds onto recent projects 
                                               
61 Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention; Millar, An Ethnographic Approach to Peacebuilding; Donais, Peacebuilding and 
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which complicate how we think about the local and that try to theorise intervention from the 
bottom up. 
These questions are pursued in two research settings in contemporary Serbia: non-
formal youth education and agricultural governance. Serbia as the location of the study 
emerged from its peculiar position in international politics: from the international pariah 
under the genocidal regime of Slobodan Milošević, through a short spell of democracy 
assistance super-star in the efforts to replace him, to the current positioning between the EU 
and Russia. While it has been targeted by all possible interventions—NATO bombings, 
democracy promotion, development initiatives, and EU integration—it is missing from IR 
studies of the region that focus on the spectacular sovereignty-challenging interventions that 
are unfolding in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).62 Serbia thus provides a space 
in which the agency of the international community is subtle and dispersed, and yet 
omnipresent and constantly discussed in everyday politics.  
The contemporary transformation efforts in Serbia are framed as a “return to 
Europe” and “Europeanisation.” However, while EU membership seems to be the goal 
without an alternative,63 the actors and tools are more diverse. Besides the EU, many political 
foundations, bilateral agreements, international organisations, and hundreds of NGOs 
continue to do the work of the international intervention even in the absence of highly 
concentrated efforts that are thoroughly studied in BiH and Kosovo. While dispersed, the 
desired transformation is all-encompassing. Serbia is said to be in a “triple transition:” an 
economic transition underlined by a belief in free market capitalism, a democratic transition 
toward liberal democracy, and a transition to peace which sees transitional justice and 
reconciliation as it goals.64 Most importantly, while it might not be in international news, the 
efforts to promote peace, democracy, and the free market in Serbia are not absent—the 
following section introduces two fields where transformation is marked by international 
presence and that orient the empirical practice of the thesis.  
                                               
62 For an example of different interventions in the Balkans, see Siani-Davies, International Intervention in the 
Balkans since 1995; Woodward, ‘The Long Intervention’. 
63 The “no alternative” narrative is surprisingly literal. For example: the slogan of the Democratic Party in 2011 
was simply “There is no alternative to Europe/EU” [Evropa nema alternative.] Mikuš deals with this example in 
his PhD thesis on reforms in Serbia, Mikuš, ‘What Reform?’, 89. 
64 The connection between “transition” and subjectivity transformations is explored in Makovicky, 
Neoliberalism, Personhood, and Postsocialism. I will further pursue this issue in Chapter 1. While this seeming 
novelty of the intervention’s concern with local subjectivities will also be somewhat contextualised in Chapter 
1, it is important to note here that in addition to political, analytical, and methodological reasons to starting 
from subjectivities, subjectivities also emerge from the policies of interventions themselves. 
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i. Policy sites as fields  
The thesis focuses on two particular fields, non-formal education (NFE) and 
agricultural governance, that act as settings for my research. An alternative to choosing 
policy fields would have been focusing on particular projects or donors. This, however, 
would entail remaining faithful to intervention’s conceptual limitations: what the donors 
deem important and what they choose to turn into projects. A view of these fields allowed 
me to track experiences as they are made in the intersection of many actors and issues, and 
at times complicated even my own idea of what the site is. 65  
The reasoning for the choice of specific fields is twofold. First, the two fields and their 
seemingly “apolitical” character provide a unique chance to study the less spectacular and 
less researched interventions in local politics. Second, as a project that seeks to complicate 
visions of the local—in both practices and scholarship of intervention—I also wanted to 
depart from the usual categories that the Balkans are placed in: transitional justice, 
democracy support and electoral transformation, EU integration in the form of rule of law, 
or typical civil society studies. 
Non-formal youth education (NFE), in the form of schools on democracy, civic 
rights, human rights, and conflict resolution has become an orthodox tool of “soft” 
interventions. It is situated firmly within the realm of civil society because civil society 
organisations (CSOs) are the providers of NFE, and it offered easy access to local everyday 
experiences through attending workshops and interviewing trainers and participants. This 
allowed me to explore how the supposed beneficiaries of NFE relate to themselves and the 
political life around them.  
While NFE is an area which is firmly in the civil society sphere and has many 
different donors involved, the second area of interest, agricultural policy reform, is state led 
and EU mandated, and presented as an apolitical, developmental project not relating to 
concepts like freedom and democracy. As such, it provides an opportunity to explore 
interventions in a sphere very different from the civil society realm of NFE, but at the same 
time animated by many of the same assumptions of what makes a “transition.” In focusing 
upon this area, I explore how civil servants, CSOs, and producers themselves are imagined 
changing according to ideals of liberal peace and neoliberal subjectivity, and I highlight how 
a focus on experiences of this transformation complicates such readings.  
                                               
65 Even though these two policy sites are the foundation of the thesis’ empirical practice, one of the contributions 
is highlighting the limitations of such understandings of the “field” and the thesis ultimately goes “beyond” 
these fields. I will come back to this in Chapter 6 and in the Conclusion.   
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In taking these fields as sites where I explore the encounters between everyday 
subjectivities and international projects, I follow other works that have similarly studied the 
interaction of the local and the international beyond the usual outcomes and actors. These 
works are scattered across disciplines and they have all provided invaluable input for the 
thesis. Daniela Lai, for example, expanded the common understanding of transitional justice 
in BiH to encompass socio-economic claims and redistribution.66 Another literature discusses 
the politicisation of LGBT and queer identities in relation to EU, and the West more 
generally, exceptionally well. In doing this, it simultaneously works against the idea that EU 
values shape an otherwise shapeless mass and remains attentive enough to its power to 
critique its shortcomings and emphasise real and potential achievements.67 The subfield of 
critical policy studies tends to study the welfare state with particular attention to hierarchies 
of EU/non-EU. A number of authors within it productively engaged with the post-war 
transformations in South East Europe.68 Within transitional justice, Mladen Ostojić 
examined the legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) within Serbian domestic politics, and Jelena Subotić focused on the strategic use of 
international goals and norms within Serbia.69 In anthropology, Stef Jansen and Andrew 
Gilbert contextualised intervention in BiH within longer and wider local dynamics,70 and 
Theodora Vetta and Marek Mikuš minutely examined how democracy promotion in Serbia 
resulted in a very specific form of neoliberal civil society.71 Finally, a rich field of cultural 
studies is grappling with the ways in which the ideal of the EU intersects with local desires 
and contexts to produce what it means to be Balkan, post-Yugoslav, or Serbian.72  
This thesis is a contribution to this project of developing a more nuanced appreciation 
of international efforts in the region without erasing the subjectivities of those whose lives 
are supposed to be transformed in these efforts. At the same time, I also wish to generate 
                                               
66 Lai, ‘Transitional Justice as Redistribution: Socioeconomic (In)Justice and the Limits of International 
Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina’; see also Lai, ‘Transitional Justice and Its Discontents’. 
67 Bilić, ‘Europeanization, LGBT Activism, and Non-Heteronormativity in the Post-Yugoslav Space’; Bilić, 
LGBT Activism and Europeanisation in the Post-Yugoslav Space; Slootmaeckers, ‘The Litmus Test of Pride’; Kulpa, 
‘Western Leveraged Pedagogy of Central and Eastern Europe’. 
68 Lendvai and Stubbs, ‘Assemblages, Translation, and Intermediaries in South East Europe’; Lendvai, 
‘Europeanization of Social Policy?’; Stubbs, ‘Performing Reform in South East Europe’; Deacon and Stubbs, 
Social Policy and International Interventions in South East Europe. 
69 Ostojić, Between Justice and Stability; Subotić, Hijacked Justice. 
70 Jansen, ‘The Privatisation of Home and Hope’; Gilbert, ‘Foreign Authority and the Politics of Impartiality’. 
71 Vetta, ‘Let’s Get Up!’; Mikuš, ‘What Reform?’ 
72 Petrović, Yuropa; Petrović, Mirroring Europe; Volčič, ‘The Notion of “the West” in the Serbian National 
Imaginary’; Greenberg, ‘On the Road to Normal’; Spasić and Petrovic, ‘Varieties of “Third Serbia”’. 
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some wider theoretical implications of the empirical analysis for the study of intervention 
and IR more generally. 
V Thesis argument 
The most visceral illustration of the rationale for an orientation toward experiences 
of intervention came from my own (unavoidable despite my efforts) participation in the 
Empathy Studio exercise. In addition to clarifying the questions of governing and being 
governed that focus the puzzle of this thesis, my time in Istanbul forced me to critically 
approach my own positionality in this project. I was obviously a participant of the event, but 
I was also a researcher academically approaching these experiences. I did not come 
unprepared: I was aware of the literature on doing “ethnography at home,” I was aware of 
the strange construction of “home” that can turn a Turkish university into “native” terrain, I 
was invited by supervisors to consider how my own positionality might be captured by the 
concept of hybridity. Yet, this workshop was the first time that I actually embodied this 
oscillating identity.  
As I was comfortably lulled into the sounds of my native language during cigarette 
breaks and discussed the familiar smells of Turkish coffee that mark homes across 
Yugoslavia as well, I felt at home. As we shyly asked each other where we spent the war 
years, it was obvious that I share many concerns and experiences with my colleague 
participants. Yet, as the discussions started, I began taking notes in English on my laptop. 
In asking for everyone’s participation consent, my foreignness was pried open by questions 
about funding and scholarships that allowed me to travel from a Hungarian based MA to a 
UK PhD. More than anything, in discussing consent forms and my methodology with Dr 
Howard who facilitated the workshop, I automatically felt different: when asking about 
papers, ethics, and conferences, he did not look at me as a participant or a local peace agent 
anymore, but instead as a British-based colleague.  
Perhaps luckily, for the Empathy Studio exercise I was paired with a very young and 
easy-going Bosniak man. He thoroughly enjoyed the week and made this very clear at the 
closing session. He did not feel he needed any specific healing, but he also did not feel 
particularly insulted by the “elephant in the room” narrative. Writing this almost three years 
later, it is obvious that I should have known that nothing bad or uncomfortable will 
happen—Edin was an easy-going guy and his question followed this. Yet, I did not know 
this when I stepped in the small classroom turned into a recording studio. As I sat down, 
facing Edin in the middle of the multiple-person filming crew, I felt trapped by the gaze of 
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several lights and cameras. The discomfort persisted even after they turned the cameras to 
film only our hands upon my request. Dr Howard came in and leisurely leaned on the door 
frame. He did not come into any other sessions and I felt observed—is this how everyone 
else felt as I took notes throughout the week? As possible questions raced through my mind, 
I was completely unable to separate myself from the expectations that others might have of 
me: is this the time to inhabit my role as a “war affected” individual? Is this the time to try to 
exercise researcher’s distance? Will Dr Howard think that I am “too local” and doubt my 
methodology if I become too emotional? Or will he consider me a transnational academic 
and negate my home attachments if I ask a question that is boring and removed from the 
post-conflict experience that I am supposed to have? The questions might seem banal, but 
the visceral feeling and the contractions in my stomach were real. It is these issues that 
shaped the questions I asked, my ways of answering them, and the arguments I produced. 
I use this anecdote not only to bring myself into the text as advised by ethnographic 
orientations, but to emphasise the political relevance of the ways that we engage subjects 
that are perceived as local in practices and scholarship of intervention. As I pondered the 
different shades of anger expressed by the group in reaction to the Empathy Studio exercise 
and wondered about my own discomfort at the naturally multiple roles I inhabit, I started 
realising that there is a larger problem with how subjectivities, local subjectivities, are 
engaged by practices and scholarships of intervention. The group anger and my own reaction 
were only a small symptom, a visceral illustration, of a much larger problem. Namely, the 
failure to engage the people targeted in these projects as full, contemporaneous, 
contradictory, and complete subjects of international political and social life.  
In short, the thesis forwards the argument that remaining methodologically and 
analytically faithful to the concept of intervention will always be in tension with efforts to 
learn about and from experiences of everyday people. The discomfort that I felt while being 
filmed for the Empathy Studio exercise stemmed from trying to fit my own subjectivity in the 
concept of “intervention”—I was either the local that needed saving, or a detached 
international scholar. This feeling of confinement, conceptual inadequacy, and even 
epistemic violence continued throughout my fieldwork—not in relation to my own 
experiences that were usually less participatory than that particular session in Istanbul, but 
when trying to make sense of the stories narrated to me by the people I spoke to. Despite the 
recent rush to the local, the concept of intervention reduces the subjects to nothing more 
than the targets of those interventions, even when it tries to grasp their realities and 
experiences. 
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 To make sense of motivations for attending NFE, I had to understand 
unemployment and migration in a “transitional” economy. To understand the seemingly 
irrational policies in agriculture, I had to understand the allure of Europe in a place that is 
continuously denied its European identity. To understand my own discomfort, I had to ask 
what makes me want to preserve my idea of self as a UK PhD student or a child of 
Yugoslavia. I thus looked at people as more than “targets.” They were political subjects, 
navigating intervention at the same time as finding their place in wider global flows and local 
circumstance. To try to understand them, I had to look beyond intervention and treat these 
experiences as political on their own terms.  
Practicing these lessons becomes, ultimately, impossible within the confines of the 
concept of intervention. Thus, the thesis concludes by advocating that we forego the concept 
of “intervention” and instead investigate these dynamics through research focused on politics 
of improvement. I capture the shift in two moves that locate subjects and dislocate intervention. 
First, the clear subject positions between the local and the international that are constitutive 
parts of intervention are replaced by more nuanced positioning—it is true that the position 
of the improver and the improved make the politics of improvement, but these positions respond 
to neither the scales nor the identities of local/international. Engaging subjects, and their 
politics, means trying to move beyond these insufficient heuristic devices. And second, by 
thinking these subjects as coeval with the practices and discourses of intervention we are 
forced to look beyond intervention itself and rethink the way we understand concepts like 
subjectivity, governmentality, or liberalism.  
I then develop the concept politics of improvement through a conversation with the 
work of anthropologist of development Tania Li, and especially her book The Will to Improve. 
In the book, even though the topics include interventions from colonialism to World Bank 
conservation and civil society building efforts, Li does not study intervention, but what she 
calls “improvement schemes”—programmes that are guided by an undying “will to improve” 
the lives of populations, and which are a constant, if ever-changing, feature of political, 
social, economic, and ecological life.73 In her study, she examines the rationalities and effects 
of these schemes not in isolation from one another, but as projects that layer onto each other 
and create multiple positionings that open or close possibilities for practicing politics.  
Politics of improvement emphasise a conceptual shift from intervention to politics of 
improvement: even though they are underpinned by the same teleological ideas of progress 
                                               
73 Li, The Will to Improve, 7-12. 
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and history, improvement schemes are not seen as being constituted by the inside/outside of 
nation-states, nor are they discrete acts that necessarily lead to liberal rule. In so doing, I am 
not advocating only a fuller appreciation of the rich encounters guided by the mission of 
improvement. International interventions, understood as discrete acts of varying levels of 
coercion and interference, are indeed the main way that politics of improvement are 
currently conducted. However, I want to push to look at their blurry margins and beyond. 
This kind of empirical opening is already underway with scholars of intervention studying 
land politics, cultural practices, and everyday lives.74 Nevertheless, I fear that introducing 
these “new” areas in existing frameworks will once again reduce their complexity to well-
established parsimonies that limit how we understand agents, acts, and effects of these 
projects. 
i. Chapter outline 
The thesis proceeds in three parts that relate to the central question of how to 
approach local subjectivities in interventions, and what we might learn by doing so. Part I 
sets out the problem and my way of navigating it; Part II explores how subjectivities are 
connected to interventions in two fields: non-formal youth education and agricultural 
governance; and Part III employs the discoveries from Part II as prompts for a more 
fundamental rethinking of analytical concepts and methodological frameworks. 
Part I emphasises why we should seek to engage these subjects and highlights some 
limits to approaches that have tried to do so thus far. In response, it develops my own 
framework for doing so. 
Chapter 1 dives into the connection between subjectivities and interventions as a form 
of rule by reviewing the turn to localism that has marked both the practice and scholarship 
on interventions. It situates the focus on the local in interventions within a longer overview 
of the connection between subjectivity and power. Subjectivity here is seen as constitutive of 
and constituted by forms of rule. In doing so, the chapter raises the stakes of the research 
question—asking questions from the experiences of those that are supposed to benefit from 
interventions does not tell us only things about practices and logics of interventions, but more 
generally about how forms of rule are connected to everyday lives.  In reviewing literatures 
that increasingly aim to “bring back the local,” the chapter raises two issues of 
conceptualising local agency: that of the location of political agency that is often placed on 
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the side of the international and removed from the local realm; and the interconnectedness 
of that political agency with international power.  
These two issues are a starting point for Chapter 2 which presents a framework that 
seeks to locate political agency with the targets of interventions, while avoiding romanticising 
it or treating it as separated or bounded from the international. While governmentality is 
used to explore the connection between forms of government and subjectivities, 
ethnographic methodology is utilised to inquire into the subjectivity side of governmentality 
(as opposed to the usual focus on political rationalities). The meeting point of these two 
literatures is presented as an invitation for a more fluid methodology presented at the end of 
Chapter 2. This methodology understands ethnography through two issues. First, it pays 
special attention to the tools for generating knowledge—the researcher herself, and the 
frameworks, methods, and concepts she uses. And second, it is oriented towards the world 
as it is made in meaning, and structures that might be underwriting that meaning. 
After Part I focused on why and how to engage local subjectivities, Part II goes on to 
practice this framework in two fields and asks what is brought into view with this new 
approach that focuses on subjectivities. After Chapter 3 shortly provides historical context 
for a study in Serbia, Chapters 4 and 5 ask how subjectivities engage interventions in the 
form of non-formal youth education and agricultural governance.  
Chapter 4 shows how youth in Serbia are not just governed towards neoliberal ideals 
of entrepreneurship, a liberal civil society, and economism, but how youth actively navigate 
non-formal youth education as part of the political economy of unemployment. However, 
the chapter avoids this question of intentionality—whether my interlocutors “buy into” or 
“strategically manoeuvre” within neoliberal rationalities. On the contrary, the chapter uses 
governmentality as a tool to learn about government precisely from this ambiguity; namely, 
how government in Serbia connects to international flows and blurs the lines between state 
and civil society, freedom and constraint, governmentality and politics. 
Chapter 5 focuses on different fields of visibility—namely the restrictions that 
translate from the choice of concepts to our empirical practice. By following the experiences 
of different subjects in agricultural governance, the chapter delves into the field of 
agricultural land governance which is at the same time framed by narratives of intervention, 
and officially outside the realm of EU involvement. In doing so, the chapter points to two 
things further discussed in Part III: it demonstrates the limitations of the concept of 
intervention—i.e. land that remains out of sight of traditional intervention scholarship, and 
it uncovers different forms of power and subject positions that exist within this field. 
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Even though Part II presents the thesis’ empirical practice, analytical arguments are 
developed through this empirical engagement. In accordance with my definition of 
ethnography as a reflexive practice, Part II remains in constant oscillation between 
expectations of my frameworks and concepts, and the stories I encountered in fieldwork. 
These reflections form the basis of Part III which steps out of the field to develop these 
analytical arguments further. In doing so, it answers the question of what we can learn from 
engaging the subjectivities of those who are supposed to reap the benefits of international 
interventions.  
This approach does more than add empirical detail to the two fields under study. 
There are three disruptions highlighted in Chapter 6: the empirical practice of Part II 
uncovers subject position, forms of power, and fields of visibility that go beyond those 
imagined by concepts such as intervention or liberal governmentality. The thesis sees subjects 
who are supposed to be empowered, but also those who are expected to silently disappear. 
The power that engages them is sometimes nurturing and dispersed, but at other times 
coercive and violent. And the fields in which these experiences are made far transcend the 
narrow fields of action described in program documents and policies.  
These disruptions are distilled through two methodological and analytical 
discussions: the tension between experiential and structural critiques, and the appearance of 
liberalism as a coherent rule promoted where it is lacking. The two discussions are pushed 
forward by a rethinking of scale. The thesis argues for considering scale as identity, a level 
of power operation, and as a feature of explanatory frameworks. Such reconceptualisation 
allows me to advocate for continual oscillation between fieldwork and theory, structure and 
experience, answers and surprises. Moreover, such a conception builds on critiques of 
liberalism and decolonial thought that emphasise that liberalism always works through 
heterogeneity despite its assertion of universality.75 This calls for a critique that would remain 
attentive to both experiences and structures, and that would approach liberalism as a lived 
reality that depends on naturalising dichotomies like local/international and liberal/illiberal. 
We can then learn about global politics by listening to everyday stories, and we can better 
comprehend the importance of international politics as they make and are made in everyday 
lives and subjectivities. The global stops being a simple amalgamation of localities, and the 
local is not reduced to a vernacularization of global processes. In the world we study they 
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“call each other into being” as they orient both everyday practice and “high” politics.76 And 
in our scholarship, they invite us to think big while trying to understand global politics, and 
practice humility while trying to remain faithful to our interlocutors 
Finally, Chapter 6 argues that the concept of intervention itself stands at the heart of 
our analytical problems: it essentialises conceptions of local and international and it occludes 
the coevalness of spaces and processes. Instead, it suggests politics of improvement as a concept 
through which to approach these programs, agents, and practices that seek to promote peace, 
development, and democracy around the world. Instead of depending on fixed positions, we 
locate a multiplicity of subjects that are coeval and invite us to think about the various 
threads that join them across scales and locations.  
The Conclusion once again reviews the work presented in the thesis and connects it 
to specific literatures. The thesis answers the question we started with by arguing that we 
can approach subjectivities of those intervened upon through an ethnographic exploration 
of the connection between subjectivity and forms of rule—locating them as political subjects. 
From there, it shows that such a practice ultimately leads to dislocating intervention itself. 
However, because its methodology emphasises reflexivity during knowledge production, a 
series of arguments is developed in the background of the thesis: what it means to centre on 
subjectivity in IR, how we might start to reconsider the way we approach liberalism, how to 
reconcile expectations of ethnography and other methodological recipes with their use in the 
field, and how to think about the Balkan region differently with insights of colonial and post-
colonial thought. These reflections and arguments are presented in the conclusion. 
Before moving to politics of improvement in Chapter 6, the majority of the thesis 
proceeds with the language of intervention: there are donors, targets, project goals, time-
frames, and rationalities. I have kept this language because it was this language and the 
relationship between subjects and intervention that motivated the project. Yet, in Chapter 6, I 
do not re-fashion intervention to make space for the people I spoke to, but I argue that the 
connection between the lives of those improved and the agents, rationalities, and practices 
of improvement cannot be understood through intervention defined as specific acts through 
which “international agents” promote liberal ideals. In doing so, I use excesses and 
disruptions that we face in such radical opening as a base for a more fundamental, and 
perhaps less conclusive, rethinking of the analytical and methodological tools that we use to 
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Katarina Kušić 
 Introduction | 36 
study international politics. This argument, if persuasive, may have important implications 
for how we study and engage intervention in IR, and beyond it. 
ii. Scope of the project 
It is important to note the scope of the project and shortly discuss what the thesis does 
not do. First of all, unlike many critics of international intervention, I am not trying to uncover 
or define their true nature: whether it is an imperial plot or a benevolent desire to develop. 
This would require exploring the intervention and the interveners more—a project tackled 
by many and producing a spate of works that unpack, define, and problematise 
interventions.77  The thesis does, however, touch upon the nature of rule in those countries 
doing the intervention simply because every student of intervention always writes two 
stories: one about the accomplished West that does the intervention and is the holder of 
peace, development, and democracy, and the other about “the Rest” that is devoid of these 
things and needs help getting there.78 In efforts to diagnose what “goes wrong” in the Rest, 
we are necessarily upholding the image of the West where things are “right.” In my own 
effort to step away from both the teleological narratives and the diagnoses which they enable, 
I also write a different story about the West, liberalism, and the interventions that it 
practices.79  
Along with moving away from focusing on true intentions, I also move away from 
trying to determine whether a particular intervention is a success or a failure. This too would 
require me to submit to the intervention’s definition of success/failure, something that I 
consciously write against. Recently, Gearoid Millar developed a thorough ethnographic 
methodology for evaluating peacebuilding missions.80 While providing important insights 
into the dynamics of intervention and powerfully arguing for a more holistic and immersive 
approach to studying them, his framework remains limited by the parameters given by the 
intervention itself—and remaining within these parameters once more excludes those already 
absent from them.  
                                               
77 The literature is too vast to cover. For a selection from different fields, see Kurki, Democratic Futures; 
Heathershaw, ‘Unpacking the Liberal Peace’; Mitchell, International Intervention in a Secular Age; Escobar, 
Encountering Development. 
78 I borrow the formulation from Sadiki’s discussion of knowledge production in the study of democratic 
transitions. Sadiki, ‘Towards a “Democratic Knowledge” Turn?’, 710. 
79 An additional caveat is due in my approach to liberalism. In my approach to lived liberalism, I draw from 
others who have explored it theoretically, but stay away from treating it that way myself and instead approach 
it as a lived reality that animates my puzzle. Some works that have provided thorough critical appraisals of 
liberalism are Hindess, ‘Liberalism – What’s in a Name?’; Jahn, Liberal Internationalism; Povinelli, Economies of 
Abandonment; Barkawi and Laffey, Democracy, Liberalism, and War. Moreover, I read Foucault’s work on 
governmentality as a critique of liberal and neoliberal reason.  
80 Millar, An Ethnographic Approach to Peacebuilding.  
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It is precisely the desire to stay free of the parameters of the intervention that brings 
me to my final point of restraint when it comes to policy prescriptions. While engaging with 
the local turn literature and designing a methodological framework that might enable us to 
learn more from local experiences, I stay away from offering advice: I am not interested in 
figuring out how to do interventions, or local ownership, “better.” Following Li, I recognise 
that the jobs of a critic and a programmer are necessarily different: a programmer has to 
think within the parameters of the possible which are set by the powers at play, while the 
critic can focus precisely on the construction and effects of those parameters. While 
“programming demands closure” that allows one to focus on a particular issue and possible 
solution, critique depends on “openings.”81 As will become clearer in the following chapters, 
the scholar’s desire to study intervention requires similar closures. It is precisely against these 
closures that this thesis is written. If anything, I would argue for letting go of the idea that 
we always have advice to offer—the hubris that makes things doable and expertise 
practicable needs to be contained if we seek to not just help others, but to produce knowledge 
with them democratically.82  
 
                                               
81 Li, ‘Social Reproduction, Situated Politics, and The Will to Improve’, 116.  
82 I borrow the idea of a democratic knowledge production from Sadiki, ‘Towards a “Democratic Knowledge” 
Turn?’ 
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Chapter 1 
 Finding the Local in Interventions 
 
The global project of helping those lacking peace, democracy, and progress has 
fractured into an array of fields: democracy promotion, statebuilding, nation-building, 
peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, and sustainable development, to name just a few. 
Each functions with its own best practice, issues, and criticisms, yet they have all recently 
found the local—whether in the form of civil society or the individual—as both the site and 
instrument of change. This chapter examines the role that local subjectivities have in 
practices and scholarship of intervention. It engages with what development studies have 
termed “the valorisation of the local” and the literature that has become known as the local 
turn in IR. Before moving on to Chapter 2 that develops my own framework for approaching 
local subjectivities in international interventions, this chapter takes stock of approaches that 
have sought to do so thus far, and reviews some of their limitations to anticipate the tensions 
that will inevitably arise in my own empirical practice. 
The first part will track the seeming “downward movement” of interventions that 
used to focus on structural adjustment and institution building, but nowadays look at 
behavioural economics and individual choices. More than just looking at it in practice 
through concepts of local ownership, partnership, and participation, this part of the chapter 
will also trace how this turn to localism played out within the concepts of the everyday, 
hybridity, and friction that were developed to jostle the binaries of local-international, and 
“bring back” local agencies after an excessive focus on the international. 
The second part of the chapter will complicate these moves. Firstly, it will question 
the self-proclaimed transformation “downwards” by uncovering the continuity, rather than 
disjuncture, in the ways that different forms of government have historically engaged with 
imagining the local as the subject of government. This transcends looking at the local as 
either a tool or an obstacle of progress and sees it as crucial for any design of government. 
Secondly, without dismissing the contributions of concepts like hybridity and friction, this 
section will also highlight the limits they encounter and that animate the methodology to be 
presented in Chapter 2. Finally, the last part of the chapter will examine some ways that the 
Serbian local has been imagined by introducing critical studies of Balkanism and existing 
literature on interventions in the region. 
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I The local from colonialism to intervention 
Recent years have witnessed a proliferation of “localised, empirical and inductive 
approaches”1 to both practicing and studying interventions. Writing as early as 2000 within 
development studies, Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke have both identified and critically 
appraised what they read as “valorising the local over the general.” This move downwards 
worked within both “new” Right and “new” Left approaches to development—the “new” 
Right realised that supporting markets is not enough and became aware of the “cultural 
underpinnings” of the development processes, while the “new” Left emphasised the 
potentials of grassroots identity politics and radical democracy that would at the same time 
move away from Marxist economic reductionism and provide an alternative to mainstream 
(neoliberal) models of development.2 As such, the turn to localism became attractive across 
political divides. Moreover, it united policy and scholarship of interventions as both 
converge on emphasising the importance of the local over then general.  
i. Finding the local in practice 
This downward move is perhaps best captured in Oliver Richmond’s four 
generations of peacebuilding: the first generation aimed for a negative peace and did not 
concern itself with much more than the state; the second generation more idealistically 
conceived of a civil peace that would resolve the political, economic, and social issues that 
led to conflict in the first place; the third generation embraced the “grassroots” and “bottom 
up” approaches and included concerns for democratisation, human rights, and economic 
reform; and the fourth generation, coming out of the critiques of the liberal peace approach 
of the previous generation, finally descended into the everyday, concerning itself with 
creating hybrid subjectivities that would usher in a new, post-Westphalian peace.3  
In this move, the local did not just receive attention, but it also changed in quality. 
While it was often seen as the source of conflict, peacebuilding projects have also moved from 
this idea of the local as a spoiler of international designs, to valuing it as a tool. The works of 
Paul Lederach and Elise Boulding have popularized the idea that the micro-practices of the 
local and the everyday have a specific quality and indispensable potential for peacebuilding 
                                               
1 Mohan and Stokke, ‘The Dangers of Localism’, 242. 
2 Mohan and Stokke, 249, 255. 
3 Richmond, Peace in International Relations, 99–115. 
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practices.4 Here, the role of the local everyday emerges as a solution, in contrast to previous 
approaches that saw it as a part of the problem. 
Similar moves are discussed in literatures on democracy promotion, development, 
and statebuilding.5 But it is worth emphasising that even in these moves that see the local as 
a solution, the idea of it as a possible source of the problem has not disappeared. The 
difference now is that these problems stem from micro-identities, rather than any 
institutional designs or structural circumstance. This move is captured by Jessica Schmidt 
who observed a shift from conflict studies, which investigated circumstances that lead to 
violence, to peacebuilding, which studies violence as a part of identity.6 These agency-centred 
notions of peace and democracy allowed the rise of therapeutic approaches which seek to re-
socialize faulty individuals and combine easily with the idea that the quotidian and the 
subjective hold the answers for ending war.7 
This valorisation of the local reflected in a growing obsession with concepts like local 
ownership, partnership, participation, civil society, and capacity building. It is usually 
understood that local ownership entered the scene as a direct consequence of the failure of 
the developmental programs in the 1980s and 1990s, the backlash against harsh structural 
adjustments in the 1980s, and failures of democracy promotion in the Middle East in the 
2000s. The fact that it always lacked clear “consistency or substance” did not stop it from 
becoming a staple in interventions around the world.8 While receiving a great deal of 
attention in literatures on statebuilding and peacebuilding as a novel approach, the move to 
local ownership was a continuation of the focus of participation and partnership that 
emerged in development in the 1980s.9 In development, the idea of participation and 
participatory research methods that valorise local knowledge over international expertise 
sought not only to correct the “unsuitable” international designs by privileging local 
knowledge, but they also bridged academia and practice through their focus on the 
                                               
4 Mitchell, ‘Quality/Control’, 1630; Lederach, Preparing for Peace; Lederach, The Moral Imagination; Boulding, 
Cultures of Peace. For another engagement with Lederach's legacy, see Chandler, ‘Peacebuilding and the Politics 
of Non-Linearity’. 
5 Bridoux and Kurki, Democracy Promotion, 67–69; Abrahamsen, ‘African Democracy’, 242; Schmidt, 
‘Democracy Promotion in a Post-Political World’; Schmidt, ‘From Transformation to Reality’, 246; Bliesemann 
de Guevara, ‘Introduction: The Limits of Statebuilding’, 118. 
6 Schmidt, ‘Democracy Promotion in a Post-Political World’, 239. 
7 Schmidt, 239. 
8 Chesterman, ‘Ownership in Theory and in Practice’, 4. 
9 These methods were largely popularised by Robert Chambers. For examples of his work, see Chambers, ‘The 
Origins and Practice of Participatory Rural Appraisal’; Chambers, Rural Development; Chambers, Whose Reality 
Counts? For a review of this literature and its critiques, see Williams, ‘Evaluating Participatory Development’; 
Mohan and Stokke, ‘The Dangers of Localism’. 
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development of participatory research methods.10 Moreover, this move also held 
emancipatory potential that would work against the North-South hierarchies that usually 
determine the relationship between development actors and those in need of development.11   
Local ownership, however, is not the only road to be taken in the rush to the local. 
The underlying logic is also visible in discourses around capacity building, which similarly 
views institutions as not only the products of social contexts, but also productive of those 
contexts.12 As such, building institutions changes individuals, but changing individuals also 
helps build effective and appropriate institutions. The link to capacity building then becomes 
obvious—in order for the locals to own anything, they have to develop capacities to do so.13  
In this development, civil society emerges as a specific site for building those 
capacities.14 Once it was realised that the states that are intervened in are “weak,” “fragile,” 
or “failed,” civil society emerged as a more functional alternative through which to take 
ownership.15 Acknowledging the disparity between a Western-liberal conception of civil 
society and the realities around the world did not stop civil society from becoming a key 
partner for development, peacebuilding, and democracy promotion.16   
The strength of these concepts lies in connecting the “downward moves” described 
above. As Simon Chesterman puts it, they conceptualise “the relationship between actual 
political control and the transformation in mentality.”17 This relationship that connects 
individual subjectivities, or mentality, with political control and transformation, will become 
crucial for both problem solving and critical intervention literatures. Today, it is safe to say 
that the valorisation of localism has become an orthodox dimension of international 
interventions.  
ii. Finding the local in academia 
In 2013, Vivienne Jabri argued that in the peacebuilding literature, “the ‘local’ factor” 
is “subsumed at best and totally negated at worst.”18 This argument is further clarified in the 
work of Meera Sabaratnam that diagnoses critiques of liberal peace with analytical and 
                                               
10 For an analysis of Rural Participatory Appraisal as one such method, see Mohan and Stokke, ‘The Dangers 
of Localism’, 242–44. 
11 Mohan and Stokke, 247, 253. 
12 Donais, Peacebuilding and Local Ownership Post-Conflict Consensus-Building, 26–27. 
13 Wilén, ‘Capacity-Building or Capacity-Taking?’, 341. 
14 For a quick (if somewhat outdated) review of the literature linking civil society (NGOs) and democratisation, 
see Mercer, ‘NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization’. 
15 Verkoren and Leeuwen, ‘Civil Society in Peacebuilding’, 160. 
16 For early reflections, see the edited volume Hann and Dunn, Civil Society Challenging Western Models. 
17 Chesterman, ‘Ownership in Theory and in Practice’, 4. 
18 Jabri, ‘Peacebuilding, the Local and the International’, 3. 
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methodological bypassing of target subjects. She associates analytical bypassing with 
governmentality frameworks that will be discussed in Chapter 2, but methodological 
bypassing is obvious in classic critiques of liberal peace such as Richmond’s Transformation 
of Peace and Chandlers’ International Statebuilding: The rise of Post-Liberal Governance.19 In those 
works, the critique of international efforts implied a methodological choice of centring on 
the “the genealogies, contradictions and trajectories of intellectual traditions associated with 
the ‘West’ as the key object of intellectual concern.” 20 In this approach then, the target 
subjects are rendered simply irrelevant to academic inquiry. Sabaratnam uncovers the same 
tendency in empirical works that condemn both logics and outcomes of international 
interventions.21 While providing piercing critiques of the liberal peace, they nevertheless 
focus on the international efforts to promote it and do not try to engage with the experiences 
of those targeted by those projects.22  
With the realisation of the methodological and analytical privileging of the 
international, the obvious remedy for this absence of local voices is to focus on those who 
have been silenced by both the liberal peace project and its critics.  Similarly to the apparent 
“re-localisation” of intervention practices narrated above, academic literature on 
interventions also recently focused on local input after years of neglect, and is trying to “bring 
local societies back into the scholarly discussion.”23 This “re-localisation” was done in IR 
through concepts of hybridity and friction.  
The concept of hybridity developed by the post-colonial scholar Homi Bhabha has 
been used widely in efforts to re-conceptualise intervention dynamics as an encounter in which 
the local has agency, rather than an imposition of an external agenda on a passive recipient 
or a tabula rasa. 24 The literature nowadays is too vast for the space provided, so I will engage 
with some of its key concepts and authors, and then present critiques that are crucial for 
developing the approach to be presented in Chapter 2.25  
                                               
19 Richmond, The Transformation of Peace; Chandler, International Statebuilding. 
20 Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism’, 263. 
21 Some of the works she criticises are Chandler, Empire in Denial; Chandler, Bosnia; Richmond and Franks, 
Liberal Peace Transitions; Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox; Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War. 
22 Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism’, 264. 
23 Bliesemann de Guevara, ‘Introduction: The Limits of Statebuilding’, 118. 
24 Bhabha, The Location of Culture. 
25 For a genealogy of the concept in the peacebuilding literature, see Graef, Practicing Post-Liberal Peacebuilding, 
chap. 1. For recent engagements, see the edited volume Freedman and Lemay-Hébert, Hybridity. For putting 
it in conversation with hybridity in humanities and social studies, see Nadarajah and Rampton, ‘The Limits of 
Hybridity’, 54–57. 
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Hybridity started in biology, and moved through race studies into cultural theory.26 
In intervention literature, one of the earliest conceptualisations of hybridity is offered by 
Roger MacGinty in his book in which hybridisation is “regarded as a dynamic and complex 
process in which prior-hybridized entities coalesce, conflict, and re-coalesce with other prior-
hybridized entities to produce a context of constant mixing and interchange.”27 This 
definition brings to the fore what are supposed to be two main contributions of thinking with 
hybridity. First, instead of a one-directional process of imposition that results in an 
international design, we see a “dynamic and complex process” which results in “mix” of the 
local and the international. And second, the entities that are in this process, have already 
been hybridized in past encounters and hence the framework should be able to overcome the 
local/international binary that intervention scholarship usually works with. This approach is 
meant to move beyond the problems of overly neat, static, and top down analyses permeating 
more mainstream literature. Moreover, its less coherent reading of liberal peace promises to 
move the critique of intervention “beyond the level of caricature,” while at the same time 
avoiding the “romanticization of local, indigenous, customary, and traditional approaches to 
peacebuilding and development.”28  
Richmond’s work similarly revolves around the concept of hybridity. He focuses on 
post-colonial subjectivities to imagine a hybrid post-liberal peace. In Foucault’s late works 
on the care of self and others, Richmond sees a way of re-politicising the everyday, thus not 
only giving the local “the chance to speak” and avoiding the trap of methodological and 
analytical bypassing, but also making interventionary policies engage with, rather than re-
shape, the other. For him, the attention to the everyday as a source of critical agency marks 
a distinct move: from liberalism’s tendency to governmentalize and depoliticise,29 into post-
liberal forms of peace. In these new forms of peace, “agencies are expressed that contaminate, 
transgress and modify both the international and the local” and “enable political mobilization 
to deal with everyday issues, to build representative institutions and locally resonant forms 
of statehood.”30 He goes on to theorise post-colonial forms of civil society and critical agency, 
formed from social practices and subjugated knowledge, to usher in a new state, a state 
                                               
26 As such, hybridity was a key concept for racializing science and policies of the 19th and 20th centuries. For a 
detailed history, see Young, Colonial Desire. 
27 MacGinty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance, 51. 
28 MacGinty, 3. 
29 Richmond, ‘Foucault and the Paradox of Peace-as-Governance Versus Everyday Agency’, 200–201. 
30 Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’, 669. 
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“accountable to a global and post-colonial civil society, comprising a range of international 
actors working within the liberal peace and a range of international, elite and local—local 
actors exercising critical agency” which also applies to “the international and its institutions, 
which also to some degree are modified by such critical agency.”31 In this body of work, we 
see that including the local as a source of critical agency and resistance leads to hybridity 
that is not only more inclusive, but also more emancipatory. 
As the hybridity literature was based on Bhabha’s concept, another sub-set of 
literature emerged from the readings of Anna Tsing’s Friction: An Ethnography of Global 
Connection.32 Instead of just inquiring into the outcome of the encounter, as hybridity literature 
does, friction literature opens up the process by studying “the complications of peace-building 
and how hybridity occurs, not by focusing on the actors and concepts at either the 
international or local level, but on the friction between them.”33 In some ways, the literature 
on friction was born out of the perceived failures of the hybridity literature—namely, it 
sought to counter hybridity’s reliance on “singular and static units” of interveners and locals, 
and offer a framework that “stresses the emergent and unexpected nature of unintended and 
unplanned consequences.”34 As such, it meant to “move beyond the simplification of local 
versus global.”35 However, such a project is proving to be more difficult.  
a. What makes hybridity and friction? 
Both hybridity and friction rely on the idea of two entities—the local and the 
international—coming together to create the processes that are then analysed. It is worth 
pausing here on the assumptions that underwrite the way that we understand these entities.  
In intervention scholarship, the international is represented by the term liberal peace. 
It is worth mentioning here that the term international is often invoked not as a specific 
anarchical system of nation-states, but as a vague conglomerate often termed “international 
community.” The international community, whether celebrated or castigated, is not made up 
only of states, but also from transnational institutions like the European Union (EU) and the 
United Nations (UN), financial institutions like the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and big international non-governmental organisations like Oxfam 
or Save the Children. Even though it is defined only in particular instances by referring to 
                                               
31 Richmond, ‘Critical Agency, Resistance and a Post-Colonial Civil Society’, 431. 
32 Tsing, Friction. 
33 Millar, Lijn, and Verkoren, ‘Peacebuilding Plans and Local Reconfigurations’, 139. 
34 Millar, Lijn, and Verkoren, 139. 
35 Millar, Lijn, and Verkoren, 142. 
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specific actors in different empirical contexts, it intuitively makes sense to argue that “the 
international can become local if they leave the big ivory tower and the air conditioned 
room.”36 I will leave the existence of ivory towers and air-conditioning around the world 
aside, but it is important to stress here that the international is not treated ontologically in 
itself (as opposed to something else that might be termed the global,) but as that which is not 
local, whether that is air conditioning or liberal values.37 International is that which has a 
different scale and quality of agency than the local.38 I will come back to this scalar issue both 
in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 6, but here I want to emphasise that the one thing that unites 
this international (community) is its seeming liberal quality already discussed in the 
Introduction. While there are those who rightfully contest this quality, even they agree that 
there is an understanding of international intervention as a liberal program39—it is by mixing 
with the local that liberal peace can turn into either a failed project of illiberal government 
or into a more positive “post-liberal peace.”40 
While the international is represented by the intervention itself, the local required 
some conceptual leg-work to be brought to existence—it is at the same time imagined as 
having the opposite of liberal values, but needs to become useful for achieving changes 
towards precisely those values. As already glimpsed in the discussion of Richmond’s work, 
this local input is imagined in terms of everyday practices and resistance. The local turn thus 
sees the local as a container that holds the emancipatory potential for countering the 
inappropriate, heavy-handed, top-down approaches. Once again, the local becomes productive 
of the outcome of the intervention itself.  The central question of the critiques of liberal peace 
coming out of the local turn thus becomes how to open that container—or “how best to 
‘access’ all other narratives so far silenced by the predominance of imposed liberal blueprints 
of peacebuilding, development and emancipation.”41  
                                               
36 Kappler, Local Agency and Peacebuilding, 4. 
37 My own use of global/international follows this. I do not use “international” and “global” as diagnoses of 
political realities—I do not embrace overly optimistic announcements of the development of a “global society,” 
nor do I accept that international politics are limited to state actors. 
38 This is also why the friction literature that deals with the international can be inspired by Tsing’s work which 
is even in its title an ethnography of global connections. Tsing, Friction.  
39 For example, Heathershaw refers to liberal peace as a “virtual phenomenon,” and Selby argues it is nothing 
more than a myth. Heathershaw, ‘Unpacking the Liberal Peace’; Selby, ‘The Myth of Liberal Peace-Building’. 
40 For a detailed discussion of post-liberal peace, see Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’, 668. 
41 Randazzo, ‘The Paradoxes of the “Everyday”’, 1353 citing; Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War, 
234 Emphases added. See also; Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’, 226–44; MacGinty, 
‘Introduction’; Lidén, ‘Building Peace between Global and Local Politics’. 
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While some of the suggested methodological orientations for this project of “accessing 
other narratives” will be addressed in the following chapter, for now it is important to 
highlight the dual understanding of the local (represented by the everyday) forwarded in 
these critiques. Everyday serves as a “functional description for the reality of social and 
political interactions,” but it also becomes more than a description when used as a “facilitator 
for the normative aims of an emancipatory paradigm.”42  Accordingly, accessing and using 
these local agencies actively becomes paramount in any effort to create a more effective, 
sustainable, and appropriate peace.  
Similarly, and sometimes simultaneously to the everyday, understanding local 
resistance has been conceptualised as the missing local input. In this narrative, local agencies 
are expressed either by “resisting aspects of statebuilding or co-opting it.”43 Drawing mostly 
on James Scott’s ideas of everyday resistance,44 this literature focuses on “infrapolitics” that 
bring about “a hybrid ‘local-liberal’ peace”—a peace that comes to being when “agencies are 
expressed that contaminate, transgress, and modify both the local and the international.”45 
The existing literature on these moves is vast, but the steps are surprisingly simple: 
international designs are deemed unfit for local contexts, and the local turn is thus supposed 
to tap into the everyday, informal, and resistant in order to produce friction. Friction would 
then depart from international designs and result in something hybrid, something often 
imagined to be more locally appropriate, and more emancipatory. More than providing a 
literature review, the rest of this chapter will try to situate the local turn into a more general 
problem of engaging with subjectivities of the intervened-upon.46 The next sections will first 
complicate the seeming novelty of the local turn by emphasising how much it is produced 
within academia itself, and then by emphasising the much more general and historically older 
connection between forms of government and conceptualisation of their local subjects. The 
following section will then shortly review some of the critiques of the local turn and hybridity 
approaches to draw out methodological, analytical, and political issues to be further 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
                                               
42 Randazzo, ‘The Paradoxes of the “Everyday”’, 1355. 
43 Richmond, ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’, 669. 
44 Scott, Weapons of the Weak Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. 
45 Richmond, ‘A Pedagogy of Peacebuilding’, 121; see also MacGinty, International Peacebuilding and Local 
Resistance; Richmond and Mitchell, Hybrid Forms of Peace; Richmond, ‘Critical Agency, Resistance and a Post-
Colonial Civil Society’. The most empirically rich and conceptually refined account of everyday resistance in 
peacebuilding can be found in the recent de Heredia, Everyday Resistance, Peacebuilding and State-Making. 
46 For the most recent review of the local turn in peacebuilding, see Randazzo, Beyond Liberal Peacebuilding. 
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II Complicating the move downwards 
The previous section showed how local engagement becomes crucial for both 
practices and scholarship of intervention. In policies and problem-solving literature, 
concepts like local ownership and capacity building are operationalised in an attempt to 
disseminate and contextualise norms of democracy, peace, and development without 
imposing them onto a tabula rasa. Taken like this, the valorisation of the local, while promoted 
to the “status of orthodoxy” in international interventions, remains a failure because the deep 
and sustainable change that the local actors are supposed to facilitate never materializes.47 
Because of this apparent failure, many of the critiques of these concepts and practices belong 
to what can be called internal critique: works that have focused on the failures and limitations 
of the implementation of the concepts that are supposed to empower local actors.48 On the 
other hand, more critical literature, which could be called fundamental critique in Cooke and 
Kothari’s distinction, has approached this move in two ways: either by emphasising that this 
move might be only a “cynical veneer” intended to ameliorate critiques of intrusive 
interventions without any respect of national sovereignty, or by reading it as a more micro, 
but simultaneously more intrusive, intervention in the souls of those intervened upon.49  
The first strand of fundamental critiques argues that the move away from the 
Washington Consensus, marked by the abandonment of harsh structural adjustments and 
conditionality, is only a screen that occludes “more of the same.” By reframing actions to 
seemingly stay within the confines of sovereignty, the international actors remain no “less 
intrusive, less demanding, or less powerful.”50 This line of critique built onto existing critical 
accounts of intervention which see them as ultimately supporting the interests of the Global 
North and transnational elites.51 Taken this way, the shift to the local is nothing but a façade 
that enables the same intrusiveness to survive, while negating any kind of responsibility.52 In 
short, these accounts echo the critiques of participation-based approaches to development: 
the preoccupation with the local focuses on individual change, rather than political 
contestation, and thus both depoliticises important issues, and forecloses dissent; it 
                                               
47 Kurowska, ‘Practicality by Judgement’, 4. 
48 The distinction between internal and fundamental critique comes from Cooke and Kothari, ‘Participation as 
Tyranny’, 4–7. 
49 Some also read it as a combination of the two, see Miklian, Lidén, and Kolås, ‘The Perils of “Going Local”’. 
50 Kurki, Democratic Futures, 230. 
51 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy; Robinson, ‘Globalization, the World System, and “Democracy Promotion” in 
U. S. Foreign Policy’; Robinson, ‘Promoting Polyarchy: 20 Years Later’; Gill, American Hegemony and the 
Trilateral Commission. 
52 Joseph, ‘Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism’; Chandler, Empire in Denial. 
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homogenizes the local through concepts like community (or local ownership, capacity 
building, or civil society); and it uses the language of emancipation to further incorporate the 
Global South into the same old projects of capitalist modernisation (or liberal peace.)53 In 
short, the intervention’s primary goal remained the same—disciplining—even though the 
discipline is served through different means.54   
The second strand of fundamental critique takes the effects of the local turn more 
seriously and reads it as a reorientation from targeting the states, to targeting the individual 
subjectivities of the population itself. The sentiment is captured well in Mark Duffield’s 
analysis of the development apparatus which underwent a dramatic change: from focusing 
on “economic growth in the hope that development will follow” to targeting “whole societies 
and the behaviour and attitudes of people within them” and working “to change indigenous 
values and modes of organisation and replace them with liberal ones.”55 This not only changes 
the conceptualisations of local social relations, but also empties out concepts like democracy 
which are now abandoned as universal ideals and expected to be moulded onto local 
contexts.56 Instead of changing the nature of global capital, or adapting societies to better 
deal with it through state policies, governance targets the micro-level and the everyday in 
hopes that those lagging behind will adapt themselves and create forms of government that 
are appropriate for them. This not only allows the exploitation to continue as the above 
critiques would suggest, but it also allows international actors to exert control of more and 
more areas of life.  
While reading the move in different light, both these critiques rightly problematise 
the motivations of the seemingly radical transformations of the intervention machine: is it 
really concerned with the well-being of the population and the individuals? However, while 
both interpretations moved the debate in ways that importantly informed both academic and 
practice discussions, trying to determine one true reading might present a dead-end at this 
point.  
To avoid having to decipher the motives of international actors which are necessarily 
varied, I am not so much concerned whether we see more local ownership or not—as John 
                                               
53 This summary of critiques is provided in Williams, ‘Evaluating Participatory Development’. However, the 
same article also challenges the depoliticisation critique in a number of ways. For the most famous exposition 
of the depoliticisation thesis, see Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine. 
54 Abrahamsen, ‘African Democracy’. 
55 Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, 42. 
56 Schmidt, ‘From Transformation to Reality’. 
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Heathershaw notes, success is not necessary for discourses to be reproduced, and there are 
always competing paradigms that coexist simultaneously and merge pragmatically.57 I see 
these developments as telling of a larger, and historically longer, connection between the 
individual subjectivities of those intervened upon and the policies that are supposed to 
govern them. This thesis goes beyond assuming and/or investigating aims, cynical or 
otherwise, to probe assumptions and effects. It pursues a different way of studying this 
valorisation of the local. Saying that it is just a cynical construct does not tell us anything 
about the effects it might have beyond its intended—explicitly or implicitly—consequences. 
As already discussed in the Introduction, the thesis aims to study and situate interventions 
beyond these narratives of failure and success. 
Following this line of thought, the rest of this section will problematise the downward 
move while refraining from trying to uncover its true motivations.58 In this step, I want to 
emphasise two aspects that are crucial for trying to better understand the relationship 
between intervention and conceptualisations of their targets. First, by highlighting the ability 
of the intervention machine to absorb critique, I want to warn against reading too much 
“change” into this temporal narrative of downward moves. Second, once we consciously 
problematise narratives focusing on disjuncture, it becomes possible to see continuities in the 
way that different forms of government have approached the local throughout history. Taken 
this way, the conceptualisation of the local for government in general becomes far greater 
than the literature on the local turn suggests.  
i. Continuity and critique 
The interplay between critique and the transformations described above cannot be 
overstated. While it is common to bemoan the lack of “impact” that academic work on 
interventions has on policy, it is becoming increasingly obvious that IR has what Roland 
Paris labelled “conceptual ordering”59—“less tangible and potentially more influential” 
effects that intervention scholarship has in policy circles.60 As Heathershaw has noted, many 
scholars work closely with(in) interventions and thus enable what he calls “hegemonic 
incorporation” of concepts and criticisms that turn critique into a new dogma.61 Such a 
                                               
57 Heathershaw, ‘Unpacking the Liberal Peace’, 606. 
58 I thank Berit Bliesemann de Guevara for initially encouraging me to approach this reading more critically at 
the first presentation of my project at Aberystwyth University, 2015. 
59 Paris, ‘Ordering the World’. 
60 Albæk, ‘Between Knowledge and Power’, 79; quoted in Paris, ‘Ordering the World’, 67. 
61 Heathershaw, ‘Unpacking the Liberal Peace’, 613, 616. 
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process can be traced through the popularisation of Lederach’s work in peacebuilding traced 
by Thania Paffenholz in the Peace and Conflict literature and practice.62 Similarly, Rita 
Abrahamsen has shown how the critiques targeted at the development discourse in the 1990s 
were absorbed in the good governance agenda that successfully repackaged the same 
hierarchies and unequal relationships. This, she argues, not only allows the intervention 
apparatus to survive without substantive changes, but it also robs concepts like 
emancipation, participation, and empowerment of their political potential and turns them 
into a tool of neoliberal responsibilization.63 But more than deciding whether these concepts 
originate in the critiques of interventions, or their practices, it is important to note that 
discussions like the one around the local come to their prominence precisely because they 
are “filtered through the debate between problem solving and critical scholars.”64  This ability 
to absorb critique is precisely what gives the interventionary apparatus its “antipolitical” 
strength.65  
Once this self-proclaimed disjuncture between “business as usual” and the local turn 
has been questioned, it is possible to trace the role of the local in government that goes well 
beyond what is usually imagined in intervention scholarship. I want to draw out some of the 
continuities in the way that interventions framed their efforts as creating self-governing 
individuals and communities long before including the words local ownership, capacity 
building, or resilience in its policy papers. Instead of taking the local turn to be a 
contemporary phenomenon, this section will bring out the connection between the ways that 
the local is approached and governing strategies devised around it. Namely, I want to 
highlight that the above reading obscures the fact that the local has been observed, studied, 
theorised, and used since the first colonial attempts at governing populations who are unfit 
to govern themselves. The bifurcation of the world into those governing, and those governed, 
or those intervening and those intervened upon, depends on imagining the local different 
from those supposed to improve it. And this “imagining” is always a laborious process that 
did not start only with the current local turn.  
The longevity of the connection between government and the local presents 
somewhat of a contradiction. Examining the turn to localism in development studies, Mohan 
and Stokke highlight this incongruity: much of the research and practice surrounding the 
                                               
62 Paffenholz, ‘International Peacebuilding Goes Local’. 
63 Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy. 
64 Graef, Practicing Post-Liberal Peacebuilding, 24–25. 
65 Li, The Will to Improve, 276. 
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local is done in the hopes of better informing bureaucrats, that will in turn make the 
intervention more appropriate and efficient. This “liberal assumption,” however, “ignores the 
ways in which the state has used ‘the local’ politically through material and discursive 
practices that disempower.”66 As an example, they talk about colonial indirect rule and the 
apartheid system, both of which worked through celebrating and utilizing local difference. 
However, their goal was not empowerment, but fuelling fragmentation and division in local 
politics that might otherwise develop into a political opposition.67 
Similarly, hybridity is supposed to make the liberal peace project more “context 
responsive” by engaging local cultures, traditions, and knowledge. However, Suthaharan 
Nadarajah and David Rampton stress that by positing this hybridity as a “universalising 
ambition” that works to ensure peace through “context specific and mutually accommodative 
interfacings of the international and the local,” we are seeing a rendition of imperial orders 
that utilized the notion of indirect rule—“a practice of government which worked through 
institutions that relied on what were thought to be indigenous customs and structures of 
authority.”68 Hybridity is similarly imagined to come to being through local adaptations of 
international designs. 
Local ownership, as the source of hybridising international designs, has also been 
analysed in its relation to colonial rule. Its genealogy can be tracked to the 1940s in discussion 
of colonial administration—local ownership is to liberal peace what “allegiances with local 
powers” were to indirect rule.”69 In this analysis then, indirect rule does not end with the end 
of colonial administrations. On the contrary, the practice of indirect rule continued through 
projects like development and liberal peacebuilding that seek to “assist, advise, and constrain 
the conduct of postcolonial states.”70 However, while these authors rightly highlight how the 
use of supposedly new and emancipatory concepts both has a longer history and can be used 
to fold them within capitalist or liberal peace projects, I do not wish to only emphasise the 
continuity of international power over local designs. Another aspect that I want to highlight 
is the conceptualisation of the local itself. 
                                               
66 Mohan and Stokke, ‘The Dangers of Localism’, 254. 
67 Mohan and Stokke, 254. 
68 Hindess, ‘Citizenship and Empire’, 253; cited in Nadarajah and Rampton, ‘The Limits of Hybridity’, 56. 
69 Wilén, ‘Capacity-Building or Capacity-Taking?’, 340; Ejdus, ‘Local Ownership as International 
Governmentality’, 6; citing Barkawi, ‘“Defence Diplomacy” in North-South Relations’, 601. 
70 Hindess, ‘Politics as Government’, 409; cited in Ejdus, ‘Local Ownership as International Governmentality’, 
7; See also Chatterjee, ‘Empires, Nations, Peoples’. 
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In all the different variations of localism, there is the defining assumption of the local 
as being different from the international (often conflated with the idea of the universal or the 
global). While this differentiation between those who need help, and those who know what 
is good for others, is a constant, the conceptualisation is not always straightforward.71 This 
operationalisation of the difference between those governing and those who are being 
governed can serve varying purposes, and has differed historically: firstly, the difference 
excused the colonial government during the era in which the goal was only to secure 
“extractive-effects on colonial bodies.”72 By positing the governed populations as sub-human 
and thus without hope for improvement, there was no reason for another justification of 
imposed rule. In the late colonial period, however, the goal shifted to ensuring “governing-
effects on colonial conduct.”73 This difference was now recast as something improvable. The 
rule was now justified not by the ontological difference between the rulers and the ruled, but 
by the rulers’ ability and good will to guide the subjugated populations towards progress that 
would one day close the gap between the local and the colonial and allow for self-rule. This 
end goal, of course, was never to happen in this “structure of permanent deferral” where 
natives were promised rights but could never achieve the maturity needed to exercise them.74  
What both of the above narratives have in common is the connection between a 
certain conception of the local subject, and the policy that this conception invites and 
excuses. This connection has been captured well in Prem Kumar Rajaram’s book Ruling the 
Margins.75 In it, Rajaram studies what he calls “administrative government”— “a type of rule 
centred on devising and implementing regulations governing how we live and how we 
conduct ourselves economically and politically, and sometimes culturally.”76  He grounds this 
type of rule in the images of native societies and questions how this process of imagining and 
knowing works to create an idea of moral and political obligations for the state.77 The 
important lesson of Rajaram’s colonial and contemporary cases is that the “imaginations of 
native society” do not stay separated from the real world, but are “concretized into policy” 
with specific economic and political arrangements in mind.78  Rajaram concludes that 
                                               
71 Inayatullah, ‘Why Do Some Know What’s Good for Others’. 
72 Scott, ‘Colonial Governmentality’; cited in Li, The Will to Improve, 13. 
73 Scott, ‘Colonial Governmentality’, 214; cited in Li, The Will to Improve, 13. 
74 Wilder, ‘Practicing Citizenship in Imperial Paris’; cited in Li, The Will to Improve, 15. 
75 Rajaram, Ruling the Margins. 
76 Rajaram, 1. 
77 Rajaram, 22. 
78 Rajaram, 90. 
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orientalism, or representation of the local, needs to be studied in its “material and social 
effects.”79 This “ordering and arraying of people and things”—of knowing the local in a 
particular way—not only legitimizes the intervention, but also guides its specific shape and 
policies.80  
This line of inquiry is of tremendous importance in interventions: they depend on 
specific constructions of the local, its problems, and their solutions—not only to legitimize 
interventions for domestic and international audiences, but also in the process of creating 
both the policies and the objects of their policies. The point was perhaps most famously 
pursued in development studies by Arturo Escobar in his Encountering Development. Escobar 
explored how development discourse “colonises reality” and exposed how “certain 
representations become dominant and shape indelibly the ways in which reality is imagined 
and acted upon.”81 For Escobar, this was “the production of discourse under conditions of 
unequal power.”82 And although this “colonialist move” was identified as an integral part of 
colonial rule by scholars like Chandra Talpade Mohanty and Homi Bhabha, Escobar sees it 
as relevant for the way that contemporary development discourse makes it subjects. 83 Even 
though clearly drawing from Edward Said’s analysis of discourse, Escobar does not remain 
in the realm of representations, but seeks to “pay closer attention to the deployment of the 
discourse through practice.” He explores how “discourse results in concrete practices of 
thinking and acting through which the Third World is produced.”84 In his work, the act of 
imagining the subject of development thus goes hand in hand with the practice of development, 
and interventions can and should be looked at similarly. 
Within IR, Roxanne Doty summarized the power of this engagement well in her 
description of North-South relations. For her, these relations “become more than an area of 
theory and practice in which various policies have been enacted and theories formulated; 
they become a realm of politics wherein the very identities of peoples, states, and regions are 
constructed through representational practices.”85 More than just emphasising the 
importance of representational practices and identity construction for international relations, 
Doty’s study also echoes other points that are raised in this chapter. Her selection of cases 
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includes colonial practice in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, counterinsurgency in the 
1950s, and two contemporary discourses: North-South relations within American social 
science, and promotion of democracy and human rights in the Global South. The range of 
these encounters once again brings to the fore the continued relevance of knowing the local, 
even when that knowledge is formed through “continuity and change, repetition and 
variation.”86  
ii. Ambiguity of localism as its defining strength 
James Ferguson, writing about anthropologies of development, rightly noted that the 
rediscovery of the local in the form of civil society, and later “grassroots” organising, marked 
a distinct shift in interventions. The problem used to be that of the “savage” where there was 
too much local and not enough of functioning state. Today, the “savage” is repackaged as the 
“grassroots,” and the problem is too much state which the local should restrict.87 In his 
overview of the uses of the local in peacebuilding, MacGinty repeats this distinction when 
he divides the history of peacebuilding in two large eras: one in which the local was 
“irrelevant” and the goal was to “delocalise,” and the new era which “rediscovered” the local 
as a tool for improving intervention.88 The previous section worked to undo this self-
proclaimed transformation of the intervention apparatus by focusing on the continued and 
always relevant connection between imaginations of the local and practices that are supposed 
to govern it. But along with continuity, ambiguity is the second important element of this 
process.  
Contrary to analyses such as that of MacGinty, the fact that the “old” interventions 
were concerned with states and worked through generalizing theories, does not mean that 
the local was irrelevant. 89 The policies of structural adjustment or institution building still 
depended on both particular representations that inspired these generalizing theories, and 
on reading the local in a particular way that made it legible within those theories. Today, 
even though the local seems to be pregnant with solutions to the problems of peace, 
development, and democracy, once these programmes fail—and they necessarily do so—the 
local is also an explanation of that failure, moving quickly from an agent of emancipation, to 
an obstacle to international designs. Even in times of local ownership and capacity building, 
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the local still remains ambiguous enough to easily slip from the role of magical solution to 
one of long-lived irritant. 
This power to continuously morph is crucial for the survival of interventions that 
keep falling short of achieving their aims. Kai Koddenbrock examined this process in his 
study of how “influential policy advice constructs a stable Congo image” and how this image 
turns into “recipes for intervention.”90 An important facet of Koddenbrock’s article is 
focusing on the process of intervention as a “looping process” that allows the inevitable 
failure of intervention to paradoxically invite more intervention.  He first unearths how 
reductionism and self-referentionalism prevalent in policy papers dealing with Congo enable 
interventions, but he goes on to use Ferguson’s concept of “functional pathologization”91 to 
uncover two steps in a process which determines the recipe for intervention: 1) the 
Congolese economy, politics, and society are analysed in a reductionist manner which 
prescribes a specific kind of intervention, and 2) reflecting on the failures of intervention 
both draws from and further feeds into these reductionist images to attribute the failures to 
“problematic Congolese behaviour,” “wrong or incoherent focus of intervention,” “lack of 
Congolese capacities,” or their “problematic behaviour.”92 This creates a reductionist and 
self-referential outlook in which the “assumption that the West is able and legitimized to 
engage in this kind of work remains untouched.”93 This process then not only enables 
intervention, but also excuses its failures. As such, the malleability of the local is not merely 
productive of different forms of government but is crucial for the survival of intervention 
practices. 
As tempting as it is to create one master narrative as an object of critique, the power 
of the construction of the local lies precisely in its oscillation between tool and spoiler, 
emancipation and subjugation, a problem and a resource. Post-structural critiques of 
development uncovered how the development discourse creates local societies as incapable, 
weak, and in need of help. In the discussion on local ownership, participation, and resilience 
we see the local emerging as willing, capable, and crucial for taking action. Reading this 
seeming disjuncture as a paradigmatic and practical shift might be misleading—only by 
                                               
90 Koddenbrock, ‘Recipes for Intervention’, 549. 
91 Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine. For another exploration of how pathologization functions in discourses 
of humanitarianism and trusteeship from British colonial practices to contemporary peacebuilding, see the 
unpublished thesis Igarashi, ‘Genealogical Analysis of the Dispositive of Humanitarianism/Trusteeship’. 
92 Koddenbrock, ‘Recipes for Intervention’, fig. 1. 
93 Koddenbrock, 559–60. 
Katarina Kušić 
 Chapter 1 | 56 
putting them in conversation can we grasp the importance of what is perceived as the local 
for all forms of government.  
III Limits to finding the local 
While both hybridity and friction came about as concepts that were supposed to 
resolve the issue of dichotomising the local and the international and allow local agencies to 
affect the outcomes of interventions, they are both targets of convincing critiques. Friction 
is said to be lost in translation. Tsing’s innovative writing that traverses sites and creatively 
engages with dispossession, soon turned into creating “generic typology of interaction.”94 
Friction as a concept in intervention literature was thus operationalized as a tool for 
predicting the outcomes of the intervention, while Tsing’s friction was all about the 
unpredictability of local-global encounters.95 For example, Annika Björkdahl and Ivan Gusic’s 
informative article on frictional peacebuilding in Kosovo, while providing rich local context, 
still fits local subjects into one of three options: as localising, co-opting, or counteracting 
global norms.96 So even though friction is meant to destabilise the local/global dichotomy and 
account for power relations in peacebuilding encounters, it still depends on conceptualising 
local subjects only in relation to the international.  
Similarly, it is now common-place to argue that the hybridity literature essentially 
failed because it both oversimplified the entities of the local and the international that were 
to be hybridized, and because it soon turned into a policy tool that was supposed to become 
operationalized, predictable, and planned.97 These critiques of hybridity in IR have built on 
an already rich scholarship in cultural studies that has critically approached the concept.98  
Moreover, hybridity in intervention literature also subscribes to a linear 
understanding of development of governance—hybridity is located on a line between the 
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liberal Westphalian state and the illiberal state.99 This reinforces a Eurocentric teleological 
view of development and robs hybridity of its emancipatory potential that lies in the 
possibility of hybrids falling outside of that line. These approaches also sneak in further 
normative valorisations, such as the celebration of hybrid over the non-hybrid, or the 
evaluation of positive vs. negative hybridity.100 Space prevents further engagement with the 
piercing critiques that this literature has invited, 101 but I will focus on two particular issues: 
the impossibility of transcending what are ultimately two different entities, the local and the 
international, and how this reflects on the connections that we see between local agencies 
and international power. 
i. Location and embeddedness of local agency 
As already glimpsed, many of the critiques of hybridity revolve around the following 
question: “To what degree does the assertion of hybridity rely on the positing of an anterior 
‘pure’ that precedes mixture?”102 It is important to highlight that this assumption of an 
“anterior ‘pure’ that precedes mixture,” also has far-reaching consequences not only for the 
way that we conceptualise outcomes of the interventions as possible different hybrids, but 
more generally for the way that we approach the subjectivities of those intervened upon.   
The view that hybridity approaches failed to overcome the binaries they sought to 
challenge is not a new line of argument—no matter how much they argue for transcending 
them, they ultimately depend on the local and the international as given categories. The 
process of hybridisation is usually thought to start when “[i]nternational and domestic actors 
enter into a bargaining relationship whereby each actor attempts to promote its own values, 
norms, and practices.”103 The distinction between international actors who we might assume 
have “international norms” and their local counterparts is thus a starting point even though 
the point of the literature is to make sense of outcomes that transcend those labels. Do 
international actors bring in some of their “localness” or are they mechanically constituted 
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products of free-floating “international discourses”? Are there no local agents that work in 
international agencies? And is not everyone these days at least somewhat produced by the 
international flows of media and ideas? Thus, no matter the disavowals of essentialising 
moves and cautionary proclamations, the analysis still depends on identifying those “pure” 
entities, that precede friction and hybridity, as their constitutive parts. This conceptualisation 
of the local still relies on positing the difference that then makes the encounter itself. This 
difference can be presented in cultural or ontological terms, but both similarly finish in 
binary thinking.104 This has very political implications.  
The issue of politics of hybridity, or the failure of hybridity to take into account 
politics, has been noted in both cultural studies and within IR.105 By relying on cultural and 
ontological difference that marks separate entities, we are foregoing the opportunity to 
explore hierarchies that make them, and the politics within those entities. It is precisely 
within these politics that we can find positionings that complicate clear-cut identifications of 
local and international. In this section, I draw out two specific political implications of this 
seemingly abstract failure to move beyond the heuristic devices of the international and the 
local. The first one relates to the conceptualisation of the place of political agency, namely 
through the differentiation of the everyday from the political. The second relates to the issue of 
the constitution of that agency, namely what the assumption of pre-hybridized purity hides 
from our view. 
In critiques of international discourses and power as depoliticising, we paradoxically 
once more remove local subjectivities from the discussion. In these efforts to stress the 
negative consequences of projects of development and liberal peace, their power is often 
exaggerated and results in a mechanical understanding of subject formation that folds local 
subjects neatly into the great intervention discourse. This interpretation offers a reductionist 
view of power which is all-powerful and omni-present, and as such precludes any openings 
for resistance, contestation, and re-politicisation.106  
Even when these approaches explicitly set out to bring back the local, they re-inscribe 
the dichotomy that renders the local as the everyday, while the intervention is the political. This 
line of thinking relegates the local as somehow removed from “real” politics and concerned 
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only with the micro and the everyday. In the words of Sabaratnam, such treatment of the 
local everyday, despite its best intentions, banalizes instead of politicises that space.107  
This is perhaps most easily demonstrated by looking at popular treatments of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH). In her effort “to bring hidden agencies back into the political and 
social world,” Stefanie Kappler investigates the hidden spaces of agency in BH.108 In 
Kappler’s analysis, these “hidden agencies” are assumed to be outside of the political and social 
world until they are seen by the EU. One has to wonder why they cannot exist as political 
agencies outside of the EU’s view? With the best intentions of creating a framework that 
gives agency to the “powerless,” Kappler is reproducing the idea that these people in fact are 
powerless (she does not use quotation marks) until supposedly empowered by EU recognition. 
Thus, there can be no empowerment outside of the EU, and no agency outside of the 
international.109 Moreover, in her focus on those hidden, everyday agencies that are 
important to uncover and could present an important political project if framed so, she is 
further removing from view the very real, political, and non-EU related mobilisations that 
happened in BiH at the beginning of the war.110 However, because she expects hidden 
resistance and everyday practices, she remains blind to organised political mobilisation. More 
than just painting an empirically inaccurate picture, this approach traps the local in the 
everyday and further limits its access to the political.  
The issue surrounding engaging local practices and actors then becomes more than 
just adding detail and choosing one’s empirics. It becomes a question of conceptualising the 
political agencies we are engaging with. To use Jabri’s formulation  “the local agency we all 
seek to define, should be specifically defined as political agency”—something that she deems 
peacebuilding studies as unable to do.111 This depoliticising move has been paradoxically 
fuelled by critiques of peacebuilding as a governmentalizing or a depoliticising project: in 
efforts to uncover interventions as removing issues from the realm of the political, the local 
is often read as already emptied of politics, and thus neoliberalisation is given an absolute 
mandate to re-shape agencies around the world.112 While the critique of these practices 
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remains important, it is also necessary to caution against simple rejection of local spaces as 
already and completely depoliticised. 
The approaches that focus on how the local is made through cultural and ontological 
differentiation from the international can run the risk of ignoring all the other ways that the 
two make and remake each other through history. In focusing on the intervention as an 
encounter that makes the subjects, it is easy to identify local political agency by casting it as 
somehow isolated from international power prior to the intervention itself. As Nadarajah and 
Rampton argue, “the hybrid peace approach fails to take seriously the historical co-
constitution of the international, national, and local and the relations of power that connect 
these in both peace and conflict.”113 It is this “historical co-constitution” that is missing when 
we use labels such as the local and the international—a longer view with a multiplicity of 
connections might help us understand how they became seen that way.  
It is increasingly clear that the efforts to confine political subjectivities to the 
parameters of interventions is not possible, yet it is not clear how to proceed in this 
endeavour. This thesis builds onto existing works that have started this project: statebuilding 
studies that emphasise “the historicity and international embeddedness of non-Western 
societies” and explore these “long-term structures, cultural particularities and wider 
influences which reach beyond the immediate political situation, temporally as well as 
spatially;”114 decolonial and post-colonial works that see intervention as a continuation of  
historical connections;115 and the works already mentioned in the Introduction that similarly 
treat the Balkans as political subjects in both historical and contemporary political order.  
This chapter has so far demonstrated the importance, and some limitations, of 
engaging with the local in intervention scholarship and practices. Chapter 2 will try to move 
beyond these tensions through a conversation between literature in governmentality and 
anthropology that has sought to differently conceptualise local agencies and global powers 
that engage them. But before moving on, the following section will take forward some of that 
analytical debate to examine “the making of the local” in practice—how Serbian subjects 
have been imagined in discussions on the Balkans. If I am to engage with these subjectivities, 
it is crucial to recognise that my own engagement does not happen in a vacuum but builds 
on a long history of representations of Serbian subjects in popular culture, practices of 
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intervention, and in academia. Moreover, connecting those subjectivities to intervention 
necessarily requires highlighting the relationship explicated above:  between the 
representations of the local and interventions that seek to engage it. 
IV Imagining Serbia116  
The Balkans have always been made in its encounters with the West. When 
approaching the region, we face a ready-made selection of images and concepts that orient 
our ideas of what the Balkans are. This representational discourse has been examined 
through studies of Balkanism. Inspired by, but differentiated from, Said’s Orientalism, the 
term Balkanism was developed by Maria Todorova to denote “a specific discourse [that] 
moulds attitudes and actions towards the Balkans and could be treated as the most persistent 
form or ‘mental map’ in which information about the Balkans is placed, most notably in 
journalistic, political and literary output.”117 In addition to Todorova’s Imagining the Balkans, 
other foundational works are Vesna Goldsworthy’s Inventing Ruritania, Dušan Bjelić and 
Obad Savić’s edited volume Balkans as a Metaphor, Andrew Hammond’s Debated Lands, and 
works that deal with Eastern Europe more generally, such as Larry Wolff’s Inventing Eastern 
Europe, and Attila Melegh’s On The East-West Slope.118 Said’s influence here cannot be 
overstated—today it is understood that there exists a whole subfield which deals with 
representations of the Balkans as bloody, volatile, backward, and in need of supervision.119 
Such influence of post-colonial theory requires us to ask: how post-colonial are the 
Balkans really?120 While the presence of historical empires cannot be ignored, and the 
contemporary coloniality of power rests on Eurocentered modern power in which Europe is 
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always the subject, and the Balkans the object, of intervention,121 it is obvious that there is 
no colonial situation nowadays.122 However, I will build onto Rajaram’s work to emphasise 
that even with the ambiguity of this condition, the lessons of administrative rule cannot be 
underestimated. Most importantly, putting into conversation studies of Balkanism with 
Rajaram’s discussion of administrative rule allows us to move away from deconstructing 
these representations, or debating the (non)existence of something more real than them. 
Instead, we are invited to examine the “materiality of Balkanism”123—not only how it is 
produced, but also how it translates into specific projects of government.124 Taken like this, 
these representations become crucial because they are implicated in the wider dynamics of 
subject formation in a region that is “largely ascribed from the outside” as a socio-political 
space.125 
Within IR, these images are examined as they are translated into prescriptions for 
intervention, and many have approached the Balkans and the conceptualisations of its 
problems as crucial for the development of a new era of interventions.126 More generally, 
peacebuilding and statebuilding literatures usually focus on the region’s post-conflict 
aspects. However, following Berit Bliesemann de Guevara’s insistence that “post-conflict is 
not the only characteristic that matters,”127 the following section will trace different ways that 
the Balkans have been made legible to various international interventions. It will first 
examine the Balkans, and Serbia specifically, “in-conflict” through Lene Hansen’s work on 
Western (non)-intervention in the Bosnian War. Next, it will focus on contemporary 
implications of the labels of “post-conflict,” “post-communist,” and “in-transition” to show 
some ways these labels are materialised in policies.  
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i. The Balkans in conflict  
Perhaps the most famous and detailed IR treatment of the connection between 
Western policy and the ways that the Balkans are imagined is provided in Hansen’s Security 
as Practice.128 She conceptualises Western policy in the Bosnian War “as always dependent 
upon the articulation of identity, while identity is simultaneously produced and reproduced 
through the formulation and legitimation of policy.”129 Putting into conversation UK and US 
debates on (non-)involvement in the Balkans, with classic works on Balkanism such as those 
of Todorova and Goldsworthy, Hansen teases apart Balkanist discourse into three specific 
discourses.130 The first casts the Balkans as the romantic, exotic, but attractive Other, which 
fell victim to Ottoman influence. The second sees it in civilisational terms, with a possible 
Balkan Enlightenment at the hands of the benevolent European influence. The third sees the 
Balkans as unrepairable, mired in “ancient hatreds” and irrationality.131 
Similarly to the ways that colonial government repositioned itself in relation to the 
colonies, we see in this narrative a changing relation between Europe and the Balkans, with 
similar oscillation between casting difference along an insurmountable ontological gulf, and 
the workable state of “deferral.” The added value of Hansen’s study is not just a 
consideration of a variety of texts—from travelogues to political writings and biographies—
but also her insistence on the malleability of the discourses she analyses. Once again, we see 
that the discourses that make the subject are powerful but never definite and can change and 
exist simultaneously and ambiguously.  
Most importantly for this discussion, there is a particular formation of the Serbian 
subject that Hansen detects. In the 1990s, Hansen finds the UK and US debates revolving 
around variants of the Balkanist discourse—i.e. around the idea that there is something 
ontologically different about the Balkans that can explain the atrocities that were happening 
there. However, alongside this view of the Balkans as unrepairable and hence not worth 
intervening into, we also see an emergence of the “Genocide discourse” that breaks apart the 
unified Balkan subject to create two new subjects. This discourse creates a multicultural 
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Bosnia as a victim, a perpetrator Serbia, and locates the conflict firmly within Europe, hence 
making it a European responsibility.132 The notable differentiation here emerges between the 
victims of the genocide, Bosnian Muslims, and the perpetrators of the genocide, Bosnian 
Serbs and Serbians. However, the assigning of blame onto Bosnian Serbs complicates the 
implied responsibility of the West. Blaming Bosnian Serbs does not fit the “multicultural” 
identity of Bosnia—and this identity is indispensable for its equation to the Western, equally 
multicultural self. Hence, we see a further division within the Serbian subject—what Hansen 
calls the “Balkanising Serbia” discourse— between the elites who can be blamed and 
accordingly disposed of, and the civilians who are innocent and hence can remain to make 
the multicultural dream of Bosnia come true.133  
What matters here is the duality of the national subject and the absolution brought 
about by a removal from politics: the abhorrent behaviour of Serbian political elites becomes 
ontologically separated from the apolitical innocence of the civilians.134 In this discourse, the 
“humanisation” and commensurability with the West are achieved through de-
politicisation—only by casting citizens as removed from politics, can they be excused from the 
atrocities that the region is involved in and be worthy of Western attention. Two important 
themes emerge here and will be elaborated on throughout the thesis. First, the importance 
of the “educational potential and a modernist receptivity” of Serbian people that opens the 
door to supervised progress once the corrupt leaders are removed.135  And second, the idea 
that to become innocent means to remain apolitical. The interplay between potential and deferral, 
and the importance of re/de-politicisation are issues that still structure Serbia at home and 
abroad. Hansen’s analysis shows a different road to bypassing the subject from the 
methodological and analytical bypassing studied by Sabaratnam. The importance of 
discursively negating local agency here is pragmatic: only by casting civilians, as opposed to 
elites, as helpless, could one argue for Western compassion.136  
Hansen’s study more generally fits into the defining aspects of the Balkan imagery in 
IR—mainly its preoccupation with war and conflict. And even decades after the war, the 
                                               
132 Hansen, Security as Practice, chap. 9. 
133 Hansen, 166. 
134 Hansen, 113. 
135 Hansen, 100. 
136 However, the analytical bypassing is reproduced in the orientation of Hansen’s study itself. Namely, its 
concern with foreign policy and constructions of identity as they are articulated from the West, in the West, 
about the Balkans, means that subjects remain not much more than imagined by the West. In her analysis, 
there are no real Bosnians, Serbians, or Croatians—while the book critiques the representations of those 
subjects, we still do not get a glimpse of their existence outside of them. 
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region is most popularly considered as being post-conflict before anything else. Sometimes this 
means putting an emphasis on military interventions like in Hansen’s work, and at other 
times that means focusing on transitional justice or civil society initiatives that would repair 
what was broken during the war. As already glimpsed in the Introduction, my own project 
seeks to disrupt this structure of knowledge production about the region by emphasising 
both other modes of existence in the region, and other ways that the international plays a 
part in them.  
While Serbia has been the object of Western intervention in variety of ways, from 
NATO bombings and economic sanctions, to technical assistance and EU rural development 
funds, the thesis focuses on policy fields seemingly removed from issues of war, and on time 
frames situated after the war-reporters have left.137 Accordingly, the types of engagement 
that the thesis will follow are seemingly mundane and removed from the spectacles of 
bombings and international administrations.138 I want to use the rest of this section to 
highlight how in addition to “post-conflict,” the labels of “post-communist” and “in 
transition” also determine the levels and forms of engagement with the region. 
ii. Materiality of Balkanism: subjects and policies of “post-conflict, post-
communist, and in-transition” 
The concept of transition can relate to a transition from authoritarian forms of rule 
towards democracy, the transition from a centrally planned economy to market capitalism, 
or even the transition from war to peace. While the first two are usually presented in a 
bundle, here I will focus on its economic part.139 The fall of communism in many ways 
presented an opportunity for the development of what Naomi Klein termed “the shock 
doctrine,” and Western staff and resources rushed to the East to steer this shift to capitalism 
that was supposed to be both comprehensive and rapid.140 However, more than just 
                                               
137 For a quick overview of these more coercive measure, see Dragović-Soso, ‘The Impact of International 
Intervention on Domestic Political Outcomes’. 
138 The international administrations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are explicitly intervening since 
they do not pretend to respect state sovereignty. For more on these cases, see Knaus and Martin, ‘Travails of 
the European Raj’; Chandler, Empire in Denial; Visoka, Shaping Peace in Kosovo. Moreover, because of the 
presence of Islam, these countries are much more easily cast as “the Other” in the current climate of 
Islamophobia. For a short discussion on the importance of Islam, see, for example Rexhepi, ‘From Orientalism 
to Homonationalism’. 
139 For a policy-oriented critique of the political transition paradigm, see Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition 
Paradigm’. 
140 Klein, The Shock Doctrine. For a quick overview of these developments in Eastern Europe, see Chapter 1 in 
Wedel, Collision and Collusion. Wedel’s work more generally tracks how Western aid worked in the East though 
various networks and actors. This view of a transition to capitalism as a “West to East” transmission has 
recently been challenged by work that uncovers transnational East-West networks that came to make the 
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specifying the end goal, the understanding of this space as “in transition” still filters its 
contemporary economic development through the prism of transitology and neoliberal 
economics. As Michael Pugh has argued, this means that economic problems are explained 
through local deficiencies, rather than by questioning the global neoliberal systems that 
Serbia is supposed to be implementing.141  
This label also invokes a particular type of subjectivity. Since the problems of 
transition are not associated with the design of its programmes, they necessarily present 
faulty local implementation as the explanation of failure. The label “in transition” is thus 
underlined by a particular vision of local subjectivity that needs to transform in order to 
successfully practice capitalism. So even though it is concerned with the economic system, 
questions of personhood and subjectivity feature prominently in discussions of transition. 
Namely, many of the failures of the transition are explained through references to the lack 
of personal development and human capital—issues that we will encounter again in Part II 
of the thesis.142  
The region’s post-conflict nature invokes another specific conception of local 
subjectivity. Most obviously, because it is assumed that the Balkans are somehow naturally 
inclined to violence—either because of “ancient hatreds” and an ontological predisposition 
to violence, or as the consequence of the rule of many different empires—the ideas of 
“supervision” are never far from the international political imagination. The solution to the 
threat of sliding back from post-conflict to conflict emerges in the form of “soft imperialism,” 
or “necessary empire” as put by Robert Kaplan in a recent opinion piece in the New York 
Times.143 Thus not only is the local imagined as violent, but because war looms as a threat so 
prominently, the erasure of local agency can be presented as an undramatic solution to this 
exceptional problem. 
Another consequence of post-conflict status is the preoccupation with what Hughes 
and Pupavac have called “pscyho-social interventions”: a specific reading of the whole 
population as ill and in need of psychosocial help. Hughes and Pupavac’ analysis of 
                                               
current economic model, and the uncertainty of the end result in the early 1990s. See Bockman, Markets in the 
Name of Socialism; Bockman and Eyal, ‘Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Economic Knowledge’. 
141 Pugh, ‘The Political Economy of Peacebuilding’, 24. 
142 This is captured in an ethnography of a Polish factory in Dunn, Privatizing Poland; See also the contributions 
in Makovicky, Neoliberalism, Personhood, and Postsocialism. 
143 Kaplan, ‘The Necessary Empire’. These visions of Balkans under “supervision” are remarkably common. 
One of the most famous proponents of such politics is Michael Ignatieff and his concept of “Empire lite.” See 
Ignatieff, Empire Lite. 
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therapeutic governance in the Balkans and Cambodia includes efforts to “reconstruct culture 
and the very personality of individuals through psychosocial intervention involving both formal 
and informal education […].”144 Thus the post-conflict label attached to the region and the 
individuals that live in it both supports the narrative of an ever-expanding realm of 
intervention—from elections to individual personalities—and serves to depoliticise policy 
discussions by focusing on individual, rather than structural, problems and solutions.  
Finally, the framing of the region as post-communist, which is more than occasionally 
mistakenly mixed with post-Soviet, also has specific implications for the way we imagine 
local subjectivity and for the policies that engage it. Perhaps most obviously, it provides a 
recipe for democracy promotion through civil society—something that has supposedly been 
completely absent during communism, and something without which democracy cannot 
function.145 This interpretation diagnoses local subjectivities with “apathy” and lack of “civil 
involvement,” and offers “participation” and “building civil societies” as solutions.146   
iii. Political limitations of engaging the targets of interventions in post-
Yugoslav spaces 
The previous section sought to problematise how the Balkans are approached in 
popular discourse, and to push forward the materiality of those representations: how they 
create images of local subjects, and how these images are closely connected to interventions 
that target them. Here, I want to illuminate the issues of location and international embeddedness 
that were dealt with earlier in the chapter, as they unfold in this context. 
The banalisation and depoliticisation of everyday lives are here not only 
consequences of methodological and analytical failures, but they become necessary to even 
begin to see the subjects as human. As shown in Hansen’s study, without depoliticisation, 
these people would be active agents in atrocities projected on TV screens around the world 
in the 1990s. Because the Serbian state in the 1990s was seen as monstrous, the Serbian 
population had to be separated from this demonised political realm to claim humanity.147  
                                               
144 Hughes and Pupavac, ‘Framing Post-Conflict Societies’, 884. Emphasis added. 
145 For a short introduction of the concept in the region, see Brown, Transacting Transition the Micropolitics of 
Democracy Assistance in the Former Yugoslavia; Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Ker-Lindsay, and Kostovicova, Civil Society and 
Transitions in the Western Balkans. 
146 Buden most strongly brings about this point when he says that “[t]he repressive infantilization of the 
societies that have recently liberated themselves from communism is the key feature of the so-called post-
communist condition.” Buden, ‘Children of Postcommunism’, 18. 
147 Importantly, this absolution via separation from politics is also employed by people in everyday interactions. 
For analyses of “apathy” and “anti-politics” in Serbia, see Greenberg, ‘There’s Nothing Anyone Can Do about 
It’; Helms, ‘The Gender of Coffee’. 
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The issue of the embeddedness of local subjects and connecting the local and 
international is perhaps best summarized by Susan Woodward when she argues that the 
debates in the 1990s that revolved around whether to get involved or not (that were so well 
analysed by Hansen) actually masked the way that international actors were already involved 
“from the beginning.”148 Here, I do not wish to refer to just the actions of the European 
Community/European Union, or the dubiously well-planned recognitions of independence, 
but also to the geopolitical and economic embeddedness of Yugoslavia and its successor 
states. As we will see in Part II of the thesis, the interconnectedness of the local and international 
is something that always made and continues to make the subjectivities the thesis will 
explore.  
Similarly to the conceptual continuities that this chapter tried to emphasise, the 
involvement of foreign and international actors in the Balkans also becomes most insightful 
once examined in light of its continuities, rather than its differences. Since the Great Powers 
involvement in the second half of the 19th century until today, international involvement has 
relied on both diplomatic (and sometimes military) and economic measures, and although 
such measures oscillated between more and less coercion (or between coercive intervention 
and “mere” interference), it was always created between the push of foreign actors and the 
pull of differently motivated local actors.149 This thesis follows this direction and explores 
how the international is and has been present in lives of those who are targeted by projects 
that seek to foster peace, development, and democracy in contemporary Serbia.  
Conclusions 
While it seems common-sense that interventions should be examined from the eyes 
of those who are supposed to benefit from them, this agenda is far from straightforward.  
Critical scholarship argues that many of the approaches that valorise the local in the end fail 
to treat “the ‘local’ as having agency in its own right.”150 Despite the intention to prioritise 
local agencies, experiences, knowledges, and people, many of these efforts attempt to harness 
the local for liberal peace, or I would add, for the intervention itself.151  
This chapter showed that despite so many efforts to problematise the 
local/international dichotomy, allow more local agency, and include indigenous voices, the 
                                               
148 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 147. 
149 Woodward, ‘The Long Intervention’. 
150 Paffenholz, ‘Unpacking the Local Turn in Peacebuilding’, 859. 
151 Nadarajah and Rampton, ‘The Limits of Hybridity’, 60. 
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treatment of the local and indigenous in intervention scholarship is still lacking:  it is often 
superficial and marginalized (not just receiving less funding, but employed to only certain, 
explicitly apolitical, goals), even when actively sought after and celebrated. While this work 
is important in bringing the everyday into the considerations of world politics, it risks 
reducing the local to banal observations. If we need to argue that “individuals have very 
sophisticated cognitive abilities,”152 we have to seriously reconsider our starting assumptions.  
This chapter has highlighted different ways that local subjectivities have been 
engaged in intervention literature. Tracking the moves downwards in both practices and 
scholarship on intervention emphasised two points. First, the self-proclaimed transformation 
of the intervention machine as suddenly interested in the local is problematised to highlight 
how knowing the local is always crucial for the design of government. And second, even the 
attempts to counter the exclusive focus on the power and agency of the international prove 
to be limited. 
These critiques of intervention often result in relegating local agencies to the realm of 
the everyday, thus further negating the possibility of its conceptualisation as political agency. 
The two assumptions to highlight here are about the location of political agency and its 
embeddedness in international politics. First, as the first part of the chapter showed, our efforts 
to bring back the local often have a counter-effect—by focusing on the everyday and 
emphasising the deleterious depoliticisation brought about by neoliberal transformations, 
many of these approaches run the risk of reifying the depoliticising image of the local. And 
second, such representations of the local, whether in policy or academic documents, prevent 
us from seeing the international embeddedness of local subjectivities that transcend the temporal 
frames of the intervention itself. It is through thinking these connections that we might be 
able to theorise from local experiences differently, rather than approaching them as tools or 
spoilers for predefined goals.  
Finally, the last part of the chapter showed how the Balkans are usually imagined, 
how the Serbian subject holds a specific place in these narratives, and how the region is 
framed with the frameworks of post-conflict, post-communist, and in-transition. It is worth 
noting here a ground-breaking IR text—Elizabeth Dauphinée’s Politics of Exile, which used 
precisely an everyday subject, a Bosnian Serb translator Stojan Sokolović, to complicate 
both IR’s claims regarding the limits of knowledge, and more general claims around ethics 
                                               
152 MacGinty, ‘Everyday Peace’, 551. 
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of research. Yet in her effort to complicate the assumptions of the discipline, Dauphinée once 
again constructs a subject from simplifying “balkanist signs”—“religious fanaticism, an 
informal economy, genocide and rape.”153 And while she is doing important work for the 
discipline, one has to wonder what kind of work is done for the Stojans of the region? While 
IR grapples with its existential tensions, Stojan’s existence is confined to a an apolitical exile 
first, and then to a war criminal stereotype, removed from the political mobilisations in both 
his home and receiving countries.154 This project is similarly targeted at the discipline, and 
yet it is also motivated by an ethico-political concern for representations of and engagement 
with the subjects that made my fieldwork—subjects whose political subjectivities cannot be 
confined to the labels of post-conflict, post-communist, and in-transition.  
Thus, the central question becomes how to engage local subjectivities differently, and 
what might we learn from doing it. In asking this question, it is necessary to situate agency 
on the local side of the intervention. Moreover, it is necessary to conceptualise it without 
bounding it to that location and separating it from the international. The following chapter 
answers the first part of the question by advocating an ethnographic approach to 
governmentality that is better able to navigate these issues.  This approach is then applied in 
Part II of the thesis while exploring non-formal youth education and agricultural governance 
in Serbia. However, the thesis also asks what can be learned from this different 
engagement—and it is this question that is answered in relation to agricultural policy and 
youth education in Part II, and in relation to intervention scholarship and its methodological 
and analytical debates in Part III. 
 
                                               
153 Zinaić, ‘The Scope of Violence’, 405. 
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Chapter 2 
 Ethnographic Explorations of Governmentality 
 
This chapter presents my own approach to studying experiences of people supposed 
to reap the benefits of international interventions—an ethnographic exploration of 
governmentality meant to build onto the critique presented in Chapter 1. This approach 
seeks to locate political agency within the targets of international interventions without losing 
sight of the embeddedness of that agency within international politics. Following Patrick 
Thaddeus Jackson’s observation that methodology is a key site for reflection, this chapter 
will not be just a straightforward presentation of my analytical and methodological 
frameworks, but it will draw out some of the main tensions that the project emerged from.1 
Namely, it will address the problems of studying international power through the everyday, 
and approaching the everyday as neither a mere instance of the international, nor a fetishized 
bounded local.  
 The chapter engages with two specific bodies of literature that are complementary 
on this issue: governmentality studies are accused of erasing the local in their study of how 
it is produced by international power, while ethnography is easily seduced by empirical 
details that construe the local as separated from global forces that are not directly observable. 
The chapter proceeds in three parts. The first part presents governmentality as a concept 
which connects subjectivities and forms of government. The usual explanation for the 
proliferation of governmentality studies in IR relates issues of accessibility and translation. 
While the first interdisciplinary wave of governmentality studies was inspired by the 
publication of the Foucault Effect in 1991,2  the complete lectures were translated and 
published during the 2000s, thus opening the doors for the burgeoning field of 
governmentality studies and their adoption within IR. While the accessibility of the lectures 
definitely encouraged the use of governmentality, I think there is also a more substantive 
explanation. Namely, as we saw in Chapter 1, there is a growing concern of the world order 
with the inner world of individual subjects—this has naturally drawn attention to the concept 
that explicitly deals with connecting power and subjectivities.  
                                               
1 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations; cited in Aradau and Huysmans, ‘Critical Methods in 
International Relations’, 597. 
2 Foucault et al., The Foucault Effect. 
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Instead of using governmentality as a ready-made concept, this section will also 
engage with its critics to highlight tensions that are productive for this project. It will focus 
on two specific issues: (1) how the operation of power is shaped by politics and power 
hierarchies, and (2) how to avoid an overly neat account which in its critique of international 
power forgets and thus erases local agency.  
I explore these issues further through an ethnographic methodology. The second part 
of the chapter defines ethnography not only as a method, but as an orientation that 
complicates how we conceptualise the objects of our study, and our own relations to them. 
This section further draws on debates in anthropology to highlight the difficulty of treading 
a fine line between centring target experiences, and fetishizing localness. It complicates the 
view of the local as culturally and temporally bounded and cast as ontologically different, 
and it also argues against the erasure of the researcher in favour of ethnographic reflexivity 
and situatedness. 
Finally, the third part of the chapter presents a framework that uses concepts of 
programs, practices, and effects of government in order to explore how subjectivities engage, 
and are engaged by, international interventions.  
I Governmentality 
A project that is interested in the connection between subjectivities and forms of 
government invites the work of Michel Foucault, whose main objective was the exploration 
of different kinds of subjectivations.3 The concept of governmentality inspired a rich 
literature within IR that focuses on how conduct is conducted through the design of freedom 
rather than coercion, and an already vast array of criticism.4 Before moving on to present 
how I engage with governmentality, this section will try to summarize those critiques in two 
main camps: those that critique governmentality studies as unable to consider structural 
conditions in which government happens, and those that focus on the conspicuous absence of 
agency in accounts of governmentality. This division is telling in itself: a concept whose main 
                                               
3 Kelly points out the difference between subjectifaction (subjection) and the more active self-regulating 
subjectivation. Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, 87–89; cited in Kiersey, ‘Neoliberal Political 
Economy and the Subjectivity of Crisis’, 366, note 8. 
4 Death, ‘Governmentality at the Limits of the International’; Vrasti, ‘Universal but Not Truly “Global”’; Selby, 
‘Engaging Foucault’; Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’; Walters, Governmentality; Chandler, ‘Critiquing 
Liberal Cosmopolitanism?’; Chandler, ‘Globalising Foucault’; see also the forums in Kiersey and Weidner, 
‘Special Issue: Foucault and International Relations’; Huysmans, ‘Forum’; Shani and Chandler, ‘Forum - 
Assessing the Impact of Foucault on International Relations’; Albert and Lenco, ‘Forum—Foucault and 
International Political Sociology’. 
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strength is supposed to be connecting the micro and the macro, is perceived as missing both. 
The chapter proceeds with taking both of these critiques seriously. Moreover, instead of 
trying to find out what the “correct” use of the concept of governmentality might be, or what 
Foucault really meant by it, this short review of literature serves more to orient my own 
analytical and methodological approach that is born out of these tensions.  In short, I think 
that it is precisely these anxieties that make governmentality a concept able to start what 
Michael Merlingen referred to as creating “a powerful critical sociology that pulls the 
analysis of subjectivity into the exploration of world order.”5 
i. Governmentality defined 
Despite the proliferation of the concept and the discussions on its “true” meaning that 
will be partially presented below, Foucault’s own use of the term governmentality was 
ambiguous. In a short book that critically introduces the concept and the literature that it 
inspired, William Walters finds three distinct ways in which Foucault uses the notion of 
governmentality: 1) the conduct of conduct between the two extreme poles of “strategic 
relations” and “states of domination,”6 2) governance of and by states in exploring “the 
conditions of the possibility of modern state” and 3) a particular set of governmental 
techniques employed since the end of eighteenth century—what Foucault calls liberal 
governmentality.7 My own approach falls within the first category: I use governmentality to 
examine connections between subjectivities and different forms of government, while I qualify 
those practices that seek to govern through freedom as (neo)liberal governmentality.8   
Anywhere on the line between strategic relations and states of domination, the 
defining characteristic of governmentality as a form of power is its concern for the everyday 
of the subjectivities which it engages.9 To cite Foucault, governmentality “is a form of power 
which makes individuals subjects.”10 It is this focus on the connection between everyday 
subjectivities and the power that shapes them, that inspired the use of governmentality in this 
project.  Foucault recognized three distinct “modes of objectification which transform human 
beings into subjects.” Modes of inquiry are those that operate under the status of sciences, thus 
                                               
5 Merlingen, ‘Monster Studies’, 273–74. 
6 Foucault, ‘The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom’, 299; cited in Walters, 
Governmentality, 11. 
7 Walters, Governmentality, 11–12.  
8 My use of term “government” here is close to that of “governance” used by some governmentality scholars. I 
use “government” as the practice of the art of government: more than supervision, it implies intervention to 
achieve governmental ideals in multiple and varied spheres. Foucault discusses this in Birth of Biopolitics.  
9 Vrasti, ‘Universal but Not Truly “Global”’, 50. 
10 Foucault, ‘Subject and Power’, 781. 
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creating, for example, the speaking subject of linguistics, or the labouring subject of 
economics. Modes of dividing practices, or disciplines, divide the subject either from others or 
within itself, thus creating the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy. And lastly, there 
are those modes which human beings use to turn themselves into subjects, for example as 
subjects of sexuality.11 
This conceptualisation allows us to trace the concern with subjectivation not only 
through the lectures on governmentality, but through different stages in Foucault’s work: 
from investigating scientific fields of linguistics, biology, and economics in The Order of Things 
and Archaeology of Knowledge, to the dividing disciplines of the prison in Discipline and Punish, 
and the final volume of History and Sexuality: The Care of the Self.12 Moreover, it situates his 
lectures on governmentality, Security, Territory, Population and Birth of Biopolitics, given in the 
period between 1977 and 1979, as the bridge between the concern with macro processes of 
the formation of regimes of truth and discipline, to the mundane practices which individuals 
use to turn themselves into subjects.13  
Governmentality then has a “mediating function” that is twofold: it firstly mediates 
between power and subjectivity to study how techniques of rule are tied to “technologies of 
the self”14 and how forms of political government translate to “processes by which the 
individual acts upon himself;”15 secondly, it highlights the relationship between techniques 
of power and forms of knowledge which make government possible.16  
Following the three different modes of subjectivation Foucault uses, we can see how 
international interventions operate in those three modes. 
a. Sciences 
Whether it is development, liberal peace, democratisation, environmentally 
sustainable development, or peacebuilding, all of these concepts have been working through 
their own epistemic communities—what Foucault referred to as “modes of inquiry which try 
to give themselves the status of sciences.”17 This mode of subjectivation is detailed, for 
example, in Arturo Escobar’s  investigation of how the development discourse has managed 
                                               
11 Foucault, 777–78. 
12 Foucault, Discipline and Punish; Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Care of the Self. 
13 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population; Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. 
14 Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Care of the Self.  
15 Foucault, ‘About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self’, 203. 
16 Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke, Governmentality, 2. 
17 Foucault, ‘Subject and Power’, 777. 
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to “colonise reality;” how it works through the discourse of good governance and 
technologies of democratisations; how experts create specific images of countries and regions 
which enable developmental thinking and doing; and how developmental thinking empties 
projects of politics.18 Interestingly, this is one area which even those critiquing the 
“internationalisation” of governmentality studies consider an important and successful 
contribution.19  
b. Disciplines  
All these rationalities are born out of practices of disciplining, rendering some 
subjects, be it regions, states, populations, or individuals, deficient, abnormal, and targeted 
for reform. Tore Fougner, for example, has shown how annual competitiveness reports 
produced by organisations like the World Economic Forum and the International Institute 
for Management Development govern states by both constituting them as market subjects, 
and conducting their conduct through designing their freedom.20 Oded Löwenheim also 
provided a detailed analysis of the ways in which power and knowledge are connected in 
various governance indicators.21 The array of tools used for benchmarking today is 
astounding in itself: Freedom House ratings, corporate credit house ratings, corruption 
indices, human happiness measurement. Even the recent peace index is just the tip of the 
disciplinary iceberg creating an “indefinite discipline: an interrogation without an end.”22  
c. Self-objectifying practices 
Foucault’s later work focused on “the way a human being turns himself into a 
subject.”23 This aspect is curiously missing from most studies of intervention. This can be 
explained by the textual bias of governmentality studies: because scholars examine mostly 
official policies and assume subjectivities produced in their response, there is little discussion 
of how individuals are actually attached to those policies on the ground. This is perhaps most 
easily seen in works on civil society—studies that focus on how interventions work through 
fostering a specific conception of political life and a specific vision of civil society. These 
                                               
18 Escobar, Encountering Development, 5; Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy; Mitchell, Rule of Experts; Ferguson, 
The Anti-Politics Machine. 
19 In addition to Escobar and Ferguson, Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault’, 333; cites Marc DuBois, ‘The Governance 
of the Third World’; Brigg, ‘Post-Development, Foucault and the Colonisation Metaphor’; Edkins, Whose 
Hunger? 
20 Fougner, ‘Neoliberal Governance of States’. 
21 Löwenheim, ‘Examining the State’. 
22 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 227. 
23 Foucault, ‘Subject and Power’, 778. 
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studies examine policy documents and rely on civil society organisations (CSOs) actively 
participating in technologies presented in those documents, such as calls, evaluations, 
competitions and so on—this in turns makes them neoliberal subjectivities.24 However, there 
is little exploration of what actually happens with the everyday of CSOs, or how CSOs are 
made into a concept that captures human practice. Besides demonstrating the textual bias of 
governmentality studies, this exclusion is also due to a general lack of concern for subjects 
of governmentality, an issue that will be discussed in detail below.  
ii. Critiquing international governmentality25   
Governmentality has been used widely to study international politics. It is employed 
to explain EU’s democracy promotion,26  building states and civil societies in Africa,27 global 
governance,28 liberal peace and development,29 Europeanisation,30 the emergence of a 
European civil society,31 European peacebuilding missions,32 and, more broadly, how global 
spaces are imagined and governed through using concepts like security, world order, global 
networks, European integration, and ethical capitalism.33   
The proliferation of these projects, and the ambiguity of the concept itself, have 
sparked debates on the “proper” application of governmentality in IR. The debates are telling 
of a larger divide among those who use Foucault’s work to interrogate global politics.  On 
the one hand, there is a growing literature that combines governmentality with other, 
increasingly Marxist and critical realist, insights to reach “grand” conclusions about the new 
workings of the global order. On the other hand, there are those more “conventional” 
                                               
24 Malmvig, ‘Free Us from Power’; Kurki, ‘Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion’; Tagma, 
Kalaycioglu, and Akcali, ‘“Taming” Arab Social Movements’. 
25 This is far from an exhaustive list. For a good overview of what Walters calls the “international 
governmentality studies constellation,” see Walters, Governmentality, chap. 3. For an engagement with various 
critiques of IR’s use of governmentality, see Vrasti, ‘Universal but Not Truly “Global”’. 
26 Kurki, Democratic Futures; Kurki, ‘Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion’; Tagma, Kalaycioglu, 
and Akcali, ‘“Taming” Arab Social Movements’; Malmvig, ‘Free Us from Power’. 
27 Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy; Abrahamsen, ‘African Democracy’; Gabay and Death, State-Building and 
Civil Society in Africa; Death, ‘Governmentality at the Limits of the International’. 
28 Lipschutz and Rowe, Globalization, Governmentality and Global Politics Regulation for the Rest of Us?; Enroth, 
‘Governance: The Art of Governing after Governmentality’. 
29 Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars; Dillon and Reid, ‘Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and 
Complex Emergency’; Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War; Richmond, ‘The Problem of Peace’; 
Duffield, ‘Getting Savages to Fight Barbarians’. 
30 Diez, ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others’; Walters and Haahr, Governing Europe; Huysmans, ‘A 
Foucaultian View on Spill-Over’. 
31 Kutay, Governance and European Civil Society. 
32 Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, European Union Peacebuilding and Policing Governance and the European Security and 
Defence Policy. 
33 Larner and Walters, Global Governmentality; Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke, Governmentality. 
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governmentality scholars whose empirical accounts showcase how power is executed 
through pairing particular political rationalities with different political technologies. This 
“curious bifurcation in Foucauldian interpretations of world politics”34 has not gone 
unnoticed: Thomas Lemke differentiates between sweeping sociological narratives and 
detailed empirical studies;35 William Walters talks about the importance of bridging the 
concern with empirical detail with an interest in the “bigger picture;”36 Laura Zanotti 
differentiates between those using governmentality as a heuristic and those using it as a 
descriptive device;37 and Michael Merlingen contrasts the less critical and more reader-
friendly discourse analysis with the more critical and less reader-friendly studies of 
biopower.38  
The following section continues along these lines and will provide a short overview 
of critiques along two camps: one strand of literature, that might be considered more 
conventional governmentality studies, is criticized for their “flat ontologies” which do not 
inquire into structural conditions. The second strand of literature, on the other hand, focuses 
on the grand narratives of capitalism and neoliberalism, but often remains blind to micro 
practices that sustain them, and perhaps more importantly, to the everyday day actors that 
live, make, and complicate them. The end result is a curious situation which sees 
governmentality studies devoid of both structures and agents of international politics.  
a. Erasing structures 
This line of criticism accuses governmentality studies of being unable to deal with 
“the structural dimensions of power, as well as the specificity and irreducibility of the 
international.”39 They start from the famous interpretations of Foucault’s work on 
governmentality that subscribes to what they refer to as a “flat ontology.” For example, the 
idea of analytics of government, elaborated by Mitchell Dean in his seminal work in 1999,40 
is in line with Nikolas Rose’s41 idea that governmentality should abstain from trying to create 
grand theories or new sociologies of governance—it should be contained to a “particular 
                                               
34 Merlingen, ‘Monster Studies’, 273. 
35 Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke, Governmentality, 16. 
36 Walters, Governmentality, 111. 
37 Zanotti, ‘Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology’, 289. 
38 Merlingen, ‘Applying Foucault’s Toolkit to CSDP’, 189–90. 
39 Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault’, 326. 
40 Dean, Governmentality. 
41 Rose, Powers of Freedom, 19. 
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stratum of knowing and acting”—remaining provisional and decidedly empirical while 
eschewing realist ontologies and explanations.42  
This approach to governmentality, however, has received a spate of criticism from 
both within and outside of IR. 43 Outside or IR and as early as 1995, Bruce Curtis found that 
Rose and Miller’s focus on governmentality solely as technical devices cannot be productive 
because of its blindness to interests and intentions of different social actors. To quote his 
illustrative example: what can we learn from identifying a school curriculum with the goal 
of creating a sense of “pride in nation” as a mere technical device without considering the 
goals of educational planners?44 Similarly, what can we tell about the working of global 
governance, benchmarking of political and economic performance, and practices that turn 
states and their populations into targets, if we do not consider the power relations that make 
them possible and are reproduced in the process?45 
This issue is summarised in the difference between the how of power—the realm of 
governmentality, and the why of power—seemingly the goal of “real” IR. However, there is 
more at stake here than the difference between explaining and understanding as goals of 
inquiry. The consideration of “the structural dimensions of power” both points to the issues 
of scaling up of governmentality, and limits its conceptual utility to localities that function 
with “advanced liberal rule.”46 Here, limits to “scaling-up” governmentality to explain 
international politics are found precisely in the structural inequalities that are present in the 
uneven international, and missing from the domestic sphere that Foucault was concerned 
with.47  
Structures are invoked again when trying to explain why liberal advanced rule is not 
present globally, even if we agree that international agencies such as the World Bank and 
IMF try to govern through employing governmental techniques. In this case, we are faced 
                                               
42 Osborne, ‘Techniken und Subjekte: Von den “Governmentality Studies” zu den “Studies of 
Governmentality”’; cited in Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke, Governmentality, 16. 
43 Frauley makes a convincing case that Rose and Miller are more responsible for this reading than Foucault 
himself, and that more attention to his archaeological works would lead to a realist ontology. See ‘The 
Expulsion of Foucault from Governmentality Studies’. 
44 Curtis, ‘Taking the State Back Out’, 583. 
45 Selby translates these concerns to IR well: “The notion of ‘governmentality’, for example, while it can shed 
light on how populations are administered and subjects are constituted in, say, modern Turkey, or can point us 
towards the novel mechanisms by which the New Partnership for African Development is attempting to self-
discipline African states into ‘good governance’, cannot itself be used to explain why the Turkish state is more 
governmentalized than the Syrian one, why there is so much ‘bad governance’ in Africa specifically, or indeed 
what the purposes and objectives of governmentality are.” Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault’, 337. 
46 Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’. 
47 Joseph, ‘Governmentality of What?’, especially 225. 
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with attempts of applying governmentality, and the failures of this application.48 This approach sees 
places outside advanced liberalism—such as the Middle East, or the varyingly democratic 
Balkans—as failed attempts of ruling through freedom, and make the difference between 
developed and developing countries the analytical fault-line for governmentality studies.49 
Furthermore to explain those different outcomes in different parts of the world, we have to 
examine “conditions of possibility” and “underlying social relations” that make 
governmentality fail or succeed.50  
These issues are now well rehearsed in what can be described as a Marxist critique 
of international governmentality studies. To summarise, the critique starts from the 
observation that Foucault was concerned primarily with how power works in the domestic 
arena—homogenous and liberal, and thus it cannot be unproblematically scaled-up to talk 
about the international realm, marked by its unevenness and anarchy.  
b. Erasing subjects 
Perhaps surprisingly, alongside an inability to capture structural conditions, 
governmentality studies have similarly been accused of erasing the other side of the social 
world, namely the subjects. Nicholas Kiersey offers a useful summary of different starting 
points to this critique when he differentiates between a Marxist and a communitarian 
critique of IR governmentality studies,51 and the following section will add the recent 
decolonial critique to this list. But before we move on, it is useful to clarify what the implied 
relationship between subjects and power is when one invokes governmentality. 
Neoliberal governmentality denotes a specific shift in an understanding of the 
subject—instead of the rights bearing subject of classical liberalism, we are faced with a 
responsibility bearing subject. The move is a consequence of the market rationality that 
forms the basis of neoliberalism. As already mentioned in the Introduction, the enterprise 
form subsumes not only all social relations, but also subjectivity itself.52 Self-enterprising 
individuals are not coerced into conforming, but controlled “through the organised 
proliferation of individual difference in an economized matrix” that promotes the “rolling 
back of the frontiers of the state, its promotion of marketized social institutions and its 
inculcation of a vigorous materialist individualism.”53 Thus profound shifts in the most 
                                               
48 Joseph, 240. 
49 For an elaboration of this argument, see Vrasti, ‘Universal but Not Truly “Global”’, 54–55. 
50 Joseph, ‘Governmentality of What?’, 240–41. 
51 Kiersey, ‘Neoliberal Political Economy and the Subjectivity of Crisis’. 
52 McNay, ‘Self as Enterprise’, 56. 
53 McNay, 56, 60. 
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intimate understanding of the self and its relation to others go hand-in-hand with major shift 
in forms of government. This was observed powerfully with the introduction of capitalist 
markets and democracy in post-communist Eastern Europe. In the words of Elizabeth 
Dunn, “the successful creation of market economy requires changing the very foundation of 
what it means to be a person.”54  
Government then happens through a myriad of everyday choices that subjects make 
towards “the avoidance of risk and the maximization of their own happiness”: choosing 
employment, accepting risk, writing a competitive CV, investing in friendships that have a 
future, evaluating compatibility with partners, rewarding flexibility, appraising consumption 
patterns, and nurturing specific work habits.55 All of these are techniques through which 
neoliberalism formats individuals. Subjectivity then, becomes a means of control, or as Lois 
McNay puts it, “[i]ndividual autonomy becomes not the opposite of, or limit to, neoliberal 
governance, rather it lies at the heart of its disciplinary control.”56 This complicates any ideas 
of resistance—a topic we will touch upon in Chapters 4 and 5—but it also invites critiques 
of erasing agency more generally.   
When discussing the Marxist critique, Kiersey moves it in a particularly productive 
direction because he does not include only criticisms from Selby and Joseph that were 
touched upon in the previous section, but he engages with Ian Bruff’s work that finds a 
commonality between Marxist and Foucauldian approaches—namely, they are both 
reductionist in that they offer a “totalising ontology” which reduces human practice to just a 
product of capitalist or power relations.57 Marxists insist that all human action is a product 
of capitalist relations, while Foucauldians insist that all human action (that in turn produces 
subjects themselves) is a consequence of power relations. Thus, the fluidity usually 
associated with governmentality approaches that see power everywhere and in everything 
and is hailed as “epistemological modesty,” actually becomes “epistemological austerity.”58 
Any kind of investigation of how the subjects might participate themselves in their own 
making is precluded by a focus on power relations—“there is only one way to know about 
the world—no other aspects of human existence need be considered.”59 Thus, Foucauldian 
                                               
54 Dunn, Privatizing Poland, 56. See also the edited volume Makovicky, Neoliberalism, Personhood, and Postsocialism. 
55 McNay, ‘Self as Enterprise’, 61. 
56 McNay, 62. 
57 Bruff, ‘The Totalisation of Human Social Practice’, 341. 
58 Bruff, 334. 
59 Bruff, 344. 
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approaches turn the subject into a passive “vehicle for power relations.”60 This creates an 
outline which “asserts an uncompromising framework of the social and tends to elide the 
particular in human practice.”61 This tension between investigating subjects, and power that 
approaches them, will play a crucial role in the second part of the chapter that will present 
ethnographic meta-methodological reflections on the same issue.  
The communitarian line of critique, started by David Chandler’s contribution to 
International Political Sociology, and continued in the subsequent forum in Global Society,62 
focuses on the importance of the political subject for both those who celebrate post-territorial 
politics, namely liberal cosmopolitans, and those who radically critique it, namely those who 
use a governmentality or a biopolitical approach to world politics. 63 The critique proceeds in 
straightforward moves: 1) both liberal cosmopolitan and radical biopolitical approaches base 
their argument on the rejection of state-based communities, without any effort to imagine 
the alternative; 2) by doing so, they abandon the figure of the liberal rights-bearing subject 
and thus break the connection between citizenship and political community, 3) this 
eradicates the “mediating links of political community” and empties politics of subjects and 
hence meaning.64 The individualisation and de-politicisation are thus not the results of 
“effervescent and imperialistic liberalism” as Foucauldian scholars might make us think, but 
they are a much more disappointing result of a general “check out” of subjects whose leaders 
were unable to offer a coherent liberal program that would serve as a basis of a political 
community.65 So the choice of seeing the new post-statist world order as inherently liberal and 
celebrating the power of global civil society, or as an Empire engulfing the totality in its 
biopolitical power, becomes a matter of not much more than the starting positions of the 
critics involved, since it is not grounded in any empirical considerations.66 The basic premise 
is the same—the political subject is lost.  
At the time of publication, Chandler’s criticism was seen as an attack on 
governmentality studies and another “interrogation” or “trial” for Foucauldian inspired 
scholarship.67 While I do not read such intentions in this work, it is nevertheless impossible 
                                               
60 Bruff, 343–47; cited in Kiersey, ‘Neoliberal Political Economy and the Subjectivity of Crisis’, 371. 
61 Kiersey, ‘Neoliberal Political Economy and the Subjectivity of Crisis’, 371. 
62 Kiersey and Weidner, ‘Special Issue: Foucault and International Relations’. 
63 Chandler, ‘Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism?’ 
64 Chandler, 56. 
65 Kiersey, ‘Neoliberal Political Economy and the Subjectivity of Crisis’, 375. 
66 Chandler, ‘Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism?’, 57. 
67 Debrix, ‘We Other IR Foucaultians’; Rosenow, ‘Decentring Global Power’. 
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to neglect the overwhelmingly liberal character of Chandler’s vision of politics. This vision 
of the desired political subject is constrained—in a way, it is reminiscent of what Sabaratnam 
identified as a hegemonic vision of political life that constitutes liberalism as “the only 
relevant frame of politically relevant being.” This frame acknowledges political being only 
insofar as it is based on the concept of an “individualist secular citizenship”—a proper liberal 
subject.68 In her work on decolonial strategies in IR, Sabaratnam clearly argues against such 
an approach that would supress any political being outside the specific liberal frame. Only 
after provincializing these hegemonic frames, are we able to open space of exploring 
“alternative political subjecthoods” and the lessons that they may lead to.69 And 
provincializing them means engaging with subjectivities that transcend them without a priori 
casting them as apolitical or banal.  
More than just articulating an argument against a nostalgia for an imagined liberal 
subject, Sabaratnam’s work directly engages governmentality studies when she summarises 
them as analytically bypassing subjects. This decolonial critique argues that since 
governmentality approaches privilege “a specific modality of power that works through the 
production of volition rather than coercion or loyalty,” the subjects that are engaged by power 
are analytically missed in the framework.70 In a way, Sabaratnam here agrees with Chandler’s 
critique of governmentality approaches: the view of international power as governmentalizing 
and thus subject-producing inevitably robs us of a political subject that would be the platform 
for resistance to that same power. However, Sabaratnam goes further to find similarity 
between Chandler’s approach and governmentality approaches: they both critique the 
disappearance of political subjects, but they both fail to specify that it is the subject that is 
the target of intervention that is missing—Western agency and political subjectivity are still 
operational.71   
As already glimpsed earlier in the chapter, I treat these lines of critique—Marxist, 
communitarian, and decolonial, as productive and instructive, rather than debilitating. In 
response to them, I employ an ethnographic approach to governmentality that can re-focus 
subjectivity in the study of governmentality.  
                                               
68 Sabaratnam, ‘IR in Dialogue … but Can We Change the Subjects?’, 792; She cites Ayers, ‘Imperial Liberties’. 
for the elaboration of how a particular idea of the subject is “exported” by claims to universality and through 
the “democratisation” agenda. 
69 Sabaratnam, ‘IR in Dialogue … but Can We Change the Subjects?’, 792. 
70 Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism’, 265. 
71 Sabaratnam, 266. 
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II Ethnography  
The arguments for “adding” ethnography to governmentality studies are well 
rehearsed: after its blinding concern for power and discourse, ethnography promises an 
engagement with the everyday that would break with the view of governmental 
transformations in “monolithic and linear terms.”72 The above described difficulties of 
thinking alongside structures and subjects of governmentality studies are reflected in their 
methodological orientation which is often described as having a textual bias. 73 Put most 
simply, because of its insistence on studying policy papers that are supposed to reflect power 
and its technologies, governmentality studies fail to take into account both the structural 
conditions which led to the development of such policies, and the messiness that happens 
during efforts to transplant those policies from paper into practice.  
My arrival into the field of IR at the height of the criticisms levelled against 
governmentality studies meant that I always approached governmentality through its lacks. I 
deliberately eschewed programmatic documents and kept eyes open for resistance, 
messiness, and structures that littered the pages of governmentality critiques. This meant 
descending into what Foucault called “the witches’ brew of real life” and what Rose referres 
to as sociologies of rule, as opposed to staying at the level of studying rationalities of 
government.74 Ethnography thus emerged as a methodology capable of bringing into view 
those things usually obscured by the textual bias of most governmentality studies.75  
However, the tensions between Foucault’s project and sociologies of rule or 
ethnographies of practice are undeniable. This is perhaps best captured in Dean’s response 
to an article advocating for ethnographies of practice.76 In it, Dean emphasises that “Foucault 
is not seeking to access the complexity of everyday life but the conditions under which we 
form a knowledge of and seek to govern such domains as everyday life.”77 In other words, 
                                               
72 A similar argument is made for IR in general, as ethnography hopes to transcend IR’s “static and state-
centric” perspective, with more attention to “everyday practices and embodied actions.” Lie, ‘Challenging 
Anthropology’, 202. 
73 Howell identifies three problems associated with a methodology that  focuses exclusively on policy 
documents: 1) it reduces Foucault’s notion of discourse to mean language, while a more productive analysis 
would be concerned with dispositifs 2) by overlooking “minor articulations and contestation” they produce a 
kind of “governmentality without genealogy”, and 3) it treats it as completed and successful strategy of hiding 
neoliberal policies, thus obscuring the true complexity of the changing state-citizen relationship that revolves 
around the term. Howell, ‘Resilience as Enhancement’. 
74 Rose, Powers of Freedom, 19. 
75 For a discussion on the consequences of the textual bias of governmentality studies, see Howell, ‘Resilience 
as Enhancement’. 
76 Dean, ‘Neoliberalism, Governmentality, Ethnography’; in response to Brady, ‘Ethnographies of Neoliberal 
Governmentalities’. 
77 Dean, ‘Neoliberalism, Governmentality, Ethnography’, 359. 
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governmentality studies are concerned with the rationalities that guide government, not with 
the messiness of really existing government.  
While Dean successfully presents Foucault’s own work to defend this position, there 
is a very political problem with this stance, even if it is defended “in the original.” The 
problem with this kind of reading is that those determining both the conditions for forming 
knowledge, and the knowledge itself, are usually far removed from those experiencing the 
practices of intervention inspired by that knowledge. In fact, such a focus is utterly incapable 
of addressing the decolonial critique of bypassing local subjects. Even if we were to try to 
bring back some agency in the form of messiness and transformation of programs on the 
ground, we would still end with an image of the world governed by structures imagined 
emerging from the West, and their particular local expressions around the world. Because 
of this, I abandon any insinuation of “faithfulness” to Foucault and proceed with an 
ethnographic exploration of governmentality. By doing so, I hope to contribute to a wider 
project that is not only interested in the interstices of agency and power, but that seeks to 
inquire specifically into the possibilities, ways, and consequences of “studying the agency of 
being governed.”78 
But before moving on, it is not enough to just define what I mean by an ethnographic 
approach. I also want to review some debates about the possibilities and limitations of 
ethnographic methodologies. These debates illuminate some tensions present in trying to 
engage subjects that we might consider local, and how they interact with processes and 
powers that might be considered international or global.79  
The general rising interest in ethnography and micro dynamics of political life can be 
read as a part of a general move of social science towards the micro to counteract its usual 
preoccupation with abstract units and dynamics on a macro level. It is traced back to mid-
seventies, which used the popularisation of semiotics, phenomenology, and hermeneutics to 
attack positivism by arguing that focusing on practice would enable reformulating “high-
theory” questions from the actors’ point of view.80 This turn made it to IR in a growing focus 
                                               
78 For a formulation of this project, see the edited volume Hansson, Hellberg, and Stern, Studying the Agency of 
Being Governed, 6–7. 
79 As already discussed in Chapter 1, I do not use “international” and “global” as diagnoses of political realities. 
I.e. I do not embrace overly optimistic announcements of the development of a “global society,” nor do I accept 
that international politics are limited to state actors.  
80 Marcus, ‘Contemporary Problems of Ethnography in the Modern World System’, 166. For an early account 
of the practice turn in anthropology, see Ortner, ‘Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties’. 
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on practice and ethnography.81 Ethnographic engagement is meant to counter the usual 
“armchair analysis” that relies solely on language and discourse understood without 
practice.82  
My own use of ethnography exceeds the usual understanding of ethnography as 
implying some sort of “epistemological imperialism” with a privileged access reality.83 
Drawing on George Marcus’ differentiation between meta-methodological discussions that 
focus on the pedagogical process, and discussions of particular tactics of inquiry, this part 
proceeds as follows: 84 the first section will define ethnography not only as a practice, a genre 
of writing, or a set of methods, but as a particular sensibility. This sensibility complicates how 
we conceptualise both those we research and the researcher herself—issues examined in the 
following two sections. Finally, the last section will present tactics of inquiry that I used 
throughout the fieldwork conducted in 2016. 
 
i. Defining ethnography: Anthropology  ¹ ethnography ¹  participant 
observation85  
 
“The aim of the ethnographer is to listen deeply to and/or to observe as closely as 
possible the beliefs, the values, the material conditions and structural forces that 
underwrite the socially patterned behaviours of all human beings and the meanings 
people attach to these conditions and forces. When we conduct research with an 
ethnographic imaginary these are some of the aspects of human existence that we aim 
to uncover.”86  
 
The above distinction between anthropology as a discipline usually associated with 
ethnography, ethnography as a methodological orientation, and participant observation as 
one ethnographic tactic of inquiry (a specific “method”), captures the most important point 
of my own definition. I define ethnography not only as participant observation or immersion, 
but as a certain sensibility. This sensibility—variously referred as a particular stance, 
                                               
81 Adler and Pouliot, International Practices, 2011; Pouliot, ‘“Sobjectivism”’; Bueger and Gadinger, ‘The Play of 
International Practice’; Vrasti, ‘The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations’; Salter, ‘The 
Ethnographic Turn: Introduction’.  
82 Neumann, ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn’. 
83 Dean, ‘Neoliberalism, Governmentality, Ethnography’, 360. This is an accusation raised by Dean in response 
to Brady’s argument about the potentials of governmentality studies with an ethnographic imaginary. See the 
debate in Foucault Studies: Brady, ‘Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethnography’. 
84 Marcus, ‘‘How Short Can Fieldwork Be?’ 
85 I borrow this formulation from Forsey and Hockey, ‘Ethnography Is Not Participant Observation’, 72. 
86 Forsey, ‘Ethnography as Participant Listening’, 567. 
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imaginary, or orientation—has two main aspects.87 First, by recognizing that the main data 
collection tool is the researcher herself—with all the theories, concepts, situatedness, 
emotions, and affects that come along with it, it abandons the “view from nowhere” and 
recognises that all knowledge is produced from a particular location.88 And secondly, it is 
oriented towards the social world and material objects, but pays special attention to the 
meaning-making work that goes into creating them. This orientation allows us to more fully 
appreciate not just human experiences, but also how they are made through different forces 
that might be underwriting those experiences.   
Such a definition moves away from ethnography as a tactic of inquiry. Nowadays, it is 
recognised that the grounding myths of anthropological fieldwork are ideals that might 
orient our practice but are never achieved.89 The idea that we have to participate and observe 
for at least 12 months is disappearing due to institutional limitations and methodological 
reflections. The obsession with “how long”—the idea of a 12-month cycle that is supposed 
to offer a view of one agricultural cycle—still lives on only as a myth.90 We similarly admit 
that participant observation is mostly participant listening, even when it is technically called 
participating.91 Most of our ethnographies are dispersed, multi-sited, and draw on a spate of 
methods such as ethnographic interviews, impromptu focus groups, and our own every-day 
observations.92 
Letting go of the idea of ethnography as a method of long-term participant 
observation, however, leads to a problem of definition. If it is not a method, what is it? My 
definition is concerned with meta-methodological issues in the process of knowledge 
production.93 This section will draw from anthropological literature on ethnography to build 
onto the above definition and argue that the main contribution of ethnographic methodology 
                                               
87 For a discussion of ethnography as a sensibility, see Schatz, ‘Ethnographic Immersion’; Pader, ‘Seeing with 
an Ethnographic Sensibility’. Brady refers to it as an “imaginary” in Lippert and Brady, Governing Practices. 
Ethnographic stance is referred to in Ortner, ‘Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal’. 
88 Here, I draw on the broad field of feminist standpoint epistemology. See Harding, ‘Rethinking Standpoint 
Epistemology’; Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges’.  
89  Lie, ‘Challenging Anthropology’, 214–18. describes other definitional features of ethnographic fieldwork 
and shows how his own research failed to live up to them.  
90 For a discussion around “how long should fieldwork be,” see the exchange in Marcus and Okely, ‘Debate’. 
91 Forsey, ‘Ethnography as Participant Listening’; Forsey and Hockey, ‘Ethnography Is Not Participant 
Observation’. 
92 The concept of multi-sited ethnography was coined in Marcus, ‘Ethnography in/of the World System’. 
Recently, novel methodological approaches are developed in so called “global policy studies.” A great example 
is Stepputat and Larsen, Global Political Ethnography; Feldman, ‘The Case for Nonlocal Ethnography in a World 
of Apparatuses’. 
93 Marcus, ‘‘How Short Can Fieldwork Be?’ 
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is muddling the clear boundaries of concepts and subjects. Specifically, I argue that this 
particular understanding of ethnography complicates the very idea of fieldwork as a meeting 
between the research subject and the researcher, in something called the field. This view offers 
important lessons to a project that is usually interpreted as going “into the field,” to approach 
the local as our research subject. I hope to problematise all three of these terms by arguing 
that such a conceptualisation incarcerates both the subjects and the researchers. Moreover, 
it precludes the essential consideration of “epistemological and political issues of location,” by 
insisting on an empiricist “commitment to ‘the local.’”94  It is against this empiricist 
“commitment to the local” that I define ethnography and approach the experiences of my 
interlocutors.   
ii. Anthropology, ethnography, and IR 
In his 1922 Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Bronislaw Malinowski famously defined 
the goal of ethnography as “to grasp the native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realise 
his vision of his world.”95 This view still resonates with discussions of ethnographic methods: 
it is through full immersion that we are able to apprehend the native’s point of view. This 
claim, however, has been problematised—this section will draw on those conversations to 
find lessons on how to approach subjectivities from which I set out to learn about 
interventions.96 This idea that the finished ethnographic text somehow translates the native’s 
inner life into words understandable to readers elsewhere was challenged in the 1980s when 
anthropologists realised that instead of describing culture, ethnographers are actually writing 
it into existence.97 This recognition that ethnography is never about just “recording” is 
referred to as “the crisis of representation,” or the 1986 moment in anthropology. The 
publication of three seminal volumes unearthed the politics innate to all ethnographic texts 
and opened the doors for experimental ethnography.98 This moment focused on the 
production of text and challenged an “ideology claiming transparency of representation and 
                                               
94 Gupta and Ferguson, ‘Discipline and Practice’, 39. 
95 Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, 19 emphasis original. 
96 This is a goal more modest than an overview of the “ethnographic turn” in IR in general. Excellent work on 
that topic can be found in Vrasti, ‘The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations’; Rancatore, 
‘It Is Strange’; Vrasti, ‘Dr Strangelove’; Lie, ‘Challenging Anthropology’. 
97 Clifford and Marcus, Writing Culture. 
98 Clifford and Marcus; Marcus and Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural Critique; Turner and Bruner, The 
Anthropology of Experience. They were later criticized for focusing only on the politics within texts at the expense 
of ignoring politics that surround the production of those texts. Escobar, ‘The Limits of Reflexivity’, 378. talking 
about Fox, Recapturing Anthropology. Vrasti also adds the works of Geertz on the same issue, that were published 
before 1986: Geertz, ‘Deep Play’; Geertz, ‘Thick Description’; cited in Vrasti, ‘The Strange Case of 
Ethnography and International Relations’, 282. 
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immediacy of experience.”99 In general, it encouraged and actively advanced literary 
theoretical reflexivity.100 
In a scathing 2008 article, Vrasti argued that the embrace of ethnography within IR 
can be explained by IR’s ignorance of the developments described above. Examining IR 
ethnographic works, she argues that IR’s “ethnographic turn” adopted a “selective, 
instrumental and somehow timid understanding of what ethnography is and does.”101 Most 
interestingly, instead of engaging with basic anxieties that were articulated in 1986 and 
which constitute contemporary cultural anthropology, IR imagines ethnography as a solution 
to its own crisis of representation. It expects ethnography to “resolve the aporias of textual 
representation, automatically bring about emancipation, or render political scientists 
reflexive.”102 Specifically, ethnography was expected to do two things in IR: to “launch an 
emancipatory empiricist agenda that could rescue IR from moral relativism and (re)invest it 
with a much-desired policy voice,” and to “refurbish the discipline’s parochial vestiges 
through an inter- and multi-disciplinary effect.”103 In the section below, both of these are 
problematised. 
Here I do not wish to examine ethnographic IR on its own, or in relation to 
anthropology like Vrasti did.104 Rather, I want to foreground a particular debate in 
anthropology relevant to the current project: that is, how one might approach “the local” and 
“the field” in which the local is supposedly to be found, while knowing that what we uncover 
is always just a representation. However, I remain wary of Vrasti’s warning about the 
appropriation and big promises of ethnography—I do not expect ethnographic 
methodologies, nor anthropological debates, to offer “solutions” on how to approach the 
local. On the contrary, I use them here to draw out lessons and tools with which we might 
think around problems that are inevitable when trying to study the subjectivities of those 
“being governed.”105 
                                               
99 Clifford and Marcus, Writing Culture, 2. 
100 Clifford and Marcus, 24. This further led to what has been termed post-modern or experimental 
anthropology, which sought to introduce methods like dialogic or polyphonic writing in efforts to question the 
authority of “a science that has claimed to represent cultures” (p. 15). 
101 Vrasti, ‘The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations’, 281. 
102 Vrasti, 284; citing Marcus, Ethnography through Thick and Thin, 190. 
103 Vrasti, ‘The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations’, 295. 
104 For general overviews, see Wedeen, ‘Reflections on Ethnographic Work in Political Science’; Gusterson, 
‘Ethnographic Research’; For responses to Vrasti, see Rancatore, ‘It Is Strange’; Lie, ‘Challenging 
Anthropology’; Aradau and Huysmans, ‘Critical Methods in International Relations’, 609–11. 
105 Hansson, Hellberg, and Stern, Studying the Agency of Being Governed. 
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The specific post-1986 developments I draw from came about from the perceived 
accelerations of the movements of peoples, cultures, and goods around the world that made 
the idea of a local that is somehow separated from the global untenable.106 This obviously 
played a major role in a discipline where the local, or the native, has been central to its self-
conceptualisation. Anthropology relied on leaving “home” to go into “the field” and study 
how “the others” organise “their societies.” This idea of going out into the field to study the 
other brought with it the assumptions that “here” and “there” reflected only features of 
geography. However, behind a designation of geographical location, “here” and “there” 
necessarily reflected difference—here was modern, and there was primitive. So to study the 
development from primitive to modern, ethnographers travelled and collected data “in the 
field.”107 This differentiation brought with it a spate of dichotomies that played a part in how 
exactly we represent the local and the global. The global is construed as “a space that is 
dynamic, thrusting, open, rational, cosmopolitan and dominant while the local is 
communitarian, authentic, closed, static, nostalgic, defensive (but ultimately defenceless) 
and the site of ethnic, sexual, regional and other fragmentary identities.”108  And as much as 
we have moved beyond the old colonial ethnographies, these meanings still lurk behind our 
engagements with difference. Most importantly, because the international in scholarship on 
intervention is represented by a vague “international community,” this literature translates 
the local-global dichotomies discussed in anthropology to the local-international dichotomy 
that makes intervention.  
This view that separates the local and the global ran into trouble once anthropologists 
realised that globalisation is bringing societies and cultures around the world closer and 
closer together—the exotic “other” which was anthropology’s object of study and raison d'être 
was disappearing. As globalisation, migration, mass media, and diasporic communities 
brought cultures and individuals closer than ever before, anthropology was forced to deal 
                                               
106 Additionally, the Malinowskian goal of grasping the native’s point of view was further problematised 
through works that situated this project in not only innocent curiosity, but also in a colonial project of 
expansion. Space prevents a more thorough engagement with this history of anthropology as discipline, and 
ethnography as a practice of approaching difference, but I remain acutely aware of it. For key arguments, see 
Asad, Anthropology & the Colonial Encounter. 
107 Gupta and Ferguson, ‘Discipline and Practice’, 35. 
108 Ley, ‘Transnational Spaces and Everyday Lives’, 155; quoted in Marston, Jones, and Woodward, ‘Human 
Geography without Scale’, 428. 
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with the fact that there is no more “unspoilt” otherness to be explored—the field there was 
starting to dangerously resemble the home here.109  
Recognizing that “otherness” itself is a construct threatened the disappearance of 
anthropology’s subject matter, but it translated into a vigorous refocusing from its subject as 
a definitive characteristic, to “its distinctive mode of understanding reality.”110 This crisis was 
never resolved and what this distinctive mode entails is still heavily debated. However, there 
are contributions of this debate that are relevant to this project. 
This debate led to a productive rethinking of the concepts of “the field”— supposed 
to contain the local cultures that we study, and “home”—supposed to be separated from it. 
The conventional narrative of the researcher choosing a “field” which is always elsewhere 
and separate than “home” and thus equating the local with locality, has been supplanted by 
an effort to “decenter and defetishize the concept of ‘the field,’ while developing 
methodological and epistemological strategies that foreground questions of location, 
intervention, and the construction of situated knowledges.”111 This led to insightful 
discussions around the tension within anthropology that at the same time rejects “the idea of 
the local as a bounded entity,” but relies on a method that “takes it for granted.”112 
This brings us to the central question: “How […] can ethnography—at home or 
abroad—define its object of study in ways that permit detailed, local, contextual analysis and 
simultaneously the portrayal of global implicating forces?”113 In other words, how can we 
both work to re-politicise the local by engaging with locations of politics usually erased from 
IR, and still remain attentive to ways that those locations are shaped by international power? 
If intervention scholarship is rushing to the local as we showed in Chapter 1, it is crucial to 
consider how this might be done while not losing sight of “global implicating forces.” The 
main tensions of this crisis in anthropology, that between studying the particularities of the 
                                               
109 Gupta and Ferguson, Culture, Power, Place; Gupta and Ferguson, Anthropological Locations; Appadurai, 
Modernity at Large; Appadurai, ‘The Production of Locality’; Appadurai, ‘Discussion’. While this was explicitly 
discussed in the works of scholars like Akhil Gupta, James Ferguson, and Arjun Appadurai in the 1990s, it 
was not completely surprising. As early as 1966, writing about modernisation and the anthropological relations 
to the field, Lévi-Strauss stated that “the new threat to our studies is not, then, so much quantitative as 
qualitative: these large populations [i.e. the ‘primitives’, as Lévi-Strauss calls them] are changing fast, and their 
culture is resembling more and more that of the Western world. Like the latter, it tends to fall outside the field 
of anthropology.” Levi-Strauss, ‘Anthropology: Its Achievements and Future’, 124–27 quoted in; Lie, 
‘Challenging Anthropology’, 208. 
110 Marcus, ‘Contemporary Problems of Ethnography in the Modern World System’, 168. 
111 Gupta and Ferguson, ‘Discipline and Practice’, 4–5. 
112 Gupta and Ferguson, 4; See also Amit, Constructing the Field Ethnographic Fieldwork in the Contemporary World, 
especially the Introduction. 
113 Clifford and Marcus, Writing Culture, 22., describing Marcus’ contribution to the same volume. 
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local which can no longer be seen as separated from global dynamics, can offer insightful 
lessons for studying interventions whose core dynamic is between international designs and 
local circumstances they meet upon deployment on ground.  
a. Subjects as culturally and temporally bounded and ontologically different 
“Can we be sure, for example, that ‘the particular’ we seek to study, or the cultural 
worlds we presume to exist, may actually be empirically bounded? Is ‘the local’ not 
the constantly refashioned product of forces well beyond itself?114 Does it not exist 
only as part of a sociopolitical geography of multiple scales and coordinates?115 Is it 
not true that the singularity of places, just like the singularity of ‘traditions,’ ‘customs,’ 
and ‘cultures,’ is being fashioned ever more in response to the market? Surely, neat 
antinomies between the local and the global, between field and context, between 
ethnography and metanarrative, beg the very questions that we should be asking.”116  
 
The insights of this crisis resonate with the issues discussed in Chapter 1, namely, 
they can be summarised as the need to let go of concepts of the local that render it culturally 
and temporally bounded, and ontologically different. It is by letting go of the idea of 
boundedness, contemporary or historic, that we can begin to appreciate more fully the varied 
locations of political subjectivities, and their embeddedness within international politics. 
Moreover, the issue of cultural boundedness is incredibly important for critiques of liberal 
peace that see “culture” as a remedy for flawed international designs. Many critics still lament 
the interventionist practices for not paying enough attention to local (or local-local in 
Richmond’s terminology)117 culture, and the solution is being more “culturally sensitive” or 
“culturally attuned.”118 Even hybridity scholarship relies on the concept of culture, and 
culturalist critiques inevitably lead to questions of origin and authenticity—who is to be 
considered as local and pure? Which “local culture” is to be fitted into the liberal framework 
to make it a hybrid? 
Culturalist critiques ignore two of the most powerful insights of the anthropological 
critique of culture. Such readings still depend on conceptualising “the world as a series of 
                                               
114 Appadurai, Modernity at Large; Appadurai, ‘Discussion’. 
115 Ortner, ‘Fieldwork in the Postcommunity’. 
116 Comaroff and Comaroff, ‘Ethnography on an Awkward Scale’, 156–57. 
117 Richmond defines the “local-local” as a “diversity of communities and individuals that constitute political 
society beyond this [elite and civil society level] often liberally projected artifice.” Richmond, ‘Becoming 
Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism’, n. 2. This understanding is supposed to look for “deeper, more contextual” 
(Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, 13.) expressions of local agency, but Richmond never elaborates on what that 
depth might bring or what the context might be in different cases.  
118 Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, 51. 
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discrete, territorialized cultures.”119 Thus the idea of bounded culture serves to “enforce 
separations that inevitably carry a sense of hierarchy.”120 Moreover, they posit culture as 
some sort of Leviathan standing above and magically ruling over a homogenous ground to 
make up “autonomous local cultures” which can somehow be juxtaposed to a homogenizing 
movement of cultural globalisation.121  
This conceptualisation of the world as a series of bounded locals becomes even more 
problematic when it faces dynamic processes in which the local and international interact. 
This has twofold implications: it imagines intervention as the only trans-local force that 
reaches the otherwise bounded locality, and it assumes a temporality to this interaction that 
starts only with the launch of the intervention. As the critiques presented in the previous 
chapter showed, even recent studies of intervention which focus on the hybrid and the 
everyday, adopt a “presentist or short temporal frame” and hence end up ignoring the 
interconnectedness and mutual constitution of different spaces.122 We are not only in danger 
of perceiving the local as bounded from the international, but also as perceiving the 
intervention as the only connection to the international. This view does precisely what Jean 
and John Comaroff warn against in the above quote. It assumes that the “local culture” is 
temporally bounded prior to the intervention, and that it is only the intervention that binds 
it to global forces—thus the local which has not been touched by intervention, here 
representing both modernisation and globalisation, is the only “local-local.”  
b. Is the local subject ontologically different? 
This temporal and cultural confinement often implies an ontological differentiation 
between the liberal Western subjects that intervene, and the traditional subjects that are 
intervened upon. Terms such as the local-local reinforce the underlying assumption of 
ontological or cultural difference as the primary boundary between the interveners and those 
intervened upon. This understanding of the local leads to asking questions of limited 
potential like who are the real locals? Or, what is authentic, as opposed to co-opted by the 
governmentalizing project?  
This problem of difference between the liberal subjects and the authentic others is 
usually resolved by the invocation of a transcendental subject that supposedly guards us 
                                               
119 Gupta and Ferguson, ‘Culture, Power, Place’, 2–6. 
120 Abu-Lughod, ‘Writing Against Culture’, 137–38. 
121 Gupta and Ferguson, ‘Culture, Power, Place’, 2–6. 
122 Nadarajah and Rampton, ‘The Limits of Hybridity’, 65–66. 
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from falling into the trap of ontologizing the difference between the Western and non-
Western subject: we are all born equal, hence we all have the same rights.123 However, such 
universalism is also misused to hide the particularism of the specific vision of political life 
that is promoted.124 As already touched upon above in the discussion on the communitarian 
critique of the loss of subject in governmentality studies, this leads to the exclusion of political 
life which does not fit the liberal frame—a frame which hides its particularity under the 
veneer of universality.  
This issue weds IR to early ethnographic representation in unexpected ways. Vrasti 
notes that this othering of political life outside of the West remains prevalent in IR that sees 
“pre-modern” political forms in line with early ethnographic images produced by 
missionaries and colonisers. These images “reinforce IR’s constitutive fantasy, namely, the 
idea that the ‘state of nature’ is an anarchic and barbaric realm.”125 The questions of how to 
engage and represent subjectivities—those that do not “fit” into the idea of what a (Western) 
subject should be—then becomes crucial for overcoming these politically constitutive 
caricatures.126  
It is my argument here that anthropology has been sympathetic to this effort since at 
least the 1980s, and as such can provide valuable lessons. Addressing the problem explicitly, 
Ferguson and Gupta write: 
 
“By decoupling the idea of experience from the vision of an ontologically prior subject 
who is ‘having’ it, it is possible to see in experience neither the adventures and 
expression of a subject, nor the mechanical product of discourses of power, but the 
workshop in which subjectivity is continually challenged and refashioned.”127  
 
This thesis seeks to achieve this through an ethnographic approach to interventions 
as seen by the people who are supposed to reap the benefits of these projects. In this effort, 
it is not enough to engage the local beyond essentialism or mere products of international 
power. We also have to go past imagining locations as culturally and temporally bounded. 
By accounting for historical and contextual forces that might explain the material differences 
                                               
123 Krishna, ‘The Importance of Being Ironic’, 387. 
124 Sörensen, ‘Balkanism and the New Radical Interventionism’, 4. 
125 Vrasti, ‘The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations’, 299. For more on the political 
relevance of the “state of nature” and its roots in colonialism, see Jahn, ‘IR and the State of Nature’. 
126 In pursuing this line of thinking, Sabaratnam shows that this engagement has to have as its basis an 
embodied, as opposed to a transcendental subject Sabaratnam, ‘Re-Thinking the Liberal Peace’, 96–102. 
127 Gupta and Ferguson, ‘Culture, Power, Place’, n. 17. 
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between the interveners and those intervened upon, I hope to move beyond embracing some 
mythical ontological difference as an explanatory tool.128 
iii. Conceptualising the researcher through ethnographic reflexivity 
The definition of ethnographic sensibility that I employ is not restricted to 
problematising how we might imagine the local as the object of our study but goes on to 
problematise “the researcher” as always connected to that object in a myriad of ways that 
break with the imagined cultural and temporal separation. In the words of Gupta and 
Ferguson, “the question of location from which anthropological knowledge is constructed 
must be a central one.”129  This important dimension is not always present in ethnographic 
works. 
In her discussion of the ethnographic work in Peaceland, the more ethnographic of her 
two monographs and perhaps the most widely read ethnography of peacebuilding, Séverine 
Autesserre is aware of her own positionality.  She has direct access to the community she is 
researching, she is already “immersed,” she has relationships that will allow her to go beyond 
the prepared scripts that these people recite to usual researchers and she can really “get at” 
how the community works.130  
Yet, when talking about “theory building” and “consolidation and generalisation 
through fieldwork” she presents ethnography as (only) a superior tool for collecting data: 
Autesserre does ethnography because methods like observation and participation are the 
only way to access “everyday practices and habits.” In the Appendix in which she elaborates 
on her ethnographic approach, we are presented with an overwhelming number of 
interviews, locations visited, people spoken to, and ways of accessing stakeholders. Thus, 
despite her awareness of her own positionality, Autesserre’s conceptualisation of 
ethnography assumes as its defining feature not the recognition of the tool of knowing—i.e. 
herself, but a promise of a unique “access to reality.”131  
                                               
128 See Chapter 1, and Nadarajah and Rampton, ‘The Limits of Hybridity’, 59; Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of 
Eurocentrism’, 267. 
129 Gupta and Ferguson, ‘Culture, Power, Place’, 23; they also draw on other important works on politics of 
location in anthropology and feminism, see Clifford, The Predicament of Culture; Mani, ‘Multiple Mediations’; 
The importance of feminist authors in this area cannot be overstated, the concept of “politics of location” itself 
started from Rich, ‘Notes Towards a Politics of Location’. Emphasis added. 
130 She explicitly recognises these benefits, Autesserre, Peaceland, 277. 
131 Sabaratnam takes this critique further and argues that Autesserre’s study is ultimately Eurocentric: even 
though she “listens” to local interlocutors, she fails to take their references to racism, imperialism, and 
colonialism seriously—thus finding cause of the interventions’ failures in “everyday practices,” rather than 
structural coloniality of power. I do not pursue this critique further, but it is worth emphasising that 
Sabaratnam’s observation that Autesserre’s “Eurocentric thinking is thus manifest in an ongoing and final 
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In terms of feminist standpoint epistemology, this view does not challenge the idea of 
objectivity, but argues for a “strong method” better able to achieve it.132 This is not exclusive 
to her work—in a field that is largely based on critiquing projects and expertise knowledge 
for not being context sensitive, the statement “I’ve been there” offers a certain epistemic 
legitimacy—an idea that we know because we have somehow experienced the real local 
circumstances.133 This knowledge is the knowledge of difference—how the particularity of 
the local challenges and changes the universal designs of the international. 
This not only reduces ethnography to a “data-collection machine capable of accessing 
unmediated reality in all its authenticity and accuracy,”134 but also resonates with other 
sources of experience. Namely, it is easily mixed with the idea that we similarly know because 
we are somehow from a specific region—a fact which is also supposed to give us some unique, 
privileged access. Without denying the importance of context, I want to argue here that the 
main contribution of an ethnographic approach is not its privileged access, but its possibility 
to reflect upon issues of that access—the idea that no matter if we are at the desk, or 
immersed in the field, we always know from a specific location. This is what Jon Harald Sande 
Lie defines as anthropological reflexivity—“the constant and reciprocal relationship between 
fieldworker and informants, underscoring that the fieldworker’s position in the field 
influences the data that she gains access to and acquires.”135  
Here, the above mentioned “crisis of representation” becomes more than doing away 
with “the field” as an adventurous voyage to the “other” lands—it also instructs us to pay 
attention to ways in which we are not only biographically, but also historically and socially 
connected to the sites we study.136 Instead of making ourselves disappear, a task impossible 
even with the best intentions, we are invited to reflexively consider these connections, how 
they influence the researcher, the research, and the researched. In my case, these connections 
are even more prominent as I grew up in what is today Croatia, in a region that shares the 
border and war history with Serbia. I travel with a Croatian passport that has free access to 
                                               
epistemic alignment with the international interveners” can be actually read as Auteserre’s failure to inquire 
further into herself as a tool of knowing—constant reflexivity of our explicit and implicit “alignments” is a 
constitutive element of my definition of ethnography. Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention, 31. 
132 Harding, ‘Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology’, 462–63. 
133 This is not limited to academic practice – “first hand” knowledge as a legitimising tool is also used in the 
policy circles. See Bliesemann de Guevara, ‘Journeys to the Limits of First-Hand Knowledge’; Bliesemann de 
Guevara, ‘Intervention Theatre’. 
134 Vrasti, ‘The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations’, 281. 
135 Lie, ‘Challenging Anthropology’, 205; citing Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures especially the last chapter. 
136 Gupta and Ferguson, ‘Discipline and Practice’, 38; citing Gordon, ‘Anthropology and Liberation’. 
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the EU (unlike a Serbian one), and my Croatian accent and dialect display my origin in every 
conversation I have in Serbia. However, while these facts made me a foreigner in Serbia, my 
language familiarity, the ability to read Cyrillic, and cultural proximity, marked me as one 
“studying their home” among colleagues in the UK—in the eyes of British scholars, I was 
doing “native ethnography.”137 
The literature on the potentials and pitfalls of this approach is numerous, but here I 
want to point out a few relevant points.138 For scholars who are socialised in international 
academia but do fieldwork “at home,” the questions of differentiating between home and 
field crystalize in all their complexity: is home the Western academia which equips us with 
our theoretical orientations and goals, where we return to “write up” and “make sense” of 
the chaotic field experiences? Or do we return “home” when we enter the “field” and slip 
back into the language we share with our parents? Is our adoption of the role of the 
researcher enough to call a culture where we grew up a “site”? In this case, ethnographic 
inquiry stops being an unproblematic exploration of “Otherness” but enters a more complex 
territory.  
Researchers working in internationalised academia and going “home” for fieldwork 
enter a “double bind”—they are perceived as either lacking the distance needed for good 
fieldwork and expected to minimise their local identity in some mystical attempt at 
preventing bias, or they are burdened with the responsibility to “speak their identity,” thus 
turning their origins into a form of essentialism.139 This conceptualisation does more than 
highlight the experiences of these researchers, it also uncovers the underlying assumptions 
of objectivity arising from distance/disengagement, and the dangers of falling back into the 
traps of essentialism discussed above.  
More than just producing a “double bind,” the idea of “native ethnography” is 
underpinned by methodological nationalism—the idea that nation-states are containers of 
cultures to which a belonging automatically makes us a “native” can only survive while 
fetishizing the nation-state. Put most simply, even if I was doing research with agricultural 
producers in the villages around my home town, I would still not be a “native”—the worlds 
                                               
137 The idea of “native anthropology” was one of the products of the “crisis of representation.” By “repatriating” 
anthropology and studying and denaturalising “home,” instead of the Other, anthropology was meant to avoid 
practices that exoticise its subjects. 
138 See, for example Greverus and Römhild, ‘The Politics of Anthropology at Home’; Kürti and Skalník, 
Postsocialist Europe; Narayan, ‘How Native Is a “Native” Anthropologist?’ 
139 Gupta and Ferguson, ‘Discipline and Practice’, 17. 
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they inhabit and build are different despite their proximity, and an ethnographic stance 
enables us to both recognise and learn from these differences.140 Perhaps the only cases where 
one is really “at home” in their fieldwork are auto-ethnographic works that centre on the 
researcher,141 and those that investigate the networks and locations the researcher usually 
moves in.142 This thesis is not auto-ethnographic—agriculture is not my home, and even the 
non-formal youth education was somehow foreign to me because, to the genuine surprise of 
many of my interlocutors, I managed to not engage with it until I decided to study it. Despite 
this, an ethnographic stance requires me to situate myself. Not only by offering a mandatory 
list of personal traits that mark most methodologies—female, white, under 30—but by 
considering how situatedness shapes our questions and ways of answering them. And my 
own ambiguous position in Serbia undeniably shaped the questions I ask and how I went 
about finding answers. 
a. The researcher in the literature, the field, and the text 
The ideas of feminist standpoint epistemology have been eloquently elaborated in a 
2015 article by Cecilie Basberg Neumann and Iver Neumann. In the article, they advocate 
situating oneself in literature, the field, and writing. 143 Starting with autobiographical 
situatedness, they draw on feminist standpoint epistemologies and the work of Sandra 
Harding to argue for strong objectivity—a concept that invites us to learn from the difference 
between the subject and the object of study, rather than to seek to transcend or control it.144 
In practical terms, this means interrogating the role our own autobiographies played in 
choosing the research questions and themes we are interested in—situating ourselves within 
the literatures we use.145 The Introduction and Chapter 1 already emphasised that the choice 
of fields and themes in this project developed in conversation with works on intervention in 
general, and on intervention in the Balkans in particular. And while my choice of a region to 
study was pragmatic to a certain extent—the time/funding constraints made it almost 
impossible to achieve language and cultural fluency needed for an ethnographic approach in 
                                               
140 A good example of this relates to the language that we use in the field. Lie, for example, worked in the World 
Bank in an English-speaking environment, but still had to learn another language—the “developmental 
idiolect.” Lie, ‘Challenging Anthropology’, 215. Similarly, I had to learn specific subsets that related to 
agricultural issues, EU-speak, and non-formal education, even though BCS is my native language.  
141 Inayatullah, Autobiographical International Relations; Dauphinée, The Politics of Exile. 
142 Ethnographic works written by experts on development and interventions in general are here particularly 
worth mentioning. Mosse, Cultivating Development; Mosse, Adventures in Aidland. 
143 Basberg Neumann and Neumann, ‘Uses of the Self’. 
144 Basberg Neumann and Neumann, 803–4. 
145 Basberg Neumann and Neumann, 803–4. 
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a location where I am unfamiliar with the language—it is also undeniable that the questions 
I ask are posed from the location of an autobiography largely situated in the region that is 
the object of the study.  
This positionality of my questions is best illustrated in my readings of other works. 
For example, in Stefanie Kappler’s important work on Bosnia in which she provides a much 
needed focus on local agency, I had to wonder why she considers OKC Abrašević—a famous 
youth centre in BiH—a “peacebuilding agent” when it looks like “just another” alternative 
youth space?146 When looking at photos, I connected it to similar places around the Balkans 
where my own friends spend time. Moreover, I knew that people who are active in these 
spaces participate in networks that spread all over Europe and beyond. Of course, it is 
unique in context and practice, but it is also a part of an international alternative scene. 
Coming back to the above discussion of what constituted the “proper object” of ethnographic 
inquiry and how we need to represent our objects of study to give legitimacy to our research, 
here I needed to ask what makes one a peacebuilder?  It seems to me that politically active 
youth in Germany or in the UK would be just that—politically active youth, while the same 
activities in BiH are cast as peacebuilding.  
One possible interpretation is disciplinary survival—like anthropology needed 
“natives” to survive, Peace and Conflict studies need (local) peacebuilders to survive. Letting 
go of specific concepts endangers the disciplinary self-understanding. However, I also had 
to ask what remains out of sight when seeing this space as “only” a peacebuilding space—
what kind of limits to political subjectivity does it pose? How does it limit what we see? 
These questions indelibly shaped my research interests. Even though Part II of the thesis 
continues using the language of intervention and focuses on its “targets,” the below methods 
and the following chapters seek to engage with subjectivities beyond these conceptual 
categories—an effort whose transgressions underpin the main argument of the thesis. And 
while such a project partially reflects an ethnographic sensibility that recognizes the 
limitation of concepts,147 it also partly springs from a personal discomfort of my own identity 
being contained in them.  
The second aspect of Basberg Neumann and Neumann’s recipe is field situatedness—
the idea that “[b]ecoming aware of the self and of what happens with you when you relate 
to the other(s) in the field may be highly analytically rewarding.”148 Perhaps the most 
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productive way this played out in the field for me is in my own status ambiguity. When 
arriving to Belgrade after being loaded with the anxiety of “going home” and the double bind 
described above, I was at the same time shocked and relieved when people asked me how I 
am finding my way in a foreign country. But the ambiguity was not only between the 
perceptions of my UK/international colleagues, and fieldwork participants, but it could also 
oscillate within one conversation. It became common that people consider me foreign while 
comparing Croatia and Serbia—the corruption in Serbia is at a level that I cannot imagine 
in Croatia, the unemployment is more dire, the state is more authoritarian, the poverty is 
more acute. However, once the conversations started involving Western Europe or the US, 
I soon became local enough to understand things that these Western Europeans simply could 
not—they come here expecting that the same frameworks work in Serbia and the 
Netherlands, they cannot understand how we function here! Throughout the chapters, I will 
return to these questions of belonging and hierarchies as constitutive parts of interventions 
themselves, but for now, I want to emphasise not only the ambiguity of my own location, but 
also the relational character of all locations and their productive effect on our research.  
The last site for situatedness is the text itself.149 Basberg Neumann and Neumann 
offer two ways of going about this: one is the reflexive wager which produces a text that is 
centred on how the researcher herself is changed during the research process. Dauphinée’s 
Politics of Exile is probably the most famous example.150 The second option is the analyticist’s 
way—in this option, we do not focus on ourselves to interrogate the structures that make us 
and the world, we do not rely on introspection. Instead, an analyticist “focusses on coming 
to terms with themselves as an instrument of data production.”151 The difference is also 
described as one between a methodological situatedness that is dealt with analytically, and a 
methodic situatedness that is dealt with reflexively: “Where a reflexivist researcher tends to 
handle the relation between the interlocutor and researcher by asking how interlocutors 
affect them, an analyticist researcher tends to ask how the researcher affects the 
interlocutors.”152  
Following this distinction, this thesis falls into the analytical camp—I think of 
“method as a question of producing data by bringing certain value commitment with [us] 
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into the field.”153 While I accept that it is not only my sense of self that influences the research, 
but the research process also influenced my sense of self, I do not make space for this in a 
thesis that is ultimately not concerned with me. However, I also do not aim to erase myself 
from the text: it was me who read theories, spoke to people, thought about questions, and 
analysed observations. I make this visible in the text not to limit its scope, but to practice the 
ethnographic stance that emphasises that all knowledge is produced from a specific location—
it means to practice “strong reflexivity” by putting subjects and objects of research on the 
same “critical, causal claim.”154 In doing so, I do not shy away from making knowledge claims, 
but make them with a claim to strong objectivity.155 
III Moving forward 
The critiques of governmentality resonate with tensions between ethnographic detail 
and explorations of the forces that make it in anthropology. In a nutshell, governmentality 
studies can often become blinded by their object of study: in an effort to emphasise how 
power works to create subjects, they easily slip into providing a too coherent picture of 
subject formation which negates any local context that might complicate international 
designs. While staying attentive to all the critiques voiced in the last decades and presented 
shortly in this chapter, the rest of the chapter and the thesis will proceed quite differently. 
Instead of trying to reach a conclusive answer as to what Foucault meant by 
governmentality, or what is the correct way to “scale it up,” I provide a methodological 
orientation towards ethnographic explorations of governmentality which do not resolve these 
issues per se, but offer ways of thinking and doing around these issues.  
i. Programs, practices, and effects 
In developing a methodological orientation that would be more faithful to subjects of 
power, rather than Foucault, I turn to Tania Li’s use of the concept of governmentality. 
Working with governmentality, and combining it with Marxist and Gramscian insights, Li 
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created a work that skilfully navigated between accounting for projects that apply power 
and try to shape people’s behaviour, and emphasising the incompleteness of such projects 
and the ways that people take action in response and beyond them. Li outlines three key 
concepts, programs, practices, and effects, which should guide empirical analysis of 
government.156  
Programs are “goal[s] to be accomplished, together with the rationale[s] that make[s] 
[them] thinkable, and the associated strategies and techniques.”157 They depend on rendering 
certain problems technical, bounding a specific population to the problem, and devising a 
mechanism for addressing the problem and evaluating the process. Most work on 
interventions using governmentality has focused precisely on this aspect that is legible from 
policy documents and discourse. It is in these processes that expert knowledge is activated 
to produce orientalist discourses. A more ethnographic approach, which is emerging in the 
practice and ethnographic turns in IR as well, “pay[s] attention to how programs take hold 
and change things, while keeping in view their instabilities, fragilities and fractures, and the 
ways in which failure prepares the ground for new programming.”158  
Practices refer to two sets of actions: those which constitute the area of intervention 
by rendering it technical, and informal practices which transform, adapt, reject, and resist 
these processes. This implies exploring the gap between a plan and its realisation and 
involves asking questions like what are those connected to a project, as proponents, 
implementers or targets, actually doing and how are their practices interpreted by other 
subjects.159 While the practice turn in IR160 has brought these dynamics to the fore when 
investigating how high politics are produced, reproduced, contested and reformed in the 
everyday lives of politicians, it is still not common to ask how these interact with local 
everyday subjectivities and experiences.  
And finally, effects of governmental intervention can be both intended and 
unintended. They surpass the different programmes’ “limited, technical field[s] of 
intervention.” Li emphasises that of special importance is “the intersection between 
particular programs with their limited, technical field of intervention, and the many other 
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processes that exceed their scope.”161 The emphasis on these messy intersections has far-
fetching consequences on how we are to methodologically approach effects as they are 
recounted by local targets of interventions. The effects of the intervention are not confined to 
the intended policy areas but become intertwined with the social processes they encounter 
on ground.  
While the concepts of programs, practice, and effects helped me sharpen my view 
during fieldwork, they do not provide much reflection on how we might pursue them. Most 
importantly, they do not explicitly warn against dangerous conceptualisations of the local 
that we have encountered in Chapter 1. The following section summarizes the points made 
in this chapter to offer some direction on how to study programs, practices, and effects of 
international interventions.  
ii. Positional critique 
This project practices a positional, rather than a cultural, critique. Sabaratnam 
differentiates between the two to highlight that positional critique abandons the problematic 
analytical use of “culture,” allows a more complete, appreciation of international politics, and 
remains open to complex “political content and context of human consciousness, meaning, 
and agency.” 162 This has very clear consequences. First, such orientation moves away from 
deciding who or what is the local in any scenario. Instead, I abandon this “nostalgia for origins” 
and agree that by local we mean the specific political and epistemological conditions that 
govern the production of locality, as opposed to any essentialist notion of culture.163 With the 
relevance of the idea of the local as both providing the tools to enhance international 
intervention efforts, and the source of critiques against it, this letting go might force scholars 
in a productive crisis resembling the project of decentring the field (as the container of the 
local) in anthropology.164  
Along these lines, I propose to follow Ferguson and Gupta and move beyond “a 
commitment to ‘the local,’” to foregrounding “epistemological and political issues of location” 
instead165—namely how we conceptualise subjects and objects of our research process. 
During fieldwork, I did not look just for Serbian people as locals, but I focussed on speaking 
to those who I thought were the targets of interventions, and those who seemed to be 
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translating between the intervention and its implementation on the ground. By refusing to 
take the concepts of local and the international for granted, I strive to more fully appreciate 
the work that goes into ascribing those labels to specific people, ideas, practices, and 
processes. 
Secondly, a positional critique looks for effects, rather than trying to define or explain 
success or failure.166 In relation to governmentality, a positional critique would move us beyond 
a focus on the dichotomy of success/failure in projects of government that leads to research 
looking for governmentality or searching for the homo oeconomicus as proof of 
governmentalisation. This kind of approach not only reduces governmentality to hypothesis 
testing, but it also further limits our object of study to success, and more often failures, of 
international interventions.  
Many IR accounts of interventions start with this observation of failure and seek to 
answer why this failure happened. Internal and fundamental critiques will find different 
reasons for the failure, but their objects of study are the same. I propose to look for effects 
that go beyond what we might consider simple success or failures. In practical terms, this 
calls for more open-ended interviews that I will discuss shortly, but it also changes the way 
that I use governmentality as a concept. In this effort, governmentality stops being something 
to confirm or negate, but becomes a tool that brings to fore both the ideological importance 
and material effect of positing a certain kind of life as the norm.  
This view is present in the vast literature on critiques of governmentality. Lemke, for 
example argues that liberalism is trying to create a reality which it argues already exists.167 
Taking this seriously means not looking for this reality—buying into the argument that it 
already exists—but focusing on the myriad of ways in which it is trying and failing to be 
realised. Vrasti built on this when she argued that governmentality is never global, but is 
always universal. This is worth quoting at length: 
 
“Global governmentality manifests its force not through the actual number of people 
or states it controls, but by acting as a standard of reference against which all forms of 
life (individual, communal, political) can be assessed according to modern 
conceptions of civilisation and order. Those individuals who possess the skill, talent, 
market value, and entrepreneurial spirit to respond opportunistically to the demands 
of capital will enjoy greater access to job markets, housing options, residence permits, 
and cultural goods around the world. Similarly, those states that can abide by to the 
dictums of good governance, fiscal responsibility, and foreign security will receive 
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better credit ratings, lending agreements, and international support. Those who fail 
to conform will become second-order citizens, confined to slums and ghettos, doomed 
to perform low-skilled and tedious jobs, or perpetually developing states stuck in a 
tight spot between foreign intervention and humanitarian assistance.”168 
 
It is precisely this standard of reference that can be tracked through programs and practices of 
government. And the effects of applying this standard cannot be confined in the diagnosis of 
success or failure.  
Moreover, similarly to the treatment of liberalism as a reality to be discovered, 
accounts of subjectivity in governmentality studies often approach homo oeconomicus as type 
of subject to “look for” during fieldwork. In a way, this represents the homo oeconomicus as an 
anthropological fact that we need to confirm or dismiss.169 Yahya Madra and Ceren Özselçuk 
argue that Foucault never saw the homo oeconomicus as a finished project but instead treats it 
“as an interface between the individual and the government.”170 An interface that translates 
human life into data comparable to governmental standards of reference. Thus, the following 
chapters move away from a success/failure view of subjectivation and treat the ideal of a 
neoliberal subject as an interface through which humans become known to projects of 
government. In this effort, governmentality becomes the critical position through which to 
examine the interaction of subjectivity and government. 
iii. Doing fieldwork: talking, observing, and thinking 
 
“[…] as a framework, method itself is taken to be at least provisionally secure. The 
implication is that method hopes to act as a set of short-circuits that link us in the best 
possible way with reality, and allow us to return more or less quickly from that reality 
to our place of study with findings that are reasonably secure, at least for the time 
being. But this, most of all, is what we need to unlearn. Method, in the reincarnation 
that I am proposing, will often be slow and uncertain. A risky and troubling process, 
it will take time and effort to make realities and hold them steady for a moment against 
a background of flux and indeterminacy.”171  
 
While the previous section challenged the idea of the local as temporally and 
culturally bounded outside of intervention, and emphasised the importance of not treating it 
ontologically different, it is incredibly difficult to translate these insights into practical 
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methods of doing research. A fairly straightforward recipe comes, perhaps surprisingly, from 
IR, as opposed to anthropology. In her project of decolonising intervention scholarship, 
Sabaratnam proposes to do so through “reconstructing subjecthood:” “the property of having 
one’s presence, consciousness and realities engaged in the analysis of the political space.”172 
Moreover, she offers specific strategies for doing so. These strategies directly deal with 
temporal and cultural confinement of the local experiences, and tackle the ontological 
difference often implied in that confinement. The three strategies refer to recovering 
historical presence, engaging political consciousness, and investigating material realities.173  
Recovering historical presence counters the ahistorical orientation of intervention 
scholarship. This ahistorical orientation prevents us from seeing the long-term connections 
between the locations we are researching and liberalism and/or modernity.174 This in turn 
leads to seeing all those who do engage with liberal and/or international institutions, norms, 
and ideas, as “either co-opted into its ideology via false consciousness, or engaged in 
elaborate game playing.” Recovering historical presence then directly confronts the temporal 
confinement of local subject by “cultivating an appreciation of the historical presence of 
target societies and contemplating its significance for the politics of intervention.”175  
 Cultural confinement should be tackled through her strategy of engaging political 
consciousness—beyond approaching local politics within the labels of local or everyday. 
Sabaratnam distils two goals of anti-colonial thinkers that are relevant here. Firstly, this 
engagement implies recognition as a political and decolonial act of humanisation. Secondly, 
this engagement adds analytical strength to an account of a regime (whether it is colonialism 
or intervention) through the eyes of those living it.176 Most importantly for this project, this 
view complicates “essentialised” conceptions of political subjects—such as the 
coloniser/native, or indeed the intervener and the intervened upon.177 Moreover, it 
emphasises that this project of engaging local subjectivities is not just about adding empirical 
detail, but that things we uncover help us learn about the intervention itself. 
Lastly, the focus on ontological difference and trying to figure out what is truly local 
should be replaced with attention to “material realities of the interventions.” This new view 
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invites us to go beyond critiquing “neoliberalism,” or governmentality and intervention for 
that matter, as ideologies or abstract rationalities, and instead see them as “concrete 
system[s] lived by humans in time and space.”178 I do this by moving away from 
governmentality as just an abstract form of government, through exploring how its 
programs, practices, and effects are experienced by my interlocutors.  
These strategies are both powerfully argued for and used in Sabaratnam’s book. 
However, the book understates the inevitable messiness that this kind of research brings 
with it. Reading Sabaratnam’s book (and even more so the thesis that the book is based on), 
one gets the feeling that she proposes a methodological recipe that was developed through an 
in-depth engagement with anti-colonial thinkers and then practiced in Mozambique in quite 
a straight-forward way. It is this methodological straightforwardness that I want to 
complicate, because following a clear recipe might preclude the disruptions that will be the 
foundation of the discussion in Part III of the thesis. 
 If we are to allow the experiences of interlocutors to guide our research, we have to 
be open to changing our research as we learn more about these experiences. As such, while 
we might have strong orientations and philosophical underpinnings to our methodologies, 
the idea that we will practice them undisturbed and that our questions will remain the same 
is dangerously misleading because it allows the researcher to avoid the biggest benefit of an 
ethnographic approach to fieldwork—being faced with the limitations of our own concepts 
and questions. It is helpful to adopt an abductive approach to reasoning in which we allow 
our thinking to be led from surprise in the field (these surprises are usually born out of the 
mismatch between the expectations researchers bring into the field and their observations 
and experiences once they arrive there) towards its possible explanations.179 Such process 
will not necessarily flow in a linear way, but will require a recursive constant movement 
between theory and the field.180 The added value of ethnography here is the possibility to let 
fieldwork encounters actually change our questions and account for the positionality of those 
questions.181  
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Here, I will present my tactics of inquiry, how they changed during fieldwork, and 
how they influenced what I was looking for. As the quote opening this section shows, 
methodologies are necessarily prescriptive—they have to argue for a specific way of going 
about finding an answer and they are offered not only as lessons learned, but as lessons to be 
repeated. Following a prescription gives us a sense of security— “if only you do your methods 
properly you will lead a healthy research life.”182 Contrary to this, the one aspect I want to 
emphasise is the uncertainty, incompleteness, messiness, or fuzziness that accompanies this 
process. I do this not just to provide a more honest account of my own methodology, but to 
emphasise that the tensions between our empirical and our analytical practices are both 
inevitable and productive—especially if we strive to learn from, not just about, the people, 
things, and processes we encounter in fieldwork.  
Gideon Kunda describes ethnographic fieldwork in the following quote: 
 
“Ethnographic research, in practice, consists of four very basic activities, regardless 
of the fancy names attached to them by methodologists seeking legitimacy in various 
popular genres of academic rhetoric: observing people’s activities, talking with people 
willing to answer questions about their life, collecting texts of various sorts produced, 
preserved, displayed and consumed by the people one is studying, and devising ways 
of keeping a comprehensive, detailed and reasonably legible record of all of this.”183 
 
These four tactics: observing people, talking to people around very broad themes, 
collecting texts, and archiving records of all of this is basically what I have done during 2016. 
In addition, I reviewed and learned from other ethnographies, and I paid more attention to 
things that are usually missing from governmentality studies: namely political economy, 
debates around legislation, and contestation—things that can help us create an image of 
context. These tactics together make my method. 
a. Participant observation and observing participation  
The tactics I used varied both between the two fields, and within them. They changed 
based on issues of access—what I could approach and when, and in relation to the questions 
that I was asking as my research was developing. In non-formal youth education, it was 
much easier to participate in the traditional fieldwork sense—I attended a course over a 
whole semester and got to know the facilitators and the participants. I participated in three 
“live-in” events, and I attended a multitude of lectures in Belgrade and in Novi Sad where 
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nothing differentiated me from other participants. One great benefit of participating in 
various educational events is that they were participatory, but they nevertheless exposed me 
to a large number of people, life stories, and experiences. In many ways, these gatherings 
often served as focus groups—as we would be discussing political events, concepts, and 
observations, I was there to record the conversation. Even though it was not me who 
organised it specifically as a “focus group”, I nevertheless got exposed to a focus group 
dynamic. Without the pressure of the usual formal invitation and expectations associated 
with focus groups, these meeting were probably more data rich than the usual focus 
groups.184 Moreover, by getting to know people better, I was able to conduct interviews as a 
part of participant observation.185  
In the field of agriculture, on the other hand, my “participation” was more limited. I 
was unsure whether I should try to spend time on a specific farm or seek access among the 
policy makers. With policy makers, I tried to attend the trainings that the employees of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economy received, but my queries were 
promptly silenced with reports on the trainings, rather than an invitation to attend them. In 
interviews, I was often presented with well-rehearsed technocratic explanations and scripts. 
While providing an important insight into dominant narratives that guide policies in Serbian 
agriculture, these interviews provided little in terms of personal experiences that I was 
interested in. Aside from limitations of access to policy makers who translate between the 
EU and local producers, I also considered spending time with a specific group of producers. 
This, however, seemed unsuitable for the myriad of processes that I was interested in—
staying within one family, I would not have the access to different stories like I did when I 
attended educational events.  
As the following section will show, I compensated for this by conducting more 
ethnographic interviews. But I also attended press conferences and public events and 
followed mainstream and social media that relates to agriculture in Serbia. I also travelled to 
Romania as a part of the Serbian delegation to the Nyéléni European Food Sovereignty 
Forum. This not only allowed me to travel and spend time with people who see themselves 
as actors in Serbian agriculture, but it also opened up new networks that I explored. With 
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time, I felt I became at least a bit of a part of community of people broadly interested in 
agriculture in Serbia. I received invites to events and developed close relationships that “kept 
me in the loop.” All these things gave me a glimpse into the way that people relate to 
themselves and others even without traditional participant observation. 
b. Ethnographic and narrative interviews 
To compensate, I conducted more interviews—using a snowball technique and 
always keeping an ethnographic sensibility when conducting them. In my first methods 
training on ethnography, we were explicitly told that an interview-based study is not an 
ethnography. And while I used more tactics than interviews, it is still true that my study of 
Serbian agriculture is based more on listening, than on observing or participating. Here I did 
not use interviews to just complement participant observation, but I consider the interview 
ethnographic in itself.186 Martin Forsey summarises well what I mean by ethnographic 
interviews: 
 
“To conduct interviews with an ethnographic imaginary is to ask questions beyond 
the immediate concerns of the research question. They probe biography, seeking to 
locate the cultural influences on a person’s life, looking later to link this to the pursued 
question, or, in the inductive spirit of ethnography, to even change the question.”187  
 
The ethnographic orientation was not only a choice, but also a necessity. Since I was 
interested in subjectivity—a concept of analysis that does not have a correlate concept of 
practice—I could not go in and ask about how “governmentalized” my interlocutors felt. I 
was interested in effects of intervention programs, but because I was interested in the 
unintended aspects of them, it was not enough to just directly ask about how the people I spoke 
to see the EU (although I have often touched upon this as well). Here, open-ended and semi- 
and un-structured interviews became a key tactic. They allowed me to learn about what my 
interlocutors found important, and permitted me to get a glimpse of the ways they relate to 
themselves in discussion on how best to develop towards peace, democracy, and 
prosperity.188  
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d. Reading policy documents as ethnographic artefacts  
The main contribution of an ethnographic approach to governmentality studies is 
going beyond the usual textual bias that governmentality studies operate with. This is mostly 
because it seems obvious that policy documents are not faithful images of policy— Li’s 
engagement with policy texts, for example, was even criticised by policy makers themselves 
because texts are “poor representations of program realities.”189 This obsolescence of text was 
visually overwhelming when I started arriving to numerous NGO offices. They all had 
libraries that consisted of NGO publications—policy recommendations, summaries, 
analyses, newsletters, and full-length books—that were stored in their offices, and then given 
in kilos to curious researchers like me. I started accumulating this literature and with the size 
of the pile, my anxiety grew as well—when was I to read all these texts? And more 
importantly, what was I supposed to gain from reading them?  
In her defence of her use of policy texts, Li emphasises two dimensions of texts. First, 
they have effects because they actually inspire practices. And second, these texts also “reveal 
an ethos, a way of defining problems and connecting them to solutions.”190 I find both of these 
assumptions questionable. In the former case, the causation between text and practice is 
impossible to discern. As we discussed in Chapter 1, they are intertwined in ways that 
prevent any “origin” stories. How are we to know whether the text inspired policy, or it was 
created in conjunction to legitimise an already set solution? Are the two united by a particular 
rationality in both cases? In regard to the latter case of reading the documents in hopes of 
discovering an “ethos,” I was faced with two issues. First of all, the neoliberal ethos in policies 
today is so pervasive that it does not tell us much about the specificity of the experiences that 
we want to study. Any policy recommendation nowadays relies on governmental ideals of 
market competition, efficiency, transparency, and individual accountability. I was not 
interested in once again “discovering” neoliberalism. The second issue relates to the 
circumstances in which these documents are written. Is the neoliberal ethos in them a 
reflection of the authors’ life worlds, or is it meant to tick the donor boxes and secure 
funding? I find this question unanswerable, but I also find governmentality to be uniquely 
positioned to explore this ambiguity through its rejection of a clear distinction between co-
optation and resistance.191  
                                               
189 Li, ‘Revisiting “The Will to Improve”’, 235. 
190 Li, 235. 
191 Mitchell, ‘Everyday Metaphors of Power’. More on this in Chapter 4. 
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Keeping these issues in mind, I read policy documents and NGO publications as 
ethnographic artefacts—I learned about how and by whom they were created, how they 
were justified, and what purpose their authors intended for them. At times, it was the ethos 
in them that I analysed, while at other times it was the discrepancy between the ethos and 
the material reality that provided insight.  
e. Archiving 
The archiving of material was a learning process. Drawing on Emerson et al.,192 I kept 
notes on my phone and in a notebook, and I kept a fieldwork journal in the DayOne 
application on my laptop. Most of the interviews were recorded and were provided with 
written consent. However, once I started researching land policy, people were more 
reluctant to leave any paper trail, so I used the oral consent procedure and relied on writing 
extensive interview notes.193 
Archiving in my case also involved translation. I selected the locality of my study 
partially based on my own language skills, so I naturally acted as not only translating 
between my interlocutors and this text, but also as a translator from Serbian to English and 
vice versa. Without embarking into the field of translation studies, it is obvious that this adds 
another layer of representation to the text.  All BCS (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian) 
translations are mine, unless stated otherwise. If I found some particular phrases important 
and not easily translated from BCS to English, I have added the original in BCS in Latin 
script in the parenthesis.194 I have also chosen to emphasise words and phrases that are used 
in English. Many words are introduced from English, and I find this an important aspect of 
the culture. Many of the English phrases and words are hybridized by attaching BCS 
grammatical suffixes. When possible, I have chosen to keep those forms as they are telling 
in how language reflects the domestication of different concepts.  
f. Consuming other ethnographies  
One aspect that is missing from Kunda’s four simple tactics is engaging with other 
ethnographies written around the theme and area of our research. This might be considered 
                                               
192 Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw, Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes. 
193 I followed the oral consent guidelines from The Central University Research Ethics Committee (CUREC) 
at University of Oxford with the approval of Aberystwyth University Ethics Officer. All names are anonymised 
according to the usual ethnographic practice. 
194 I have chosen to use Latin script rather than Cyrillic because both are recognised as national scripts in 
Serbia, while Latin is accessible to a wider international audience. 
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a simple literature review in anthropology, but it requires stating more explicitly in IR. This 
is what Millar talks about as Pillar 2 in his framework which relates to “ethnographic 
preparation”—engaging with anthropological literature on the topics we are interested in to 
help us understand how people experiencing peacebuilding operations make meaning.195 In 
my case, this was even more important for multiple reasons. First of all, the everyday people 
I was interested in are missing from both IR and Political Science, so ethnographies provided 
a space where I could find the subjects I wanted to learn about and from. Furthermore, I 
was also lucky that specific topics I was interested in were ethnographically investigated 
before. This made me turn to anthropologists who are cited throughout the following 
chapters. Finally, reading ethnographies allowed me to more fully appreciate the historical 
presence of my interlocutors before, during, and after the post-war intervention.  
g. Context 
Another additional tactic was contextualising my observations within structural 
conditions in Serbia. Once again, I entered the field explicitly attentive to this issue because 
governmentality studies are often accused of ignoring structural conditions, but my 
observations also guided me to them. For example, with so much time in workshops spent 
talking about job applications, I had to consider the incredible youth unemployment rates 
that my interlocutors were faced with, and the various explanations of it offered by different 
people and institutions. In agriculture, I did not look at only indicators for Serbian 
agriculture, but I also familiarised myself with the effects of EU membership in new member 
states like Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria. This helped me see the experiences of my 
interlocutors in a broader context, and also allowed me to talk with them on more stable 
ground—in many cases, the people I spoke to expected me to know things that they do not, 
and thus keeping myself informed about these issues seemingly removed from ethnographic 
methods in interviewing, listening, and observing became another key strategy.  
Conclusions 
Chapter 1 showed that even critical scholarship on interventions struggles with 
locating political agency with the targets of interventions, and connecting that agency to 
international power beyond representations that see the connection as unilinear and finished. 
This Chapter devised my own approach—an ethnographic exploration of governmentality—
                                               
195 Millar, An Ethnographic Approach to Peacebuilding, 69, 73. 
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in conversation with works in anthropology that seek to similarly locate human subjectivity 
between “the dangers of naïve essentialism” and a “mechanical understanding of processes 
of subject constitution.”196  
Since the 1980s, anthropology has been dealing with many issues that intervention 
scholarship in IR is tackling today: what are the dangers of culturalist critiques, how are we 
to approach subjects and account for both international power that shapes them, and their own 
agency outside of it? The two bodies of literature examined in this chapter not only share the 
same problem, but they also arrive at it from opposite directions: anthropology emerged from 
its obsession with “the native” and started questioning how it might still study ethnographic 
detail without fetishizing it as completely separate from the world. On the other hand, IR 
seeks to move beyond its preoccupation with international power and questions how to 
continue studying (and critiquing) international and global power while becoming more 
attentive to local agencies. Following both works in IR which critically approach the ways 
that intervention literature has engaged with local subjects, and works in anthropology that 
have problematised ideas of the local and the field, the thesis proceeds through a positional 
critique of programs, effects, and practices of government.  
This contextualisation serves multiple purposes: on the one hand, it tackles the 
politics—hierarchies, contestation, and negotiation, that might be occluded by the exclusive 
focus on the governmental in governmentality studies.197 In order to address these politics, we 
have to acknowledge the hierarchies that constitute the relations between the intervener and 
the intervened upon. In doing this, we are creating space for considerations of structural 
contexts of interventions. As I will discuss more in Chapter 6, ethnography here does not 
imply just “thick description” nor does it subscribe to a “flat ontology.” It argues for a 
reflexive approach to these issues through experience. 
The thesis explores how subjects themselves relate to forms of power and thus treats 
governmentality as an encounter, rather than a one-directional shaping. This opens the doors 
to more fully considering the agencies we are interested in. And it is precisely these two 
aspects—structures and agencies, that international governmentality studies are accused of 
erasing. This understanding of ethnography goes beyond “thick description.”198 In Part II of 
                                               
196 Gupta and Ferguson, ‘Culture, Power, Place’, n. 17. 
197 Walters, Governmentality, 5. 
198 Povinelli refers to “austere ethnography” or a “sociography” as the “other” kind of ethnography. While my 
work is significantly different than Povinelli’s, I think it can also come close to these terms. Povinelli, Economies 
of Abandonment, x. 
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the thesis that presents my empirical practice, ethnography is employed not just to access 
empirical reality, but also to start making sense of observations—sometimes by using theory, 
sometimes by invoking structures,199 and sometimes by relating to the work of other 
ethnographers. It is the ethnographic stance that unites these varying tactics.  
In conclusion, this project is concerned with avoiding the traps of both mistaking 
local subjectivity for caricatured cultural relativism, and of mechanically understanding 
subjectivation. The following two chapters will practice this in two fields: non-formal youth 
education explored in Chapter 4, and agricultural governance in Chapter 5. However, 
because I sought to learn from these experiences, rather than just describe them, Chapter 6 
will use the tensions, lessons, and discoveries of Chapters 4 and 5 to draw out lessons on how 
we might better make sense of the experiences of those living the consequences international 
intervention.
                                               
199 In doing so, this project remains aware of the rich work that has been done on the issue of agencies and 
structure in IR. Instead of pursuing these arguments in terms of social theory, I proceed to show how 
ethnography can capture these theoretical tensions within its empirical practice. I hope to demonstrate that an 
ethnographic stance can help think structure and agency together.  
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Chapter 3 
 Situating Serbia 
 
This short chapter will introduce the setting for the empirical practice presented in 
Part II of the thesis. It provides a short overview of Serbian history, it pays special attention 
to the 1990s when Serbia was centre-stage in international politics, and it presents the 
contemporary socio-political landscape in which I conducted fieldwork in 2016.  
I Historical overview 
Serbia has been in many different state formations—it was part of the Byzantine, 
Ottoman, and Habsburg empires and has had many names, orders, and rulers. It functioned 
as a kingdom from the 12th to the 14th century until it was conquered by the Ottoman Empire. 
While the South was ruled by the Ottomans, the northern parts of contemporary Serbia, 
now known as the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, were ruled by the Austrian-
Hungarian Empire. This division is popularly invoked to explain the regional differences 
between the much better-off Vojvodina, and the poor south of Serbia. However, it also 
explains the connection between Serbian national consciousness and the Orthodox Christian 
Church which united the two parts and thus served as the basis of Serbian national identity.1 
Serbia was ruled by the Ottoman Empire until 1832 when it became an independent 
principality. In 1882, it was recognised as an independent state, and between 1888 and 1918 
it functioned as a constitutional monarchy with many democratic institutions: political 
parties, parliamentary decision-making, and independent press.2   
WWI brought about the fall of Empires which had controlled Serbian territories, and 
the so called First Yugoslavia was created in 1918 under the official name: Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes. This was the first union of South Slavic peoples, and it came to be by 
merging the short-lived State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs (former territory of the 
Austrian-Hungarian Empire), and the independent Kingdom of Serbia. In 1929, it was 
renamed to Kingdom of Yugoslavia and it existed as such until the Axis power invasion in 
April 1941. During WWII, Serbia was partitioned, and most parts of it occupied by different 
                                               
1 Vujačić, Nationalism, Myth, and the State in Russia and Serbia, 123–30.  
2 Uvalić, Serbia’s Transition, 1. 
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Axis powers, while central Serbia was controlled by the Serbian government installed by the 
German occupation. The Second Yugoslavia was born after WWII under the leadership of 
Josip Broz Tito, who led the partisan resistance against the Axis powers during WWII. 
Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was proclaimed in 1943, and even though the King 
recognized it, the monarchy was abolished in 1945 and the country was renamed to The 
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946 when the communist government was 
established. It first sided with the Eastern Bloc, but after the Tito-Stalin break in 1948, 
Yugoslavia pursued its own specific vision of communism that differed substantially from 
the Soviet system in both domestic and foreign policy. In 1963, the country was renamed 
once again to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).3 
SFRY officially ended in 1992 when Croatia and Slovenia seceded and left the so 
called Third Yugoslavia—the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) made up from Serbia, 
Kosovo, and Montenegro.4 When approaching the region, it is the wars of this period that 
mark policy, public, and scholarly imaginations. The war crimes, rapes, genocide, and other 
atrocities happening among neighbours and families were televised, studied, and discussed 
broadly. It is impossible to write a concise history of the conflicts—even an introduction to 
the literature is the size of a book.5 In short, the label “the wars of the Yugoslav succession”6 
actually covers five different conflicts: the conflict between Serbia and Croatia (1990-1995), 
the short intervention of JNA (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija—Yugoslav People’s Army) 
in Slovenia in 1991, the wars in BiH that saw Bosniak (Bosnian Muslims), Croatian, and 
Serbian warring sides (1992-1995), the wars in Kosovo 1998-1999, and the short conflict in 
Macedonia in 2001. While Serbia was involved in all but the Macedonian one, the only 
fighting within Serbia happened during the controversial NATO bombings (March 24, 1999 
to June 10, 1999) that sought to prevent further war crimes in Kosovo by bombing Serbian 
territories.7  
                                               
3 In 2002, the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro was changed and this was reflected in abandoning 
the name FRY and becoming Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006, Montenegro proclaimed independence and left 
what is today Serbia and its complicated relationship with Kosovo. 
4 In 2003, the FRY changed the structure of the union into a “state union” under the name of Serbia and 
Montenegro. Baker, The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, 86. 
5 As demonstrated by the recently published overview Baker, The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. 
6 The name itself is debated. See Ramet, ‘Disputes about the Dissolution of Yugoslavia and Its Wake’. 
7 For more on this military campaign conducted without the approval of the UN Security Council, see Roberts, 
‘NATO’s “Humanitarian War” over Kosovo’. 
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There are a few important things to note in relation to the 1990s wars and the ways 
in which they are interpreted. The first thing to mention is the highly politicised discourse 
around the wars: even choosing one’s words demonstrates loyalties and positions. For 
example, talking about “aggression” and the “Homeland War” is common among those who 
put the blame on Serbia and emphasise the victimhood of Croatia and Bosnia. The label “civil 
wars” is used by those who believed in Yugoslav sovereignty and thus saw it as a war within 
a state, while invoking the word “genocide” is still considered a controversial political 
statement in Serbia.8 Secondly, the explanations of the causes of the conflict present a study 
of its own.9 While the majority of explanations focus on ethnicity and nationality as the main 
factors in the conflict, critical scholars have explored a spate of other factors: the structural 
weakness of the Yugoslavian state that was engraved in the 1974 constitution  that worked 
towards decentralisation,10 the economic decline that was reflected in the paradoxical 
socialist unemployment11 and exacerbated by the 1973 international oil crisis and the 
subsequent refinancing of debt under the IMF’s guidance,12 and the mismanagement of the 
crisis by Western European countries and the US.13 
More than just explaining the conflict, these interpretations also inspired the great 
peacebuilding efforts launched in the war’s aftermath. Taking place in post-Cold War liberal 
hubris, the peacebuilding projects in BiH and Kosovo set a precedent for an “extensive 
model” of post-conflict intervention that was later practiced in East Timor, Sierra Leone, 
and Liberia.14 Moreover, the field of transitional justice exploded after the set-up of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)—the first international 
war crimes court after Nuremberg and Tokyo. While Serbia was the country with the highest 
number of indictments at the ICTY,15 the reconstruction efforts in the country itself seem 
relatively small—while Bosnia, Kosovo, and Croatia to some extent saw the launch of great 
                                               
8 Baker starts her review with a similar observation, Baker, The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, 2. 
9 For an overview, see Jović, ‘Disintegration of Yugoslavia’; Baker, The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. 
10 Baker, The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, 22. 
11 The phenomenon of socialist unemployment has been famously examined in Woodward, Socialist 
Unemployment. 
12 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. 
13 Baker, The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, 53. 
14 Baker, 1990s. See also Sörensen, ‘Balkanism and the New Radical Interventionism’; Woodward, ‘The Long 
Intervention’. for the relevance of the Yugoslav wars in the emergence of the contemporary intervention 
regime.  
15 ICTY officially closed on December 21, 2017. Out of 161 persons indicted, 96 were Serbian. ‘The Cases | 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’. 
 
Katarina Kušić 
 Chapter 3 | 
   
 
119 
peacebuilding operations, the international community’s approach to Serbia in the 1990s was 
largely punitive until the removal of Milošević in 2000. Even after the restoration of ties to 
the West, Serbia did not receive concrete international attention like BiH or Kosovo, nor 
EU membership like Slovenia (2007) and Croatia (2013).16 As such, it presents a rich site 
for studying the effects of more dispersed interventions.  
Because the war and its aftermath were spectacular, the difference between 
Yugoslavia as a state socialist country, and the current European aspirations of the successor 
states, is often exaggerated. Yugoslavia was not a Soviet state, it practiced its own forms of 
state socialism, and it was economically and politically much more open to the outside world. 
After the break with Stalin in 1948, Yugoslavia’s socialism was based on social, rather than 
state, ownership and an economic democratic ideal of self-management.17 Yugoslav 
socialism, reworked by Edvard Kardelj, worked towards “withering away” of the state that 
opened space for a bigger role of the market that was seen as superior to both Soviet state-
socialism and American state-capitalism.18 More than just a different economic system, the 
reworking of ideology also led to more independent media, less repression than in other 
communist countries, and more openness dissent.19 
Besides its internal landscape and contrary to the usual narrative of communist 
isolation, Yugoslavia was also highly integrated politically and economically with the world. 
Politically, it navigated the fine line between the US and the USSR with Tito founding the 
Non-Aligned Movement along with Gamal Abdel Nasser and Jawaharlal Nehru. 
Economically, it was open to trade and finance, and it served as the first experiment in 
structural adjustment with the IMF sponsored austerity program beginning as early as 
1981.20 So while Milošević’s Serbia, its sanctions, and NATO bombings definitely did raise 
a generation of Serbians in isolation in the 1990s, treating the post-2000 as the first 
experience of markets or liberalism would be highly misleading.  
                                               
16 Uvalić, Serbia’s Transition, 5. 
17 For more on the Yugoslavian economic order, see Woodward, Socialist Unemployment; Woodward, Balkan 
Tragedy. 
18 Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism. While the nuances of Bockamann’s work and the wider 
implications of this argument are beyond the scope of the current discussion, even this quick overview 
demonstrates that the too easy approach to a neoliberal reliance on markets and de-centralized self-regulation 
should be problematised. Condemning markets as “new” and “imposed” prevents inquiring into how they 
historically develop. 
19 Uvalić, Serbia’s Transition, 30. 
20 Uvalić, 17. 
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II Getting rid of Milošević: 1990s and early 2000s 
The engagement of the international community in Serbia has been extremely varied. 
Following the conflicts, Croatia and BiH by 1995 explicitly oriented themselves towards the 
EU ideals of parliamentary democracy and free market capitalism. Serbia, on the other hand, 
remained with Slobodan Milošević in power under a quasi-socialist system with highly 
authoritarian traits. For many Serbians, the 1990s are remembered for record-breaking 
inflations,21 a predatory state that was not only corrupt, but actively sought to extract foreign 
currency from its citizens, and as an era of increasing unemployment and inequality.22 In 
2000, Serbia’s GDP was only at 47% of the 1989 GDP—and 1989 was already a year of 
great crisis in Yugoslavia with the annual inflation rate of 1252%.23  
In the 1990s, Serbia went through multiple rounds of varied political and economic 
sanctions (from May 1995 to October 1996, and then again in 1998-1999), it lost membership 
in all major international organisations that was resumed only in the early 2000s, and it was 
late to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) for the Western Balkans 
region.24 Despite this isolation, the final removal of Milošević is often attributed precisely to 
international democracy assistance. It is during this era, the late 1990s, that Serbia’s super-
star democracy promotion status is born. While Milošević was consolidating his power by 
eradicating free media and stealing elections, the international community, led by the US, 
embarked on a vast project of democracy promotion that entailed getting rid of Milošević. 
The peaceful “revolution” that happened on October 5, 2000, after Milošević refused to 
acknowledge the results of the presidential election in which Vojislav Koštunica won, had 
profound consequences beyond Serbia: it served to inspire similar “coloured” or “electoral” 
revolutions across Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and it demonstrated the efficiency and 
importance of democracy assistance.25  
                                               
21 The inflation rate in 1992-1993 is the second highest and second longest recorded inflation in the world. 
Uvalić, 53. 
22 Uvalić, 68–71, 105. 
23 Uvalić, 125, 21. 
24 SAA was initially signed in June 1999. The renewal of membership in IMF and the World Bank depended 
on the division of Yugoslavia’s debts and assets among the new states and thus was postponed until Serbia 
depended on the membership for reconstruction loans. Interestingly, a part of the first IMF Emergency 
Reconstruction Loan was used to pay off a loan given by Norway and Switzerland for paying off the “old 
Yugoslav” debt to IMF in an effort to access new loans. Uvalić, 84, 120–21, 126–27.  
25 Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries. 
 
Katarina Kušić 
 Chapter 3 | 
   
 
121 
While dwelling more on the ambiguous status of what is today referred to as the 
“October Changes” is outside of the interest of this thesis, it is important to note that despite 
the controversial NATO bombings of 1999, it is “democracy assistance” that got the credit 
for the fall of Milošević.26 This assistance consisted of seemingly mundane efforts like 
education, training, and material resources given to three major actors: opposition parties, 
independent media, and civil society actors.27 So even though it is Kosovo and Bosnia that 
are examined as popular examples of the liberal peace project, it was Serbia that, at least for 
a while, captured the popular imagination as an effective symbiosis of international support 
and rebellious local actors.28  
The focus on the “post” in post-Yugoslav spaces does not only occlude the 
international connections of Yugoslavia as already noted above, but it also allows the 
misreading of the current political situation in Serbia. The term “revolution” was 
problematised very soon after the October Changes, when people realised that the changes 
were not as profound as everyone believed they would be.29 But this did not mean that things 
stayed the same. The understated aspect of this transformation are the reforms that followed 
instantly after 2000. They were driven by a belief in neoliberal technocracy as preached by 
the Washington Consensus that was implemented literally in the early 2000s, sometimes 
through IMF’s conditionality and in-kind help that took the form of “expert technical 
advice,” and sometimes by over-zealous Serbian technocrats acting in accordance with the 
World Bank and IMF ideals.30 These economic changes were not only profound, but also 
under-appreciated because of the overall attention given to transitional justice and political 
conditionalities associated with the ICTY.31   
While the reforms initially showed a growth in GDP, it was a “jobless growth” that 
characterized many transitional economies and had a “devastating impact” on the general 
population.32 It is this socio-economic breakdown that is often left out of accounts of the 
                                               
26 See, for example, Spoerri, Engineering Revolution, who argues that international support to political parties had 
at best an ambiguous impact on Serbian democracy. For another overview, see Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating 
Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries. 
27 Spoerri, Engineering Revolution, 3. 
28 See, for example, articles in the New York Times and Foreign Affairs: Cohen, ‘Who Really Brought Down 
Milosevic?’; Rosenberg, ‘Revolution U’. 
29 For example, see the contributions in Spasić and Subotić, R/Evolution and Order. These are early reflections 
on the October events.  
30 Uvalić, Serbia’s Transition, 130–33. 
31 Uvalić refers to economic reforms as the “less explicit” part of the conditionality package. Uvalić, 129. 
32 Uvalić, 132, 149. 
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changes in post-Yugoslav spaces. In these narratives, the gravity of social, political, and 
economic changes mentioned above that far transcend issues of ethnic national, and religious 
co-existence, is lost. In a nutshell, the interventions (and their internal critiques) that focus 
on peace, transitional justice, and ethnic and religious co-existence, ignore that “peace” and 
“normalcy” also depend on the strong welfare state that was the corner-stone of Yugoslav 
socialism, steady employment, and a vision of future as a modernising process of betterment, 
rather than survival.33 It is precisely the difference between “survival” as the contemporary 
state and “normalcy” that was Yugoslavia, that permeates anthropological studies of the 
region and my own fieldwork experiences.34  
III Serbia today 
The recession that developed along with the global 2008 crisis only made matters 
worse. Serbia today is characterised not only by worrying statistics, but also by contestation 
around those numbers. For example, even though the official unemployment rate ranged 
from 19% to 16% in 2016, the “real rate” is considerably more severe because the official 
statistics include informal employment and ignore the negative population growth due to 
negative birth rates and emigration. Similarly, the “official” average monthly income of ca. 
550 euros gross (around 410 euros net) in 2016 is also disputed as drawing mostly from 
bigger companies and large cities. This unnaturally inflates the numbers and ignores the vast 
numbers of people who are receiving the legal minimum wage, those employed informally, 
and those employed without receiving salary (a practice that is still common in the region).35  
The political situation is equally deteriorating. During my fieldwork, many people 
who actively opposed Milošević in the 1990s described Serbia as sliding back into the not-
so-covert-authoritarianism: key people from the Milošević government are once again in 
seats of power, with the Prime-Minister-turned-President Aleksandar Vučić being the 
former Minister of Information (1998-2000). Vučić’s ruling party, the SNS (Srpska 
                                               
33 See a powerful demonstration of this critique on the example of projects working to facilitate the return of 
refugees in BiH in Jansen, ‘The Privatisation of Home and Hope’. 
34 For the idea of a “return to normalcy” as a post-conflict goal in the region, see Gilbert et al., ‘Reconsidering 
Postsocialism from the Margins of Europe’; Greenberg, ‘On the Road to Normal’. 
35 Bradaš, ‘Statistika i Dostojanstven Rad [Statistics and Dignified Work]’, 9–10. This publication calculates 
the average at 470 euros gross (340 euros net). However, the important thing to note is that even if the higher 
numbers are true, they are still not enough to cover the consumer basket from the same period that came to 
570euros—meaning that the gross salary needed to cover it is more than 800 euros. Additionally, talking to 
people I encountered during fieldwork in Belgrade and Novi Sad also supports the thesis that the official 
numbers are vastly exaggerated.  
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napredna stranka—Serbian Progressive Party), is accumulating power and there is a notable 
decrease in freedom of media and political pluralism. Serbia today walks the fine line 
between being nominally committed to EU membership negotiations, and playing 
geopolitics. It keeps its ties with Russia, China, and Turkey and refuses to recognize the 
statehood of Kosovo, while at the same time reforming every aspect of state bureaucracy 
under the EU’s guidance, and developing economic plans with the IMF that follow the usual 
orientation towards the hopes of export-oriented growth, privatisations, and welfare cut-
backs. This is the setting in which I conducted roughly 10 months of fieldwork in 2016 that 
forms the basis for the following two chapters.
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Chapter 4 
 Governing Youth: Non-formal education 
 
Projects that target youth are omnipresent—whether seen as a “problem” to be 
contained, or a “resource” to be used, youth emerge as the natural target for international 
non-military interventions.  This chapter will examine such projects that seek to empower 
youth—help them become politically active, become better citizens, and find employment. 
In these projects, youth is always imagined as ambivalent subjects of government. They are 
“simultaneously idealizations and monstrosities, pathologies and panaceas.”1 But while they 
are ambivalent, these images are not accidental. They represent larger social and political 
orderings of society. By examining how youth is imagined in projects of intervention and how 
it experiences these practices, we can therefore inquire into larger logics and effects of that 
intervention.  
My particular entry point for this chapter are various programmes of non-formal 
education (NFE). NFE is to be differentiated from formal education, which is structured 
from pre-school to higher education, and informal education, where the person learns 
individually and spontaneously.2 It has been popularized throughout Europe with the 
emergence of the Erasmus+ programme that continued the previous Youth in Action 
programme (2007-2013). Youth in Action “aimed to inspire active citizenship, solidarity and 
tolerance and involve young people in shaping the future of the European Union.”3  
NFE was especially important in Serbia due to the role of NFE and youth in bringing 
down Slobodan Milošević in 2000.4  This type of education entered the main stage of 
democracy aid with the cultural turn in democratisation studies. This approach, adopted by 
both scholars and policy makers, emphasises social capital and participation as keys in 
democratic transitions, and it included civic education as a standard element of the 
democracy aid portfolio based on the paradigm of transition.5 In this approach, democratic 
                                               
1 Comaroff and Comaroff, ‘Reflections on Youth’, 20. 
2 Space prevents an analysis of NFE and youth work in general as a field, but for a quick overview of EU 
involvement and the current debates, see European Commission, Youth Work and Non-Formal Learning in Europe’s 
Education Landscape. 
3 ‘Youth in Action Programme’. 
4 Erasmus+ is the continuation of Youth in Action programmes that were active from 2007 – 2013.  
5 Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, 17. 
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institutions and processes are no longer enough for a democracy to function. In addition, 
transitional societies are in need of new democratic subjects. Youth education thus emerges 
as a site where young people will be initiated into a democratic culture, and cultural factors 
causing democratic failure, such as apathy, nationalism, and bitterness, would be corrected.6  
NFE did not stop after the popular narrative of youth bringing down Milošević 
ended. On the contrary, in the last decades, youth globally emerged a focal point for 
international donors who see youth as capable of bringing peace, development, and 
democracy. Analysing this increasing significance of youth today, Mayssoun Sukarieh and 
Stuart Tannock write that its popularity needs to be put into the context of the rise of global 
neoliberalism: the more positive identities of youth are in line with the shifting, fluid, mobile 
and precarious nature of ever-changing contemporary capitalism.7 
Keeping this in mind, I approach NFE with asking two interrelated question. First, 
what can the ways that these projects are practiced tell us about broader logics of 
intervention? And second, how do those logics shape the everyday realities of youth they 
target? In doing so, I join a range of scholars who examined projects that seek to empower 
and develop. Nina Eliasoph, for example, studied “Empowerment Projects” in the US that 
foster “personal transformation” in youth in the US.8 Julie Hemment explored state-run 
youth projects in Russia as an aftermath of democracy promotion that targeted the region in 
the 1990s.9 Ljubica Spaskovska studied the “last generation” of Yugoslav institutional youth 
politics.10 However, the only previous ethnographic engagement with NFE’s political 
dimension in Serbia is offered in Theodora Vetta’s unpublished PhD thesis. In one of the 
chapters, she offers a thick ethnographic description of a week-long training in Serbia to 
point out how the workshop itself is a “social intervention on the terrain of self-formation.”11 
All of these scholars examine these projects as sites of governmentalisation: this is where 
                                               
6 Greenberg, ‘There’s Nothing Anyone Can Do about It’. 
7 Sukarieh and Tannock, Youth Rising?, 5. 
8 Eliasoph, Making Volunteers. For a critical discussion of “empowerment” in development, see Sharma, Logics of 
Empowerment. 
9 Hemment, Youth Politics in Putin’s Russia. 
10 Spaskovska, The Last Yugoslav Generation. 
11 Vetta, ‘Let’s Get Up!’, 84. The workshop she attended still runs annually under the same sponsorship, but I 
decided not to attend it in order to get a wider variety of participant experiences. Based on her description and 
the official website, I think the workshop in question is most similar to Erasmus+/Youth in Action workshops, 
who are notorious for their “tourism,” project speak, emphasis on intercultural dialogues, and overuse of 
colourful post its and flip charts. I think that by attending seminars which are explicitly more political, like 
those organised by German political foundations or those dealing with transitional justice, I got a better insight 
into NFE as a part of a larger governmental formation.  
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subjectivities are formed, politics defined, and issues demarcated. Examining how youth are 
“perceived, named, and represented” helps us understand the wider social, political, and 
economic government that engages them.12  
The chapter starts with asking what kind of youth are imagined in NFE 
interventions, and proceeds by investigating how youth themselves experience these 
practices.13 NFE events allowed me to spend extended periods of time with the targets of 
interventions.  My fieldwork in NFE consisted of attending a number of courses, seminars, 
and lectures. I started with a Youth for Peace week presented in the Introduction. I attended 
two Erasmus+ Youth in Action trainings organised in Serbia. I participated in a semester of 
a political school for youth active in right and centre-right parties funded by a German 
political foundation and implemented by a Serbian NGO. I participated in a seven-week 
course on transitional justice in Belgrade. I also occasionally attended lectures in other 
courses taking place in Belgrade, and I was present at numerous public lectures with 
educational goals. This allowed me to be familiar even with courses that I did not attend—
through getting to know their reputation or speaking with people who have attended them. 
In addition, I conducted in-depth interviews with trainers and participants of these courses, 
interviewed people who work in the funding organisations and people who were active in 
the field of non-formal education since the early 1990s. I also gathered policy documents 
produced by the state, donors, and civil society organisations.  
The chapter proceeds in five parts. The first part of the chapter will examine how 
youth was imagined in Yugoslavia. As discussed in Chapter 2, this “recovering of historical 
consciousness” is both a political and an analytical move. Besides making space for the 
subjectivities that are usually erased, it also helps understand how contemporary projects are 
developed in conversation with past efforts to engage youth. These past projects targeted 
youth as political subjects much earlier than the NFE that was a part of US-led democracy 
promotion in the late 1990s.14 Similarly, the expectations and experiences of these projects 
in Serbia have to be put in conversation with political education that took place in Yugoslavia 
and which already sought to shape subjectivities in particular ways.  
                                               
12 Comaroff and Comaroff, ‘Reflections on Youth, from the Past to the Postcolony’, 20. 
13 As explained in the Introduction, I borrow the formulation of governing intent and reception from Hemment, 
Youth Politics in Putin’s Russia. 
14 While examining state-led projects in contemporary Russia, Hemment, for example, emphasises that even 
though these projects function within a very specific narrative of Russian national greatness, the projects 
themselves could not be understood without inquiring into how they have built on international democracy 
promotion projects that targeted youth in the 1990s. Hemment, 12–13, 78.  
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The second part of the chapter then moves to discussing the shift from “democracy 
guerrillas” that democracy assistance created in the 1990s to the “political children” that were 
the targets of post regime-change statebuilding in Serbia. It examines how local subjects are 
engaged by different practices and how these practices echo in local contexts. In doing this, 
the section specifically moves away from pursuing the path of a cultural critique—i.e. were 
these events “authentic” or “internationally designed”—to pursue a positional critique—i.e. 
what were the effects of the particular framings of youth. The effects are captured in what I 
term project politics: professionalisation and proceduralism that are imagined to “purify” 
politics of Balkan corruption and that have reshaped the meaning of civil society, the state, 
and political action in general.  
The third part of the chapter turns to the visions of governing unemployed youth to 
examine how programs of subject production are both deployed and reproduced among 
youth in Serbia. It approaches local subjectivities by examining a particular ethnographic 
artefact, the National Strategy for Youth Employment, created by a youth association in 
cooperation with international donors and the Serbian state. I use this document to further 
inquire into visions of political life presented in it and put them in conversation with 
observations made thus far. Most importantly the section focuses on a bifurcation of youth 
that underlines unemployment strategies and uncovers a rigid differentiation of subjects by 
power which is seemingly universal. 
The fourth part of the chapter turns to different experiences—practices and 
narratives that resist those presented hitherto. I look at competing visions of political life 
advanced by my interlocutors, but also at more subtle forms of resisting with monetary re-
appropriation. The section argues that these things should not be seen as outside 
government, but as an integral part of it.  
Finally, the short concluding section will address what the things uncovered in the 
lives of the governed tell us about interventions today and open up some question to be 
pursued in Part III of the thesis.  
I Youth in Yugoslavia 
Contrary to readings that see the focus on youth as a novel move of neoliberal 
capitalism, youth in Yugoslavia was one of the constitutive pillars of socialist society. As the 
famous motto of “Tito—Partija—Omladina—Armija” [Tito—the Party—the Youth—the 
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Army] shows, youth was a crucial element of the Yugoslavian socio-political landscape.15 The 
development of the socialist citizen was a managed process: children in primary schools 
became pioniri [pioneers], and after seven years they became omladina [youth]. Youth was 
targeted by the now famous youth labour actions [omladinske radne akcije—ORA], taught 
politics in political schools, and were treated as “important [as] political subjects in their own 
right” by the federal youth organisations and its branches.16  
Youth labour actions were voluntary work actions which saw more than two million 
youth complete a number of big infrastructural projects from the 1940s, until the last ORA 
in 1990. One of the most famous projects is the “Brotherhood and Unity” highway—built in 
a youth action between Zagreb and Belgrade, connecting my own home region to Serbia. 
The motto of the ORA “we build the highway, the highway builds us” [mi gradimo autoput, 
autoput gradi nas] however, points to stakes much higher than free labour. ORAs served to 
build socialist citizens with the spirit of “brotherhood and unity.” More than just facilitating 
alliances by spending time together, these actions were supposed to erase the divisions that 
prevented the emergence of the “socialist new men.” The urban and the rural, the poor and 
the rich—all were supposed to come together in building a common future.17  With time, and 
especially after the 1960s, ORAs’ official goals and the reasons of youth attendance started 
varying greatly. Although the official rationale was still hard labour, shorter working hours 
and more opportunities for learning and leisure were introduced when most people came to 
have fun and enjoy their summers.18  
Another site of subject formation were the political schools and the highly 
institutionalised sphere of youth politics within the Party. Although only rarely mentioned 
in literature, these schools were presented to me in interviews with veterans of NFE as the 
direct antecedents of the NFE industry that emerged in the 1990s. It was in these schools 
that talented youth was supposed to mature into party cadres. Youth also practiced their 
politics in student and youth organisations that were technically a part of the state apparatus. 
In a recent book on the last generation active in these organisations, Spaskovska details how 
these networks were both products of and actively participated in creating the social and political 
landscape of late socialism in the 1980s. As much as they were a part of the state apparatus, 
they at the same time provided a platform for the critique of the regime. Using a leftist 
                                               
15 Spaskovska, The Last Yugoslav Generation, 38. 
16 Greenberg, After the Revolution, l. 535; Spaskovska, The Last Yugoslav Generation. 
17 Popović, ‘Youth Labor Action’. For more on building the Brotherhood and Unity highway, see the MA thesis 
Vejzagić, ‘The Importance of Youth Labour Actions’. 
18 Popović, ‘Youth Labor Action’. Especially p. 280, 287-290. 
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critique of what they saw as failed attempts at socialism, youth demanded more socialism: 
better self-management, less corrupt bureaucracy, more freedom of speech, and more 
employment.  
At the same time, and particularly after the protests in 1968, these organisations also 
made space for youth political subjectivities that were not inspired only by internal criticism 
of Yugoslav socialism, but also by international and transnational issues. New global social 
issues like environmentalism, pacifism, and LGBT+ visibility became a part of what was 
originally imagined as a youth party branch.19 Thus, domestic and Party student 
organisations and politics were also a place where students practiced their geopolitical 
positionings. The aforementioned issues like environmentalism and sexuality already linked 
the students into a common feeling of “Europeanness”. Yugoslav youth politics hence 
engaged both “inner” or “Yugoslav-specific contestations of the socio-political framework” 
and “outer challenges resulting from development at international level.”20  In other words, 
these party structures were the site of both “mainstream and alternative” politics—allowing 
youth to engage local politics while developing a “new transnational identity” that positioned 
them between the East and the West.21  
Spaskovska underscores that the demise of these youth organisations in the late 1980s 
was very much a part of the broader political impasse. This was a time when different visions 
of reforming socialism emerged and led to power struggles that ultimately saw the demise of 
Yugoslavia instead of its re-imagination, and allowed Milošević to fill the power vacuum that 
was left behind.22 It is onto this rich history of government practices and political debate 
about everything from youth apathy, unemployment, sexuality, the place in the party and 
the state, and the overall make up of what is supposed to be a good life that democracy 
promoters and their NFE activities landed in the late 1990s.  
II From democracy guerrillas to political children 
 
                                               
19 Spaskovska, The Last Yugoslav Generation, 126. 
20 Spaskovska, 126. 
21 Spaskovska, 27, 125–28. She uses a particularly powerful example of a UK punk music magazine that 
repeatedly printed stories of Yugoslavia as “behind the Iron Curtain.” Not only were Yugoslav bands written 
about in the UK, and British press read in Yugoslavia, but the magazine also printed angry replies of Yugoslav 
youth who advised the magazine to “ask for some education” and learn about Non-alignment and Tito’s politics.  
22 Spaskovska, 161. 
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Some time ago... Let’s say in the last decade, when you would come to [the 
organisation] you were a little revolutionary [mali revolucionar] and desired change. 
Now you are an individual fighting for yourself.23  
 
i. Democracy guerrillas 
Many of the people who are now managing and implementing NFE and other civil 
society (CS) activities in Serbia came to be employed in CS through their involvement in 
these internationally aided protests. While talking to these people who started their civil 
society careers in the era of the democracy promotion craze, I was always presented with a 
juxtaposition of the apolitical present, with the very political past. In that past, subjects of NFE 
were not bogged down by paperwork, they did not compete with project plans, and they did 
not have to account for how they spent the international currencies given amidst evacuations 
and closures of embassies.24 Below I discuss this “political” era of NFE. 
In her book on the role of democracy promotion in the ousting of Milošević, Marlene 
Spoerri emphasises that “the bombardment of Serbia was followed by a bombardment of 
aid.”25 While her narrative was challenged in stories I heard of aid arriving even before the 
end of the bombing campaign on June 10, 1999, the phrase captures the dramatic extent of 
democracy aid given to Serbia in the period leading to October 2000. These efforts made the 
Serbian “revolution” celebrated as proof that helping democracy from the outside can work 
and the “bulldozer revolution” became a model exported around the world.  
These subjects were nothing less than what The Guardian called “democracy 
guerrillas”—hallmarks of protests that finally ousted Milošević.26 NFE was crucial in the 
subjectivation of these democracy guerrillas. It was a large part of the intense funding of civil 
society and capacity building that took place in the preparation for ousting Milošević. Otpor! 
[Resistance!] and other groups opposing the regime were heavily aided by democracy 
promoters from Europe and the US and NFE played a key role in the process of organising 
the youth. For example, the European Youth Centre in Budapest became an important 
meeting point for youth NGO activists in an era when Milošević did not allow NGO 
                                               
23 Interview, Belgrade, April 7. Interviewee is an alumnus of one of the organisation’s courses and is now 
employed as the coordinator of two courses, one of which I attended as a participant observer. 
24 Interview, March 21, 2016; April 2, 2016. 
25 Spoerri, Engineering Revolution. The book focuses mostly on aid to political parties. For an account that focuses 
on civil society, see Bieber, ‘The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society’. 
26 I borrow the term from a 2005 Guardian article about a training in Albania which had Otpor! members 
present as trainers. Traynor, ‘Young Democracy Guerrillas Join Forces’. 
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development within the country.27 More generally, many NGOs “explicitly linked alternative 
pedagogy, critical thinking, democracy, and the anti-Milošević movement” and NFE became 
a site of “active citizen engagement.”28 As shown in the quote from the beginning of this 
section, back then, even entering the building was a political statement—a positioning of 
oneself against Milošević, and with Europe and the West. 
Serbian youth who was protesting was labelled revolutionary as their democratic 
spirit was oppressed by the dictatorial regime and needed technical and financial help to 
express itself. What is striking in the stories of suitcases of cash that were smuggled across 
borders in times when foreign donors were not allowed into the country, is the perceived 
political maturity of aid receivers: the democratic spirit is there, it just needs a bit of a push 
to accomplish itself. This framing of youth as the brave bringers of change is a part of the 
global narrative of youth as revolutionary subjects. Sukarieh and Tannock track the same 
narrative from early 20th century Europe, the 1960s counter-movements, to the Arab Spring 
uprisings.29 Interestingly, it is precisely Otpor! and NFE activities it once received, and that 
its members now provide, that serves as a direct link between the coloured revolutions of 
Eastern Europe to the protests in Tahrir Square.30 Former Otpor! activist went to train 
people all over the world through the Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies 
(CANVAS) that was founded in 2003 by Otpor! leaders and is closely connected both with 
Western/Northern donors and “revolutionaries” around the globe.31 Thus the Serbian youth 
and the “revolution” they brought is both celebrated and condemned as the “prototype for 
all non-violent acts of deposing dictators.”32  
Because of these transnational networks, many discussions of the coloured 
revolutions, the agency of local youth, and the international support they received easily turn 
into arguments about whether those revolutions were truly local or just, as Zeinab Abul-
Magd describes the events in Serbia in her comparison with Egypt, “staged.”33 While 
                                               
27 Vidanović, ‘Support Was out There!’ 
28 Greenberg, After the Revolution, 94. 
29 Sukarieh and Tannock, Youth Rising?, chap. 4. 
30 Abul-Magd, ‘Occupying Tahrir Square’; Spoerri and Joksic, ‘From Resistance to Revolution and Back 
Again’; Rosenberg, ‘Revolution U’; Sukarieh and Tannock, Youth Rising?, 103. 
31 See their website for more information: http://canvasopedia.org/ 
32 Abul-Magd, ‘Occupying Tahrir Square’, 568. 
33 Abul-Magd, 567, 570. This debate was addressed in Serbian academia as well. Its best captured in the 
exchange between Slobodan Naumović who wrote a text about Otpor’s foreign support and classified it as an 
“imported revolution,” and Zagorka Golubović, who challenged his conclusion and methodology. Interestingly, 
the debate does not only concern Otpor!, but also ideas about who should speak for the region: Golubović 
heavily criticizes Naumović for citing American authors. Naumović, ‘„Otpor!“ Kao Postmoderni Faust 
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naturally attractive as it tells apart authentic rebels from foreign mercenaries, this dividing 
line is a lot less clear. After talking to people from all walks of life who protested daily and 
lived under the extreme Milošević oppression, one cannot easily dismiss their agency in 
favour of USAID designs. On the other hand, the paper (and money) trails that link the 
events to US democracy promotion and regime change agendas are real. Instead of deciding 
which is true, it is useful to ask what either reading obscures. Outside of the cultural critique 
which would try to decide how “authentic” these subjects and processes are, it is more useful 
to approach the regime change and its aftermath through a positional critique that 
investigates what effects this curious joining of local and international narratives has.  
One of the results of framing youth as the revolutionary subject is the occlusion of 
other actors and processes that were crucial for political action.34 This is precisely what 
happened in Serbia. The myths of brave Otpor! activists smuggling translations of Gene 
Sharp’s book35 from NFE activities in Hungary—read as either a celebration of Serbian 
bravery or a condemnation of American imperial designs—occlude the incredibly diverse 
coalition that came together to bring down Milošević. These were not just urban youth, but 
provincial workers who went on strike, technocratic neoliberal parties that went to form the 
new government, extreme nationalist organisations, and even the notoriously radical Serbian 
Orthodox Church that called on the military and the police to respect the will of the people.36 
Neither money nor courage magically brought out people to the streets. This was a product 
of careful planning, smart strategizing, and organising in the streets, fields, and offices.  
The particular framing of the events in 2000 changed ideas about political action. I 
thus approached this field with trying to understand how ideas of political action were 
changing and what is the role of international intervention in them. As Jessica Greenberg 
powerfully argued in her investigation of student university politics in Serbia in the 2000s, a 
crucial part of this process was the translation that was happening between values and 
narratives promoted in democracy promotion and their local practices.37  
                                               
["Otpor" – A Postmodern Faust]’; Golubović, ‘Objektivna ili subjektivistička interpretacija “Otpora” 
[Objective or subjective interpretation of Otpor]’; Naumović, ‘Was Faust a Member of ′Otpor′?’; Golubović, 
‘Šta je normalna nauka? [What is normal science?]’. 
34 Sukarieh and Tannock, Youth Rising?, 107. 
35 Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy. The book was famously translated, printed, distributed, and used by 
Otpor! activists. See, Sorensen, ‘Humor as a Serious Strategy’.  
36 Stojanović, ‘Democratic Revolution in Serbia’. The rest of the contributions in the same volume present 
insightful early reflections on the October 5 events.   
37 Greenberg, After the Revolution, ll. 326–328. 
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The great funding and attention given to youth is best understood not as imposing 
foreign interests and agencies nor as resurrecting local authentic ones—the conjuncture 
worked together to translate between the two and ended up in specific ways that politics are 
practiced. This “translation” that continued into the 2000s re-defined political action both in 
terms of permissible issues and permissible tools. It is this translation, or afterlife, of ideas of 
political action that came to dominate NFE, and intervention in the region. 
ii. Political children 
While the aid generally, and investments in NFE specifically, did not stop after the 
regime change, their subjects (d)evolved. As democracy persistently stayed out of reach, the 
same revolutionary youth who brought down Milošević with a mix of humour, bravery, and 
international democracy assistance were re-drawn as lacking that revolutionary and 
democratic spirit and in need of further education on how to “do democracy.” Suddenly, the 
things that were seen as existing and needing material support in the 1990s, like critical 
thinking and politics, were now lacking and needed to be developed. The diagnosis relied on 
issues of political culture and subjectivities: political culture was deficient, and people failed 
to act as “active citizens.”38 Accordingly, the subjects of this newfound tutelage embodied in 
the ideology of “transition” needed to be taught “participation.”39 The process of maturation 
was very quickly termed “Europeanisation.” The persistent socio-political issues 
demonstrated bluntly that democratisation does not automatically provide a happy ending, 
and the country and the region embarked on the process of European integration. 
The maturation needed to happen both in party politics and among the general public. 
In party politics, NFE focused on youth as a long-term investment in the development of a 
party culture. A spate of foundations provided political skills and political marketing 
knowledge to youth and women, seeing those groups as long-term investments in parties in 
Serbia.40 These courses, workshops, and trainings still happen. Funded mostly by German 
political foundations, they target “future leaders” who are usually already active in party 
politics and equip them with knowledge, skills, and networks for their oncoming political 
careers. Because every German party operates its political foundation with the primary goal 
                                               
38 Wedel, ‘USAID to Central and Eastern Europe’. 
39 Greenberg, ‘There’s Nothing Anyone Can Do about It’. 
40 Spoerri, Engineering Revolution, 133, 143, 144. She specifically uncovers how democracy assistance might have 
hurt Serbian politics and prevented parties form developing “meaningful political content,” despite all the 
“ideology building” provided by German Stiftungen and British party foundations 
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of a “diverse political education,” all shades of the political spectre are covered.41 These 
organisations’ influence is felt beyond party politics. In Alexander Vorbrugg’s words, they 
“contest existing political realities and create new ones.”42 It is this redefinition and 
contestation that I both observed in the workshops I attended and that was retold to me in 
interviews with people active in NFE in the past.  
Simultaneously, the improved parties needed a better-informed voting public and a 
more developed civil society as their counterparts. So not only was political culture 
backward on a party level, but international aid proclaimed the entire population as apathetic 
and created “participation” as the new object of desire. 43 This introduced the valorisation of 
the local that we examined in Chapter 1: a specific type of local participation emerged in the 
idea of “building civil society.” Civil society was perceived as both lacking and a key to a 
functioning democracy. And it was to be built by “building capacities:” teaching the 
necessary skills and values through NFE.  Thus from being democracy guerrillas, Serbian 
youth (and adults) quickly became political children.44 
NFE thus cannot be discussed without addressing civil society more generally. The 
theoretical connection is made in the narrative of building democracy by building capacities 
for civil society. Moreover, most providers of NFE are NGOs themselves and the implicit 
goal of these activities has always been framed around the participants staying in the sector 
[u sektoru]: themselves becoming a part of civil society, by project writing, volunteering, or 
becoming NGO employees.  
                                               
41 There is surprisingly little literature on the activities of German political foundations despite their overtly 
political goals and omnipresence. The little research that exists, focuses on the impact of the foundations on 
party politics. The literature seems to draw the conclusion that German political foundations have little or no 
effect in the region because parties and unions they support fail to become significant political actors. I disagree 
on two points. First, in party politics, at least the Konrad Adenauer Foundation provides legitimacy to SNS 
(the ruling party in Serbia). By facilitating access to the German Government, the Foundation helps provide 
the image of Vučić as a competent leader who is brining Serbia “back to Europe.” Second, outside of party 
politics, these foundations seem to be crucial in supporting more systemic research and activism on alternative 
visions of government. While I do not want to judge the effectiveness of these actions versus their obvious 
entanglement with the political economies of civil society in the region, it is undeniable this these narratives do 
exist in the region because of the funds and projects provided by the foundations. Moreover, outside of party 
politics, the sheer number of young people who attend activities organised by these foundations warrant more 
curiosity about the effect they have on everyday lives of at least a part of the population. For some literature 
focusing on German political foundations and party politics, see Erdmann, ‘Hesitant Bedfellows: The German 
Stiftungen and Party Aid in Africa’; Dakowska, ‘Beyond Conditionality’; Phillips, ‘Exporting Democracy’. 
42 Vorbrugg, ‘Governing through Civil Society?’, 137. 
43 Greenberg, After the Revolution, 88; see also Greenberg, ‘There’s Nothing Anyone Can Do about It’. 
44 I borrow the term from Buden, ‘Children of Postcommunism’. 
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There are hundreds, if not thousands, of studies on civil society in the Balkans and 
Eastern Europe.45 Anthropologists’ contributions have been especially valuable because they 
have “particularized and made concrete” the buzzword and showed how a Western 
European idea has many different referents across Europe.46 Such concretization means 
abandoning civil society as pre-signified analytical concept and instead exploring its making 
and use in existing politics.47 In examining the changes in the lived meanings of civil society 
and the consequent redefinitions of the state and its subjects, I join Greenberg who has 
similarly examined the “aftermath” of the revolution in Serbia. However, while Greenberg’s 
work focused specifically on university student politics, here I want to more closely examine 
what happened on the level of civil society and the state as I saw them through my own 
participation in NFE and through stories told to me by my interlocutors.  
iii. A new way of governing 
a. Issues and tools of political action 
My first Erasmus+ event was a week in Novi Sad where youth from the region and 
beyond came to discuss social inclusion. The week was organised as a “training for 
trainers”—a special type of event within Erasmus+ that is supposed to raise the next 
generation of workshop trainers. I was unsure about my participation—topics of inclusion 
and exclusion seemed to be for “real youth workers” and I was worried that I would be 
expected to have such experience. However, as soon as I met the rest of the participants, it 
became clear that my worries were unwarranted—experience in youth work that I worried 
about was not high on the agenda. While relieving my own anxiety, realising that the title of 
the workshop is not the agenda, left me wondering what is. The “what’s the point” question 
which began in Istanbul and that I retold in the Introduction loomed large over the week in 
Novi Sad. We were put in a dilapidated hotel outside of the city, fed sub-par food, and had 
session after session in one of the unoccupied (by us, because we were the only guests of the 
hotel) rooms.  
                                               
45 As most relevant to the approach in this thesis, I would point out the works of Marek Mikuš and Theodora 
Vetta that are cited throughout the thesis.  
46 Hann, ‘Introduction: Political Society and Civil Anthropology’, 2. For an early account see Hann and Dunn, 
Civil Society Challenging Western Models. For a range of studies on the Balkans, see the edited volume Bojicic-
Dzelilovic, Ker-Lindsay, and Kostovicova, Civil Society and Transitions in the Western Balkans. 
47 Bilić, ‘A Concept That Is Everything and Nothing’. offers a threefold justification of this abandonment: it is 
logically incoherent because it encompasses both “civil” and “uncivil” associations, it is historically removed 
from the Western European context in which it was originally developed, and it obscures ideological and 
political investments of its actors. 
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After going back to my field notes, I realised that “the point” of the week was actually 
mentioned in passing by Maja, one of the three facilitators, in the opening session. After 
presenting the schedule and the official aims of the week, she told us that she and the other 
facilitators are “there for us” all week and invited us to use their comprehensive knowledge 
of Erasmus+ to give our projects a “European dimension.”48 What this European dimension 
is became clear only after coming back to my fieldnotes after talking with dozens of other 
people and triangulating my own conclusions with the vast literature on youth projects. 
The European dimension of our projects determines both the permissible goals that 
we might focus on, and the tools for achieving them. In the opening session, we were invited 
to draw a poster of inclusions and exclusion that we find particularly problematic in our 
countries. A girl from Macedonia drew a shoe to illustrate the expanding textile industry in 
Macedonia in which women are paid less than the cost of one pair of the shoes they produce. 
A young man from Italy drew a map of the famous boot to show us how the unification of 
Italy led to the biggest inequality: that between the developed north and the lagging south of 
the country. A young professional from Greece highlighted how one of the effects of the 
crisis in Greece was the EU literally stopping all funding for Erasums+ activities—a powerful 
illustration of the Greek position in the Union. 
During this opening, it already became clear that we were not there to talk or worry 
about such “structural” or “state” issues—there were specific problems and specific solutions 
that we were nudged towards. The point was perhaps best illustrated in one of the last 
sessions that had us presenting our own ideas that we were to develop with the new tools we 
were given. Matija is a very young, but also very ambitious man from Republika Srpska. He 
spent the week insisting that we talk more about “politics.” While explicitly thrilled to be 
given an opportunity to travel and meet young people from all over Europe, Matija also used 
coffee breaks to express his frustration with the “apolitical” character of the workshop. The 
topics that interested him did not have a place in the planned sessions. For example, he 
wanted to debate the difference between the EU democracy without growth, and the 
Belarusian dictatorship with almost full employment. In his mind the logic was bullet-proof:  
in an EU funded workshop on political work, we should be discussing EU politics.  
Matija went to an international school and was not afraid to express his opinion in 
English. Towards the end of the week, his small team was tasked with devising solutions for 
                                               
48 The discussion of this event is based on my fieldwork journal from January 2016 and recordings of the 
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geographic exclusion.  Matija combined his ambition and schooling to come up with an idea 
of an FDI led road construction. He presented the idea enthusiastically: if people are isolated, 
let us build them a road! Maja, our trainer, was visibly annoyed—on this last day of the 
workshop, have we still not learned what is fundable? She was as exhausted as we were, and 
frankly showed her annoyance with a rhetorical question: “In which of your countries do 
NGOs build roads?” People looked down—even though this is supposed to be non-formal 
education, we easily occupied the roles of formally “bad students.” Matija remained silent. I 
assumed he is not used to being wrong and I felt bad for him. In an effort to save his idea by 
at least starting a discussion, I mentioned that NGOs might actually have a role: they could 
organise a campaign to demand the road, start a petition, or design and implement public 
awareness project that would show the importance of such a project and build support. 
Matija was the only one who agreed and the topic, just like all “state” issues throughout the 
week, was quickly dropped.  
These short examples capture a larger delineation of permissible problems and 
permissible political action for dealing with them. The striking thing about representations 
drawn in the opening session is the structural character of the problems described: in an era 
where structural politics are supposedly replaced by individualism and responsibilisation, 
many young people instinctively presented structural issues as the defining characteristics of 
their national experiences. However, it was precisely these problems that we were told are 
outside of possible political action. That day, and the following seven, we were constantly told 
that we are here to talk about “individuals” and not “states.” And since it is states who frame 
the issues just described, there was no room for pursuing matters we found important.  
As the example with Matija shows, the responsibilisation worked in making the 
citizens and the NGOs they supposedly make, rather than any larger institution, responsible 
for change. Every conversation that might have led into discussions on redistribution—
whether in terms of labour rights in Macedonia, regional inequality in Italy, or roads in 
BiH—was silenced. We were supposed to think in terms of cultural centres, photo 
exhibitions, and craft fairs. Vetta’s work strongly demonstrates how the seminar she 
attended “was not just creating a particular kind of actor or enhancing a particular 
subjectivity that would assume the responsibility of action; it was also demarcating the choice 
and the possibilities of the action itself.”49 In my, as well as Vetta’s observation, the possibilities 
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were tied to micro-projects, cultural topics, and tolerance. Any discussion of action that 
would focus on structural issues was quickly abandoned. 
This limitation of political action to permissible issues has been well explored in 
studies of NGOization, globally, as well in the Balkans.50 However, I want to highlight here 
that seeing this NGOization of political action as a lived experience complicates these 
interpretations. Out of 30 participants, I was only one of two people who had never attended 
an event like this before. This means that most participants have already gone through other 
projects that explained to them the permissible coordinates. Yet, they came back to them in 
all the sessions and in all coffee breaks, dinners, and outings. Moreover, during our week in 
Novi Sad, we discussed gender, class, sexuality, race and precarity in our free time, although 
there was no time for them in the sessions. The added value of Erasmus+ projects that see 
people living together is precisely the time that allows for questions and interests to form 
around so many different individual lives. Getting to know each other inevitably led to 
curiosity and what Eliasoph termed “possibly fruitful perplexity.”51 Just because we did not 
pursue them during official sessions, does not mean that we did not discuss these topics—
topics that might have remained unsaid if we were not put in a hotel outside of Novi Sad 
together. Here, NGOization stops being a complete process of global neoliberal re-shaping. A 
closer look uncovers that the silencing was obviously incomplete—the practices of neoliberal 
governmentality do not create the homo oeconomicus.  
Besides determining what is fundable—in terms of both problems and solutions—the 
European dimension should also be reflected in the way that projects are developed and 
implemented. Among the tools that we were taught, there was also the valorisation of the 
local in the form of encouraging participation, or “not writing projects for people, but with 
people.” The former was very much a matter of getting the translations right, but the latter 
was a more theoretical issue in the group. Many participants were very much aware that 
people who are most excluded do not take part in projects like this and thus it will rarely be 
possible to write with them. Many in the group also admitted that in their work they speak 
to local governments, schools and other institutions that might have insights into what 
marginalised groups need. For example, a young man working with Roma kids regularly 
spoke to their teachers to find out more about what is happening. This reliance on the state 
                                               
50 Vukov, ‘Seven Theses’; Sampson, ‘Weak States, Uncivil Societies and Thousands of NGOs: Benevolent 
Colonialism in the Balkans’; Sampson, ‘From Forms to Norms’; Sampson, ‘Too Much Civil Society? Donor-
Driven Human Rights NGOs in the Balkans’; Vetta, ‘“Democracy Building” in Serbia’; Vetta, ‘Revived 
Nationalism versus European Democracy’; Mikuš, ‘What Reform?’ 
51 Eliasoph, Making Volunteers, xvii. 
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and local governments was judged: even though we did not discuss whether the state can 
really have the best information (for example, asking the school teachers what kids in a town 
might need), it was made very clear that this is the incorrect way—a way that loses sight of 
participation and empowerment that we are supposed to strive for. The fact that our own 
agenda-setting was ignored and silenced all week did not seem to interrupt the celebration 
of “participation” that we were supposed to encourage with others.  
Once we were put in small groups to develop our own group projects, my exhaustion 
led me to ask four of my colleagues out-loud: is the goal here to learn to write a project that 
will get funded by Erasmus+, or are we here to actually think in a grassroots way about 
issues we want to work on and learn to solve them in a non-patronising way? Nikola, a very 
experienced Erasmus+ user understood me completely and translated in simple words: 
“Some of us here manage organisations, you [Katarina] have personal projects, but they [the 
trainers] do Erasmus+ and they expect the feedback to be Erasmus+.” And the way to do 
Erasmus+ feedback is to emphasise any possible trespassing of the program’s 
governmentalized parameters: short, smart, and reportable. The way to get funded is through 
framing our ideas in “project management” terms and phrases and Erasmus+ participation. 
Practically, this translates into thinking in phases and making goals manageable and 
achievable before anything else.52  We are not there to practice politics, but to become project, 
or Erasmus+, professionals.  
Here, we see the same effects of neoliberal governmentality that Mikuš noted in 
Serbian civil society in general: not as completely abolishing political action, but 
“redirect[ing] it to actively promote the autonomisation of individuals and society, their 
constitution as self-governing subjects driven by market rationality.”53 The constant 
applying, listing, and evaluating of these projects that we were force-fed in the many 
workshop I attended is the perfect example of such a market rationality.54  
                                               
52 Vetta, ‘Let’s Get Up!’ 
53 Mikuš, ‘Civil-Society Building’, 13. 
54 It is also worth noting that Eliasoph finds wider echoes of this phase- or short-term thinking. The reportable 
objectives, measurable targets, and short-term frames resonate with larger narratives that youth today have to 
navigate. She writes: “Some of the lessons, however, seem to be useful mainly for creating citizens who will 
placidly accept contemporary government’s increasingly short-term projects; who will not panic about short-
term employment, in an unsteady job market; who will feel calm about short-term marriage; not become 
passionately attached to any people or ideas: citizens who will change their souls rather than their conditions.” 
Eliasoph, Making Volunteers, xvii–xviii. 
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b. State, citizens, and civil society  
These ideas of permissible and professionalised political action echo in much wider 
fields than small youth workshops—they have shaped civil society and the state more 
generally in Serbia. This was obvious in speaking to an NGO worker in an organisation that 
was started during anti-Milošević protests and then grew to be the partner organisation of 
the EU’s TACSO (Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisation).55 Unlike other 
NGO workers who would often lament this professionalization as taking them away from 
community work and trapping them in endless paperwork and donor politics, Danijela was 
clear about the division of labour: grassroots organisation do activism, while organisations 
like hers serve to provide the technocratic expertise. Her organisation, however, provides 
the expertise in the form of NFE activities designed specifically for NGOs: how to write a 
project, how to develop a strategy, how to fundraise. Thus even in her own narrative, the 
grassroots are helped by professionalizing them, not by someone else doing the “professional 
part” for them. Most obviously, this professionalization excludes those grassroots 
organisations that are unable or unwilling to engage in “project speak.” But the consequences 
are far greater. The professional networks created cement the existing flows of resources and 
power, and establish a control of money, personnel, knowledge and concepts.56 Moreover, it 
also leads to creating professionals whose expertise has purchase across multiple sectors. 
The professionalization that starts with NFE activities in late teens and early 
adulthood creates professionals who are not limited to working in the civil society. The role 
of NFE in this cycle is recognised. The same person employed in the TACSO NGO and 
quoted above emphasised that people “in the sector” probably attend five or six of those 
“little schools” [školice] I am interested in before getting employment.57 Many year-long 
courses emphasise that the networks that they make long outlive the courses in question. We 
thus see an emergence of a specific class of actors who move between international projects, 
local NGOs, and different government offices.58 
                                               
55 TACSO mission is defined as “to increase and improve the capacity and actions of CSOs as well as their 
democratic role. Through TACSO’s capacity building activities, support and assistance, the aim is to achieve a 
strengthened civil society and to stimulate a civil society-friendly environment and culture.” It is reserved for 
civil society in countries not yet part of the EU because CSOs are seen as “key actors in supporting their 
country’s accession process.” ‘What Is TACSO?’ 
56 Sampson, ‘Weak States, Uncivil Societies and Thousands of NGOs: Benevolent Colonialism in the Balkans’. 
57 Interview, March 14, 2016. 
58 Janine Wedel’s work on aid in Eastern Europe is a good example of the importance of (in)formal networks 
in aid. See Wedel, ‘“Studying Through” a Globalizing World’; Wedel, Collision and Collusion. In the Balkans, 
much of the research on this topic comes from the field of critical policy studies. For example, see the edited 
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In such a world, it becomes increasingly difficult to classify actors: a person working 
in a big INGO can move to a bank or a Ministry the next day. Accordingly the difference 
between the institutions gets blurred. This re-working of the state-civil society relation was 
even more complicated by the changes that happened after the regime-change. It was civil 
society who became the government after the overthrow of Milošević and the most obvious 
effect of the massive support to civil society during 2000s was the entrance of civil society 
actors and social movement leaders into official politics. One of my interviewees who has 
been working in a big NFE organisation since mid-1990s described the 2000 events as 
“waking up one day and discovering that you personally know the entire Cabinet.”59 
Similarly, when I asked NGO workers about the biggest changes in their work, they always 
spoke about the difficulty of changing their relationship to the state: from working to bring 
down a government, to becoming the government itself. Besides obviously complicating the 
conceptualisation of civil society as a limit to the state, this also changed the motivations for 
attending NFE activities and working in civil society more generally. As an interviewee 
explained, people went from using NFE and NGOs to confront political power, to seeing 
them as an opportunity to gain political power through the existing networks.60  
While the civil society and party politics grew closer and closer, civil society, with its 
higher wages and exciting work environments, still retained its specific allure. In discussing 
this topic, an NGO employee summarised the feeling:  
 
“I mean, it’s a lot easier like this—I sit here, the AC is on, blinds down, we’re having 
a nice chat… better than being out on the campaign trail on some market trying to 
convince some people and getting spat on, cursed, and insulted. And that’s all a part… 
a part of politics. So, there is definitely glamour here [in civil society]. The majority, 
a large part, of, let’s say educated people [obrazovanog sveta] would like to exert some 
government [bi volela da vrši neku vlast], but would not like to fight for it, would prefer 
to be handed it on a platter.”61  
 
                                               
volumes Thomas and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Public Policy Making in the Western Balkans; Deacon and Stubbs, Social 
Policy and International Interventions in South East Europe; Clarke, Making Policy Move; and Stubbs, ‘Flex Actors 
and Philanthropy’; Stubbs, ‘Networks, Organizations, Movements’; Stubbs, ‘Stretching Concepts Too Far?’ 
Wedel termed these actors “flexians” and their networks “flex nets.” These are: “the new players and networks 
of power that do not restrict themselves to activities in any one area. Rather, through their activities, they 
connect state with private, bureaucracy with market, political with economic, macro with micro, and global 
with national, all the while making public decisions—decisions backed by the power of the state.” Wedel, 
Shadow Elite, x–xi. 
59 Interview, March 21, 2016 
60 Interview, April 7, 2016. 
61 Interview, April 2, 2016 
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Even though it might be “nicer” to sit in the NGO office than be in party politics, 
NGO workers still became valuable assets for the state government. Once the “return to 
Europe” began, it was NGO workers who knew how to write projects, deal with 
international organisations, and use English. Skills gained through NFE and used to bring 
down a government suddenly became needed to make government possible. Moreover, the 
conditions set by the EU focused on cooperation between the state and civil society. The 
performance of these networks is sometimes theatrically absurd. I witnessed it when I 
attended the consulting meeting for CSOs and the Ministry of Education, Science, and 
Technological development, organised by the Office for the Cooperation with Civil Society.62 
The NGO Working Group meeting for Educational Reform had about 80 CSO 
representatives and several Government officials. CSOs were demanding change, and the 
officials convincing them they are doing everything that was possible to perform the best 
they can. Early in the morning, a representative of one of the biggest NGOs in Serbia raised 
her hand in the Q&A. But she did not start with a question. She started by congratulating 
the ruling party, whom I assume was represented by the Ministry officials, for being re-
elected earlier that week. There was an actually audible gasp in the room: independent media 
and civil society have been warning about the growing authoritarian tendencies of the 
current government for a while, and both the election campaign and the actual election were 
mired with irregularities. Seeing my extremely surprised face, a young professional that I 
already knew leaned over: “No surprise there, everyone knows they get most of the line 481.”63 
The networks started in NFE school and carried into civil society thus did not change only 
civil society, but also brought about the NGOization of the state. 
This overlap between the state and civil society was already examined in Mikuš’ study 
of the creation of the Serbian Civil Society Law in 2009, and the starting of the Office for 
Cooperation with the Civil Society in 2011. In both events, personal ties played a more 
important role than a strict division between governmental and non-governmental titles and 
Mikuš brings to fore these “informal networks and interstitial arenas of power.”64 It is 
necessary to ask how international politics are shaped by and shape these interstitial arenas. 
                                               
62 The meeting took place on April 25, 2016, in Belgrade.  A short summary can be accessed from ‘Izveštaj o 
Konsultativnom Sastanku Ministarstva Prosvete [Report from the Consultative Meeting of the Ministry of 
Education and CSOs]’. 
63 This budget line relates to all state and municipal NGO funding and is officially called “donations for non-
governmental organisations.” However, the budget line also finances youth and sport organisations, religious 
associations, and political parties, thus adding to the funding confusion of the third sector in Serbia.  
64 Mikuš, ‘Informal Networks’. 
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c. Project politics: economism and proceduralism 
NFE practices that I observed, and the experiences of their targets that go on to work 
and live in civil society in Serbia, point to the very political changes that the supposedly 
apolitical NFE and civil society building brought to Serbia.  The simultaneous 
professionalization of NGOs and NGOization of the state are a part of a larger process that 
I call the projectivization of politics. The cooperation between international and domestic actors 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s did not only help bring down Milošević, but it also 
translated into a very specific vision of the ordered relationship between the state and the 
civil society.65 This specific vision of governing utilizes seemingly technical concepts like 
budget discipline, audit, efficiency, and competition, and at the same time invites the civil 
society as a partner in this administrative rule, and as a competitor in the field of public 
services provision.66 There are multiple dimensions to this projectivization of politics: a 
specific form of participation for both individuals and communal action, a market rationality 
as economism in which funding becomes the legitimizing tool for political ideas, an over-
reliance on transparency, meritocracy, and expertise as supposedly apolitical ideals, and the 
proceduralism which dominates the public discourse today.  
Another important feature of projectivized politics is the need for external 
legitimation: while there might be many doubts about how accepted or not EU integration 
process is in the eyes of the Serbian public, it is obvious that there is no political alternative 
to Europe.67 This powerful pairing of progressive politics with “Europeanisation” shapes the 
political context by further professionalizing NGOs, both directly through TACSO and 
funding, and indirectly by limiting the visions of permissible political action. This not only 
detaches NGOs from their constituencies and excludes alternative dialogues that may better 
fit local contexts, 68 but also affects everyday political subjectivities. In other words, it does 
not only shape civil society by determining what is fundable and what is not, but it also 
defines the limits of possible political imaginaries. I witnessed these in the many “problem 
oriented” group assignments we were given in different workshops: Matija was chastised by 
not only the trainer, but also his colleagues for thinking about a road in an assignment dealing 
                                               
65 Greenberg, After the Revolution, 21. 
66 Mikuš, ‘Civil-Society Building’, 13. 
67 This is more than a catchphrase. The May 2008 election campaign revolved around two groups who claimed 
that Europe in fact, does, or does not, have an alternative, and explicitly stated so in their campaign slogans 
and group titles. For more details, see Mikuš, ‘“European Serbia” and Its “Civil” Discontents’, 6. 
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with ameliorating rural isolation when everyone knows that NGOs cannot be concerned 
with infrastructure; unemployment was instinctively connected to a faulty educational 
system causing reduced “employability” instead of any examination of possible other 
structural causes; corruption was to be treated as an effect of “mentality,” rather than 
capitalist economy. These negotiations, however mundane they may seem, capture more 
general discussions of who counts as a political subject, what counts as legitimate political 
action, and what claims can be made.69 And it is within these boundaries that youth navigate 
another constitutive part of their lives—unemployment. 
III (Un)employed youth 
At the end of one of the sessions of political school organised in cooperation of a local 
Serbian leftist party and the UK Labour party, a participant who had to leave early said 
goodbye to his colleagues by “wishing [them] the best of luck with the election and speedy 
employment.”70 The reference to the election was somewhat understandable: the course I was 
attending was funded by a political foundation, and even though the party that ran it was 
marginal, it was expected that everyone there had political ambitious in the upcoming 
elections. The employment reference, however, struck me as both unusual and essential—
what does political education have to do with (un)employment? It was not unusual in that 
room because everyone at all times understood that people who attend these workshops are 
unemployed. This normalcy also made it essential. 
His comment resonated with discussions that happened in the breaks of the 
workshops I attended. These revolved around applications, CVs, job openings in specific 
NGOs, surprisingly exploitative labour practices of those NGOs, hopes, expectations to be 
rewarded, and disappointments when those rewards were missing. These observations did 
not fit into my expectations of what NFE is about in Serbia. Going into fieldwork and being 
familiar with the discourse of the Balkans as still lacking in all things democratic, I expected 
to find stories of revolutionary Otpor! subjects and troubled, but improvable, “apathetic” 
political culture. However, I found these stories only over coffees with people reminiscing 
about the days when aid, and the education it funded, was “political.” In the courses I 
participated in, I heard stories of unpaid internships, employability, and maintaining stability 
                                               
69 Vorbrugg, ‘Governing through Civil Society?’, 146. makes the same argument after working with a German 
political foundation in Ukraine. 
70 Fieldwork journal, March 18, 2016. 
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beyond anything else. The unemployed youth was NFE’s third subject after democracy 
guerrillas and political children of the last three decades. 
An Erasmus+ trainer capture the shift well in an interview: 
We have an “inflation of diplomas”… like everyone needs a diploma. And then lots 
of people who already have the possibilities [mogućnosti], who have been to university, 
now they all go to youth work eventi. And this made youth work eventi and trainings 
become ways for these people to get more diplomas. And now you have a new branch 
of recognition, and this is recognition of knowledge obtained at a seminar... This 
never used to be a part of the discussion. The discussion used to be to recognize youth 
work as a system that supports people to participate, become part of society, include 
the excluded... The focus was always on the ones who are in the biggest shit, and this 
has now changed. Now it’s like “recognize my diploma so I can get a job”—an 
interesting new moment.  
 
Youth in Action became an employment service. Unfortunately, employment service 
meaning that we, like, train youth to be super employable. And Youth in Action 
began as building solidarity, intercultural understanding…  yea yea yea... All those 
values [sve ono vrednosno], and it ended up as “let’s build super employable young 
people since they are complaining that they cannot find jobs.”71  
 
The trainer’s narrative is a reflection of a larger focus on youth unemployment in the 
global economy and international politics. As Sukarieh and Tannock emphasise, the post-
2008 crisis in employment has been framed as youth unemployment above anything else.72 
With the youth unemployment rate moving between close to 50% in 2013 and estimated at 
30% in 2016, it is obvious that youth in Serbia not only failed in the democratic transition, 
but it also foundered in the economic one. The popular images that explain economic failure 
and unemployment present specific images of both the state and the population. The state is 
oppressive and harasses entrepreneurs only to fund the politicians’ dependence on rent from 
corruption. And employees, especially those in the public and non-profit sector, are 
described as “socialist,” implying that they are “given desks” in offices and a secure income, 
but no real work. Even youth unemployment is often explained by a lack of entrepreneurship 
—being so spoiled as to decline moving to another region or accepting a low wage—general 
“inactivity,” or the failure to be creative and think outside of the box to create marketable 
products and services. While I am not equipped to judge the validity of these claims beyond 
instinctively connecting unemployment to the mass de-industrialization which followed an 
extremely flawed privatisation process, what I find most interesting is the power these 
images hold across cultural, political, and economic debates in the country.  
                                               
71 Interview, Belgrade, February 21, 2016. 
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It is important to note that I did not find these images and explanations just when 
attending “employability” events. I was primarily interested in ideas of political action and 
thus attended events that focus on political and social topics. Yet, unemployment and 
“employability” that is supposed to resolve it haunted every event I attended. It did not 
emerge from program plans, but from experiences of people who navigated both NFE and 
unemployment in Serbia. In the story of unemployment, NFE, even in its “political” version, 
emerges in two ways. First, people treat these events as CV embellishments and “collect 
diplomas” both to kill time while unemployed and as a form of entrepreneurial betterment of 
self—a sentiment captured in the trainer’s comments quoted above.  Second, NFE serves as 
an entry point to the professionalized networks discussed above who move through both 
local and international civil society, the state, and the private sector.  
The latter point is best illustrated in an interview with Marina, a young professional 
who was the project manager for the semester-long course I attended in Belgrade. She 
herself was a graduate of a different course in the same organisation and this was her first 
paid employment in civil society. In a conversation with her, I wanted to make sense of the 
incredible motivation and determination that I observed in the students who I met: 
 
KK: I look at all these young people—they work, they study, they attend so many 
non-formal education programs. Where does the motivation come from? 
 
Marina: From the first piece of information when choosing a university somewhere, 
I don’t think it’s very different in Croatia or anywhere else, that you simply... You… 
the most important challenge in growing up is that you have to equip yourself 
[osposobiti se] for the labour market, which is quite closed... And then your… I mean, 
it is simply not enough that you just get a university degree and that you are 
academically...on any level, even on the highest level... It’s not enough. In this way, 
you have to master skills and knowledges in most areas, the most that you can, so that 
you can expect that you can potentially be... I think these are serious... This is what 
[senior employee of the organisation] best describes as literally the return of the times 
of the precariat. We are all afraid of jobs in some… If everything will be ok, if we will 
have a salary, if everything will be ok tomorrow... Will it be this way or that way...? 
All these are… The labour market conditions you [uslovi te]. But the good side of this 
is that really everyone is then all over the place. And I really think that a young 
person… it’s only an excuse to say “I am studying at a university.” I’m telling you: I 
studied and finished in time [u roku].73 By then I already had two jobs when I was 
finishing, and I think this can be accomplished... It’s just... Just good organisation, 
good plan, and serious motivation. And the motivation firstly comes from the outside, 
                                               
73 This qualification talks to the problem excessive time needed to obtain a higher education degree in the 
region. For many, and especially before the Bologna process, a four-year degree can take up to eight years to 
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I think in our growing up, and then it somehow quickly moves to the inside. When 
you are already finishing your degree and you really start to really want this... And 
somehow these two connect. 
 
There are a few fascinating parts of Marina’s narrative: the most important challenge 
being equipping yourself for the market, the feeling of always being “not enough,” the 
acceptance of the precarious existence as a given that can be ameliorated by improving 
oneself and becoming better at navigating the precariat, the “excuses” that others might make, 
the individualist meritocratic approach that celebrates one having a “good organisation” and 
“serious motivation.” And, perhaps most importantly, the source of that motivation is coming 
from the outside: from the labour market, from the people encouraging you, from the 
opportunities presented, and threats perceived. And then “moving inside,” to become a part 
of the subjectivation as a successful homo oeconomicus in neoliberal times.  
NFE here comes out as a strategy of improvement of oneself. The ethos of 
entrepreneurship which is proposed as a solution was introduced with the first discussion of 
“transition.” However, entrepreneurship here relates to more than just starting your own 
business—it relates to man-enterprise not only in an economic, but also in an anthropological 
sense.74 In such a view, neoliberalism becomes governmentality in the sense used by Dardot 
and Laval discussed in the Introduction—encompassing “the totality of human action” to 
refashion it along the ideas of self-enterprise and competition.”75 And the benefits of NFE 
are great and real. People learn how to navigate bureaucracies with entrepreneurial 
confidence, they become used to taking meeting notes, they become fluent in project talk, 
they gain experience in working in English, and they meet people who they will be able to 
turn to for any skills that they might be missing. 
More than providing CV skills, NFE also offers an entry point into the employment 
networks that are otherwise out of reach. This happens through an implicit promise that 
CSOs in which you work or take courses might offer employment. This was retold to me in 
many ways, with positive and negative outcomes. When people were bypassed after years of 
volunteering and attending and facilitating courses, they were not afraid to be direct: they 
expected “some type of employment” and felt wronged when it was withheld. Moreover, the 
Erasmus+ trainers are notoriously devoid of any kind of certification, thus making it possible 
for “anyone” to be employed as a trainer and get access to wages several times higher than 
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the averages for the countries in the region. More than facilitating the emergence of closed 
networks, i.e. you will always hire people who you, or someone else from your network, 
already know, this also leads to questioning the motives of employment in civil society. As 
explained by an Erasmus+ trainer: 
 
“It’s more it being the moment that they understand... however strange that word 
may be, which is used by the European Union—“opportunity”—you have financial 
opportunity... Then people get little dollar signs in their eyes [dolarčići]… Like, here, 
there’s money that we should take. And regretfully, there are more and more trainers 
who are there because they know this is a job that can be well paid.”76  
 
These expectations can be interpreted both as “strategic use” that somehow stays 
outside of the reach of power, and “buying into” these narratives. As Müller shows in his 
study of state education in Russia, some youth really do see competition for the game that it 
is and learn to play it without necessarily identifying with its underlying ideological 
assumptions.77 Similarly, many youth that I met were aware of “the game” they were 
presented with. They played not because they instantly believed in the promises of 
meritocracy that they could observe as false first-hand, but because they deemed this route 
as having the best chances to end in employment. Making a clear distinction on when exactly 
one starts to internalise the rules that one is obeying misses the more far reaching 
consequences of these techniques of power.  
While worrying about (un)employment, these youth thus participate in the 
projectivization of politics. Depoliticisation is then a lot less spectacular than an imperial 
plot. On the contrary, it is the product of real people trying to take care of their very real 
needs. By doing so, they are (re)shaping civil society itself. The civil society does not work 
just to communicate the needs of the private sector to the state and instruct it how to organise 
its population, but it is supposed to respond by offering trainings and NFE activities which 
will ameliorate the lack of skills and entrepreneurial spirit—stepping in as the service 
provider for the failed formal educational system. And the subjects themselves not only lower 
their expectation in salaries and work conditions, but also invest their time and emotion into 
NFE, internships, and volunteering to increase their value as human capital.  
Another effect of these practices is the harnessing of human potential. Civil society is 
expected to absorb those most determined to work on changing things by providing them 
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with jobs that bring with them a very specific lifestyle and identity.  Many of the young NGO 
workers and volunteers would cautiously voice their disgust at seeing the NGO sector, 
which is supposed to be changing society for the better, exploit, and in some instances 
actually harass, its employees and volunteers. But more than this irony of separating politics 
from economy to the extent that one can be politically progressive while relying on 
exploitative labour, the NGO effect among socially and politically conscious young adults in 
Serbia demonstrates how “capitalism incorporates values and dispositions supposed to be 
inimical or external to market relations, leaving nothing ‘outside’ of its reach.”78 They have 
ideas of social change, collective action, and sometimes radical transformations, but doing 
the best they can means becoming cogs in the big project machine—not because they are 
naïve victims of neoliberal governmentality, but because they are savvy navigators of modern 
political and economic realities.79 
IV Visions of governing unemployment 
While researching the Roof Youth Organisation of Serbia [Krovna organizacija mladih 
Srbije—KOMS], I saw they created the National Program for Employment of Youth. I 
contacted Marko, the person in charge of it in KOMS, and set up a morning coffee meeting. 
The place where we met is not a place where I would imagine “youth” to go. It was one of 
Belgrade’s nicer kafanas and Marko did not look like someone who is involved in youth work. 
His round and smiling face was friendly and talkative, but the rest of his demeanour did not 
fit my expectations—he was wearing generic blue “dad” jeans and a button-up shirt 
underneath an orange jumper, completed with a big watch that shone as he ate his breakfast. 
While trying to catch my breath in a restaurant that was clearly out of my price range, I felt 
like I was faced with a young corporate professional, and not someone in the youth sector. 
Marko started with rehearsing the critique of donor driven agendas and saying that 
everyone is “into employment” these days: “even organisations that did sexual education are 
now employment experts!”  In contrast, he was very proud of the National Program as a 
product of expertise: it was presented even to the Prime Minister and Marko was sure it will 
be adopted once the whole election craze is over.80 To help me understand the importance of 
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the document, he listed names of ministers, governmental officers, and domestic, EU, and 
UN strategies that were involved and consulted in creating the Program. I found them 
impossible to catch and make sense of, but Marko was proud of the names and acronyms he 
was invoking. They showed that, unlike “those other organisations,” he actually is an expert 
on employment. The more “procedures” he listed, the fairer and less biased I was supposed 
to perceive the document; and the safer he and others involved in making it were from 
accusations of corruption.  
The document that he sent me a few days after our meeting was telling—not because 
it will actually be put in effect, but because it was produced by “youth” for the Serbian 
government. The document was created in the cooperation of the Ministry of Youth and 
Sport, KOMS, and NAPOR (National Association of the Practitioners of Youth Work). I 
treat it as an expression of subjects formed in the interstices of domestic policies and 
transnational institutions and norms that engage them. It was produced by youth who have 
become experts in EU speak, in applying for grants, in delineating goals, outcomes, and 
measures, and who, by learning to reproduce the language of this project world, also learned 
to reproduce its specific views and diagnoses.81  
The process started in February 2015 with a consultation with the biggest employers 
in Serbia, 36 foreign and domestic companies, on issues relating to youth employment. The 
document is supposed to provide clear guidelines for all stakeholders on how to improve the 
dreadful situation in youth employment in Serbia. To quote the document itself: “The goal 
of the National Program for Youth Employment until 2020 is to contribute to the changes in 
the value system, help increasing the quality of the labour force, and help youth employment 
in Serbia.”82  
Here I want to contextualize this diagnosis of causes of youth unemployment and the 
specific solutions it imagines as ameliorating them. The document illustrates multiple things 
that are crucial in trying to understand how youth is experiencing a global effort at increasing 
their employment. First, I want to underscore the constructed character of images that 
reproduce the narratives of the deficient Balkan subject as lacking the skills and the will for 
employment. Second, I hope to show how these images focus on individuals but imply a much 
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wider vision of an ideal form of political, economic, and cultural order.  And lastly, I want to 
bring out the silences that underline this document, and my own fieldwork. Namely, I want 
to discuss youth that is missing from NFE activities I observed. This youth is not imagined 
to be empowered to pursue employment in elite CSOs nor to develop start-ups as projects. 
This youth is encouraged to follow a different market rationality into “dual education” and 
emigration.  
i. National Program for Employment of Youth—an artefact of a vision  
The program identifies four specific issues: 1) youth value systems and information 
about the needs of the labour market, 2) youth competencies needed to develop through 
trainings and non-formal education, 3) professional practical experiences and the 
development of the “dual education” system, and 4) creation of an atmosphere suitable for 
developing youth entrepreneurship.83 These issues are then translated into five specific key 
outcomes, each further explained through specific goals, operational measures, and inter-
sectorial initiatives. These are: 1) Youth in Serbia are informed and have positive values and 
attitudes towards work, 2) Youth in Serbia have applied knowledge, skills and key 
competencies, 3) Serbia has a national program of practical education [praksa], 4) Serbia has 
a growing number of young entrepreneurs and youth practice self-employment more, and 5) 
Serbia effectively implements educational policies in employment84 
In these five outcomes, the document offers specific visions of the ideal political, 
social, and economic arrangements in Serbia. The document imagines its political mission 
completed by a so called “delivery unit”—a concept popularized during the alleged 
cooperation between Tony Blair and Aleksandar Vučić, and translated into JUR [jedinica 
usmjerena na rezultate—results oriented unit].85 Graph 2. in the document illustrates the delivery 
unit which starts with the leader in charge of the each of the four key outcomes (value 
change, knowledge and skills, practical experience [praksa], entrepreneurship, and the fifth 
key outcome is the delivery unit system itself). Between the leader and the evaluating team 
of the unit, there are four key stakeholders: foreign investor, the Ministry in charge of the 
particular outcome, NGO, and the private sector. The document does not explain its reliance 
on two corporate representatives, one in the form of a foreign investor and another in the 
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Employment until 2020]’, 8–9. 
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form of the private sector, but I see them as echoing two different paradigms: one of 
economic progress through FDI which is so dominant in Serbia, and the public-private 
partnership which is so popular in the world of projects. Moreover, there is no explanation 
of the imagined cooperation between the stakeholders. But in its absence, we can use the 
creation of the document itself as indicative of the process.  
The KOMS Working Group on Employment and Entrepreneurship, who Marko 
explained as being in charge of the creation of the document, was started as one of three 
KOMS working groups developed in a project application for the Ministry of Youth and 
Sport. Once the funding was acquired, the Ministry approached the group and tasked them 
with the creation of the NAPZM. The team started by surveying employers (only from the 
private sector) to find out more about their needs, and the document itself is a plan for how 
the government should satisfy those needs. This once again reiterates the re-positioning of 
civil society already discussed earlier in the chapter. Instead of civil society “limiting” 
government, they are working together. In this case, both are working to shape the 
population to respond to capital’s needs.  
ii. Constructing the unemployed subject 
These issues of changing values and nurturing entrepreneurial inclinations from an 
early age are clearly efforts at social engineering of well performing neoliberal subjects. 
Interestingly, the “changes in value system” that are mentioned first in the document, are 
never specified. However, we do get a glimpse into some of the issues of the “value system” 
in the section which describes the inputs of companies which were asked to comment on 
youth employment.  
 
“When describing the situation in which they are currently and the challenges that 
they are facing, companies pointed out that major problems are found in the lack of 
preparation of youth to work in specific sectors, i.e. lack of practical experience, high 
expenses of employing youth, lack of specific professional profiles on the labour 
market (e.g. crafts or IT profiles—data mining, business intelligence), insufficient 
mastery of business skills, inadequate value system which brings with it in many 
senses unrealistic expectations of youth when it comes to employment, income levels, 
and work ethics.”86  
 
“Changing values” and adjusting the “unrealistic expectations” is listed as key 
outcome number one, but it remains unspecified beyond “positive attitudes towards 
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employment and work.” Measure 1.1.0. does call for research on current attitudes towards 
work and employment, but nowhere is it specified what those might entail, or how we might 
know what needs changing before actually conducting the research. More than critiquing 
the design of the policy paper, I want to point out the taken for granted character of the 
claim that it is the subject—its attitudes and values— to blame for its un-employability. This 
understanding is not limited to the policy paper. In discussions of unemployment that I 
witnessed, its causes were found either in the subjects’ unwillingness to work and dedicate 
themselves, or in the educational system that failed to provide the subjects with the needed 
skills. In the document, we see the subjects’ lack in multiple areas: lack of the “right attitude,” 
most likely meaning lack of commitment to hard work, lack of skills which are supposed to 
be acquired through volunteering, dual education, and NFE, and lack of entrepreneurial 
spirit which is supposed to be developed though media and formal and non-formal 
educational programs from age eight.  
To understand the power and the common-sense status of these representations of 
the local we have to put them in conversation with other literatures. First, even though this 
narrative is part of a more global approach to unemployment that demonises youth,87 in the 
Balkans it could not be accepted as a reality without an understanding of the Balkan or post-
socialist subject as deficient. The narrative of “transition” from socialism to capitalism sees 
the failure of the subject to be anything less than a perfectly flexible vessel for human capital 
as a consequence of “old socialist ways” or “expecting the state to care for you.” As already 
mentioned in Part I of the thesis, post-socialist heritage in the form of the way we approach 
the Balkan post-socialist subject is crucial in designing and naturalising policies. Second, the 
narrative reflects a bigger picture of education subsumed to the needs of capital. As such, 
understanding the images of youth that are used in these projects and the ways that youth 
live their consequences is impossible without inquiring into the political economy which 
dictates what is expected of the labour market. And in the Balkans, the labour market is 
increasingly seen as a provider of cheap labour.  
iii. Different visions for different subjects 
Within youth policy captured in the NPZM, we see the quiet co-existence of radically 
different ways of developing youth for the labour market. One aims at creating the workforce 
ready to be harnessed by the private sector, and the other nurtures entrepreneurial spirit and 
self-employment. It is obvious that these two policies require very different educational 
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systems. One is familiar from stories of empowerment and entrepreneurship. Education for 
young entrepreneurs as we usually understand them, as independent business owners, would 
entail an individual approach and topical width that would allow creativity to develop. The 
other one, however, is quite different and requires an alternative way of practicing one’s 
market rationality. Here I want to briefly point out two of these alternatives that I 
encountered in conversations with youth and documents of NFE: training for migration and 
the “dual education” that is mentioned in the above document.  
Training for migration as one of these “alternative ways” of practicing market 
rationality was brought to my attention by Jelena, a professional seminar-goer I got to know. 
She applied to everything and was able to explain, evaluate, and compare different 
workshops better than any ethnographer could ever dream of. In addition, Jelena was also 
explicitly “political:” she grew up protesting against Milošević and she was both 
knowledgeable about party politics and aware of its limitations in Serbia. When I met her, 
she was finishing her second MA and she was desperately looking for a job. She was 
pursuing multiple venues: her ideal placement would be in one of the human rights NGOs 
in Belgrade. Coming from a “second Serbia” family, Jelena saw herself as “the opposition” 
and she wanted to work on those issues that the Serbian government considers taboo.88 The 
second venue she was pursuing was trying to start her own publishing house through a state 
project for helping young entrepreneurs open their own businesses. The selection was based 
on preparing a business plan, but most of the candidates, Jelena included, considered the 
business plan as a “form” to be filled out, rather than an explosion of creative juices as 
imagined in “start-up” narratives. Lastly, Jelena was trying to find a teaching position in one 
of many schools in Belgrade. Telling me about it, she emphasised that I cannot imagine how 
many schools there are in Belgrade. She only finds out about them when she sees the job 
listing: “You enter a building, and op, there’s a school!”89 She mentioned a particular school 
located on the fourth floor of a building in downtown Belgrade: on one side there are four 
classrooms of a medical nursing school (years one to four) and on the other side four 
classrooms for learning German (German level one to four). The match is obvious: as soon 
as they obtain their qualification, the nurses are ready for working in Germany.  
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What Jelena observed in this particular school is a small illustration of a much larger 
phenomena of economic migration from Serbia (and the region more generally), particularly 
strong in the health sector. This is recognized by development agencies. German Society for 
International Cooperation (GIZ), for example, focuses on nurses in their “Triple Win” 
project for “sustainable recruitment of nurses” from Serbia, BiH, and Philippines. The 
project connects nurses in Serbia with employment agencies and placements in Germany, 
helps them in preparatory courses while in Serbia, and facilitates integration upon arrival. 
The triple win relates to the following: “1) pressure is eased on labour markets in the 
countries of origin, 2) migrants’ remittances provide a developmental stimulus in their 
countries of origin, 3) the shortage of nurses in Germany is alleviated.”90  
While it is obvious how Germany and the Serbian state win in this case, it is less 
obvious how the actual nurses win. In my conversations with youth in Serbia, opportunities 
like this—where you would go abroad to a “well-functioning” country, get a “real” job, and 
actually get paid for the work done—are celebrated as a break from the “lack of 
opportunities” in Serbia. Yet, in those same conversations, none of these people actually 
wanted to live abroad. Given the choice, they would much prefer getting a real job and getting 
paid in Serbia.  
Most importantly, while the governmental practices that encourage and facilitate 
migration are obvious—both in the documents and in observations like that retold by 
Jelena—there are preconditions for migration that cannot be captured in those practices. 
Namely, as Beate Jahn observed in her critique of the policies seeking to ameliorate 
inequality through free movement, there has to be inequality that motivates the migration in 
the first place. Moreover, the migrant herself has to be imagined as a subject without social 
and political ties, able to “freely” pursue the market rationality that leads to relocation.91 
Migration can be imagined as a “triple win” only if subjects are imagined “free” of social ties. 
It is these structures and processes that go beyond governmentality that I will come back to 
in Chapter 6.  
Another less exciting way of practicing market rationality comes in the form of dual 
education. The “dual education” system or “vocational education” has long been debated as 
a key reform strategy for secondary education in Serbia. The reform is led by the Serbian 
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Chamber of Commerce, and it is greatly helped by GIZ, The Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation (SDC), KulturKontatk Austria, and SwissContact.92 Accordingly, German, 
Austrian and Swiss policies are to be emulated. Besides technical support, these agencies 
also provide public platforms that are supposed to promote the idea in the public. For 
example, the centre right German political foundation Konrad Adenauer Stiftung published 
a brochure on dual education in Danas, the main oppositional daily.93 In 2016, two 
conferences were organised in cooperation with Swiss and German experts, and the project 
is supported by the then-Prime Minister Vučić.94  
The supposed benefits of dual education are diverse. First, the students benefit from 
the ability to earn money by spending a part of their school week at work. By doing this, 
they gain skills that not only make them generally more employable, but actually provide an 
opportunity for continued employment in the same company. The benefits, however, go well 
beyond personal gain to contribute to Serbian development in general. At an event organised 
in cooperation of the Serbian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Swiss Embassy, 
Vučić explained how the dual education model is crucial for a whole range of “most 
important questions that we [Serbians] have to best answer to”—“employment, GDP 
growth, life standard, European integration.”95  The impact on employment is obvious, but it 
has to be emphasised that the discussion of GDP is not limited to growth from the increased 
employment: dual education is also used for attracting foreign investors. While it is never 
explicitly stated that it provides cheap labour, the understanding that dual education 
provides skilled labour and incentive for investors is widespread. Advocates of dual education 
present it as a key element in the negotiations that facilitate the arrival of FDI in Serbia, 
while the opponents condemn it as another way of favouring big capital at the expense of the 
citizens.  
It is undeniable that nurses who migrate to Germany and students who are employed 
by companies that participated in their secondary education are better off than being 
unemployed. But the narrative is still worth unpacking. More than relying on different 
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approaches within the same project of the entrepreneurial self, this image relies on inequality 
already present in Serbia and increasing at a steady rate since the beginning of the restoration 
of capitalism. And with civil society helping to shape the population according to the 
market’s needs, we see most clearly Foucault’s understanding of civil society as a solution to 
the problem of managing subjects of state sovereignty in a certain territory not as subjects of 
rights, but as economic subjects.96 This management implies macro adjustments such as a 
system for vocational training responsive to the needs of FDI, but also adjustments in the 
realm of subjectivity.  
Dual education is an educational policy targeting youth, but its vision is all 
encompassing. It dictates a new relationship between the state that is supposed to provide 
the labour for the capital, and the civil society that is supposed to be the supportive link in 
this mechanism (as it has been in the debate so far). Moreover, it directly imagines teachers 
and unions as problems to be resolved. A document developed by GIZ “anticipates resistance 
to change” and predicts two possible sources of contention: 1) those who are at risk at losing 
“influence, power or resources” (teacher unions, existing policy experts), and 2) those who 
“do not find themselves prepared or willing to assume new responsibilities” (for example, 
businesses who do not wish to develop secondary education plans).97 In this “resistance,” 
there are two obvious purposes. First, and once again, any kind of political discussion on 
distribution of resources that might be started by unions is framed as a nuisance, rather than 
a constitutive part of politics. And second, while this vision is presented as universal, the 
inability to adapt is once again particularised: the “problem” becomes only those who lack 
the will and the skills to adapt to change.  
A part of this governmentality is an understanding of life that explains the difference 
between a young adult in vocational training and a young owner of a start-up business as 
different expressions of the same entrepreneurial spirit: both make market calculations based 
on their situations and competitively strive for the best possible option. Sometimes this is 
economic migration, sometimes accepting work below basic labour standards, and 
sometimes it is doing internships while getting a university degree to make oneself the best 
valued human capital. But because they are all driven by the same entrepreneurial drive, we 
see as a result the normalisation of economic inequality that expresses itself both culturally 
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and politically. For this normalisation to work, human life as an enterprise has to become a 
social and cultural norm.  
The youth that are supposed to get work in factories opened through FDI or by 
migrating abroad are not supposed to compete with the youth populating the many business-
incubators in Belgrade. Their entrepreneurship does not rely on being creative, but on 
knowing their limits so they can make sure to get the most within them. They are expected to 
accept what they can get, get over their old unreasonable socialist demands of labour rights, 
and perform the tasks needed. A major restriction of this research is that this youth does not 
attend NFE activities and therefore I had little contact with them.98 Yet their absence is 
telling in itself—it is naturalised by two images of successful youth. One is a successful owner 
of a start-up and the other a docile factory worker. This image pointedly shows that 
governmentalisation, despite its apparent universalizing tendencies, depends on and works 
through differentiation and unevenness, sometimes between two young adult subjectivities, 
and sometimes between countries in the core and the periphery. I will discuss this further in 
Chapter 6. 
V Resistance   
The added value of an ethnographic approach to governmentality is the recovery of 
the messy, incomplete, and contested aspects of governmental practices—what Sukarieh, in 
another investigation of a NFE workshop in Jordan, termed as “recognis[ing] the 
importance of local agency, resistance, and contestation in processes of neoliberal subject 
creations.”99 While the chapter so far has emphasised how practices of NFE have effects that 
far surpass creating empowered young citizens, this section will focus more on the 
contestation that surrounds those processes. But before moving on to some of these 
encounters, it is necessary to qualify the label of “resistance” that I attach to these people and 
events—especially because the focus on resistance is often celebrated as a panacea for liberal 
peace in a fashion similar to the valorisation of the local that Chapter 1 discussed.100  
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Drawing especially on Foucault’s work, liberal peace critics like Richmond have re-
conceptualised resistance as “critical agency” capable of countering IR’s usual view of 
resistance as cemented in a position of “inferiority, irrelevance, illiberalism, spoiling or 
injustice.”101 Coming from a different angle, anti-colonial critique elaborated by Sabaratnam 
sees in resistance the local subjecthood that is usually silenced in critiques of liberal peace— 
resistance thus again provides an opportunity to learn from the targets of intervention and 
their political analysis.102 While building onto both of these approaches, my engagement with 
these practices and narratives is different. I do not approach them with the goal of finding 
the local “grassroot,” neither by unquestioningly embracing the on-the-ground political 
analyses that I will show are more problematic. I turn to resistance in order to make better 
sense of how subjects position themselves within the narratives of progress and government. 
Foucault famously argued that “where there is power, there is resistance.” But he also 
added that “this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.” 103 One 
of the most important contributions of governmentality studies to considerations of power 
and its varied effects is the impossibility of a clear delineation between power and that which 
resists it. While some read this as pessimism inscribed in Foucault’s thinking, my own 
approach is more sanguine.104 Rather than looking for the “authentic” local that might stand 
outside and resist global narratives that I examine, I chose to look at all subjectivities as 
always relational and made in complex matrices of power. Accepting this as a starting point 
means that resistance being shaped by the power it is supposed to challenge does not 
disqualify it. It is still a transgression that can both change political life and inform our studies 
of it. Hence, I use the label resistance “lightly”—as an important diagnostic of both power 
and its effects, but without inscribing in it inherently revolutionary potential. Thus, this 
discussion of people and narratives that contest practices of neoliberal governmentality 
avoids having to decide whether the people I have spoken to have “bought into” or are 
“resisting” neoliberalism. I stay away from defining who has managed to circumvent, and 
who has fallen prey to neoliberalism. However, the fact remains that the planet is not 
populated by homogenous economic subjects. And because of this, understanding the local 
experience of global governmentality necessitates highlighting practices that contest and 
transform it.  
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i. Alternative visions of governing 
The most obvious form of resistance I encountered is providing visions of progress 
that are in direct opposition to those offered by the international community and often the 
Serbian state. Even though the “dual education” policy is seemingly built on a broad 
collation—supported by business and government, the state and international agencies, and 
even referenced to the World Bank as Vučić has done in the above quoted speech—there 
are also alternative visions that see the policy as exploitative and damaging. An article by 
Saša Dragojlo published on the portal Bilten summarises the critique. The dual education 
policy exploits both the children who are not adequately paid for their work and the state 
which subsidizes the program. In doing so, it reproduces class differences because children 
from lower class families will be trapped by an education that provides skills specific to 
employers who thus increase their power. Moreover, this education precludes any kind of 
political education that might happen in more traditional education.105 The article points to a 
different, leftist, conception of citizenship, democracy and development. However, I do not 
cite it here as only a well-written narrative, but also because the portal on which it is 
published, Bilten is itself a product of a transnational “educational project.” 
The Bilten project is funded by a leftist German Political Foundation that funds many 
“new left” social movements in the region. It cooperates closely with Mašina, a similar website 
in Serbia. It is precisely this broad coalition of groups (most of them under the joint name of 
the Levi samit Srbije—Left summit of Serbia) that attended the public consultations of the 
Draft of the Law on Dual Education with posters like “a child is not a commodity” and 
“children are not cheap labour.”106 I was in touch with these groups both through inquiring 
into Mašina—an educational project whose now famous portal is actually an output of its 
educational activities—and through attending numerous lectures in Belgrade around 
broadly leftist and feminist topics. Many explicitly political events I attended that were 
organised by leftist groups in Belgrade were directly funded by foreign political institutions: 
at the beginning of the lecture, we would all “sign in” on the sheets that were used for proving 
the “impact” of events to their donors. 
While the design and competition around these projects were definitely a 
governmental practice meant to depoliticise, it seems that the “real goal” of the projects was 
re-politicisation through educational activities. And while I was in Belgrade it seemed like it 
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was happening everywhere. These actors used NFE and other interventions to advocate for 
a different vision of political life—one that conceptualised the state, the citizen, and society 
in ways that differ from the dominant operative narratives of funding bodies. The sentiment 
was best captured in an interview with Bojan, a Serbian employee of a German political 
foundation’s Belgrade office. As I explained my interest in the organisation’s activities and 
their place in Serbia’s socio-political landscape, Bojan was very clear that his foundation—
and the people who they funded and employed—is not a part of civil society in Serbia. This 
was a direct confrontation to both their registered status in Serbia and their main activity of 
helping NGOs in the region. Bojan explained that the current vision of civil society in Serbia 
is indubitably apolitical as it worked through concepts like advocacy, democracy, and rule of 
law. In Bojan’s narrative, CS donors in Serbia did not only move away from grassroots 
political organising, but they actually pacify the organisations they fund and support. And his 
foundation is different: 
 
“Our way of working leaves us the option to avoid pacifying these groups; they keep 
something like their own politics and their own political identity. And they really talk, 
they really somehow enact politics [zaista nekako sprovode politiku] in different ways 
close to them.”107  
 
These alternative visions did not come just from the progressive leftists from 
Belgrade. In the semester course for right wing political youth that I attended, one of the 
lectures was on fiscal politics. The topic was expectedly unpopular: economics are difficult 
to comprehend for people who did not study them, and the participants found it hard to 
relate to the matters that were discussed. In demonstrating the economism that we were 
supposed to be taught that day (and generally in the course), the speaker used an example 
of a “useless” highway that was built from Čačak, a small town in southern Serbia, and the 
Adriatic coast in Montenegro. The speaker used it as a case of a bad investment: there is not 
enough industry transported in the region to warrant the cost of building a highway.  
This is where the discussion got more heated. A young man from southern Serbia 
raised his hand to argue against dismissing the highway as useless: the region is extremely 
isolated, and without the highway and a better connection to Serbia they cannot even hope 
to ever develop an industry that would use such a highway. The speaker stood their ground, 
and another young woman joined the discussion. She started by introducing herself as a 
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“non-economist,” someone who “runs away from numbers all her life.” She said that these 
kinds of investments cannot be looked at just “economically,” but as something for the “good 
of the town or the village” [dobrobit za grad ili selo]—cost-benefit [used in English] analysis is 
not enough, something needs to be done for citizens for the common good [opće dobro], and 
not just for political points [političke poene]. The “common good” was not surprising—this was 
a course for parties that very much rely on ideas of the nationhood and the “common good” 
it creates. However, the interesting part of the course is that the “right” in Serbia also 
includes the neoliberal and libertarian right. This particular view was represented by three 
participants from a technocratic libertarian party. 
Vlado, a participant that came as a representative of this technocratic party, did not 
agree: such considerations are futile, anything besides a pure cost-benefit analysis ends up 
with each “pulling to their own village [svako samo vuče na svoje selo]”. Here, we see the 
aforementioned “purification.” Economism is not only imagined as neoliberal progress, but 
also as a specific cure to the corruption of “everyone trying to work only for their own 
village.” Admittedly, it might not be wrong to want to develop one’s home, but in these stories 
these aspirations are not just benevolent efforts at benefiting specific communities, but 
calculated moves to stay in power by “buying” votes with symbolic gestures.  
The challenges to this economism were a particular form of resistance. In the case of 
this particular course, it was resistance framed around nationalist and often populist 
demands. While explicitly providing for youth associated with centre and moderate right 
parties, the composition of the course I attended itself demonstrated the futility of such 
readings of politics in Serbia. To ask “what people this project attracts” like in the 
introduction to the chapter, inevitably involves asking what it means to be “right wing” in 
Serbia today. My observations were similar to those of Hemment who observed the Nashi 
activists in a Russian university. They see “themselves as civic warriors, fierce and righteous 
individuals who, in a corrective to the disparaged politics as usual, engage[d] in forms of 
direct action to educate an ill-informed, apathetic public.”108 Many people I spoke to saw 
themselves as primarily fighting the “good fight.” Even though they subscribed to extreme 
party lines around Kosovo, LGBT+ rights, and gender, their everyday activism related to 
employment, local community issues, and either vehemently supporting or opposing the 
ruling party.109  
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The right-wing orientation of the course was reflected in the speakers. We had a 
lecture literally on ordo-liberalism using the same thinkers that Foucault teases apart in his 
lectures. We were told that any effort at re-distribution is “buying votes.” We were taught 
that only private property protects: buffalos are extinct because no one owned them, while 
privately owned cows are doing well.110 When encountering these issues abstractly, the 
students were responsive: technocracy meant facing the corruption that is obviously hurting 
the country. However, when faced with more practical examples of economism, like in the 
example above, the students rebelled by invoking the good of the community and the nation. 
Yet, unlike Sukarieh’s experience in Jordan where class was used to challenge neoliberal 
narratives, here I saw nationalism as an alternative that pays more attention to the common 
good.111  
The two narratives mixed in complex ways. One of the most eagerly awaited speakers 
was a German politician whose visit was a special occasion: it was attended by the 
representative of the foundation that funds the course, and the project manager was visibly 
nervous—used to dealing with the youth attending the course, she was now performing for 
the people funding her employment. The politician was there to speak about the German 
model of social market economy. The lecture presented the basic tenets of the model also 
known as Rhine capitalism and put them in conversations on global economic and political 
challenges. Yet, as soon as the Q&A was open, a very different topic emerged. The students 
prepared for this visit and knew that he had left politics in 2010 and has since become a 
successful businessman and the designer of one of the most famous FDI projects in Serbia.112  
The Q&A immediately opened with questions about investments in Serbia: how did 
he decide to come? Why? What place does Serbia have in the bigger business plans? The 
politician-turned-investor explained the choice to come to Serbia by comparing it to two 
other options: one being in Southeast Asia and the other in Bulgaria. Southeast Asia proved 
inferior because it had higher transport costs due to distance and less trained workforce. 
Bulgaria, on the other hand, was deemed politically less stable and therefore less able to 
                                               
110 Fieldwork journal, March 1, 2016. Paradoxically, the illustrative example also points to the welfare (or lack 
thereof) of cows in industrial farming and highlights the suffering that is occluded by a focus on profit. 
111 Sukarieh, ‘On Class, Culture, and the Creation of the Neoliberal Subject’. 
112 The investment that opened for business in 2013 and expanded ever since was controversial. It was presented 
as the revival of the never-forgotten ruined Serbian auto-industry, and at the same time heavily criticized along 
with other government efforts to subsidize FDI. With each employment that paid around 200EUR in salaries 
subsidized with thousands of euros, many were (and still are) asking what the financial sense is? For more data 
on these subsidies, see the investigative project Istinomer, ‘We Did Not Give 10.000 Euros per Employee 
[Nismo Davali 10.000 Evra Po Radnom Mestu]’. 
Katarina Kušić 
Chapter 4 | 164 
 
provide state support for procuring licenses (for example, for gas emissions). In this 
narrative, Serbia emerged as the winner of the race to the bottom: labour was cheap but 
qualified, the state was strong enough to both subsidise financially and “move” legislation 
and licenses, and it was close enough to the European market. Hearing it put this simply, I 
braced for the expected storm: while the aspiring technocrats in the audience might accept 
this economism, the nationalists will surely intervene!  
I was very wrong. Even though there were many hands in the air after this 
explanation, the students did not aim to challenge this narrative, but to appropriate it: is 
there a chance for an investment in a different region? What exactly would they need to 
consider opening more factories elsewhere? Do they know that there are free trade zones 
opening around the country? Instead of condemning exploitation, the youth that sat beside 
me saw it as the only opportunity for development and invited it.  
This peculiar mix of neoliberal narratives and nationalist contestation, and the motley 
results of their encounters, become especially important in many debates around “the local” 
and “the local-local.” In these debates, radical nationalism and rejection of both economic 
and social progressiveness is something that is read as “authentic.” My observations, on the 
other hand, show that neoliberalism can be embraced along with nationalism, and even 
rejected on almost the same grounds. Instead of seeing the neoliberal international 
intervention in conflict with local nationalism, making sense of the observations in the course 
requires seeing both the intervention and nationalism changing together in what Tamara 
Vukov has referred to as “the dance of neoliberalism and nationalism.”113 They stop working 
with opposing logics—both in the state level, and on the subject level and invite us to 
reconsider how we conceptualise power and its subjects—a topic that will be discussed in 
Part III of the thesis.  
ii. Resisting with money 
A number of people that I met were completely aware of the neoliberal agenda of 
donors, but they were determined to politicise the funds and use them for their own 
programmes. One example was a young man I met in Novi Sad who was trying to apply for 
an Erasmus+ project to support an existing initiative in which they had young adults with 
“social difficulties” (very often criminal convictions) work in their summer camps and help 
build agricultural and communal alternative living spaces. They were experienced in getting 
EU funds, but as we learned from working on Marco’s application during the “develop your 
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own idea” session at the training in Novi Sad, many of these things were a matter of 
“translation” of political goals to the neutral and apolitical “project speak” of the EU. For 
example, “coming closer to nature” becomes “techniques for sustainable and resource 
efficient living,” and “horizontal decision making” becomes “active citizenship and 
participation from an early stage.”114 Thus, aims to re-negotiate the relationship with the 
living environment gets framed   as “efficiency” and experiments in radical democracy get 
reduced to “participation” once again.115 
Resistance to the current practices of project politics was also practiced in 
foundations when choosing how to support the organisations they decided to support. Bojan 
(from the political foundation discussed above) was aware of the difficulties of an activist 
life, and therefore explicitly sought to provide an at least somewhat steady income to people 
the Foundation worked with. They should not worry about paying rent, filling out form after 
form, or having another job that would cover their living expense—activism should be their 
job and the Foundation’s funds are used for the purpose. As such, the use of funds steps 
outside of the market rationality of calls, competitions, and transparency. In his narrative, 
Bojan was clear that it is precisely this stepping out that places his organisation outside civil 
society in Serbia. Civil society here was presented at the same time apolitical by serving as a 
platform for elite class formation, and as a very political submission to narratives of liberalism 
and EU accession. This organisation refused both. 
In all of these contestations, we see what Vorbrugg terms “the copresence, 
entanglements, and mixings of political and antipolitical moments and rationalities.”116 
Practices of NGO funding and NFE that are usually understood as depoliticising are re-
appropriated and put to work for explicitly political goals. Funds are diverted and used for 
both personal gains, and for political and social goals that cannot be confined within the 
visions of the donors.  In this process, alternative visions of what it means to act as a state, 
civil society, and citizen are forwarded.  
Conclusions 
This chapter explored how local youth experiences practices of non-formal education 
that seek to promote peace, development, and democracy by building citizens capable and 
willing to navigate liberal democratic societies. Using observations from NFE, the chapter 
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discussed larger fields of civil society and unemployment that defined how youth is engaged 
by these projects. In addressing issues identified in Chapter 1—that of locating political 
agency among the targets of intervention and contextualising this agency within local and 
international contexts—the chapter did not only address these issues, but it also complicated 
them in multiple ways.  
In trying to locate the “local experience,” the chapter uncovered a multiplicity of 
subjects: the democracy guerrillas that told me stories of bravery and heroism from the late 
1990s, the political children that suddenly had to learn the ways of politics and democracy, 
the unemployed youth, and the resisters who are not far away—my contemporaries who are 
navigating the aftermath of all these projects and who are varyingly engaged or abandoned 
by current donors and agencies. This demonstrates the theoretical arguments presented in 
Chapter 1: ideas about local subjectivity, with all of their ambiguity and malleability, are 
intimately connected to practices of government.  
The ways that these experiences were connected to international intervention is a far 
wider and a much messier process than a straightforward subjectivation of the homo 
oeconomicus. Here, I would like to raise four distinct points. First, intervention’s effect far 
surpasses the creation of the individual subject and goes on to reshape the concepts of state, 
civil society, and the citizen. Civil society grew closer to both the state and international 
donors, the state itself became directly engaged in project politics, and the citizenship was 
defined as enacted firmly within the limits imposed by this translation. The limits were set 
by ideals of economism and proceduralism, and the result is projectivized politics.  
The wider effect of project politics was felt in an issue seemingly removed from 
discussions of peace and democracy—youth unemployment. As I watched how my 
interlocutors navigate the acute unemployment they find themselves in, it became obvious 
that NFE is part of a wider system that seeks to govern unemployment. This programme 
depends on the promotion of “individualistic and moralistic solutions, rather than [state] 
intervention into the labour market” and is accompanied “by a strong attempt to tie the 
education system firmly to the fluctuating need of industry and hence capital.”117  
Second, these practices, although very obviously reflecting ideals of global 
neoliberalism, are not ahistorical or groundless. The origins of this programme are 
unmistakably global neoliberal ideals. These neoliberal dreams, however, are rooted in the 
enduring image of culturally, politically, and economically deficient Balkan subject. Since 
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Yugoslavia, NFE was used to create “citizens.” However, while the citizenship in Yugoslavia 
was structured by the image of “brotherhood and unity,” today it revolves around self-
enterprise and competition.  
Moreover, these practices build onto specific images of what subjects are and how 
they should be transformed. In her analysis of “participation,” Greenberg goes beyond 
analysing it as a just a neoliberal technique and points out that none of its critics actively 
engage with subjective underpinnings of these processes. She argues that “such analyses tend 
to elide what is compelling to local actors about becoming self-managing, self-regulating 
subjects.”118 To understand the compelling power and the effects of these solutions it is 
necessary to put them in context with the discussions on Balkanism that helps us understand 
why the images of local subjects as unwilling and unable to find employment can so easily be 
rationalised as the truth. Any invocation of structuralism is associated with backward 
socialist thinking, any demand interpreted as socialist entitlement. Proceduralism is 
supposed to serve as “purification” and eliminate (post)socialist corruption.119 Economism is 
supposed to replace the anti-market reliance on state welfare and teach people that they can 
make it on their own if they navigate the market well. And professionalization aims at re-
socializing the corrupt and lazy to embrace “European values.” While not denying the very 
real problems in Serbia, it is important to underline the particularism innate to explanations 
which do not question processes, but only their local implementation. This does not only 
necessarily leave bigger problems and more effective solutions out of sight, but it also 
productively prescribes other ways of thinking and living. Local agency here emerges as 
pathology and its only relationship to the international is its stubborn retardation of the 
global march to progress. The important thing to note, however, is the productive power of 
these images as they inspire and legitimize governmental practices and programs. 
Third, the chapter also contested the supposedly straightforward nature of these 
programs of government that seek to affect a purportedly universal subject. While their most 
obvious manifestation might be in practices that seek to govern through freedom—the 
making of human capital and man-enterprises—in reality they depend both on the drawing 
of lines between those meant to be empowered and those contained, and on naturalising 
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those lines. In his study of a German political foundation’s activities in Ukraine, Vorbrugg 
argues that the “universalizing gestures” that these foundations rely on, necessarily 
universalize the exclusions inscribed in them.120 I observed similar line drawing in visions of 
government like the one presented in the NPZM document. 
NPZM is inscribed with a particular bifurcation of youth and their assigned future 
development. How much human capital needs to develop in a person is not a universal 
standard. While I encountered those trained to be future leaders and taught to invest in 
themselves, the other subjects were youth training to migrate and those going through 
vocational education under the supervision of the state and foreign investors. By pointing to 
these subjects, which are precisely the people who are not imagined in stories of civil society 
empowerment and CV building, the chapter exposes the limits of methodological and 
analytical frameworks. These disruptions will form the basis of the discussion in Chapter 6. 
And fourth, these practices are engaged, contested, and at times fuel the politics that 
they are supposed to eradicate. The added value of an ethnographic approach here is 
precisely in problematising the clear-cut reading of governmentality that would be produced 
from focusing only on the intent of governing. In a similar project on an NFE activity in 
Jordan, Sukarieh invokes Ferguson to highlight the “complex relation between the 
intentionality of planning and the strategic intelligibility of outcomes.”121 It is this 
intelligibility that confronts us when trying to study the effects of interventions from the 
experiences of its targets. The prescribed meritocracy and individualism resulted in civil 
society as an elite formation and network of professionals. Instead of posing a limit to 
government, its role became employment and self-interest. On the other hand, the practices 
that were meant to depoliticise and cement the limits of political thought and action, were 
contested by similar international donors and identical NFE practices. Instead of firmly 
drawn lines between the political and anti-political, we saw people practicing politics in 
whatever ways accessible and we saw practices of government inspiring, rather than 
eliminating political contestation. 
In conclusion, by trying to study local experience and its various connection to 
international power, the chapter presented a less conclusive, yet a far richer story than one 
of depoliticisation. At one of the Erasmus+ events I attended, we were encouraged to use the 
term “youth with fewer opportunities.” By avoiding any allusion to class, race, gender, 
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sexuality, or ethnicity, the term would allow us to help “those in need” without questioning 
the systemic issues that created those needs. A young man from Greece wondered out loud:  
 
“We all agree that we use this term only in writing projects with the EU, but aren’t 
we all today youth with fewer opportunities? Fewer than our parents, fewer than our 
peers in Western Europe, and fewer than we had when we were born...”122  
 
The statement makes obvious that the youth I encountered, and the youth constantly 
targeted by neoliberal practices of NFE, is neither a passive product of global neoliberalism 
nor the authentic local separated from global flows. They are political subjects, aware of their 
positionality within their communities, the state, Europe, and the world. Learning from them 
does not mean only “understanding” them better, but questioning ways we think about 
politics and society that they make. It also shows that, perhaps surprisingly, while some 
aspects of intervention work to contain alternatives to neoliberalism, others work to support 
them.  Thus the reading of neoliberal intervention as depoliticising—presented in the 
Introduction and Chapter 1 in works of Brown, Dardot and Laval, and McNay—is 
incomplete. This interpretation fails to grasp the myriad of ways in which the people I met 
practice politics. Politics that are grounded in ideas of what a Balkan subject is, but politics 
that are never considered just local. I will pursue this redefinition in Chapter 6. But before 
stepping outside of these fields of experience to ask what we might learn from them, we will 
inquire into a new site away from NFE activities of youth: that of agricultural governance. 
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Chapter 5  
Governing Agriculture: Between accession and 
investment 
 
Agriculture is usually relegated to development studies—research that concerns 
peasants, technological innovation, and community politics. It is not the first thing that comes 
to our mind when thinking about intervention—the high state politics of statebuilding and 
peacebuilding rarely pay attention to what goes on in the fields where food is grown. Yet 
there are very stable ideals of how agriculture should be governed, and who should be the 
subjects of that government. This ideal is very much a part of the greater vision of what good 
political life is. In this chapter, in lieu of a liberal peace package, we are presented with a 
modern agriculture package that is nevertheless underpinned by similar values of 
entrepreneurship, market competition, “the right” form of government, and specific 
subjectivities.  
As such, agriculture becomes a field in which we can examine (international) politics 
generally, and politics of intervention more specifically. In the study of politics generally, 
agriculture already serves as the basis of insightful and varied studies. William Biebuyck, for 
example, interprets the EU through food supply as a “a formative space in the creating and 
exercise of centralized governing authority in Western Europe.”1 He examines the EU 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and other instances of agricultural government 
alongside more commonly discussed phenomena such as war and market integration as 
crucial for the emergence of EU as we know it today. Outside Europe, agriculture was and 
still is the target of many development practices. Agriculture, perhaps unsurprisingly, serves 
as a powerful illustration of the “postcolonial” condition that Akhil Gupta examines in his 
detailed book on agriculture and the making of modern India.2 In his analysis, “technologies 
of food production” are intimately intertwined with global capitalism and discourses of 
development—the basis of understanding of postcoloniality for rural people in India.3 A 
different examination of globalisation comes from treating agriculture as a field of 
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governance. In an edited volume, Vaughan Higgins and Geoffrey Lawrence bring to fore the 
many ways that the government of food is becoming transversal and is moving onto non-
state actors that might initially be perceived as removed from the political realm.4 Within 
Serbia, Andre Thiemann used a small agricultural village as a setting in which he examines 
broader state relations in transitional Serbia.5 In the only monograph that deals with the 
political implications of agriculture in Serbia, Slobodan Naumović used three agricultural 
case studies to examine wider processes of Europeanisation.6 All of these examples 
demonstrate that agriculture is crucial for understanding concepts like the state, the market, 
different forms of power, and the relations between them. These are the concepts through 
which interventions work and that make and are made by people experiencing them. 
Within intervention scholarship, scholars like Gearoid Millar, Andreas Hirblinger, 
and Meera Sabaratnam have started exploring agriculture as one dimension of the liberal 
intervention machine.  In a series of articles, Millar examines a particular land grab in Sierra 
Leone as a “direct embodiment of the liberal peace paradigm” and uses it bring to the fore 
the economic dimension of liberal peace—a belief that marketization leads to peace.7 
Hirblinger, on the other hand, approaches the post-peace agreement in South Sudan through 
the “tri-partite relationship between political subjectivity, government and land” that 
profoundly shapes both conflict and post-conflict dynamics in the country.8 Sabaratnam, in 
her study of Mozambique, focuses on a different type of intervention in agriculture. She 
examines practices like microfinance projects, efforts to facilitate a move away from (semi-
)subsistence farming and towards “producing for the market,” and reforms aimed at building 
the Ministry of Agriculture. Starting from the perspective of the peasantry which is supposed 
to be the beneficiary of these projects, she uses agriculture to uncover wider characteristics 
of liberal peace interventions—they are “largely indifferent, irresponsible or fragile.9  
Similarly, this chapter takes agriculture as a field in which we can examine the 
experiences of “being governed.” The following pages capture many of the above themes. I 
examine the reforms and statebuilding efforts in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
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Water Economy10 (and the people that make it) and I inquire how the focus on nurturing 
market relations unfolds in different dimensions of agriculture. The chapter proceeds in five 
parts. The first part of the chapter will offer a short historical overview of agricultural 
government in Serbia to provide historical context, and to point to legacies that are still 
present in policies today.  
The second part will define intervention as EU accession and bring to the fore the 
subject-making implied in EU practices. However, more than just “employing” 
governmentality to uncover these processes, this part will use its ethnographic orientation to 
highlight aspects of local experience that would stay hidden in a focus on EU practices—
things like brain drain, local class stratification, and the political economy of civil society. 
Without these things, the account of the effects of EU practices remains under-explored. 
The third part of the chapter will more specifically employ the thesis’ change of 
vantage point to that of those who are supposed to benefit from interventions. By following 
the concerns of my interlocutors, instead of intervention’s official aims, it will bring out the 
field of agricultural land use—a field which is formative of any agricultural policy, but which 
is absent from EU negotiations. The third section will dig deeper into land policy and follow 
Foucault’s advice to start analysing power from contestation. It will focus on a particular 
form of resistance against changes in land policy to draw out narratives and concepts that 
people use to orient themselves and their experiences of the transformation of agriculture in 
Serbia.  
The fourth part will shortly summarize how these issues that emerge from the 
chapter’s empirical practice reflect on the project of engaging experiences of those being 
intervened upon.  
Finally, the conclusion will shortly review how the chapter speaks to the problem of 
studying intervention from the eyes of those experiencing it. However, more than restating 
the work done in the thesis so far, it will draw out specific tensions that emerged and that 
will be pursued further in Chapter 6.   
                                               
10 Here I focus on a Ministry that changed its name during the writing of the thesis. During my fieldwork, it 
was still The Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection. With the EU requirements stating the 
separation of those two bodies, the expected change came after the 2017 election and the Ministry is now 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economy. To avoid confusion, I shorten this to “the Ministry” 
from now on. If I am talking about another Ministry, it will be specified.  
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I Agriculture as a political and ideological project through history 
As noted above, the way that land and food are governed reflects political, social, and 
economic relations on that land. This was especially visible in Yugoslavia, where agriculture 
presented both an object of government to be reformed, and a tool for reforming the 
population. But before expanding on Yugoslav agricultural policy, it is worth noting that 
agriculture mirrored the more general forms of rule even before WWI. For example, the 
Ottoman occupation in Serbia worked through the millet system—non-Islamic subjects were 
treated as “protected persons” who were guaranteed their religious autonomy, and they were 
also nominally free sharecroppers with hereditary rights on land property. This meant the 
main stratification happened between the (foreign) rulers and the ruled, and in turn allowed 
Serbia to develop as an egalitarian society of free peasant small-holders.11 Vojvodina, on the 
other hand, switched between Austro-Hungarian and a short period of Ottoman rule. While 
under Austro-Hungarian rule, land was used in the process of “colonisation:” mostly 
German, but also Croatian, French, Italian, Slovak, Armenian, Rumanian, and later 
Hungarian peasants were relocated to repopulate the previously abandoned areas and pay 
taxes to fund the defence against the Turks. Larger pieces of land, however, were given to 
Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches and other elites, and the peasants who 
received land through the process of colonisation were often the victims of enclosure 
practices. Because of this, Vojvodina was marked with much larger estates than the rest of 
the country, and its ethnic make-up is still diverse.12 In both cases, the population was largely 
made up of poor, often landless, peasants, and this is the base on which the Yugoslav 
modernising project took place.  
Under Yugoslavia, the government of agriculture reflected the modernizing project 
of industrialization by decreasing the proportion of the agricultural population. Additionally, 
it presented an effort at redistribution through progressive land reforms that reflected 
Yugoslavia’s positioning as a project that brings together economic, social, and political life. 
As will become clearer below, the experiences of agricultural policy in Yugoslavia can be 
traced to tensions in its political rationalities, thus echoing Foucault’s accusation that 
socialism never developed its “art of government.”13 The tensions come from the ways that 
                                               
11 Vujačić, Nationalism, Myth, and the State in Russia and Serbia, 126. This is a necessary oversimplification of the 
tenure system. For a detailed account of land tenure practice during the Byzantine and Ottoman rule in Serbia, 
see Chapter 1 in Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia. 
12 For more on this period in Vojvodina, see Chapter 5 in Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in 
Yugoslavia. 
13 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 94. 
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peasants were imagined as subjects: in the progressive land reforms after the war, they were 
made landowners in an atmosphere where “land to the peasants” was a natural companion to 
the popular slogan of “factories to the people.” However, it is precisely this ownership which 
made the state always suspicious of peasants—ownership as such was profoundly anti-
socialist and seen as leading to capitalist accumulation.14 
The first major land reform was conducted in 1919 with the creation of the Kingdom 
of Serbia, Croats and Slovenes (First Yugoslavia). Large Austro-Hungarian estates were re-
distributed by the state to former serfs [kmetovi] who were suddenly free land-owning 
individuals. Around 1,7 million hectares of land was given to landless people, with priority 
given to soldiers who fought in WWI and their families. The land was also used for yet 
another process of colonisation: ethnically Serbian war veterans and the poor were relocated 
to border areas in Vojvodina, Slavonija, Macedonia, and Metohija and Kosovo to own and 
work small parcels of land.15 The land reform, however, was far from perfect. Peasants were 
supposed to re-pay the cost of the land to its former estate owners which facilitated the 
creation of indentured labour. Land distribution was distorted by corruption and 
negotiations with land-owning elites, and the reform itself was never really finished or 
successful.16 So despite the policies of the reform being described as progressive, during the 
First Yugoslavia, the inequality in land ownership grew, and peasants themselves, although 
comprising sometimes up to 90% of the population, suffered deteriorating living conditions.  
In Post-WWII Second Yugoslavia, which came to be known as SFRY, the “village 
issue” [pitanje sela] emerged as key to the total transformation to socialism—the main goals 
of agricultural and land policy were nothing less than the abolishment of capitalist relations 
and the socialist transformation of villages. Here, the individual peasant becomes a problem 
to be contained—due to their ownership of land and “the interest in the tractor” as a form of 
means of production, the individual producer was considered to be an “anti-socialist and 
capitalist element.”17 In a detailed account of the Yugoslav economic system, Branko Horvat 
provides a timeline of three policy periods in Yugoslav agriculture: etatist collectivisation 
from 1949 to 1953, a focus on cooperation as an alternative to collectivisation in 1954-1965, 
                                               
14 Horvat, The Yugoslav Economic System, 349–50. 
15 Giordano summarizes the goals in two points: answering the “social question” by carrying out acts of justice 
and transferring land from the rich to the poor, and nationalizing territory by ethicizing landed property. 
Giordano, ‘The Ethnicization of Agrarian Reforms:  The Case of Interwar Yugoslavia’, 34. 
16 Lazić, Poljoprivredna proizvodnja [Agricultural production]], 43; cited in Srećković, ‘Istorijat agrarnih reformi 
[History of Agrarian Reforms]’, 515. 
17 Horvat, The Yugoslav Economic System, 349–50. 
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and the laissez-faire approach from 1965 onwards.18 I will follow a similar outline to highlight 
how these reforms are layered upon each other and still shape the experience of agriculture 
in Serbia today. 
The first period was marked by a new land reform that worked to collectivise 
agriculture based on the Soviet model. While the focus was on creation of the Peasant 
Working Cooperatives, it was always clear that they are only the means to achieve the more 
general goal of socialist transformation.19 Moreover, party officials were quite clear that the 
development of such a new form of agriculture does not demand just new technology like 
agricultural machinery, but also “political and organizational preparation”—teaching 
peasants how to become new political subjects.20 By developing four types of cooperatives 
with four different types of land tenure, the state tried to encourage the peasants to join the 
cooperatives voluntarily by allowing them to keep their land, thus diverging significantly 
from the Soviet model. The idea was that with increased productivity and general rise in the 
standard of living, the peasants will one day simply let go of their attachment to private 
ownership of land.21  However, even though the collectivisation was nominally voluntary, in 
reality, “severe administrative and political pressures,” under the label of “curbing capitalist 
elements in the village,” targeted the peasants to urge the transformation.22 
The complete transformation of rural political organisation failed. People would kill 
the livestock they were not allowed to keep as private ownership upon entering the 
cooperative and cooperative property was destroyed in acts of sabotage. Peasants also 
speculated with property so as to transform most of it into okućnica23 which they were allowed 
to keep, and minimise the property that they would be bringing into the cooperative.24 All 
these acts of resistance led to significantly decreased productivity, and the Soviet model of 
collectivisation was abandoned in 1953. The land maximum was lowered further, and the 
extra land was mostly given to (state owned) agricultural enterprises.  
This second period focused on cooperation, but it already saw the use of the free 
market as a tool for transformation: it was supposed to teach the peasants that they have to 
                                               
18 Horvat, The Yugoslav Economic System. 
19 Tochitch, ‘Collectivization in Yugoslavia’, 27. 
20 Tochitch, 28. 
21 Tochitch, 28. 
22 Horvat, The Yugoslav Economic System, 229–30. 
23 The literal translation would be “around the house.” It refers to small plots of land the peasants were allowed 
to keep as private property.  
24 Tochitch, ‘Collectivization in Yugoslavia’, 36. 
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either intensify their production through modernisation (joining the cooperatives that had 
modern technology made available by the state), or leave agriculture altogether and move to 
the growing industrial sector that was in desperate need of workers.25 Moreover, by 
abandoning the efforts at collectivisation and substituting them for “socialization” 
[podruštvljavanje—meaning the transformation of private property into “socially owned 
property”], Yugoslavia set out on a specific path to socialism which, as we will see, further 
complicated the issue of land ownership.26 This period also saw the characteristic dual 
development of agriculture: large collective production alongside small individual 
production connected by the concept of cooperation.27  
Since 1961, peasants who were given small plots of land were free to sell them. And 
they largely did so by entering cooperatives [zadruge]. As explained to me in an interview 
with a retired expert on zadruge, this was done for very practical reasons: the child benefits 
that peasants would get from being employed as workers in cooperatives were more than the 
income, they could get off their land. This created a boom in the land controlled by 
cooperatives: in the period of 1961–1968, cooperatives bought more than 190,000ha of 
agricultural land. Peasants were restricted by the land maximum which was decreased to 
10ha, and they used the cooperatives to expand production. They gave up their earnings 
from the cooperatives and used the money to purchase and hire land, equipment, machinery, 
and expertise. Since cooperatives did not have any land restrictions to abide by, they 
provided an opportunity for expansion. All these resources were used to work on cooperative 
land, as well as the small plots the peasants were allowed to keep as okućnica.28 Because 
property could not be listed as cooperative property, in this way land was socialized and the 
socially owned sector in the country grew. 
After the 1965 general reform in the economy, agriculture policy started relying 
heavily on the market. In short, a view that “producers would be left to themselves and that 
a laissez-faire approach is most suitable” became dominant.29 After 1968, the liberalisation was 
even more extreme as the market assumed a more prominent role and the state completely 
                                               
25 McVicker, ‘Chapter 6: Major Agricultural Reforms’, 107. Also, Horvat, The Yugoslav Economic System. 
26 Luković, ‘The Country Road to Revolution’. 
27 Horvat, The Yugoslav Economic System, 236. In making the two co-exist, the state introduced the concept of 
cooperation which determined the relationship between the two while continuing to encourage peasants to join 
cooperatives 
28 Along with works cited in this section, I am obliged to thank Branislav Gulan and Đorđe Bugarin, experts 
on the topic of zadruge, for talking me through the history of different forms of production in Serbia. I especially 
owe observations about the experience of these different state policies to conversations with them.  
29 Horvat, The Yugoslav Economic System, 346. 
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retreated from any regulatory functions. This led to rising prices, imports under dumping 
prices, and an overall stagnation in agricultural development.30 Horvat defines the nature of 
the problem theoretically: the cooperative was treated at the same time as a 
business/economic unit that should be governed by market rationality without implicating 
the state, but also as an “agricultural station that should educate and help the backward to 
adopt modern agrotechnology without charging the full value of the services provided.”31 In 
a way, its market rationality was in tension with its socialist goals. While space prevents a 
further discussion of the role of market rationalities in Yugoslav socialism,32 it is important 
to state that it is with these challenges that Yugoslavian agriculture entered the difficult years 
of the general crisis in the 1980s. 
The 1990s saw a complete transformation of the social order in Serbia, agriculture 
included.33 This had a paradoxical effect in agriculture: on the one hand, many people from 
the cities went back to (semi-)subsistence farming in rural areas to complement their 
disappearing incomes. On the other hand, farmers producing for the market were destroyed 
by the inflation. However, as one of my interlocutors explained, those who were brave 
enough, used the opportunity to expand in these times of crisis. The easiest way to expand 
(if you were able to hide from the mandatory military draft) was to take on huge bank loans, 
buy land and machinery, and then pay only a fraction of the loan back after the inflation had 
done its part.34  
These cases of brave agricultural entrepreneurs, however, were not enough to keep 
agricultural production at a level that would allow the market to operate. The big cooperative 
and state-owned enterprises were especially hurt by the disappearance of the Yugoslavian 
market. Additionally, the complicated history of failed collectivisation and the turn to 
socialization meant that Yugoslavia, along with Poland, were the only countries in Eastern 
Europe that emerged from socialism with around 85% of land still privately owned.35  So 
Serbia entered the 2000s with a high percentage of privately owned land, destroyed 
infrastructure, ruined big enterprises, and as it began its “delayed transition”36 it needed to 
                                               
30 Horvat, 249. Dumping prices refer to the sale of products in foreign markets for prices lower than their value.  
31 Horvat, 376. 
32 See Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism.  
33 The concept of social transformation instead of “transition” is usefully employed in Sörensen, State Collapse 
and Reconstruction in the Periphery. 
34 Interview with a producer, October 4, 2016. 
35 ‘Country Report: Serbia’, 8. 
36 I borrow the term from Bieber, ‘The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society’. He analyses the 10-year delay 
between the first proclamations of independence of Croatia and Slovenia, to the ousting of Milošević in 2000. 
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deal with both increasing agricultural output in general, and the creation of a land market 
that would govern the 25% of land that was state owned.37  
The early 2000s saw a major shift in the government of agriculture best observed in 
two documents: the 2004 Strategy for Serbian Agriculture [Strategija poljoprivrede Srbije] and 
the 2006 Law on Agricultural Land. The technocratic government in power was explicitly 
oriented towards international financial institutions, and they created agricultural policies 
accordingly. The 2004 Strategy is controversial for two reasons. First, it was officially a 
product of technical assistance aid to Serbia. It was developed in cooperation between EU 
experts and the Ministry in 2004 and adopted in the Serbian Parliament in 2005. However, 
it was widely criticized for not being written with the help of a foreign expert, but by a foreign 
expert, with the knowledge and approval of the then Minister.38 While this captured the 
public’s imagination in debates that might resemble discussions on local ownership, 
practically it matters little who wrote the document. What matters is that the Strategy was 
written in line with the liberal peace narrative of market economics. The Strategy was 
discussed for its explicit neoliberal orientation and a focus on privatisation, encouraging 
production for the market, and re-conceptualising the role of the Ministry to be limited to 
fostering a well-functioning market, and thus abstaining from both advising on comparative 
advantages and any possible protectionist measures.39 However, this narrative was not a 
straightforward imposition even if literally written by someone else. It was assembled in an 
encounter of global neoliberal vision that dominated the discussions of post-communist 
transitions with the historical experiments with markets in Yugoslavia.   
The same can be observed in the Law on Agricultural Land from 2005 which was 
similarly oriented towards global narratives of neoliberalism and sought to correct the 
previous experiments in forms of ownership. Mladen, one of the designers of the 2005 Law 
explained the creation of the Law in a long narrative interview. He started by telling me that 
he “really believes in the market”, and that the Law was designed precisely to create a well-
functioning market which will work to “transfer the land into the hands of those most 
                                               
37 The amount of this land, however, was much smaller than in other countries in Eastern Europe because 
Yugoslavia abandoned efforts at collectivisation very early (in 1953). This meant that Yugoslavia (similarly to 
Poland) emerged from communism with most of the land registered as in private ownership. A document 
prepared for the FAO in 2006 estimates that out of 5.1 million ha (some 66% of total land), 3.6 million ha are 
arable land (incl. permanent crops), and 350,000 to 380,000ha are state owned. See ‘Country Report: Serbia’. 
38 Naumović, Fields of Paradox, 112., states that the 2004 Strategy was written by a Dutch expert employed on 
the Twinning program between the EU and Serbia.  
39 Naumović, 66. 
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productive and efficient farmers.”40 The market is needed to develop a middle class of farmers 
who would carry Serbian agriculture away from unproductive smallholders and inefficient 
state enterprises.41 And in his desire to develop the middle class of farmers, Mladen was clear 
that it is his way of imagining Serbia becoming a global actor—(semi)subsistence peasants 
cannot participate in the global markets that Serbia was returning to after a long decade of 
international isolation, but middle size farmers can. Similarly, in experiments in Yugoslavia, 
the market was imagined to guide the behaviour of specific producers and usher in both a 
new form of production and a new subjectivity. 
This short historical contextualisation allows us to engage with subjects as existing 
outside the temporal confines of the intervention. In Sabaratnam’s words, it affords the 
subjects a historical consciousness that is usually stripped away from targets of 
intervention.42 Here, I want to emphasise two things. First, the government of agriculture 
(and its experiences) always reflected the ideological, political, and economic dynamics of 
the time in question—whether that was creating the “new socialist man” in place of the pre-
socialist peasants as was the case with the SFRY reforms, or the sharp turn towards 
neoliberalism in the early 2000s in which Serbia ran towards the global ideals of private 
ownership and market capitalism. Agriculture thus makes visible connections between wider 
visions of government and individual subjectivities. However, as already mentioned in 
Chapter 2, I do not treat these blueprints as anthropological facts—i.e. literally translated 
into reality. I examine them as schemes with real life consequences that transcend their 
intended fields of effects. 
Second, these schemes of agricultural government in Yugoslavia always developed in 
intricate relationships with empires, foreign policies, and global flows of ideas: from the 
Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires who drew the lines still visible on the make-up of farms in 
the region, to the Soviet influence over collectivisation (and lack thereof), and finally to 
embracing the neoliberal policies in the early 2000s in the rush to return to the fold of 
international organisations like the World bank and the IMF. The government of agriculture 
                                               
40 Interview, October 4, 2016. 
41 This structure is usually referred as a “dual structure of production:” it is dominated by very small semi-
subsistence producers, who mostly farm along with holding other employment, and, on the other hand, very 
big state enterprises. This makes CAP difficult to implement in Eastern Europe because the “family farm” 
which is the most common unit of production in the EU, is missing from this picture. Many policies are thus 
devised at the “farmerization” of producers in Serbia. While some producers have risen to this so-called “middle 
class,” they still account for only a small fraction of production. It is correct to use Diković’s description of 
most producers as “neither peasants, nor farmers.” 
42 Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention, 39–41. 
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of Serbia always imagined the subjects of agriculture as not just local actors, but as 
participants in global politics. As the next section will show, this remains true today.   
II Governing agriculture through EU integration  
In contemporary Serbia, the government of agriculture is shaped by a particular 
intervention—Europeanisation. The technical expression of Europeanisation is the official 
EU accession process, the so-called negotiations [pregovori].43 In this enormous process of 
development through legislative harmonisation divided into 35 chapters, agriculture comes 
out as especially important. This is not just because the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)44 
is famously the EU’s biggest expenditure, but also because agriculture in Serbia plays a 
bigger role than in the average EU state. Agricultural and food industry represents 40% of 
gross domestic production45 and more than 20% of the workforce in Serbia is employed in 
agriculture, thus making it one of the highest in Europe.46 The technical process of EU 
integration specifically targets agriculture in three chapters of the acquis communautaire, the 
bundle of legislative harmonisation that needs to be completed before a state can become a 
full member. Chapter 11 (Agriculture and Rural Development), Chapter 12 (Fisheries), and 
Chapter 13 (Food Safety) account for more than 40% of the acquis communautaire. They are 
so comprehensive that most of the changes in the agricultural and food systems are framed 
within the so called “Euro-Atlantic integration” [evro-atlantkse integracije] which are presented 
as the goal of the transition from Yugoslav socialism to independent liberal democracies in 
the region.47 
Even beyond the official EU negotiations, the “return to Europe” in agriculture is the 
central piece of narratives ranging from state policies to individual aspirations. For example, 
in the Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development of the Republic of Serbia for 2014-
2024, the goal is unequivocally to “set the basis of new agricultural policies, defined along 
the principles of modern public policy and the clear orientation of the Ministry towards the 
taking on a European model of agricultural support.”48 The document goes on to detail the 
                                               
43 Serbia applied for EU membership in in December 2009, it was given official candidate status for EU 
membership in 2012. The official negotiations started in January 2014, with the first two chapters opened in 
December 2014.  
44 Common Agricultural Policy is the EU’s system of agricultural subsidies. It is the largest EU expenditure 
(ca. EUR59 billion/year) and accounts for more than half of the total EU budget.   
45 Lukač and Gulan, ‘The Agroindustry of the Republic of Serbia and European Integrations’. 
46 ‘Strategija Poljoprivrede i Ruralnog Razvoja Republike Srbije Za Period 2014-2024. Godine’, sec. 2.1.2. 
47 Volk, Erjavec, and Mortensen, Poljoprivredna politika i evropske integracije u Jugoistočnoj Evropi, 4. 
48 ‘Strategija 2014-20124 [Strategy 2014-2024]’. 
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changes in agricultural policy needed to implement CAP, the adoption of the legal 
framework stipulated in the acquis communautaire, and the institutional reforms needed to 
harmonise administrative structures with those of the EU.  
The goals of “modern” policy and the “EU model” of agriculture are worth paying 
closer attention to. In agriculture, modernity does not relate only to the institutions, but also 
the “backward” form of agriculture that is prevalent not only in Serbia but in most of 
Southern Europe. This form of agriculture is characterized by a large number of very small 
farms, high proportion of subsistence and semi-subsistence producers, lower inputs, and 
accordingly lower yields.49 While such a form might be celebrated in food activist circles that 
see precisely this kind of agriculture as the antidote to the industrial food complex, in policy 
circles and agri-business it is presented as a problem of “backwardness” to be overcome by 
adopting the EU model of agriculture.  
Acquiring access to policy makers in the Ministry of Agriculture, or those actually on 
the negotiating team for the EU negotiations proved more difficult than expected when I 
arrived in Belgrade. My emails were rarely responded to, and when replies did arrive I 
received detailed reports and many links but could not get anyone to actually talk to me. An 
opening unexpectedly happened in one of the youth courses that I attended. The speaker for 
the particular class was one of the main EU negotiators—a confident, knowledgeable, and 
quick-thinking man in his early forties. It was obvious that he enjoyed the challenge of EU 
negotiations. The “us” vs “them” rhetoric snuck into his stories and he was obviously 
energised by the challenge even though he was the first to tell us that negotiations are “not 
really negotiating anything” because the EU standards are pre-defined—it is how, not if, these 
will be implemented in Serbia that is “negotiated.”  
I approached him after his talk to ask for advice on how to continue in my study of 
agriculture. After I explained that I am interested in the transformations of agriculture he 
was noticeably excited about my interest and I was increasingly optimistic about my 
prospects in studying the world of these adroit policymakers. In a quick chat about 
agriculture in Serbia, he swiftly played with the Serbian translation of agriculture as field 
economy [poljoprivreda: polje=field, privreda=economy] and pointed out that the biggest 
transformation of poljoprivreda needed is that people involved start acting like it is in fact 
privreda—people have to understand it as an economy and guide their own behaviours by using 
economic rationalities. I was noticeably shocked by such a straightforward economisation 
                                               
49 Berkum and Bogdanov, Serbia on the Road to EU Accession. 
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and neoliberal reasoning, but my further work in agriculture (indeed substantially helped by 
this EU negotiator) proved both the importance of this image and its far more complex 
reality.  
Thinking this intervention with governmentality points out the fact that the diagnosis 
does not stop at the “form of agriculture.” In its governmental reason, it reaches down to 
subjectivities themselves and ways that they should be produced and enticed to work within 
this new government. And it is here where we can once again track the connection between 
forms of rule and three individual subjectivities: the public servants supposed to transform 
the state along neoliberal lines, the producers themselves who are supposed to become 
entrepreneurs more responsive to the market, and civil society that is supposed to both 
participate and mediate between the two. 
i. Civil servants 
The institutional deficiencies in the Serbian governance have to be corrected through 
nurturing new types of civil servants that would build these new institutions and reform the 
public sector. The horror stories about ineffective public sector, people who simply “don’t 
understand” how the EU works, and Ministries who “refuse to do their homework” are often 
invoked as an explanation for the slowness of European integration and the lack of progress 
supposed to accompany it.50 The issue, however, is not just the lack of practical knowledge 
which can be explained by lack of experience—i.e. civil servants who are still learning about 
how the EU works, so needing help to devise and implement EU legislation at home. The 
criticism here goes beyond skill into questioning the will to learn. In my interview with an 
EU delegation member, I asked about IPARD51 funds and it was this lack of will that she 
found most frustrating: 
 
“It is not that they [Ministry employees], ask too much [i.e. do not know enough], 
but that they don’t ask at all, they act as if they understand everything, they refuse 
help that everyone knows they need!”52 
 
 While the example I use here is from a foreign employee of the EU delegation, this 
image of the inefficient, incompetent, and lazy public servant is pervasive: it was repeated to 
                                               
50 Interview, September 29, 2016. EU Delegation, Belgrade. The same narratives are present in the media and 
the popular discourse as well.  
51 EU’s Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance for Rural Development. IPARD holds the promise of 
EUR175 million for Serbian agriculture, but it has been delayed multiple times because Serbia failed to create 
the institutional capacity for distributing funds, namely a functioning Payment Agency.  
52 Interview, September 29, 2016. EU Delegation, Belgrade. 
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me by producers to illustrate the lack of state concern for them, by NGOs who bemoan the 
lag in legislative changes needed to advance the EU integration process, and sometimes even 
by the people actually working in civil service. In a way, the public sector is demonised not 
only in policy documents, but also in public narratives. Marek Mikuš examines this 
phenomenon as a moral project of public-sector retrenchment in Serbia, and identifies the 
general view of the public sector as multiply immoral: too big, with salaries that are too high, 
and completely lacking motivation and initiative.53 
The Serbian government deals with this mostly through hiring and wage increase 
bans that the above study by Mikuš explores. The EU, however, has very specific tools for 
targeting this issue: the twinning and TAIEX programs which seek to transform the public 
sector by transferring expertise from EU member states to new candidate countries and thus 
facilitate the acquis adoption. These mechanisms are celebrated as peer-to-peer (the transfer 
happens between experts working in the same departments) and demand-driven 
(host/candidate countries have to request the program).54 While my own ethnographic work 
did not have access to the everyday working of the Ministry in which I would observe these 
processes, many works in critical policy studies have addressed these issues.55 Specifically, I 
was fortunate enough that Naumović, a Serbian anthropologist, provided a very detailed 
account of the twinning project in the Ministry—the first of its kind in Serbia.  
Within EU negotiations, the Ministry acts as the Managing Authority for IPA and 
IPARD funds.56 This means that the Ministry has to decide what it needs from the EU 
(mostly in the form of technical assistance),57 and then they contact the EU delegation with 
their request—a true effort at facilitating local ownership. However, simultaneously with 
being invited to make these decisions, the Ministry is also being specifically trained and 
educated in how to make such decisions. The educational and transformative project is obvious 
                                               
53 Mikuš, ‘The Justice of Neoliberalism’, 219. 
54 For example, see Füle, ‘TAIEX and Twinning Activity Report 2012’. 
55 I was denied access to training that was happening in the Ministry during my stay in Serbia. However, as I 
interviewed people who participated in them, I was allowed insight into the dynamics of the trainings. In lieu 
of access, the Ministry and European Integration Office provided me with detailed training reports. In 
literature. this process is fruitfully unpacked in critical policy studies that often utilize auto-ethnographic 
methods to explore the world of policy translation. For an example of such work in Post-Yugoslavian spaces, 
see Lendvai, ‘Europeanization of Social Policy?’; Thomas and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Public Policy Making in the 
Western Balkans; Stubbs, ‘Performing Reform in South East Europe’; Stubbs, ‘Stretching Concepts Too Far?’; 
Stubbs and Deacon, ‘Transnationalism and the Making of Social Policy in South East Europe’. 
56 IPA refers to the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance which allows candidate countries to access EU 
funds, and IPARD is its rural development component. 
57 There are four main ways of using IPA funds: technical assistance, twinning programmes, investment projects 
(such as procuring equipment), and financial arrangements with other financial institutions.  
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in official documents Naumović worked with when they state that “[t]wo of the most 
important, non-measurable but visible results of twinning are network building and change of 
attitudes and behaviours.”58  
Naumović points out this odd combination of very strict contract conditions and 
surface level local ownership gestures but does not theoretically pursue it.  In a way, this is 
not just giving freedom in the form of local ownership, but also shaping it in a very particular 
manner. This phenomenon has already been explored in investigations of civil society 
formation, but even though TAIEX and twinning programs remain in the domain of the state 
rather than civil society, the same dynamics are visible: while seemingly empowering and 
facilitating the creation of “active and productive” civil servants, these techniques can be 
seen as a “deep-running form of governmental control over the nature of individuals, society, 
and governance in target states.”59 The interesting point here is the process happening within 
the state, rather seemingly outside of it in civil society.  
Another fascinating aspect of Naumović’s account is the interview material provided 
by EU partners working in Serbia which heavily draw on the Balkan identity as a problem 
to be overcome: the inability/unwillingness of the staff to change, the communist legacy that 
has “culturally corrupted people” and “corrupted peoples’ minds.”60 He analyses the process 
through the lens of culture and interprets practices like Twinning in the following: 
 
“So, the thesis defended here is that they are not only instruments for the formal 
implementation of the acquis, for long term whole sector technical assistance, and for 
institution building, but also vehicles of low profile acculturation of Easterners into the 
legal and administrative cultures of the EU, all of which at present also happen to be 
working equivalents, surrogates so to say, of a still lacking general European 
culture.”61  
 
Acculturation means changing the norms, values, ways of thinking and relating to 
oneself and others—a targeting of subjectivities. More than pointing to the governmental 
power of this kind of intervention, his account makes clear that this change in culture has a 
very specific goal: facilitating the neoliberal agenda presented in the Strategy for Agriculture 
                                               
58 European Court of Auditors, ‘Special Report No 6/2003’; cited in Naumović, Fields of Paradox, 59. Emphasis 
added. 
59 Kurki, ‘Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion’, 351; See also Tagma, Kalaycioglu, and Akcali, 
‘“Taming” Arab Social Movements’; Malmvig, ‘Free Us from Power’. 
60 Interview with a foreign expert in the Twinning program, cited in Naumović, Fields of Paradox, 86–87. 
61 Naumović, 60. Emphasis added. 
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from 2005.62 A new government of agriculture—one markedly more neoliberal—indeed 
needs new civil servants.  
More than showing that governmentality can go beyond explaining civil society 
building and move into the state, this perceived incompetence of civil servants sits uneasily 
with the brain drain that is happening in Serbian public institutions and that is acknowledged 
even in reports of technical assistance: if everyone is slow and inefficient, how are they 
moving on to get jobs in the highly competitive private sector? Talking to people who worked 
and are still working in the public sector, I learned that this particular area of agricultural 
governance is shaped by a different intervention—the hiring and wage increase bans 
introduced as a structural benchmark in IMF-led efforts at “government rightsizing.” Ever 
since the first IMF stand-by agreement in 2001 (and then again in 2009, 2012, 2015), the 
government—with the public’s support—has worked towards public-sector retrenchment.63 
Under these bans, Serbian civil servants work for salaries that barely (if at all) cover the cost 
of living in Belgrade. Those who give up and leave are not replaced because of the hiring 
ban. Moreover, the Prime-Minister-turned-President Vučić, in a demonstration of economic 
rationality, issued a special decree that gives public servants only 1 euro per travelling day.64 
This is in stark tension with the fact that IPARD projects are inspected by controllers who 
spend most of their time traveling and are thus left without an allowance to actually cover 
the cost of that traveling.65   
This is not lost on the policy makers in Serbia and the EU. In an interview with a 
high-level agricultural expert that participated in the Croatian negotiations, this brain drain 
was explained to me as a “post-negotiation exodus.” While her experience was that the brain 
drain happened after Croatia was admitted to the EU and many experts who led it (including 
her), moved to open private consultancies, she observed it is already happening in Serbia.66 
Even the EU delegation employee who I quoted above, and who expressed great frustration 
with the state of the Ministry, accepted that the problem was similar in all of “these countries” 
(meaning new member states): staff is trained, and then the staff leaves. There is definitely 
                                               
62 Naumović, 66–68, 152. 
63 Mikuš, ‘The Justice of Neoliberalism’. Mikuš provides an excellent contextualisation of the project of public-
sector retrenchment within teleological narratives of transition, IMF stand-by agreements, and the late-
Yugoslavian anti-bureaucratic revolution which similarly targeted the public sector for its lavish and expensive 
lifestyle. For IMF stand-by agreements, see p. 215, 223. 
64 In October 2015, the per diem allowances for civil servants were decreased from 2556RSD to 150RSD. 
65 The issue of the controllers’ daily pay was brought to my attention in the interview with an anonymous 
member of the EU delegation. The contextualisation of the pay with Vučić decree I owe to Bojan Elek.  
66 Interview with a former member of the EU Negotiation Team in Croatia, in charge of Agriculture and Rural 
Development. September 20, 2016, Zagreb.  
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the neoliberal activation of subjects—people are trained to develop institutions and to teach 
them how to practice their local ownership thus shaping both subjects and the state that they 
make. However, this activation is also shaped (and frustrated) by a very material political 
economy of employment—a political economy made at the intersection of local 
circumstances and neoliberal narratives that mix between the IMF and local elites.   
The issue of activation through acculturation, and the failure to accomplish it because 
of the brain drain, point to the added value of ethnographic approaches. There are studies 
that examine the tension between efforts to promote local ownership and their pairing with 
very strict project requirements that results in a specific form of power; and there are policy-
oriented studies which touch upon the lived reality of brain drain. However, my point here 
is bringing them into conversation. From a governmentality perspective, the brain drain 
remains hidden until inquiring into experiences of people who are targeted by these 
techniques. It shows that neoliberal governmentality obvious in EU documents does not 
work as “intended.” It does not change state policies and cultures because the people who it 
alters end up leaving. However, it does not mean that these practices do not have effects. In 
Serbia, they helped create a burgeoning private sector of consultants, and a non-
governmental sector of international organisations that attract people formerly employed in 
public administration. This affects both the state and the wider political economy of 
agricultural government. 
ii. From peasants to farmers 
New types of producers are needed to engage with these institutions. In my 
fieldwork, I often heard disparaging accounts of producers from policy makers. For example, 
an FAO employee (who was previously employed in the Ministry for eight years) referred 
to producers as “energy vampires”—people whose complaining and demands make working 
with them impossible.67 On other occasions, other former employees of the Ministry arranged 
interviews for me by choosing the “good examples”—farmers who they thought stand out 
from the backwardness that marks the average Serbian producer.  Even producers 
themselves always differentiated themselves as “capable” from those others smaller/located in 
the South/older that are not able to deal with the demands of modern agriculture. This 
diagnosis translates into a view of modernisation and transition as transformations of the 
identities of the subjects themselves—turning peasants into farmers.68 This transformation is 
                                               
67 Interview, October 11, 2016. 
68 Diković, ‘Neither Peasant, Nor Farmer: Transformations of Agriculture in Serbia after 2000’. 
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underlined by an understanding that these subjects should be guided by economic 
rationalities. For example, the 2014 Strategy for Agriculture refers to producers in the 
following terms: 
 
“One of the most delicate issues of the future development of the agricultural sector 
is the especially unfavourable age and educational structure of the agricultural 
workforce. This problem is significant from both the aspect of the social structure of 
rural areas, and from the aspect of human potential capacity for adopting new 
technologies, changing the production structure, and many others.”69 
 
Put simply—the producers are old and not educated enough to make appropriate 
decisions on what they will grow, and how they will use new technologies to grow it. This is 
not a surprising narrative.  
The idea that something about the subjectivities of the producers is to blame for the 
lack of development in Serbian agriculture has a long history. Thiemann, for example, 
reviews literature that identifies the reasons for Serbian underdevelopment in the “lack of 
capitalist spirit” and the “lack of work discipline.”70 Similarly, the discussions within 
Yugoslavia revolved around issues like the peasants’ irrational attachment to their land, their 
“ownership mentality,” or their conservative and unenterprising nature.71  In a way, the 
peasant was always framed as lacking modernity, and always the target of different practices 
that would bring them into modernity. 
During Yugoslavia, this problem was referred to as “agrarian overpopulation.” The 
image of fast industrialising socialist society could not tolerate a high percentage of backward 
peasants. More than guiding producers into “higher” forms of production such as 
cooperatives, the socialist government was very clear on the fact that a large part of the 
peasants needs to relocate to the cities and become industrialised—they need to become (self-
managing) workers in the factory, the base of Yugoslav socialism. Today, the peasants are 
encouraged to consolidate land, embrace new technologies, and practice market rationality 
by fitting their production into “fundable” projects that will win subsidies. However, no one 
really talks about what will happen with those who do not fit in this project agriculture. This 
is the point of departure between the old socialist policies and contemporary ones: the 
                                               
69 ‘Strategija 2014-20124 [Strategy 2014-2024]’, 17. 
70 Sundhaussen, ‘Die Verpasste Agrarrevolution’, 45, 49, 59; Palairet, The Balkan Economies c. 1800 - 1914; cited 
in Thiemann, ‘The Moral Appreciation of Social Security’, 24; Also, Palairet, ‘The Economic Consequences of 
Slobodan Milošević’. 
71 Horvat, The Yugoslav Economic System, 201. 
Katarina Kušić 
Chapter 5 | 188 
 
current policies do not spend much time discussing where those who fail to turn from 
peasants into farmers should go.  
This was perhaps most painfully illustrated to me in the phrase “cleansing of 
statistics” used by a former member of the EU negotiating team that participated in the 
Croatian accession. The overcrowded numbers of small farms that are too high in countries 
like Serbia are going to be spontaneously “cleansed” by natural death of an ageing population 
and the financial demise of another portion of them.72 This particular silence cannot be 
examined by focusing on policy texts, it remains unsaid even though it is a defining feature 
of EU integration in agriculture.  
But even though no one explicitly talks about this catastrophe that awaits small semi-
subsistence farmers in the EU, there is also no illusion that this transformation from peasants 
to entrepreneurial subjects will go smoothly.73 While I tried to learn about CAP, about 
IPARD, about the interaction between multiple layers of government, project funding, and 
calls for those projects, I was embarrassed to admit that I was overwhelmed by the 
information. There is a joke in agricultural policy that there is only one person on the planet 
who truly understands CAP, but the joke is lost on producers who are forced to deal with 
CAP and similar systems. In short, people who know how to farm and market their products, 
now also have to become literate in project writing and doing. They have to learn to express 
their lives in numbers, calls, and project-language that they are far-removed from. Again, 
this is not lost on anyone. The issue of “how much money is used” from EU funds is discussed 
as a point of critique for both the government and the producers as beneficiaries of these 
funds (i.e. the government is not providing the institutions to process the funds, and the 
producers lack the will and the skill to apply for them).  
How this difficulty is mitigated, however, is a matter of debate. The logical step would 
be to delegate project writing help to Local Advising Services [lokalne savetodavne službe] 
whose job should be to support farmers with technological and other advice (and whose 
hiring practices are subject to the same hiring ban as the rest of the public sector). In reality, 
however, private consultancy businesses take this role and we are now seeing an emergence 
of a whole new market for project writing. Additionally, these projects require large bank 
                                               
72 Interview, September 20, 2016. 
73 The dairy industry in Croatia, for example, has been dramatically shrinking since Croatia joined the EU. 
This, however, is rarely discussed in Serbia. For a short news article on Croatian dairies, see ‘Proizvodnja Se 
Srozala, Mljekare Guše Uvoz i Dugovi [Production down, Dairies Suffocated by Imports and Debt]’. At the 
annual Congress of dairy producers that I attended, this issue was mentioned in passing only once, although 
the majority of the debate related to imports and exports. 
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loans because the producers provide the funds that are refunded once the project is 
completed. So they depend on taking out loans that are later repaid with subsidies. Here, we 
see that the focus on one subjectivity—turning a peasant into a farmer, contributes to a much 
larger political economy. This political economy does not only create a new sector of private 
consultancies and loans, but also excludes small producers who do not have the time to learn 
to write projects, or the funds to pay someone else to do it for them, from participating in 
IPARD and other similar schemes.74 
 A part of this larger political economy is a rigid differentiation of subjects. 
Techniques of activation seemingly target a homogenous producer subject, but in reality, 
some subjects are expected to disappear, many are expected to employ consultants instead 
of learning new skills, and a specific stratum are already entrepreneurial enough to be 
engaged directly. While many policy makers implied the differentiation between peasants 
and farmers in conversations and in who they were recommending me to talk to, the most 
literal illustration came from the same person who referred to farmers as “energy vampires.” 
After I told him I spoke to some farmers’ associations, he offered commiseration: it must have 
been difficult to speak with such difficult people. But he also had a redemptive example: in 
wheat production, there is a well-functioning association, not “difficult” at all, and made up 
of “big players,”—exporters. The FAO “listens to their needs” and then tries to feed them 
into policy through FAO projects on public-private partnerships.75 It is these “players” that 
are engaged into the new political economy of projects, it is these farms that will apply for 
subsidies and get them, and it is these people who are the new farmers. 
Here, we see the point that was already raised in previous chapters: policies do not 
only determine the future, they also diagnose the present. And the diagnosis in Serbian 
agriculture for a long time depended on creating the producer as a backward Balkan subject. 
The EU intervention here does not simply “invent” the subjects that need to be transformed, 
but the intervention is a specific embodiment of a much longer process of modernisation.  
                                               
74 Otten makes the same observation in his PhD thesis and the short article coming out of it. Since Macedonia 
got access to IPARD funds earlier, he was able to evaluate the on-going implementation of the programme. He 
comes to the unsurprising conclusion about how small producers are excluded through both co-financing 
stipulations of IPARD funds, and through not having access to personal connections that would help them 
navigate the state bureaucracy. Otten, ‘Responses to EU Rural Development Initiatives’; Otten, ‘The 
Neoliberal “Katastrofa”’ esp. Chapter 5. 
75 A separate issue, brought up in the same interview, is that even these big players do not have any tariff 
protection. While this larger context stays outside of the scope of this project, it leaves it to her to point out that 
even the elite strata of Serbian producers still lives a very peripheral experience of political economy.  
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Denaturalising these images is a process that starts with surprise. Ethnographic 
methodologies enable these surprises. Coming from literature that explicitly and implicitly 
paints people as lacking the drive and creativity to improve their conditions, one is struck by 
the rich practices and strategies employed by real people we meet. This should be 
anticipated—when talking to people in Serbia, one is talking to people who had the 
entrepreneurship, creativity, resilience, and capacity to survive 10 years of various sanctions 
and NATO bombings. Building onto this surprise, two particular studies of agriculture in 
Serbia sought to provide alternative interpretations of agricultural outcomes in Serbia. 
Thiemann and Naumović, instead of blaming subjects or the culture they are a part of, point 
out the “adverse macroeconomic conditions, the unsound agricultural policy in Serbia, and 
the moral economy of capitalist market exchange” that make the experience of Serbian 
agriculture.76 These are structural circumstances that cannot be explained through an 
exclusive focus on subjectivity, but are needed to make sense of experiences of modernisation 
in Serbian agriculture. 
My point, however, is not just to point to structural explanations that are hidden by 
a depoliticising discourse on individual subjectivities. First, as already discussed theoretically 
in Chapter 1, I want to emphasise that the connection between a particular diagnosis, a form 
of government, and the subjectivities that are targeted by it is not a completely new invention 
of contemporary neoliberalism. On the contrary, we see here that the image of the backward 
producer is situated both historically and in a more general mental map of the Balkans. This 
complicates the idea of neoliberal governmentality as something new, and as always the 
same—here it is layered upon a history of trying to reimagine producers as subjects, and it 
is connected to a resilient image of backwardness. Second, this short review shows that 
intervention in agriculture in fact targets populations—the projects, calls, and narratives of 
the EU attempt to devise a new way of governing agriculture populated by new subjects. 
However, looking into experiences of these projects pointed out that these subjectivities are 
a lot more varied than one homo oeconomicus that is supposed to replace the peasantry with 
farmers. Some are expected to disappear, some are encouraged to grow further, and the 
majority is stuck in trying to survive.  
iii. Civil society 
The peculiar situation of civil society involved in the transformation of agriculture 
under the EU’s guidance is best demonstrated in the working of the National Convention on 
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the European Union (NCEU). NCEU is a body that “aim[s] to facilitate cooperation 
between the National Assembly and the civil society during the process of the EU accession 
negotiations.”77 It is structured around thematic working groups that gather civil society 
organisations and feed their input into EU negotiations. It is a model developed in Slovakia, 
and it was adopted in Serbia after the Croatian negotiation process was accused of including 
civil society “too little and too late.” The structure imagines civil society groups commenting 
on screening reports and action plans which make the body of the EU negotiation process— 
this structure is made with the goal of implementing a “consultation process” between the 
Serbian government and the civil society and thus promoting local ownership of the process 
beyond the state. As such, it is civil society that has ownership of the reforms as they take on 
the role of watchdogs and evaluators of compliance with the acquis.  
The Agriculture and Rural Development Working Group is in charge of Chapters 
11, 12, and 13 of the acquis and officially lists over 90 members. However, its operation is 
problematic. For example, the planned Working Group Meeting was postponed during the 
whole 10 months that I spent in Serbia, so I only got reports from it from interlocutors that 
worked to keep me in the loop after I had already departed. Miloš, who runs a small NGO 
which evaluates and monitors government policies in relation to agriculture, animal welfare, 
and environmental protection, explained the meeting in an email: 
 
“Imagine, even though the Government of Serbia adopted the guidelines for 
including civil society, National Convention, and the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, 
the Ministry did not publicly publish the draft of the Action Plan, but it delivered it 
only to NCEU with the invitation for us to send the comments. The meeting held in 
December was only pro forma—the Ministry representatives just presented the Action 
Plan like we didn’t read it already. I left the meeting. All in all, in NCEU I have no 
support to try to demand that process should be transparent and inclusive, and other 
organisations obviously don’t care either, so I have to go alone and insist on it. NCEU 
obviously wants monopoly and will not insist on opening up the process, nor on 
respecting the guidelines. There, I’m bitterly disappointed by ‘my own’ [people].” 
  
He continued in a follow-up email: 
 
“The Ministry will never admit that they are missing expertise, and it’s mainly 
populated by dilettantes and incompetents [nesposobne osobe]. Accepting the CSO 
suggestions is the worst that can happen to them. Until now, they never cooperated 
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with anyone except with a few CSO who applauded them. And NCEU wants to 
monopolise [the process] because of donors, horrible.”78 
 
There are a few things going on here. First, the pro forma status of the meeting does 
not come as a surprise. I had previously attended a more general meeting of all NCEU 
groups in April 2016 and was faced with a similar feeling. As NCEU members explained to 
me in breaks of the meeting, what we are witnessing is a not a process (used in relation to the 
“consultation process”), but a simulation of a process. Beyond providing for very boring 
meetings, this allows the government to tick the boxes of civil society cooperation, but it also 
permits specific civil society organisations to similarly play into the game by producing pro 
forma reports and suggestions that use donor money and do not substantially change 
anything. But more than “doing nothing,” the box ticking exercise deflects any future call 
for transparency and local ownership—they are already there! As will be discussed below, 
this deflection and the state-civil society relationships that it enables reconceptualises all 
actors involved. 
Second, Miloš’ experience of EU intervention does not fit the usual story of neoliberal 
governmentality techniques as empowering. Miloš did not feel empowered but silenced by 
the EU mandated process of consultation. He was ready to act as the limit to government 
just like Foucault imagines in his discussions of civil society, but he could not perform that 
role. The techniques that invite CSOs to apply for funding, embrace project-life, and imagine 
government as a negotiation between the civil society, the officials, and the public are very 
much alive in Serbia. However, their effects are reduced to box-ticking exercises: like 
sending out the Action Plan to a select few CSOs the night before comments on the multiple-
hundred-page document are due, holding a meeting to note their comments without any 
engagement, and reporting to the EU that the civil society has been consulted.   
Yet the EU stipulations are not without effect: they might not be creating 
“ownership” as imagined, but they actively created a special relationship between the Serbian 
government and NCEU who competes for EU funds, receives them, and creates the civil 
society as the employer that I discussed from the youth perspective in the previous chapter.79 
This process was investigated in Mikuš’ work on Europeanisation and civil society in Serbia. 
His work invites us to see all actors involved differently: the state is “Europeanised” as it is 
                                               
78 I was granted explicit permission to use the correspondence.   
79 The ambiguous relationship between the Serbian state and the (mostly) foreign funded civil society is 
examined in Mikuš, ‘Civil Society and EU Integration’; Vetta, ‘NGOs and the State: Clash or Class? 
Circulating Elites of “Good Governance” in Serbia’. 
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restructured along neoliberal lines and projectivized through a novel and intimate 
relationship with civil society. The civil society is politically charged and ambiguously 
connected to the state, and the EU integration process stops being a technical process of 
acquis adoption and is recast as “a political and cultural process of persuasion” that works to 
“build consent for neoliberal globalization and restructuring.”80 
Through an approach that weaves together personal biographies and institutional 
histories, Mikuš highlights the fact that only some—big NGOs who are either elites or a part 
of the middle classes—are engaged in this process of transformation.81 Miloš is obviously not 
among them, yet his experience reveals much about this process—thus pointing to things 
that do not just help make sense of his experience, but things that tell us more about how the 
state, civil society, and EU integration function in contemporary Serbia.82  
To conclude this part of the chapter, it is worth restating that governmentality points 
to the subjects created in the project of agricultural transformations: public servants should 
competitively invest in themselves as human capital as they strive to build better institutions, 
the farmers should learn to respond better to market needs through innovation and 
adaptation to accomplish profits, and civil society should be there to both provide services 
abandoned by the state and to mediate between the state and the citizens. Poljoprivreda needs 
to be governed as a privreda. The subsuming of life under economic market rule is easily 
discernible in this narrative, but, as the previous section showed, even in these explicit 
attempts at forming new subjects, there are a plethora of processes that might remain out of 
sight if we are to focus only on the official discourse. We have seen the brain drain and the 
expected failure of the producers to learn to function with project-life. We also uncovered 
the wider political economy of private consultancies and loans that is supported by the same 
techniques that seek to activate producers. This is what the methodological and analytical 
orientation of the thesis uncovered so far. The next section will show how an entire field of 
government, otherwise unseen, emerged from it.  
                                               
80 Mikuš, ‘Civil Society and EU Integration’, 163–64. 
81 Mikuš, ‘Civil Society and EU Integration’; Mikuš, ‘Public Advocacy in Serbia’; Mikuš, ‘Informal Networks’. 
82 For an ethnographic study of class-based politics in the development of the LEADER program in Croatia—
a framework for local ownership in rural development was being developed in Serbia as well during my stay—
see Lukić and Obad, ‘New Actors in Rural Development - The LEADER Approach and Projectification in 
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III From agriculture to land policy  
As the above section showed, a view of EU accession as intervention points us to the 
giant apparatus of EU negotiations. The importance of EU policy here cannot be overstated: 
it seeks to reform ways and subjects of governing agriculture. So, it is hardly surprising that I 
went to Serbia thinking I will be discussing CAP and IPARD. The ethnographic approach 
to governmentality, however, led me to notice different kinds of subject-making in the field 
of agricultural development. As I started following the discussions in agricultural 
government in Serbia, I was struck by the salience of one topic completely absent from the 
acquis—that of land use.  My conversations with producers and farmers’ associations always 
pointed to land: the producers felt cheated by the changes happening in leasing regulations, 
they were worried that there will not be enough land and that the government is creating 
unfair competition, they protested what they saw as injustice. The media was similarly full 
of discussions about land: how much agricultural land does Serbia actually have, how can 
thousands of hectares “disappear,” who is leasing state-owned agricultural land, who is 
paying for it and who is occupying it illegally; what is going to happen from September 1st 
2017 when foreign citizens will be able to buy agricultural land in Serbia under SAA 
stipulations; who was compensated for the socially owned land that was privatised in the 
1990s and 2000s? These were all questions that were not only urgent, but also contested. 
Importantly, these were issues that did not see many practices of neoliberal governmentality. 
Power did not seem productive and dispersed. Instead, people I spoke to talked about 
authoritarian state power, corruption, and dispossession. Yet, because I was not there to 
validate any account of neoliberal governmentality, but to listen to the concerns of people 
imagined to develop in the process of agricultural transformation, land emerged as an 
important field to make sense of these experiences.  
It does not take an agricultural expert to see that the land ownership system 
underlines all other policies that govern practices on the land itself. However, the effect is 
increased by the fact that, since the de-coupling of the CAP payments in 2003, land, as 
opposed to previously productivity, became the basis for all the CAP expenditure.83 In the 
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EU today, just owning agricultural land literally makes money. And more than half of the 
EU’s budget is allocated to these (land) subsidies.  
In Serbia, the discussion around land often revolves around the problematic size of 
the average parcel. This problematic fragmentation was targeted by a project in which the 
state and local governments cooperated with the EU and the German government. Under 
the title of technical assistance, the projects saw the testing of a new IT system for leasing 
state owned land, pilot projects of land consolidation and returning abandoned land to use, 
and assistance with the development of drafts of by-laws elaborated for the Law on 
Agricultural Land.84 While the project was mentioned to me as one of the biggest successes 
of GIZ, consolidation processes are generally experienced as aiding those already 
successful.85 Besides this project, land is treated as a “national” question and the EU does not 
regulate it beyond including it in the stipulations on the free movement of capital. 
Paradoxically then, the land that is the basis of CAP payments—the ultimate goal of 
agricultural transformation—is seemingly removed form EU policies. Similarly, it was 
removed from my own understanding of changes happening in Serbian agriculture. But as I 
spoke to people whose transformation is imagined in the above narratives, land politics 
emerged as crucial.  
Governing agricultural land refers to different ways that agricultural land is used, 
leased, and sold in markets. Who can own land, how, and why is far from straightforward 
and it is ultimately intertwined with forms of rule on the land itself. In countries emerging 
from communism, the issue of land ownership became crucial for the imagined road to well-
functioning democracy and capitalist markets. In many narratives, it is precisely private 
ownership of land that serves as the “basis for rebuilding the economy by way of free 
interaction between property owners.” The protection of private property then “guarantee[s] 
the autonomy of the individual and the existence of the liberal economy, state of law and civil 
society.”86 Land becomes the basis of peace, democracy, and market economics—it orients 
narratives of transition, and underpins ideas on development.  
As already mentioned, Yugoslavia’s ideological project reflected directly on land 
policy. Its progressive land reforms echoed the more wide-ranging efforts at achieving 
modernity and equality. In Horvat’s account of the Yugoslav economic system, the 1960s 
                                               
84 Interview with an employee in GIZ in charge of the LC project, February 22, 2016. See also Gvozdenović 
and Knezevic, ‘Implementation of Improved LC Model’. 
85 Diković, ‘The Practices of Land Ownership in Vojvodina: The Case of Aradac’. 
86 Siegrist and Müller, ‘Introduction’, 3. 
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are referenced as the time when Yugoslavia had “the most egalitarian distribution of land in 
the world”—a point of international pride. And it is this international positioning that shaped 
Yugoslav land policy, and its current legacy on the fields all around Serbia. By international 
positioning, here I refer both to the split with Stalin, and the integration with the world 
(Western) market. The split with Stalin (along with resistance to efforts of collectivisation) 
enabled Yugoslavia to abandon collectivisation of land as its ultimate goal. In the re-working 
of Yugoslav socialism away from Stalinist ideology, the state was imagined to ultimately 
wither away, and thus could not take ownership of land. As already mentioned, the post-
1953 cooperative ownership was transformed into social ownership through the process of 
podruštvljavanje (socializing property), as the “basis of socialist transformation.” Peasants’ 
private holding were limited, and they expanded by buying land into socially owned 
enterprises. Hence, peasants in Yugoslavia reworked notions of ownership and the amount 
of socially owned land accordingly grew.87 
The importance of this change cannot be overstated: other communist countries with 
histories of forced collectivisation emerged in the 1990s with huge amounts of land in state 
ownership and embarked on a complex process of restitutions.88 Yugoslavia, on the other 
hand, emerged with a smaller percentage of state-owned land, but similarly intricate 
difficulties of determining who exactly owns land that was accumulated as “social” 
ownership. Even though the Constitution from 1996 once again recognized cooperative 
ownership (after merging it with social and state ownership in 1962), the land owned by 
zadrugas was never untangled from the socially owned enterprises that used the cooperative 
land.89 When the 2006 Constitution removed the category of social ownership (turning it into 
private ownership), the land was not returned to cooperatives, but registered as the 
ownership of the state enterprises.90 This set the stage for an incredibly complex, and corrupt, 
process of privatisation. 
                                               
87 Luković, ‘The Country Road to Revolution’. 
88 Dorondel, Disrupted Landscapes; Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare. 
89 Unlike the rest of Eastern Europe, the land/property transformation in Yugoslavia received surprisingly little 
attention. For a short, but rare, engagement with land policy from a perspective of historical anthropology, see 
Diković, ‘The Practices of Land Ownership in Vojvodina: The Case of Aradac’. 
90 The privatisation is usually described as having “low legitimacy,” as in Zivanovic-Miljkovic and Popovic, 
‘Land Use Regulation and Property Rights Regime over Land in Serbia’, 25. For details on the privatisation of 
agricultural enterprises and cooperative land, see the 2012 report by The Anti-Corruption Council, available 
in English. ‘Report on State-Owned and Cooperative Land in the Privatization Process’. Also see the more 
recent publication from the same Council, this time only in Serbian: ‘Приватизација и Располагање 
Пољопривредним Земљиштем [Privatizaton and Disposal of Agricultural Land]’. The added international 
dimension of these privatisations are not only international sales, but also the fact that the Law on Privatisation 
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This assignment of land as state ownership was done to facilitate privatisation. The 
ruined agricultural companies were worthless without the land attached to them.91 A 
document prepared for the FAO in 2006 estimates that around 70% of all state-owned 
enterprises in Serbia at the time were in agricultural production and food processing.92 This 
made the sector crucial for privatisation, but without land, there would be no interested 
buyers. And without the buyers, the privatisations stipulated by aid donors could not go 
forward.  
The complexity of land use in Serbia, however, does not end with land magically 
appearing in state ownership before sales—much of the land that was not sold, continued 
being used by the newly established private companies under the process commonly known 
as uzurpacija (usurpation). The state knew about it, but it also knew that it cannot enforce 
land tenure and drive forward the privatisation process at the same time. In the words of the 
former Minister, the deal in the early 2000s was “you buy this part, and you get that part 
until the state figures out what it’s doing.”93 And it is this privatisation and the problematic 
transfer of ownership that remain highly contested—two major reports were issued by the 
Anti-Corruption Council,94 numerous case-based efforts at disputing leases and sales happen 
all around Vojvodina, and any effort to invest in land is faced with layers of different 
programs of land management. This was the scene I entered when arriving to fieldwork in 
2016. 
i. Contemporary land use  
If you mention agricultural land in Serbia today, most people will directly associate 
it with the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) signed with the EU which 
guarantees EU nationals the right to buy agricultural and forest land in Serbia from 
September 1, 2017. 95 The issue is exaggerated by the fact that all new member states in the 
                                               
was written with the help of the World Bank in 2002. For a succinct and policy-oriented overview of different 
waves of privatisation in Serbia, see Prelec, ‘New Privatisation Wave’. 
91 The demarcation of land was supposed to be done through the Republic Geodetic Authority, but it was 
referred through a personal letter that promised the process to be done through the re-writing of the Law on 
Cooperatives. This did not happen until late 2016 when the FAO helped prepare the new draft of the Law on 
Cooperatives. I thank an anonymous interviewee for frankly describing this complex process.  
92 ‘Country Report: Serbia’. 
93 Interview, October 4, 2016. 
94 ‘Report on State-Owned and Cooperative Land in the Privatization Process’; ‘Приватизација и 
Располагање Пољопривредним Земљиштем [Privatizaton and Disposal of Agricultural Land]’. 
95 SAA—part of the Stabilisation and Association Process and European Neighbourhood Policy. The 
agreement includes specific provisions for future EU membership and details the policy harmonisation 
necessary. It entered into force on September 1st, 2014, after all member states and Serbia finished the 
ratification process.  
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last rounds of EU enlargement managed to include a moratorium on the liberalisation of land 
market, and subsequently prolonged it.96  Serbia, for reasons unknown, did not even try to 
negotiate these terms. People explained it to me in different ways: some believe that the 
negotiating team could not possibly imagine Serbia will still be outside the EU in 2017 and 
hence did not take the date seriously, some blamed it on stupidity, others saw private 
interests from people who knew they would be able to sell land acquired through 
privatisation. No matter what the logic was, the moratorium was not negotiated and the 
requirements for the free movement of capital spelled out in Article 63., point 2, of the SAA, 
thus came into direct confrontation with the Law on Agricultural Land from 2006 which 
prohibits foreign nationals from owning land.97 
Consequently, the discussions and demands for changing the Law were framed 
around this issue: it is impossible to renegotiate the SAA because it would require each EU 
member state to ratify it again in its changed form, so it is national laws that need to change.98 
This was captured by civil society groups who called for the changes in the law, namely, that 
instead of forbidding foreign nationals from owning land which would put it in direct 
confrontation with the SAA, Serbia devises ways of “demotivating” foreign nationals from 
buying land as many European countries do—by setting other restrictions other than the 
nationality of the buyer, for example, the number of years living in the village in which the 
land is, level of education, etc.  
The efforts are best captured in two documents. The first one is a special edition of 
the Student Economic Law Review which was created in cooperation with the then director 
of the Directorate for Agricultural Land and a Professor at the Belgrade Faculty of Law on 
the topic of Regimes of Property Acquisitions on Agricultural Land.99 The document examined 
different country case-studies in search of a model that would allow Serbia to copy best 
practices and avoid the complete liberalisation of the land market in 2017. The main point 
can be summarized as: if Serbian legislature is already a “copy” of EU frameworks, let it 
copy those laws which are useful.  
                                               
96 For details, see Swinnen and Vranken, “Review of the Transitional Restrictions Maintained by New Member 
States on the Acquisition of Agricultural Real Estate.” 
97 ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreement’. 
98 For more information on the Law on Agricutural Law that was active with minor amendments from 2006 to 
2015, see Zivanovic-Miljkovic and Popovic, ‘Land Use Regulation and Property Rights Regime over Land in 
Serbia’. 
99 Jovanić, Režimi sticanja svojine [Regimes of acquiring property]. 
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The second document is the 2014 publication of the above mentioned NCEU. The 
NCEU publication, even though written by one of the loudest critics of state policy which 
disadvantages small producers, is clear in that “the main goal of state institution is devising 
and implementing legal regulation that facilitates the development of free market.”100 
Moreover, it states that the “[p]rocess of EU accession is primarily a process of changing the 
consciousness of citizens who exited one system (socialist and to a certain extent undemocratic) 
and now need to learn the rules of another (capitalist and democratic.)”101 The document 
goes on to debunk the myth that “the EU wants to destroy domestic agriculture”102 and 
effortlessly reconciles the development of small producers, implementation of CAP, 
liberalisation of land and food markets, and rising standards of living through market 
competition.103 These seemingly disparate ideas are merged in a particular vision of 
development through “transition” into “Europeanisation”—a framework that imposes a 
teleological coherence on conflictual policies, and shows faith in the free market beyond 
everything else. It is this powerful erasure of the conflicts innate to this vision of development 
that is the best example of how strong the ideals of Europe work and how they are employed 
in varying purposes. 
ii. Investment as a form of government 
The anticipated changes came in December 2015 with the new Law on Agricultural 
Land, but the alteration that would allow the law to co-exist with the SAA was not made. 
Instead, under the demands for a new Law that would not be in conflict with the SAA, a 
completely new aspect was introduced: the translation of the preference for “investments” 
into the Law by a special directive/bylaw [uredba], signed by Prime Minister Vučić in June 
2016. It stated that each municipality can lease up to 30% of land under its control to an 
“investor” outside the public auctions that usually regulate the lease of state-owned land.104 
The “investor” has to apply with an investment plan, which will be examined by specially 
formed Commission that will also have the power to rank applications in case of multiple 
                                               
100 Strsoglavec and Vukmirović, ‘Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju [Stabilisation and Association Pact]’, 
3. 
101 Strsoglavec and Vukmirović, 3. 
102 Strsoglavec and Vukmirović, 9. Emphasis added. 
103 For a discussion on the mismatch between CAP and the reality of Eastern European agriculture, see Gorton, 
Hubbard, and Hubbard, ‘The Folly of European Union Policy Transfer’; For a general overview of possible 
negative effects of liberalisation implied in Europeanisation, see Knezevic, ‘Free Markets for All’. 
104 ‘Uredba [Bylaw] 56/2016’. 
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applications.105 The Commission is made up from three ministers: Finance, Agriculture and 
Environmental Protection,106 and Economy, and two other members named by the Minister 
of Agriculture and Environmental Protection. The first meeting of the Commission was on 
January 11, 2017, and the first call for investment plans was announced in February 2017.107  
It stipulated the following criteria for investment plans: the investment of minimum 
500,000EUR, the number of jobs created, contribution to increasing competitiveness 
[konkurentnost], contribution to export growth, contribution to local government 
development, and the place of the applicants’ registration (unspecified as to how this will 
influence the evaluations).108 But even with these recent clarifications, the Law was heavily 
criticized for “legalising corruption” by putting power in the hands of a small committee 
without clear guidelines, and thus hiding it behind a non-transparent evaluation process.  
It was this focus on investment that drew most attention to the Law. In addition to 
the legislative changes, another intervention in the market came three years earlier with a 
bilateral agreement with United Arab Emirates (UAE) that allows big investments from 
UAE to bypass public tenders. The first controversy was the UAE investment in land in 
Vojvodina by the Al Rawafed company.109 The Al Rawafed investment included more than 
10,000ha of agricultural land: about 3,500ha was leased for 30 years from a military 
institution VU Morović, and the rest of the land was bought from previously socially owned 
enterprises Bačka, Jadran, Mladi borac, and Agrobačka.110 The deal was heavily contested 
by producers in the area who had leased the land in question before hand—a contentious 
claim that I will discuss later in the chapter. The details of the original deal, as well as its 
progress, were kept secret as issues of “special national importance.” After legally requesting 
the information under the freedom of information right and waiting for over a year, only one 
investigative journalist project obtained the information that the lease has been underpaid—
the state earning six times less than it would if it had continued to lease the land through 
                                               
105 Another relevant change was that small producers (who own less than 30ha of land and have registered 
production for more than three years) have the right to buy up to 20ha state owned land. 
106 Now the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economy. 
107 ‘Komisija Zaseda [Committe in Session]’. 
108 ‘Otvoren Konkurs [Open Call]’. 
109 The cooperation started in 2012. All of the big investments are highly contentious. For an overview, see 
Bartlett et al., ‘The UAE as an Emerging Actor in the Western Balkans’.  
110 Gluščević, ‘Obećali Veće Prinose i Profit, a Upropastili Karađorđevo [They Promised Higher Yields, but 
Ruined Karađorđevo]’. 
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public auctions.111  It was around this time that the term land grabbing entered the discussion 
in Serbian land politics. 
Land grabbing—a term that is used in relation with the global land rush and land 
acquisitions—points to the “current explosion of large scale (trans)national commercial land 
transactions” that started after the 2008 crisis.112 The news of Serbian legislative changes 
arrived after Eastern Europe was recognized as another target of land-grabbing, and specific 
cases from Serbia were included in the report by one of the most prominent NGOs working 
on the issue.113 It is these issues that are discussed in relation to a very different program of 
modernising Serbian agriculture: foreign direct investment. 
iii. Intervention as Foreign Direct Investment  
During my fieldwork, another story of investment emerged. The 2015 Law on 
Agricultural Land was passed amid rumours of Tönnies, a giant German pork producer, 
entering the Serbian market with several farms that would need around 3000ha per farm to 
sustain production.114 This fit in with larger discourses of investitori [investors] around which 
Serbian progress has increasingly been framed. Many of my interlocutors interpreted the 
focus on investment as a departure from a policy that had hitherto (at least superficially) 
tried to encourage mid-size producers to expand—not even the emerging “middle class” of 
producers can produce an investment plan ready for the new Commission. Clearly, this focus 
on investment is crucial for understanding changes in Serbian agriculture, but where does 
this obsession with “investment” come from? And how does it work within the larger 
discourses about improving Serbian agriculture? The next section will highlight how it 
emerges within a broader project of modernisation and marketization as imagined in 
discourses of liberal peace and good governance.  
The Prime Minister is very clear on the tools needed to develop Serbian agriculture: 
Serbia needs foreign direct investment that will bring both capital and superior knowledge 
needed to make Serbia the “granary of Europe” [žitnica Evrope] that it is supposed to be. The 
obsession with foreign direct investment is not limited to agriculture, but within land policy 
it has manifested in two major ways so far—first came the bilateral state agreement with the 
UAE and then came the changes in the 2015 Law on Agricultural Land and the subsequent 
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directive that will enable investors to bypass public auctions of state land.115 As with land 
deals in general, the processes here include more than the transfer of tenure: there are also 
narratives of legitimation, subject making, technology transfer, and industrial development 
policy that shape these developments.116  
As we will discuss below, the narratives of legitimation of foreign direct investment 
in Serbia depend on technological advancement, reforming the workforce stuck with 
socialist habits, good governance, and overall peace and stability. In these narratives, we see 
that there is a very different intervention happening in Serbian agriculture outside the EU 
accession. This intervention profoundly shapes both official politics and experiences of 
agricultural producers in Serbia.  Moreover, even if conducted without specific policies 
implemented by the EU or INGOs, we uncover the life that the narratives of intervention 
take on outside their imagined fields of action: they are alive in the images of changing 
subjects and mentalities, promoting peace and stability, and effecting change through the 
working of the free market.  
a. Narratives of legitimation: problems and solutions of Serbian land use 
In this section, I go directly to public statements to analyse narratives of legitimation 
used for framing foreign direct investment as a practice of government in agriculture. These 
narratives, however, arrived to me not from the media, but from the many people I spoke to 
who critically reflected on them—in explaining their experiences, my interlocutors used 
these public narratives as a defining counter-position.117 Even though they did not frame 
them in these words, their constant reflection on what “they” (the media and the 
government) perceived as lacking and the real situation invited me to dig deeper into these 
framing devices.  
Technological advancement is the most obvious framing of the transformation of 
agriculture. This is how Prime Minister Vučić answered an MP question about the Al 
Rawafed investment in July 2014: 
 
“The Arabs will have four to five times more yields per hectare than we had—four to 
five times larger yields per hectare, believe it or not! I think this says enough, this 
will be a show case, this will be an exemplary good where you can come and see. Tell 
me, is there anyone among you who is not proud of how this looks today, and you 
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will see how it will look in 2018! In one year, we will be able to fly to Chicago and 
New York on our planes... when you look at what we managed to do... yields will be 
increased four to five times!”118 
 
In this statement, the modernity is painted as high yields and connection to the United 
States via flights that refer to another deal with the UAE—the privatisation of the national 
airline sold to Etihad Airways.119 It is in this progression towards modernity that foreign 
investors are needed. But the investment was not framed only as improving agriculture. In 
addition to modernising agriculture and improving governance, the Prime Minister frames 
many of these investments as a more general change in both individuals and in society—a 
true governmental aspiration. For example, after a visit to the headquarters of the German 
pork producer who is about to invest in Serbia, and who is considered by many to be the 
main reason for the changes in the 2015 Law, the Prime Minister spoke about how he expects 
that just the presence of Tönnies in Serbia will “change the culture of doing business.”120 The 
reference to changing culture is similar to the discussions of the Twinning Project in the 
Ministry discussed already. This framing is in line with the usual discourse of the Serbian 
people, or the Balkans in general, not doing enough, not being hard working enough, and 
generally in need of “learning” of how to “really work.” In relation to the Tönnies, the 
Minister explained:  
 
“So, our people have to learn, they have to know how the Germans do it, how they 
do it in the cleanliest possible way, in the best way, and why they are the most 
successful in Europe!”121  
 
The sentiment is captured well in the most recent speech at an opening of another German 
factory: 
 
“We live in a region where it is usually easy to talk, but it’s a lot harder to do 
something. Where words are cheap, and work and acting expensive, where criticism 
abounds, but responsibility is hard to find. Today, I am very happy that I can say that 
fulfilling promises and taking action and accepting responsibility definitely win, and, 
                                               
118 This quote is from Prime Minister Vučić in a Parliamentary debate on the topic of UAE investments in 
Serbia. For a full transcript of his responses, see ‘Dokumenti Poslaničkih Pitanja u Julu [Documents of MPs’ 
Questions in July]’. 
119 See Bartlett et al., ‘The UAE as an Emerging Actor in the Western Balkans’. 
120 ‘Vučić u Nemačkoj Sa Vlasnikom „Tenisa” [Vučić in Germany with Tönnies Owner]’. 
121 Vučić: Tenis Želi Da Ulaže u Srbiji [Vučić: Tönnies Wants to Invest in Serbia]. 
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in Serbia, they will have to keep on winning against laziness, shallowness, and, I 
would say, uncivility [neučtivosti].”122  
 
So the cooperation between the government and the foreign investors, or “our dear 
friends” in the Prime Minister’s terminology, will bring about the behavioural change that is 
needed in the workforce: they will be more hard-working and more civil. It is the cooperation 
between the hard-working German investors and the brave decision of the current 
government that mean taking action and accepting responsibility—only such approach can deal 
with the Serbian laziness, shallowness, and uncivility.  
The same speech takes it even further. The tone changed from deprecating the 
Serbian workforce by contrasting it to everything it will learn from its “German friends,” to 
one speaking to the investors themselves and celebrating the workers’ ability as the main 
“engine pulling Serbia along the road of progress.” Here, the Prime Minister employs 
concepts of peace and stability, thus drawing upon the narratives of risk but localizing them 
to utilize the ready-made image of the violent and war-prone Balkan subject: 
 
“It is important that we preserve stability. And the choice between stability and 
instability is made every day. We live in a region where if you look away for just a 
moment, the whole train can slip from the tracks. Every action is sensitive, every 
decision has long term consequences. This is why I want to say that stability is 
something that we need to work on together. So I ask you, the workers, and everyone 
else, to help us do so. Arrogance doesn’t lead anywhere.”123  
 
The speech also includes an invitation to “his dear friends in Germany” to invite more 
of their own friends from Germany to invest in Serbia:  
 
“I invite them to come and see how hard working the Serbian people are and how 
well we can work. That we always have a clear message that we want peace, that we 
want stability, that we want to work, and that we want more investments. As the 
President of the Government, I guarantee that nowhere, in none of the surrounding 
countries, can you get the conditions that you get in Serbia.”124 
 
More than a very literal illustration of the developmental race to the bottom, this 
speech illustrates that foreign direct investment is not legitimized only through quantitative 
economic calculations, but relies on the link between forms of government and the subjects 
                                               
122 Vučić: Novi Pogoni i Više Rada [Vučić: New Factories and More Work]. 
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produced by them. It employs a governmental reason when it creates the link between 
personal self-improvement, neoliberalisation of working conditions, and national progress. 
But while it engages the governmental narrative of the “well-being of population,” the people 
whose transformation is imagined—the workers—are not imagined to be empowered by 
market rationalities but contained in menial underpaid jobs. This presents a puzzle both for 
discussions on what kind of government is promoted by liberal interventions, but also for 
governmentality as a framework focusing on productive power. But before further exploring 
these tensions in the next chapter, I want to focus on a particular form of subjectivity that 
initially brought land to my attention: the people resisting changes in agricultural land use. 
IV What makes resistance? 
FDI in agriculture is always discussed in relation with the contested land needed as 
a basis for these projects. Land emerged in the narratives of people experiencing the 
changing agricultural governance as a field of contestation—a field in which how and how 
much to govern was debated, refuted, and even violently asserted. Here, like in Chapter 4, I 
use resistance not as an expression of local authenticity nor as a something exterior to power. 
I see it as crucial for understanding forms of rule in general. In following these debates on 
land politics, my attention moved away from the technical assistance and capacity building 
in Belgrade and was drawn to protests and debates around land policy changes.  
The resistance mounted against the changing landscape of land policy in Serbia was 
loud and varied. I have heuristically divided it into four different logics of resistance. The 
first was made up of producers and policy makers who identified themselves as believing in 
the free market and their abilities to successfully compete in it. They saw the changes in the 
Law, the bilateral agreement with the UAE, and the investments that were done through 
them as distorting the free market and thus precluding their fair participation in it. The 
second group is the broadly defined radical right who argue that the government is ceding 
sovereignty by not retaining land ownership within national citizenship boundaries. They 
are present in the media, but also in the Parliament in parties like Dveri. The third group are 
the owners of previous social and state cooperatives [zadruge] who argue that the sale of land 
is illegal because it violates their rights to private property. In a nutshell, they argue against the 
way that land was distributed in the transition period when socially owned land was put in 
state ownership and then privatised. They contend that social ownership implied their 
private ownership as well and thus privatisation was actually stealing their property. Lastly, 
there is a small dispersed group of those invoking the ideals of food sovereignty.  
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What makes these stories of resistance interesting is their incompatibility with easy 
narratives of what is local and global. Food sovereignty is a unique concept briefly defined 
as “a collective right of peoples to produce their own food in their own territory.”125 It is 
interesting not only because its holistic vision of food production stands in stark contrast 
with the contemporary globalised industrial food system, but also because it was developed 
across scales and has local goals with inevitably global visions.126 The insistence of the 
cooperative associations on their rights as holders of private property sits uneasily with the 
stories of romantic local Yugoslav social ownership against capitalist expansion and private 
ownership.127 The radical right groups here employ much of the anti-imperialist rhetoric 
employed by the global left, and the belief in the free market makes it difficult to celebrate 
this resistance as a local counter-narrative to global capitalist order. Here, I will use the 
example of the resistance gathered around the idea of the free market to better illustrate some 
of these issues.  
i. Resisting FDI in offices 
The individuals who designed the 2006 Law now work in a consultant firm based in 
Belgrade and service clients all over the world. When I met them, they were finishing an 
analysis for a company considering investment in Mozambique, and they were getting ready 
to travel to Georgia as a part of an expert team providing the same assistance along the path 
of “transition” that Serbia received before getting EU candidate country status. At the end 
of my meeting with Mladen who designed the 2006 law around his “faith in the free market,” 
I was completely taken aback by his advice on the direction my study should take. Once I 
had made it clear that I plan on researching the current transformations in land ownership, 
he brought up land grabbing (used in English) as a concept I should utilize. I was surprised—
a minute ago he was recommending me to read The Great Rebirth: Lessons from the Victory of 
Capitalism over Communism. The book was just translated by the Belgrade Libertarian Club 
and argues that the most successful transitions were led by “bold” privatisations and 
deregulation—precisely the things that the literature and social movements blame for 
causing the land rush in the first place.128  
                                               
125 Dunford, ‘Peasant Activism and the Rise of Food Sovereignty’, 1. 
126 For more on these dynamics, see Dunford, The Politics of Transnational Peasant Struggle. 
127 Interestingly, these associations were not the subject of any of the vast civil society building in the country 
despite their size and relevance for rural areas. For example, the Association of Small Shareholders of 
Vojvodina [Udruženje malih akcionara Vojvodine] represents about 50,000 people who used to have shares in big 
state enterprises which were then automatically sold by the state in the process privatisation 
128 Åslund and Djankov, The Great Rebirth. 
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I was admittedly confused: Mladen definitely did not belong to the transnational left 
like the organisations who published the biggest reports on land grabbing, nor did he 
champion the smallholders as the usual stories of resistance to land grabbing do.129 He 
focused on a quite different aspect of the land grab: its distortion of the free land market that 
he designed to help Serbian mid-size producers. Here, we see the very diverse use of the free 
market. Critics of land grabbing accuse the free market or commodifying land (both in the 
market, but also more literally by creating cadastres, registering tenure, and delineating 
parcels) and thus setting the stage for the contemporary land rush. Mladen and his 
colleagues, on the other hand, see the land grabs practices as a distortion of the free market 
and see a well-functioning market as protection against land grabbing.  
Beyond the seeming ideological contradictions, Mladen started telling me about his 
own work as a consultant. The analysis for the investment client in Mozambique he had just 
finished was more comprehensive and cheaper than anything available internationally. It 
was clearly a great source of pride, but it also struck me as idiosyncratic—these analyses are 
used to identify the so called “yield gaps,” the difference between the potential production of 
land and its current use. These “yield gaps” effectively create the object of investment as 
development: once an area is identified as under-utilized, investors move in to buy land and 
exploit its full potential. Like in Serbia, investments are then legitimized by a narrative which 
paints a picture of “backwardness” to be redeemed by (foreign) capital. So, while 
condemning the changes in Serbian land policy as land grabbing, Mladen was proud of his 
part in facilitating another, probably much bigger, land grab in Mozambique. I left the long 
day with Mladen with his sentence echoing in my ears: “There is no more ideology here, you 
understand that?” 
ii. Resisting FDI in the fields 
I want to retell a story of one “good” mid-size farmer who led the resistance to the Al 
Rawafed acquisition to highlight the crucial question of who has the power to resist, and 
what voices we are resurrecting when we seek to engage local subjectivities. Milenko leased 
the land that Al Rawafed is leasing now under the bilateral agreement with the UAE, and 
his family is rich enough to have tried to buy the 2000ha that have been sold to Al Rawafed.  
Milenko is well connected with the State Government in Belgrade and the Provincial 
Government in Novi Sad, so he received a map with the location of all land parcels that were 
designated for the investment even before the news was public. He mobilized 84 people who 
                                               
129 For this interpretation, see the report on Serbia in the big TNI report Srećković, ‘The Case of Serbia’. 
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were currently leasing that land. From speaking to other people involved in smaller and less 
publicized instances of resistance to investments I realise this was a usual practice: those who 
have the most to lose, the big producers, invite (or order) smaller producers to join the 
protest and thus give it legitimacy. They met and signed a contract of “collective 
responsibility” that was supposed to protect them from individual persecution. However, the 
State Information Agency (BIA—Bezbedonosno-informativna agencija) began inviting people for 
interviews, and people slowly removed themselves from the collective. 40 people remained, 
and they were “handled” by the local police for “working against the interests of the state.” 
This was much easier for Milenko because his social capital in the area made local police a 
lot more “manageable” and they continued to protest. However, Al Rawafed representatives 
soon offered these people to work the land for them, since they had delays in getting 
machinery into Serbia. Milenko was furious—he told everyone that they are crazy for 
accepting the deal—the deal would help them go through a year, but what about the future 
without any land to lease? 
After the deal, only 10 people remained in the group. And with the support dwindling 
and the pressures from BIA persisting, Milenko himself accepted the deal and started 
working for Al Rawafed. However, he still retells the story as one of insult, rather than an 
opportunity: in a mix of anger and pride, he told me that even though he now works only 
700ha of wheat for Al Rawafed, that year he finished all 8500ha in only 54 days—not even 
the most advanced farmers in Europe could do it that quickly! Milenko knows that his 
accepting the deal angered and surprised people, but his own explanation was different: “I 
was not fighting with the Arabs, I blame and I was hurt by my state!” By conceding to the 
investment, Milenko was made to construct another narrative that would maintain his view 
of himself, to preserve the coherence of him protesting Al Rawafed and then working for 
them. He echoed the resentment throughout the conversation:  
 
“The chief agronomist comes to me to talk about growing—he is from Israel and does 
not know everything about the climate here. How is it possible then that they ‘had to 
come’ because we were not capable of working the land? We were very much 
capable, just let us do it!” 
 
Milenko seems to be happy with the cooperation since he is still working on a part of 
their land. But the conversation I had with him, or the fact that he agreed to meet and narrate 
the story in great detail, shows that he still held resentment he wanted to share. Throughout 
the interview, he threw numbers at me that proved that the promise of a “fivefold increase 
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in yields”130 did not happen. The project was legitimized by a reference to the backwardness 
of Serbian agriculture, and Milenko worked hard to prove to the world, myself included, 
that such a view is unjustified. Farmers like him are not backward—they can compete, they 
can use the same agro-industrial techniques, but they need to be recognized by the state as 
being able to do so.  
The fact that Milenko blamed the state specifically, rather than Al Rawafed, I think 
is more than just a tool needed for him to reconcile his actions. It shows an expectation of 
the state, a reliance on the state even in the narratives of free market.131 Milenko was 
concerned with proving himself as a subject capable of functioning in the free market. He 
was clearly concerned with placing himself on the right side of the civilisational dualism that 
posits the ability to compete in the free (global) market as a characteristic of modernity, but 
it is his own state that had refused him the recognition. Most importantly, in a narrative in 
which he posits his ability to work as hard and as good as those foreign and modern as a 
defence against land acquisitions, Milenko is also simultaneously rendering those who are 
not able to have the newest technology and corresponding yields as open targets for those same 
land acquisitions. Thus, the image of backwardness does not serve to only justify 
intervention, but also to naturalise both old and new inequalities. 
Milenko also had a specific vision of development that Al Rawafed did not fit within. 
He told me a story of the village “coming back to life” in the last decade as producers were 
able to expand. And he emphasised that his own success is nothing without the success of 
the village—he might be able to afford football lessons for his son, but what if his son has to 
travel to Novi Sad or Belgrade to play because he has no playmates left in the village? Such 
holistic vision of local and community development was a powerful image, but it was soon 
dispelled. At the end of the conversation, I asked Milenko how much money he lost with Al 
Rawafed coming to his village. We had spent the last two hours talking about the deal and 
he was visibly upset so I automatically assumed a large sum. He looked at me reluctantly: 
                                               
130 This refers to promises of yield increases made by Prime Minister Vučić in a Parliamentary debate on the 
topic of UAE investments in Serbia. For a full transcript of his responses, see ‘Dokumenti Poslaničkih Pitanja 
u Julu [Documents of MPs’ Questions in July]’. 
131 A further discussion on various invocations of the state remains outside of the scope of the thesis, but it is 
worth mentioning that while politics in general and the state are used as insults, there is also a wide-spread 
expectation of the state as the provider of basic protections. In many discussions, this expectation is interpreted 
as “socialist mentality,” but I agree with authors like Rajković in that it presents a much more interesting 
process of re-conceptualising the state in line with global capitalism. For more on this relation to the state, see 
Rajković, ‘Concern for the State’; Mikuš and Dokić, ‘Nobody’s Stronger Than the State’. 
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“To be honest, I didn’t lose much, I just squeezed out the really small ones [producers who 
lease smaller plots in state ownership].”  
Instead of seeing incoherence in Milenko’s view of development, I think the story 
points to the silences in the teleological narratives of agriculture we are offered: if we are 
determined to develop a “middle class” of producers, where do the smaller ones go?132 Here, 
we once again see the division between the “small” and the “big”—just like in the previous 
part of the chapter that discussed EU and FAO projects. It is this division within targets of 
interventions that forms the basis of Milenko’s story and that is uncovered with the 
methodology practiced in this thesis. But before expanding on this, it is worth highlighting 
another dividing line that was used to make sense of land politics in Serbia.  
iii. Resisting FDI in party politics 
While I might have been surprised by talking to farmers and encountering their 
instrumentalisation of the free market narrative, I was less surprised to hear it in “Dosta je 
bilo [DJB—It’s enough!]: a technocratic, urban libertarian party that entered the 
Parliament in 2016. DJB loudly opposed the new Law on Agricultural Land since its 
beginning, and openly described it as “encouraging land grabbing” as early as September 
2015.133 Hoping to find out more, I arranged a meeting with Sanja, who was in the Vojvodina 
Assembly and who has written extensively on issues of land and agriculture on the DJB 
website. 
When Sanja was introducing me to the concept of land grabbing, she emphasised that 
this concept is not usually used in this region, it is reserved for “black countries” [crnačke 
zemlje]. She was referring to a racial description of African countries in which the biggest 
land grabs happen, and Serbia is “definitely not one of them.” Such a common-sense reliance 
on a racial binary as an explanation shocked me, but its implications are more reaching than 
everyday racism.  It showcases the disparities between geographies in which Serbia is located 
in Europe, and development indicators which put it firmly on the wanting side of foreign 
direct investment. Sanja is strongly attached to the dream of development, to the dream of 
belonging—preserving that attachment when faced with exclusion from the EU and 
                                               
132 My project remains silent about the everyday effects of these policies on small-scale and (semi-)subsistence 
farmers. While I heard rumours of raising lease prices, the focus of my fieldwork on articulated resistance led 
to silencing those without the power to speak up. A more traditional ethnography, as opposed to the multi-sited 
political ethnography pursued here, might correct this omission.  
133 Kozić, ‘Отимање Земље и Како Се Одбранити [Land Grabbing and Ways of Defending]’. 
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processes that are more similar to the Global South than North requires a complex process 
of negotiating one’s own subjectivity.   
And while Sanja’s racial depiction of this division line was startling, throughout my 
fieldwork I was faced with similar cartographies. In lectures, presenters would demonstrate 
the severity of indicators by stating that they resemble Senegal or Mozambique as countries 
that Serbia should not be associated with. When explaining the migrant crisis that was raging 
along the Balkan route during my stay in Belgrade, people drew distinct lines between “us” 
as white and still Christian refugees, and “them” as non-white, Islam subjects. In a way, the 
Balkan subject is at the same time considered as a part of Europe—i.e. not a part of the 
black/underdeveloped/non-Christian outside, and as needing help, knowledge, and guidance 
to become or return to this fully European status. Just as Milenko differentiated between 
him who deserves land, from those smaller ones who are permitted to be squeezed out of the 
land market, here we see how dividing lines naturalise the inequalities inevitable in processes 
of transformation. Importantly, this image was not presented to me by stereotyping 
foreigners nor just by self-exoticizing locals—it was everywhere and it underlined policies, 
behaviours, and wildly varying narratives. In short, while I sought to engage with local 
subjects on their experiences of intervention, I was faced with a much more complicated idea 
of the local subject that cannot be fully appreciated without considering its place in the global 
imaginary. 
V Engaging experience, complicating subjects 
A complicated negotiation of subjectivity happens when individuals are tasked with 
living the everyday of global (and European) inequality: how does Mladen remain so 
emotionally attached to land in Vojvodina while at the same time facilitating a (probably 
much bigger) land grab in Mozambique? How does Milenko expect his village to develop 
when he compensates for the land lost to Al Rawafed by taking land from smaller producers? 
How does Sanja preserve the distinction between “us” in Europe and “them” in the Global 
South even though Serbia is having to learn from the land grabbing experiences of the Global 
South, and is continually excluded from “Europe proper”? I am reluctant to call their 
positions incoherent—incoherence implies irrelevance. And it is often by innocent casting as 
irrelevance, rather than malicious silencing, that subjectivities and experiences disappear 
from accounts of interventions. I think they point to larger questions of the groundwork 
necessary to wed individual subjectivities to global dreams of empowerment and 
modernisation.  
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This negotiation happens firmly within the global geopolitical hierarchy of 
North/South and East/West: this is why Milenko uses the free market to defend his right to 
land—it is not the division line that is wrong, but his positioning on the wrong side of it. This 
is why Mladen can continue his consultancy while opposing the local land grabs—because 
he does not mind the idea that some land is underused and therefore those living there do 
not have the right to claim it, but he is worried about being put on the wrong side of that 
divide. And indeed, within governmentality studies that discuss how freer, more consuming, 
and more enterprising we are led to become one question that remains unexplored is why 
are we not all already the same? This lack of attention to the side that is not being empowered 
is not just an empirical blind eye—it prompts more fundamental questions about experiences 
made in the interstices of the local and the global.  
While people like Sanja, Mladen, and Milenko loudly positioned Serbia on the 
winning side of this global division line, these narratives also mix with yearnings for progress 
that imagine the transformation of local subjects in line with modern ideals. In the cases 
explored earlier in the chapter, as well as Vučić narratives in the previous section, the faulty 
Balkans subjects are imagined as improvable—they need to “learn” to be modern. In the 
narrative of FDI, the learning is done by participating in neoliberalised labour and land 
markets—in a way, the labour relation itself becomes a practice of subject reshaping and 
people are expected to enthusiastically embrace low wages and deteriorating working 
conditions as self-improvement. This is a narrative of etho-politics that shifts the 
responsibility for failed transition to the workers themselves.134 However, to make sense of 
this, we ought to further highlight its very clear civilisational goal. As Ivan Rajković reminds 
us, while ideas of Protestant work ethic are by now usually understood as Eurocentric and 
problematic, they still serve as powerful tools.135  
This productive power of the techniques governing personal work have already been 
examined in studies of post-socialism. In studying transition on the factory floor in Poland, 
Elizabeth Dunn detailed how “technical practices like auditing, accounting, quality control, 
and niche marketing” go far beyond just facilitating production and trade: 
 
“they carry along new models of social relations and encapsulate notions of what it 
means to be a person, installing them in a post-socialist environment is also, at root, 
                                               
134 For these arguments, see Rajković, ‘Commodification from Below’; Apostolov, ‘Etho-Politics in Serbia’. 
135 Rajković, ‘Commodification from Below’. 
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an attempt to make fundamental changes in the cultural notions that underpin 
economy and society.”136  
 
In this way, Dunn’s thesis is a summation of governmentality studies and an 
explanation of their specific power in post-socialist spaces. Through specific techniques in 
the work place, the actual workers are being transformed. Vučić’s hopes of learning to do 
business differently follow the same logic.  
Even though Dunn’s interpretation is useful for explaining the connection imagined 
between foreign direct investment and the changes in subjectivities that it is supposed to 
bring, it must be noted that the freedom on the factory floor is a very different freedom than 
that of a successful farmer. In discussing factory workers, Dunn adds an important emphasis 
on the fact that “free” choices are often made in situations where the only alternative is 
economic disaster—and it is the image of disaster that was retold to me far more times than 
the image of prospering entrepreneurial farmers.137  In official narratives, the disaster is 
hidden in terms like “natural death,” “consolidation,” “cleansing statistics.” It is hidden in the 
death, in those who disappear in consolidation, and those who are cleansed to make room 
for statistics closer to EU averages. And for many small producers, it is barely avoided by 
being employed by a German pork producer or as a labourer on land which they previously 
leased themselves. As with EU projects that seek to activate specific subjects while relegating 
others to financial ruin, so do narratives of FDI demonstrate the way that progress as a 
rationality of government depends on demarcating those who will be empowered and taught 
to use market rationality to demand more, and those who will be silenced and instructed to 
use market rationality to make peace with wages that are far from able to provide for a family.  
One of the strengths of studying agriculture is that its materiality serves well to 
challenge such veneers. This struck me most as I was driving and conducting an unexpected 
interview with a semi-subsistence producer who needed a ride from a factory where he was 
employed on minimum wage, to his home where he was about to continue working on his 
land.138 We were driving through tiny Vojvodina villages—famous for their “along the road” 
long design and characteristic houses. As he tried to explain to me what he perceived as 
changes in Serbian agriculture, he invited me to imagine just one big field that stretches 
across Vojvodina and is worked by high-tech machines connected to the Internet and fed 
                                               
136 Dunn, Privatizing Poland, 163. 
137 Dunn, 167. 
138 Fieldwork journal, October 17, 2016. 
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data by drones. As I just emerged from studying the land consolidation efforts, the diagnosis 
of backwardness in relation to small parcels, and the prophetic documents promising high-
tech development, I laughed instinctively at the image that I thought would satisfy those 
policy makers. Yet my passenger remained unsmiling—the big field means no small villages, 
and the high-tech machinery means no people. It is this image that captures the things hidden 
by the euphemism “cleansing of statistics” and it is this image that sits uneasily with studying 
power as always productive, enhancing, and concerned with well-being.  
Conclusions  
The Chapter explored experiences of those targeted by different interventions that 
seek to modernise Serbian agriculture. The first part of the chapter provided a short 
historical overview that showed how the government of agriculture reflected the ongoing 
political, ideological, social, and economic projects. It was presented as both a goal of these 
projects—as is the case with solving the problem of “agricultural overpopulation” that was a 
mark of underdevelopment, and as a tool of these projects—as is the case with setting up 
cooperatives in the villages that were supposed to transform peasants themselves.  
This section showed the potentials of taking agriculture as a field in which to examine 
both rationalities and experiences of government. Moreover, it brought to the fore the fact 
that agricultural government was always made in the intersection of the local and the 
international—the positioning of Yugoslav policies between market ideas, Soviet influence, 
and yearnings for development illustrate this well. As the next Chapter will show, it is this 
layering that we need to appreciate better if we are to discuss how local experiences are made 
by different projects that seek to build development and progress.  
The next section took on this experiential approach and focused on subjectivities of 
agricultural government in Serbia in two ways: how these subjectivities are imagined in 
practices of government, and the effects as experienced by these subjectivities. First, it 
presented EU accession as a practice of intervention that seeks to transform peasants, public 
sector employees, and the civil society. In doing so, it did not only point to the rationalities 
of these techniques, but also to their effects that far surpass their intended fields of action. 
Second, following the experiences of people targeted by these EU policies, the chapter 
turned to another field that makes the lived reality of agricultural government in Serbia and 
is crucial for the programme of transforming agriculture, but is removed from EU’s acquis. 
By investigating the field of land management, how it is imagined, what subjects populate it, 
and the experiences of those contesting the changes, this last section showed the radical 
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openings that are brought about by a methodological and analytical focus on subjectivities 
of the targets. 
The chapter makes three observations, but instead of treating them as closure, they 
lead to question that will be explored in the following chapter. First of all, the ethnographic 
inquiry into experiences of EU intervention showed that practices that are supposed to target 
subjects—whether they are civil servants, producers, or civil society—have a much wider 
effect than assumed in the success/failure view of intervention. Training in the public sector 
fails because people quit, but this helps create the much broader field of consultancies and 
INGOs that employ them. Targeting civil society additionally helps this peculiar political 
economy: projects are well funded and the relationship between the state and civil society is 
formalised. Thus, the everyday experience of intervention as EU accession in agriculture 
points to the myriad of ways in which intervention does not only target subjects but creates 
a much wider field of political economy of projects and civil society, and in turn re-
conceptualises both the state and the civil society. Even though these issues that point to 
wider structural changes are usually not a concern of governmentality studies, this chapter 
showed that without them we cannot understand experience and its connection to forms of 
rule.  
Secondly, when thinking about targeting producers—whether by EU projects or 
investment laws—I was continuously faced with firmly drawn division lines. The narratives 
of empowerment, activation, and entrepreneurship are present and strong, but they move 
along with narratives of death, disappearance, and silence. In the specific investment 
narrative above, as well as in the agricultural governance in general, the governmental ideals 
are obvious. Progress is imagined as a difficult-to-achieve state of hard-working farmers 
swiftly and efficiently responding to the world food market to bring Serbia, and its people, 
progress on par with life in the West. Yet the practices prescribed are very different: besides 
the entrepreneurial workshops, NGO trainings, and small-scale development projects, we 
see this same narrative used to justify a vision of progress through foreign direct investment, 
in which subjects are not supposed to “think outside of the box” or “become leaders.” On the 
contrary, they have to accept their reality of working for less than 200 euros a month as the 
most economically rational decision available.  Focusing on government through freedom 
and power as always “productive” limits the way we can understand these very different 
realities of the same project. There are obviously those whose land is taken away and are 
silenced, and those who are expected to disappear. Thinking them together will animate the 
discussion in the next Chapter.  
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Third, in following the experiences that were presented to me in fieldwork, I was led 
to a policy field that was initially imagined as separated from narratives of intervention. Land 
policy is seemingly outside the EU’s influence and my own decision to follow it was 
underpinned by an uneasiness about the strained connection between land policy and the 
conceptual limitations of international intervention. As I heard so many times, the EU does not 
interfere in land policy. Yet, the more I inquired in it, the more I saw it as another field 
targeted for transformation: the ideals of CAP fitted agricultural production are not 
accomplished only through EU’s practices and legislation, but they are employed by the 
Serbian state and global elites to narrate a road to progress through land investment. Here 
we observe a form of government created in the encounter between projects that seamlessly 
weave local and international dynamics. The discourses of good governance, transparency, 
peace and stability, are plucked from global narratives and actively put to work in very 
specific contexts. But the images of underdeveloped peasants, backward technologies, and 
the need for a subjective transformation are as local as they are international. 
More generally, the chapter destabilised the categories which orient research on 
interventions. In search of “grassroots,” we are faced with a much more complicated class 
stratification of Serbian producers. In search of local, we are faced with claims to a universal 
liberal idea of private property that comes out of specific local history. While expecting a 
“global” land rush, we are faced with the state assuming the key role for enabling FDIs. And 
in efforts to learn from the analysis of targets of intervention, we are faced with “casual” 
racism that draws the lines between those worth keeping their land, and those not developed 
enough to earn this. In short, the frames and programs used in the government of both 
agriculture and land in Serbia show that governmental ideals are very much alive around the 
world, but they are often employed internally—within Serbia and within specific 
communities—to a point of destabilising the usual dichotomy of interveners and those 
intervened upon. With lines between freedom and constraint blurred, it becomes difficult to 
differentiate between intervention and government as usual. And it is precisely these tensions 
that will be the topic of the next chapter.  
 
  
 
 
Part III 
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Chapter 6 
 Dislocating Interventions  
 
Part I of the thesis set out the problem and presented an ethnographic understanding 
of governmentality as an appropriate tool for exploring experiences of those targeted by 
interventions. Part II put those lessons into empirical practice by exploring how youth 
experience non-formal youth education, how narratives of modernisation unfold in 
agricultural governance, and how different subjects conceptualise their political actions 
alongside these narratives. In doing so, the thesis uncovered a series of disruptions—“gap[s] 
between the chaotic ‘common sense’ of lived realities and the schemes [the ethnographer] 
must apply in seeking to make sense of them.”1 My expectations formed in conversation with 
literature on governmentality and intervention were disrupted by lived experienced that 
could not be contained in their categories. This chapter uses these disruptions to draw out 
insights on interventions, forms of rule, and our ways of studying them.  
The chapter proceeds in three parts. The first part highlights the disruptions that 
emerged from Part II. It will first emphasise how representations matter by putting 
observations from Part II in conversation with literature on coloniality of power and colonial 
difference. It will build onto this conversation by complicating the constitutive concepts used 
in the thesis. Instead of one homo oeconomicus found in governmentality studies, it will uncover 
a multiplicity of subject positions created though defining and naturalising difference. 
Instead of liberal power that is nurturing and productive, it will bring into view forms of 
power that govern through more than freedom.  And finally, it will emphasise the dangers of 
working within the fields of visibility prescribed by interventions themselves.  
The second part of the chapter will draw out some analytical and methodological 
issues from these observations. It will address two specific debates: the tension between 
critiques that start from experiences and those that start from structure; and the 
understanding of liberalism as something present in some spaces, and simply absent from 
others. Through a conversation on scale, this part of the chapter will show how we can think 
beyond this conundrum of experience/structure. Moreover, it will show how this new view 
of scale can help us rethink the dichotomy of liberal/illiberal intervention and power.  
                                               
1 Li, Land’s End, 5. 
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The last part of the chapter will conclude by arguing that to engage subjectivities 
targeted by interventions and learn from them, we have to dislocate the concept of 
intervention itself. I will argue that we have to focus on connections beyond the intervention 
itself and study instead politics of improvement. Approaching projects of improvement through 
a focus on effects, programs, and practices as encountered by my interlocutors, moves 
beyond intervention in two ways: it locates subjects beyond the local/international binary; and 
it studies the coevalness of spaces and processes.  
I Disruptions: Beyond governmentality and intervention 
The narrative of creating subjects through micro-practices of projects that nurture 
freedom uncovered how governmental ideals of entrepreneurialism, freedom, individualism, 
and competition guide interventions in Serbia. However, the ethnographic approach 
advocated in Chapter 2 also led to disruptions—things that cannot be subsumed to a story 
about practices that govern self-conduct. Highlighting these observations in this section has 
two purposes. First, it showcases the potential of the methodology presented in Chapter 2. 
And second, it suggests that concepts such as governmentality can be useful even when they 
lead to observations that are not easily subsumed by them. Namely, governmentality as a 
narration of programs, effects, and practices of government uncovers much more than the 
homogenous homo oeconomicus produced by neoliberalism. In this case, it uncovered 
rationalities beyond neoliberalism, subjects that do not fit the homo oeconomicus label, and 
fields of visibility wider than those presented in project documents.  
i. Representations that matter—the rule of difference in the Balkans 
It has become common sense to say that interventions create their subjects as they 
describe them.2 A defining feature of this encounter is the asymmetry of power between the 
tutor and the tutee.3 In projects of government, these images are the defining part of their 
programs, yet governmentality has been extensively critiqued for not being able to take into 
consideration this quintessential asymmetry.4 If we are to focus on subjectivities by using 
governmentality as I have, it is crucial to put governmentality studies in conversation with 
                                               
2 Doty, Imperial Encounters; Mitchell, Rule of Experts; Escobar, Encountering Development. This was discussed in 
Chapter 1.  
3 For a genealogical study of this relationship in international politics and the field of intervention, see the 
unpublished PhD thesis by Motomichi Igarashi, ‘Genealogical Analysis of the Dispositive of 
Humanitarianism/Trusteeship’. 
4 In terms of international politics, this usually refers to the difference of (neo)liberal government supposedly 
developing endogenously in “developed” countries and being imposed on the rest. Sabaratnam refers to this as 
“exteriority of power” in the Global South. Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism’, 266. 
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bodies of literature more equipped to deal with theorisations and explorations of hierarchy. 
Without it, we cannot locate the subjects of interventions in their situated positions. 
Building onto Sabaratnam’s interpretation of intervention as animated by the 
coloniality of power and colonial difference, this section will argue that these concepts are 
useful tools for studying programs, practices, and effects of power. Drawing on Robbie 
Shilliam, she defines coloniality of power as the “hierarchical, structured bifurcation of 
Western and non-Western subjects central to modernity.”5 And while the Balkans and the 
people I worked with in my fieldwork are not subjects of colonial power, this work on 
coloniality of power as the enunciation of difference and the normalisation of different subject-
power relations is crucial for understanding how experiences are made. 
In scholarship on the Balkans, this difference has been articulated in multiple ways. 
Attila Melegh calls it the East-West slope—a civilisational slope of according value based on 
the perceived closeness to a liberal utopia imagined to be Western Europe.6 József Böröcz 
invites us to consider the “moral geopolitics” that structure the spaces within Europe. This 
rule of European difference ties European goodness “to specific location in the north and the 
west of the continent,” while the east and the south perform a function similar to the ones of 
colonial difference. This normalises a way of thinking that sees the East of the continent 
“catching up” with the goodness of its Western counterpart only if the Western counterpart 
extends its geopolitical influence over it.7 Manuela Boatcã similarly considers Eastern 
Europe as a space that never experienced formal colonisation but has and continues to be 
profoundly shaped by unequal and exploitative relationships with geopolitical power 
centres. She invites us to consider the work of imperial difference— “the less overtly racial, 
more pronounced ethnic, and distinct class hierarchies” which account for the relations 
between European Empires and their former subjects. Boatcã thus places the Balkans in 
epigonal Europe that is in a semi-peripheral position to Europe proper. 8  
No matter how it is termed, this articulation of difference is crucial for 
governmentalisation: without an acceptance of its hierarchies as common-sense, attachment 
to such projects would be impossible. The hierarchy, however, is rarely explicitly discussed 
                                               
5 Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention, 137; Shilliam, ‘What the Haitian Revolution Might Tell Us’. 
6 Melegh, On the East-West Slope. 
7 Böröcz, ‘Goodness Is Elsewhere’, 130–31. 
8 Boatcã, ‘The Quasi-Europes’, 134. Outside of post-colonial and decolonial thought, this tutelage that does not 
depend on coercion, but subject formation, has been described as a “leveraged pedagogy.” Kulpa, ‘Western 
Leveraged Pedagogy of Central and Eastern Europe’. 
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or specifically examined within governmentality studies, even though the main strength of 
governmentality is precisely putting together the formation of subjectivities and forms of 
rule. This omission leads to already discussed criticisms that focus on the lack of 
power/politics and external legitimacy.9  
Other than pointing to how the Balkans are created through the enunciation of 
difference, the concepts of coloniality and colonial difference can also be useful in 
emphasising another point without which interventions cannot be understood—namely, 
transcending the division of the social world into politics, economics, and culture as different 
spheres. This division has been noted widely. Ramón Grosfoguel, for example, presents 
coloniality of power and colonial difference as concepts able to transcend the debate between 
world system analysis that focuses on “the endless accumulation of capital on a world scale,” 
and post-colonial approaches that take culture as their primary object of critique.10 I pursue 
this project further. 
Governmentality approaches in general have emphasised the very subjective dimension 
of neoliberal government and stayed away from considering material inequalities that might 
be structuring the governmentalisation process. And while this critique is now common, the 
solution is still imagined in a choice of what Merlingen refers to as “two modes of empirically 
exploring the arts of global governance”—one, termed poststructuralist, that would focus on 
discursive workings of neoliberalism, and the other, termed historical materialist, that would 
focus on the material effects of capitalism.11  
Introducing this variety to governmentality studies and getting rid of any illusions of 
faithfulness is a welcome development, but an insistence on an either/or choice can occlude 
the very intimate connections between the two. Again, starting from experiences of those 
who are supposed to be benefiting from practices of intervention can usefully push us 
towards considering both cultural/subjective and economic/structural inequalities that 
underwrite the experiences at hand.12 The importance of considering the co-constitution of 
                                               
9 Walters, Governmentality, 72–74; Walters, ‘The Microphysics of Power Redux’, 61; Allen and Goddard, ‘The 
Domestication of Foucault’; Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism’, 265. This leads some to combine 
governmentality insights with other perspectives that are better equipped with teasing apart the power of 
pedagogy – like Gramscian approaches that are used alongside governmentality. For some examples of 
Gramscian thought used alongside governmentality, see Li, The Will to Improve, 22–27; Joseph, Social in the 
Global, 41–43; Kurki, Democratic Futures. 
10 Grosfoguel, ‘Colonial Difference’, 214. 
11 Merlingen, ‘Two Modes’. 
12 It is worth noting that an emerging field of Cultural Political Economy similarly focuses on this intersection 
of culture and capitalism. However, while CPE aims most simply to bring in culture to discussions of capitalism, 
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these two dimensions is what I will address next. However, even though the point here is 
about the necessity of not separating these spheres, this section remains trapped in precisely 
such vocabulary. Until we develop a new radical vocabulary that would transcend the 
divisions between the cultural, political, and economic realms,13 it is useful to consider 
different dimensions of colonial difference that are at play here. 
I further divide the colonial difference into considerations of material and 
representational hierarchies—one drawing on political economy of EU’s borderland, and the 
other on cultural Balkanism that has moved from an external image to an internal structure 
of self-identification. Material inequalities structure the intervention itself—reasons to 
intervene and to invite intervention are always supported by numerous benchmarks that 
describe underdevelopment, imperfect democratic processes, and potential for conflict. 
These hierarchies however, are not just discourses that create the targets of intervention, but 
they are also material circumstances that affect the lives of subjects within and beyond the 
intervention.  
Agriculture works in a highly segregated field of political economy. While the 
intricacies of CAP remain outside of the scope of the thesis, it is important to note that EU 
policies are incredibly protectionist of EU agriculture and make it impossible for Serbia to 
compete from the outside.14 However, even after eventual accession, Serbia will remain in a 
specific subordinate position: faced with participating in a single market with developed 
industrial agriculture that is governed by decisions in Brussels (in which Serbia is not likely 
to participate). While the dream of “catching up” seems to frame development policies, there 
is no illusion about the impossibility of such progress. The realities of subjects might very 
well be determined by practices which make them active civil servants, entrepreneurial 
farmers, or liberal functional NGOs—practices that seemingly work to “modernise” the 
world into a homogenous whole. But the reality is also determined by the political economy 
of agricultural production on the periphery, oriented towards foreign direct investment 
based not on entrepreneurial freedoms, but on cheap labour. 
                                               
this thesis aims to bring the analysis of culture, politics, and capitalism together through a focus on lived 
experience. For examples of works in CPE, see Sum and Jessop, Towards a Cultural Political Economy. 
13 Grosfoguel, ‘Colonial Difference’, 216; Grosfoguel here draws on the discussion in Wallerstein, Unthinking 
Social Science. 
14 Specifically, Serbian producers compete on the free market with EU producers even though EU agriculture 
has multiple advantages: bigger plot sizes, higher and more regular subsidies, higher capital investment and 
thus technological advancement. This was repeated to me by producers, big and small, academics, and policy 
makers. For more detail, refer to literature discussed in Chapter 5. 
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In non-formal youth education, it becomes quickly visible that the attraction of these 
workshops cannot be explained without intra- and inter-state inequalities. Positioned on the 
European periphery, the young people I spoke to had two primary reasons for participating 
in non-formal youth education. They wanted to better themselves and their CVs in search of 
employment—in a situation where youth unemployment rate is estimated at 50%, this 
employment is increasingly outside of Serbia.15 Further, they wanted to use the opportunity 
to travel for free in a region where travel is restricted by both a lack of disposable income 
and visa regimes. Reducing these very material facts to discourse of subjectivation would be 
both unfair and analytically limiting. 
This inequality is supported by a hierarchical representational ranking of subjects. In 
this part of Europe, the powerful narratives that frame thought and practice have been well 
researched in the studies of Balkanism, but this thesis seeks to emphasise how these 
narratives have a life beyond the narratives of Western NGO’s and EU’s offices—they 
become permanent social structures around which subjects orient themselves and cannot be 
separated from the very material inequalities that they are a part of. So instead of just asking 
how these hierarchies inspire intervention discursively, something that has moved to a status 
of truism in intervention scholarship, this thesis asks what kind of life these images—
“developed” and “developing”, or “modern” and “backward” —have beyond the intervention 
itself. Namely, how they are produced in and how they reproduce the very material inequality 
they are a part of.16   
The political economy of youth education is underlined by a representation of youth 
as simultaneously emblematic of backward Balkan subjectivity, and the hope to transcend it 
in the “next generation.” While it is important to realise that the young people I met are not 
just powerless victims of neoliberal narratives—they also strategically use opportunities 
                                               
15 The problem of youth-migration has moved to be centre of public debate in the Balkans and rest of Europe, 
often referred as a “demographic catastrophe.” A perhaps telling anecdote is a film created by a film student in 
Belgrade for an assignment on creating a documentary on the theme of “Serbia Today”. She made her film, 
“The Postgraduate Bang,” by recording her Skype conversations with three friends who are working and 
studying abroad. Marković, Postdiplomski Tutanj. 
16 It is worth noting that this claim comes very close to a critical realist position of subscribing to a realist 
ontology and a constructivist epistemology. This project has already been pursued in different ways. For some 
examples of CR in IR, see the edited volume Joseph and Wight, Scientific Realism and IR. Empirically, this 
orientation has been used by self-proclaimed CRs to examine development in Africa as in Gruffydd Jones, 
Explaining Global Poverty. The proximity between CR and Foucault’s work is explicitly discussed in Frauley, 
‘Towards an Archaeological–Realist Foucauldian Analytics of Government’. While remaining sensitive to these 
theoretical debates and empirical contributions, this thesis departs from this project in its emphasis on lived 
experience as the entry point to any further discussion on structure.  
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presented to them—it is also crucial to recognize the power of those narratives. 
Anthropological studies of neoliberalism already captured how internalising the ideal of homo 
oeconomicus and the unwinnable battle to embody it play a part in post-socialist transitions: 
the failures of transition are not explained by questioning capitalism or liberal democracy, 
but they point to subjects who lack the skill and the will to practice democracy and capitalism 
correctly. In my fieldwork in NFE, this was obvious in explanations of problems that always 
focused on failed state policies in areas ranging from education and health care, to 
infrastructure and foreign policy.17 While such “critical thinking” is crucial to improve 
institutions that are indeed malfunctioning in Serbia and in the region more generally, such 
thinking also cuts short any kind of meaning making that would focus on the connections 
between systemic causes and the observations of these problems. In these discussions, the 
agency is located on the side of the local, but it becomes agency as pathology—an explanation 
of local failure to integrate within the global universal. Thus, thinking around unemployment 
through a focus on individual traits and state policies precludes observing connections 
between de-industrialization and privatisation as a part of a global neoliberalism. The 
discussion on agricultural underdevelopment vilifies small plots that are seen as signs of 
backwardness, in contrast to EU averages, even though increasing agreement is made on the 
devastating effects of mass industrial agriculture. The solutions presented in my observations 
focus on “what works:” emulating CAP, developing employability and skills, and pursuing 
EU accession.  These issues are not presented as politics, but as what Wendy Brown calls 
“program implementation” that “eliminates from discussion politically, ethically, or otherwise 
normatively inflected dimensions of policy, aiming to supersede politics with practical, 
technical approaches to problems.”18 These are lived experiences of governing as 
depoliticisation. 
In a way, this supports the view of intervention as a governmentalisation through 
depoliticisation: systemic discussion about redistribution and political rights is replaced with 
a focus on individual dispositions and technical policies. Yet what is missing from this 
account of depoliticisation is its direct and complete reliance on creating colonial difference. 
Only once the Balkan subject exists as backward, can it go on to serve as the culprit for the 
failures of transition. This specific view of governing—whether we call it neoliberalism, 
governance, or project politics—thus arrives as the purification of very specific local 
                                               
17 The most obvious example is the connection between unemployment and inadequate higher education in 
Chapter 4. 
18 Brown, Undoing the Demos, 130. 
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conditions. Its political rationality is not only imposed from the outside, but is layered upon 
situated histories made in the intersection of the local and the global.  
ii. Problematising subject positions—translating colonial difference  
The working of hierarchies here does not remain only on what Orlanda Obad refers 
to as the horizontal axis—a gradation of nations on their levels of Europeanness, but also on 
the vertical axis within particular societies.19 Horizontal difference is employed when the ideal 
of a modern subject is used to diagnose and act upon those lacking peace, democracy and 
development. The vertical axis, however, “uses notions related to Europeanness in order to 
(re)produce hierarchies and exercise exclusions/expulsions of various segments of the 
population.”20 It operates within countries by assigning value to different portions of the same 
community based on their closeness to European ideals.21  
The difference then is also embodied in the individualistic ideas about hard work and 
entrepreneurship that were used to explain why some people were targeted by governmental 
power to become more competitive and more ambitious, while others were conspicuously 
ignored. Critiques of intervention successfully unravel the many inequalities between those 
doing the intervention from the position of the international and those locals who are 
supposed to benefit from these practices.22 Not many, however, discuss the very different 
workings of power on subjects that could seemingly fall under the same category of the 
local.23 Are the youth imagined becoming entrepreneurs the same youth that are supposed to 
learn to be cheap labour through dual education? Are the producers who will disappear in 
the “cleansings” of statistics the same local as those who package their production in fundable 
projects and are now reaping the first benefits of IPARD funds? Trying to approach the 
fields from the perspective of the targets, I have discovered that there is no universal subject 
that is created by the discourse of transition, although everyone had a basic understanding 
of what that subject would be. On the contrary, the same material and representational 
hierarchies were employed within specific populations to both produce a multiplicity of 
subjects and to justify the inequality between them as sacrifices made in the name of progress.   
                                               
19 Obad, ‘How We Survived Europe’. 
20 Obad, 185–86, 188, 192. 
21 Obad, 188, 192. 
22 For an interesting perspective, see Baker’s work on local interpreters: Baker, ‘The Care and Feeding of 
Linguists’; Baker, ‘The Local Workforce of International Intervention in the Yugoslav Successor States’. 
23 Heathershaw, for example, does differentiate between “elite” and “subordinate” discourses of peace in 
Tajikistan, but in his account, the elite refers to those having political authority. I am more interested in the 
divisions amongst those who do not have political authority, see Post-Conflict Tajikistan, chap. 4. Kappler, on 
the other hand, recognizes the divisions in Bosnian society between the modern, liberal NGOs, and the rural, 
traditional raja, but she does not inquire further into it, Local Agency and Peacebuilding, 38.  
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The government of agriculture was the most obvious implementation of such 
divisions between those deemed improvable, and those expected to disappear. The difference 
between producers judged capable of engaging in a truly capitalist production, and those 
expected to vanish from statistics has been iterated not only by officials, Serbian or 
otherwise, but by producers themselves and the general population. The “stuck in the 
past/unwilling to modernise” reasons that seemingly explain the inability to raise production 
to European levels referred to both a mentality that refuses change and the very material lack 
of capacity to modernise means of production. The universal ideal of a progressive subject 
here is not just a goal anymore, but it becomes a legitimation of failure.  
During many conversations in youth workshops I attended, it was obvious that most 
of these activities are “preaching to the choir”—the youth that is supposed to become more 
cosmopolitan, more international, more open-minded, and more entrepreneurial already saw 
themselves as embodying these characteristics in a way that the rest of the population does 
not. They were very clear on the difference between them as modern citizens, and their peers 
who were not a part of the choir to which the NGO sector was preaching: these young minds 
were open through nothing else than self-sacrifice. Skills were acquired through sacrificing 
hanging out and partying, to internships and courses. And these skills set the successful 
young adults I encountered apart from the unemployed masses that make the majority of 
youth in the country. And if those left behind were not developing skills for the labour market 
and attitudes that would make them compatible with liberal democracy, this is perceived to 
be their fault. It is precisely this internal differentiation that is often absent from discussions 
on interventions.  
So colonial difference does not only justify the governmentalisation process by 
contrasting the modern international with a backward local, but it also justifies the very 
obvious differences between subjects coexisting in the everyday—in a way, it creates the 
quotidian “common sense” that naturalised the idea of “winners and losers of the transition.”24 
I will return to the issues of this internal differentiation later in the chapter. 
                                               
24 My use of the term common-sense here comes close to the way that Gramsci uses it. See Gramsci, Essential 
Classics in Politics, 640–42. However, his own use departs significantly from the usual understanding it has in 
English. In English, the term describes a capability most simply described as “plain wisdom” that rational 
individuals possess. In Gramsci, it means the truisms that are shared by a majority of any population that are 
rarely completely rational or coherent. As such, it does not carry the automatic positive meaning as it does in 
English. For more on this, see Ch 3 in Crehan, Gramsci’s Common Sense. In my own use, the common-sense 
denotes a particular aspect of subjectivity: the meaning making that determines how one relates to oneself, 
one’s position in the world, and one’s relation to others—it thus straddles both the process of getting to these 
ideas, and the ideas themselves. For a discussion on the proximity of Foucault’s ideas on governmentality and 
Gramsci’s idea on the “common sense,” see Kurki, Democratic Futures, 222–26. 
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iii. Problematising forms of power—connecting different subject positions 
Unsurprisingly, different subject positions are engaged by different forms of power. 
This was visible across my fieldwork—in youth education, some subjects were clearly meant 
to foster creativity and entrepreneurship, while others were destined for the dual education 
track to prepare for work in the many factories brought to Serbia through subsidized foreign 
direct investment. In agriculture, it was also obvious that growth is imagined equally through 
fostering the entrepreneurial spirit of a particular class of farmers, and by silencing and the 
disappearance of an incredible number of small and semi-subsistence farmers that do not 
have a place in the “family farm” oriented EU policies.  
While uncovering the many forms of power in Serbia that work directly through 
constraint, rather than freedom, it is tempting to try to explain these forms of power through 
combining accounts of governmentality with concepts like authoritarianism.  Mitchell Dean 
highlights this in his work on authoritarian governmentality. In the short reflections on 
authoritarian governmentality, Dean is right to point to the illiberality of liberalism, and how 
the most illiberal practices might be done with the best liberal intentions—like forced 
sterilizations in Scandinavia.25 However, I am worried that such reworking of governmentality 
might be buying into the myth of liberalism that governmentality is supposed to break with.26 
While discussing the illiberal aspects of liberal government, Dean inadvertently reifies the 
division between the two and continues to uphold a vision of liberalism as something 
essentially good if pure—if only it would get rid of some unfortunate aspects. I agree that 
“[l]beralism always contains the possibility of non-liberal interventions into the lives of those 
who do not possess the attributes required to play the city-citizen game”27—but there are no 
separate forms of rule to speak of.  
The experiences discussed in Part II of the thesis point to wildly different forms of 
rule. One group of youth is encouraged to dream big and think outside of the box, while 
another is taught to accept deteriorating labour conditions as the best they can get. One 
group of producers is encouraged to grow and usher Serbian agriculture back onto the world 
market, while another is repressed, unable to lease land, and abandoned to disappear. Yet, 
                                               
25 Dean, Governmentality. 
26 An informative account of “genealogy of governmentalities” in Serbia can be found in Mikuš, ‘Civil-Society 
Building’.  
27 Dean, Governmentality, 156. 
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these disparagingly different approaches still present one rule, that uses different techniques 
on different parts of the population.28  
iv. Problematising fields of visibility29—connections beyond intervention 
Finally, Part II of the thesis also explicitly challenges the fields of visibility that are 
prescribed by governmental interventions. An ethnographic approach made me abandon the 
usual courses and pamphlets in which I would look for governmentality of interventions in 
youth and agriculture, and invited me to pay closer attention to the varied actors and 
processes that the projects I was interested in included. This approach uncovered the 
limitations of research design independent of fieldwork experiences. My original research 
design had two conceptual limitations: it was concerned with international intervention, and 
it was concerned with neoliberal governmentality as a form of power that governs through 
freedom. Tensions arose as soon as I was faced with the realities of these interventions in 
fieldwork. While the above section introduced some tensions to the idea of liberalism as 
always relying on freedom, it is also worth complicating the idea of international that I 
encountered.  
Firstly, focusing on international intervention heavily limited what practices I 
focused on. Each organisation and each project I learned about had to be confirmed to have 
received international funding. In NFE, this started to prove limiting once I was faced with 
artefacts such as the NAPZM document discussed in Chapter 4: yes, the organisation that 
created it did receive international grants, and yes, the process of state consultation with 
youth was itself probably a box ticking exercise for international donors of the state itself. 
However, once I was deep in conversation with the young man who managed the creation 
of the document, it became obvious that reducing his narrative to a direct effect of any 
particular project or intervention, would be unfairly reducing its intricacy. The only way to 
make sense of the program that he presented to me was to put it in conversation with both 
my own observations of youth, civil society, and the state, and with a spate of ethnographic 
                                               
28 Before returning to this point later in the chapter, I want to highlight here the fact that this type of interplay 
between wildly different forms of power—one making its subjects accept their circumstances, the other making 
their subjects always strive for more—is not something that is unique to “less-liberal” democracies or semi-
authoritarian states. It is a defining governmental technique of liberalism that depends on subjectivation that 
accepts these divisions as common sense. 
29 I purposely employ the term “fields of visibility” because it was used by Death as one of the “distinctive 
feature of governmentality approaches.” I would like to highlight how going beyond those fields of visibility that 
are prescribed by governmental practice is crucial if we are to understand the experience of that government, 
rather than just its rationale. See Death, ‘Governmentality at the Limits of the International’. 
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literature that deals with the same issues from an anthropological, rather than intervention, 
perspective.  
In agricultural governance, the tension was even more urgent: as I learned more and 
more about land policy, I kept hearing the same refutations about it not being a part of EU 
legislation, about it being firmly a “national issue,” about it not being an intervention itself. 
While the usual governmentality approach would see me going to the many workshops and 
reading NGO publications that rarely leave Belgrade offices, the emphasis on an 
ethnographic openness to a changing research question drew my attention to land policy—
a field which was seemingly separated from what we usually understand as intervention, but 
a field in which politics were practiced through contestation and resistance.  As I teased apart 
the public statements made by government officials, the narratives presented to me by those 
who are resisting the changes, and the experiences of producers themselves, I was forced to 
break free of the field of visibility prescribed by the EU intervention itself. That field of 
visibility excluded land policy, and it was land policy that mattered to the people I spoke to. 
Once I started investigating it more, it became obvious that the project of improving land 
policy was entangled in the same dynamics as the rest of EU mandated transformation of 
agricultural governance—markets, entrepreneurship, and modernisation ruled. For many of 
the people I spoke to, the two were not different: they were a part of the project of 
modernising Serbian agriculture towards European ideals. 
This approach led me to interesting empirical findings, but, perhaps more 
importantly, it also highlighted the danger of remaining limited to the same fields of visibility 
that are prescribed by the intervention itself. Such a limitation would reify the ordering of 
the world as imagined by the intervention and hide the many workings that come together 
to make any particular field of intervention. Moreover, it would also once more exclude all 
those who are already silenced by those policies and again remove them from considerations 
of transformation in Serbia. Remaining within fields of visibility found in project documents 
and aims would hide the powerful ways in which narratives of intervention—such as 
employment, stability, and development—now have a life of their own, outside of what we 
traditionally understood as the effects of intervention. To start understanding how the 
intervention practices change the lives of its supposed beneficiaries, we have to expand our 
view beyond the fields of visibility prescribed by the intervention itself. The following section 
will address “studying up” from this expanded view. 30  
                                               
30 The idea of “studying up” was forwarded in 1972 in Nader, ‘Up the Anthropologist’. 
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II Studying up from disruptions  
i. Navigating experiential and structural critique 
 
“Analyzing a conjuncture requires peeling back layers of meaning and practice, and 
tracking relations across different spans of space and time. It is usually the work of 
scholars who can access data and make connections that are not necessarily 
emphasised by actors on the ground. The actors’ analysis is absolutely relevant, as it 
informs their actions, but like all analyses it offers a partial perspective on the 
situation. Scholars inevitably have a different perspective and can make use of the 
difference as a source of insight, so long as they don’t lay claim to an omniscient, 
bird’s-eye view.”31 
 
So far, this chapter highlighted the expanded view created by allowing the 
experiences of those targeted by interventions to guide empirical practice. The starting point 
was an ethnographic engagement with the supposed beneficiaries of this process. The 
ethnographic orientation of the project was a conscious decision to counter the tendency of 
governmentality studies to analytically bypass the subjects with whose subjectivation it is 
supposed to be concerned. In short, the decolonial critique of accounts that use 
governmentality to make sense of, and argue against, intervention, centres on those whose 
voices are erased in this process:  by critiquing the Western governmental power for working 
to produce liberal subjects around the world, these anti-imperialist accounts still ignore the 
political subjectivity of the targets of that power. However, while “adding” ethnography to 
the mix to enable more engagement with experiences of the subjects of intervention might 
lead to problematising subjects, forms of power, and fields of visibility, it is still unclear where 
such observations might lead. This is because there is an on-going tension between 
experiential critique—pursued through decolonial engagements and ethnography,32 and 
critiques that focus on larger structures that shape intervention encounters. 
The tension is perhaps captured best in Kai Koddenbrock’s response to Sabaratnam’s 
insistence on taking local experiences seriously.33 Koddenbrock pointed out that the recent 
rush to incorporate “thick descriptions” under which the emphasis on local subjectivities 
                                               
31 Li, Land’s End, 15–16. 
32 The same objection is also raised against more standard versions of governmentality that are committed to 
fencing out forces that might structure the experiences and practices at hand. I will return to this point later.  
33 It is worth noting that Koddenbrock’s article came out before Sabaratnam’s book and is therefore largely 
based on the articles in which similar arguments are developed. However, the book brings out the more 
structural argument about coloniality of power and colonial difference.  
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might be understood, could not account for bigger structures, namely capitalism.34 Thus, a 
focus on experience poses empiricist limits on critique—reducing it to what is accessible 
“through actors only.”35 He uncovers a “family resemblance” between Sabaratnam’s focus on 
the “interpretations given by people of their own situations” and the “non-structuralist forms 
of critique that have dominated intervention critique throughout the last 25 years.”36  
More than theoretical considerations of this problem, my own empirical practice 
crystallized further political issues with an approach that would always start from the 
explanations offered by those targets.  For example, one of the resistance logics against the 
land grabs in Serbia has been led by radical right organisations. In addition to opposing the 
liberalisation of the land market and foreign direct investments in land, these organisations 
are also anti-Semitic, anti-Roma, and homophobic. It can be argued that these are the local 
interpretations of the material context that Sabaratnam argues should be the starting point 
of our research. As discussed in the Introduction, this focus is both analytical—can tell us 
more about the phenomenon under investigation, and political—it works towards 
“recognition and humanisation” of these voices that are usually erased. However, one must 
ask whether these voices should be recognised and given a platform given their political 
implications?   Where would such research lead if these interpretations were taken at face 
value? If we were to use them as a starting point, we would have to contextualize their 
exclusionary politics within the dynamic of a global crisis as the driving force behind the 
radicalization of politics, and engage further into the hierarchies of modern/traditional which 
they flip in their politics. Otherwise we run “the risk of reproducing the agents’ conceptions 
and, worse, fail to explain structural contexts of practices”—a problem common to 
approaches with a preference for “flat ontology” and the refusal of any attempt to go beyond 
experiences of the actors to abstract social structures.37 
The debate is reminiscent of the eternal agency vs. structure dilemmas present in 
various literatures. It was articulated in a materialist critique of post-colonial studies that 
condemned the reduction of colonialism to a “cultural event” and advocated a more sustained 
examination of the social context of capitalism and imperialism.38 The same critique is voiced 
in IR and scrutinizes IR approaches that negate a deeper discussion of social structures in 
                                               
34 Koddenbrock, ‘Strategies of Critique in International Relations’, n. 21. 
35 Koddenbrock, 9, 16. 
36 Koddenbrock, 9. 
37 Joseph and Kurki, ‘The Limits of Practice’, 83. 
38 This is a long-standing critique. For an example, see the essays collected in Parry, Postcolonial Studies. 
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favour of focus on norms and identities. Within governmentality studies, it was the critique 
of “flat ontology” discussed in Chapter 2.39 As such, I have no illusion of being able to offer 
a conclusive answer. However, the following section discusses scale in hopes of contributing 
to the project of trying to “study up” from the experiences of the governed. 
ii. Scale—applying and explaining power 
These analytical and methodological issues can be framed around scale: how to study 
up from experiences of the targets, how the domestic and international levels interact during 
intervention, and on what scale do we have to study and think to make sense of intervention 
practices today.40 This section will inquire further into politics of scale by differentiating 
between scale as identity, as a point of application of power, and as an explanatory framework. 
Issues of scale have recently been picked up by scholars of intervention, particularly 
in Peace and Conflict studies. Annika Björkdahl and Stefanie Kappler identify different 
strands of literature.41 The first one dealt with a critique of the international design of peace 
which was apparently insensitive to local cultural differences.42 This critique, which focussed 
on the “international versus the local,” was soon replaced with the second strand of literature 
that discusses “the international encountering the local” and the hybridity that results from 
those encounters.43 Recently, we have seen a more complex engagement with the social 
construction and fluidity of scales that tries to both theoretically and empirically 
problematise the labels of  local and international.44 This last move emphasises “that scales 
are socially constructed and thus historically changeable through sociopolitical 
contestation.”45 This move inspired studies of intervention that focus on how these labels of 
local and international are essentialised and put into political use.46  
This effort to complicate scale as identity builds on a rich literature across disciplines 
that has similarly deconstructed the binaries of local and global in which the global is 
                                               
39 For the former, see Kurki and Sinclair, ‘Hidden in Plain Sight’; Joseph and Kurki, ‘The Limits of Practice’. 
For IR critiques of governmentality, see the response in Vrasti, ‘Universal but Not Truly “Global”’. For a 
comment on more general governmentality studies, see Frauley, ‘The Expulsion of Foucault from 
Governmentality Studies’. 
40 I am aware that I am partially reifying these terms by using them in this way. However, I do so to point out 
how this scalar way of thinking is present even when not explicitly named in these discussions. Before moving 
beyond, I try to make them visible. 
41 Björkdahl and Kappler, Peacebuilding and Spatial Transformation, 4. 
42 Richmond, The Transformation of Peace. 
43 MacGinty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance; Richmond, ‘The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace’. 
44 Buckley Zistel, ‘Frictional Spaces’; Kappler, ‘The Dynamic Local’; Björkdahl et al., Peacebuilding and Friction; 
Hameiri and Jones, ‘Beyond Hybridity to the Politics of Scale’. 
45 Brenner, ‘The Limits to Scale?’, 599. 
46 Richmond, Kappler, and Björkdahl, ‘The “Field” in the Age of Intervention’. 
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construed as “a space that is dynamic, thrusting, open, rational, cosmopolitan and dominant 
while the local is communitarian, authentic, closed, static, nostalgic, defensive (but ultimately 
defenceless) and the site of ethnic, sexual, regional and other fragmentary identities.”47 
Moreover, this thinking is pursued in works that focus on politics of scale. 48 This term, which 
originates in geography, has inspired works that inquire into not only how scales are 
constructed, but also how they are used in governing interventions.  
Andreas Hirblinger and Claudia Simmons focus on the uses of the local and argue 
“for a more systematic engagement with the effects that representations of the local have on 
peacebuilding”—a project already pursued in Chapter 1 of the thesis.49 Shahar Hameiri and 
Lee Jones follow this path when they talk about how different scales, not just the local, are 
used in governing. Writing against hybridity as reifying identities supposedly prior to 
hybridisation, they argue that the result of intervention is not simply “hybrid,” but “a product 
of conflict between social groups struggling to determine order in target states, including by 
constructing scales and modes of governance where their interests will prevail.”50 Their 
empirical practice then continues to analyse how different scales are used by different parties 
in particular interventions—here, scales are not fixed, but strategically created and used.  
 However, I would like to move beyond conceptualising scale as identity, even if 
strategically used as in the case of Hameiri and Jones, to talk about scale as a point of 
application of power, and scale as an explanatory feature. It is worth quoting Jean and John 
Comaroff at length: 
 
“This, finally, is a problem of scale: of determining, in respect of any given 
ethnography—contemporary, historical, or both—the stretch of relations, concrete 
processes, imaginings, spatial planes commensurate to its realisation. ‘Locality’ is not 
everywhere, nor for every purpose, the same thing; sometimes it is a family, 
sometimes a town, sometimes a nation, sometimes a flow or a field, sometimes a 
continent or even the world; often it lies at the point of articulation among two or 
more of these things. Similarly, translocal, planetary connections and forces do not 
impinge equally or in like manner on all aspects of human thought, action, and 
interaction. In this respect, it is important not to forget that ‘the local’ and ‘the global’ 
do not describe received empirical realities. They are analytic constructs whose 
                                               
47 Ley, ‘Transnational Spaces and Everyday Lives’, 155; quoted in Marston, Jones, and Woodward, ‘Human 
Geography without Scale’, 428; See also Appadurai, ‘The Production of Locality’; Gupta and Ferguson, 
‘Discipline and Practice’; Massey, For Space. 
48 The term was first introduced in Smith, Uneven Development, 172–73. For more on its use in geography, see 
Cox, ‘Representation and Power in the Politics of Scale’; Brenner, ‘The Limits to Scale?’; Marston, ‘The Social 
Construction of Scale’; Marston, Jones, and Woodward, ‘Human Geography without Scale’.  
49 Hirblinger and Simons, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Powerful’, 434. 
50 Hameiri and Jones, ‘Beyond Hybridity to the Politics of Scale’, 60. 
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heuristic utility depends entirely on the way in which they are deployed to illuminate 
historically specific phenomena.”51  
 
In this quote, the issues of scale are not limited to how actors use them strategically, 
but they are also implicated in the politics of research—how we “describe political realities” 
is very much connected to the scalar commitments of our theories. In discussing this 
explanatory feature of scale, governmentality studies prove to be a useful starting point 
because this literature is so implicated in the issues of scale. Governmentality is imagined as 
being able to link the macro to the micro by  
 
“reconnect[ing] studies of the exercise of power at the molecular level—in 
community development corporations, informal economies, neighborhood watch 
groups, empowerment zones, micro credit extensions, and poverty survival 
mechanisms—with strategies to program power at the city, state, national, and even 
supranational level.”52 
 
Despite this, the scalar potential of governmentality has been heavily debated both within 
IR and in other disciplines.53  
These discussions on governmentality in IR imply a twofold scalar differentiation that 
is never explicitly discussed—a different scale is invoked when discussing application of 
governmentality as a form of power, and another one when using governmentality as an 
explanatory framework. Firstly, when discussing the level of application, the debate is 
whether something at the international level is governing states or directly populations of those 
states.54 For example, if we are talking about the EU, the question would be: is the EU 
governing Serbian citizens directly by bypassing the Serbian state, or is it governing the state 
itself? Talking about the international level, then, implies interactions between states—a 
supposedly anarchical system without the relationship of formal freedom that liberalism 
                                               
51 Comaroff and Comaroff, ‘Occult Economies’, 294 citing; Appadurai, Modernity at Large; Gupta and Ferguson, 
Anthropological Locations; Gupta and Ferguson, Culture, Power, Place. 
52 Fairbanks, ‘On Theory and Method’, 552. 
53 There are two main critiques found in geography: one is that governmentality approaches uncover the variety 
of neoliberalism, but since they do not take account any macro/institutional factors, they cannot account for 
the difference (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, ‘Variegated Neoliberalization’, 202.) The second one argues that 
“the interconnections between the micro-foundations of political economy (at the level of subjectivity) and its 
meso-level institutional as well as macro-structuring principles have not been sufficiently articulated” 
(Fairbanks, ‘On Theory and Method’, 551). 
54 Joseph, ‘Governmentality of What?’ 
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attributes to domestic orders. And because governmentality relies on relations of formal 
freedom, governmentality cannot be applied to the international realm.55  
Secondly, there is a debate about the explanatory potential of governmental readings. 
Namely, can governmentality only be used for “empiricism of the surface,”56 or must/can it 
do more, either on its own or by using more Marxist inspired social ontologies.57 Is 
governmentality useful for explaining only the micro workings of power, or can it contribute 
something to the macro understandings of the origins of that power? We can then ask: where 
do we have to look to understand the connections between youth unemployment and civil 
society building, or between land policy and EU enlargement, or between political activism 
and ideas of entrepreneurship? Is it enough to look at micro practices like CV writing, and 
the experiences of those engaging in them, or do we have to look beyond—in the structures 
that both make one unemployed and in need of a CV, and simultaneously design the solution 
in the form of an improved CV, rather than an improved economic system?  
When talking about the application of governmentality on a particular scale, we cannot 
seek to identify the scale at which power operates when the scales themselves are effects of 
power. When Joseph asks “governmentality of what,”58 or juxtaposes the “unevenness”59 of 
the international to an implied “evenness” of the domestic, we are led to an uncritical view 
of scales, and their essential characteristics, that somehow independently exist from each 
other.60 Separating “the assessment of international politics” from “interventions in domestic 
policies”61 is not possible in a time when global politics both reshape individual states, and 
reach individuals directly. This has been explored in both studies of intervention, and studies 
of transformations of statehood. 
 Studies of intervention emphasise that there is no such thing as a purely domestic 
intervention, as much as there is no such thing as an international intervention that does not 
engage the domestic state. Hameiri, for example emphasises how intervention works both 
internally through the state, and externally besides it. In his detailed case studies of 
Australian interventions in multiple settings, he argues that “interventions are both 
                                               
55 Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault’; Joseph, ‘Governmentality of What?’; Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’. 
56 Rose, Powers of Freedom, 57; Walters, ‘The Political Rationality of European Integration’, 157; cited in Joseph, 
‘The Limits of Governmentality’, 241. 
57 See Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault’, 341 for a short review of literature working on this intersection. 
58 Joseph, ‘Governmentality of What?’ 
59 Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, 224,230, 234, 235, 241, 242. 
60 For another argument for this ontological difference between the domestic and the international, see Selby, 
‘Engaging Foucault’. For a discussion of these arguments, see Walters, Governmentality, 97–100. 
61 Joseph, ‘Governmentality of What?’, 413. 
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expressions and drivers of significant qualitative transformations in the nature of statehood,”62 
and statebuilding interventions always have an internal-external nature. He goes on to 
identify this feature as a unique “multilevel” character that cannot be captured though 
methodological nationalism—an important lesson when trying to conceptualise scale as a 
point of application. 63  
This argument is explored from a different perspective in Andre Thiemann’s thesis 
on the Serbian state. Although it is concerned with statehood, rather than intervention, the 
thesis also reflects on how supra-national forces, including international assistance, shaped 
both the state and the individual’s relation to the state.64 In his thesis, we see a bottom up 
perspective of the transformations of statehood that Hameiri also explored. Approaching 
themes, rather than scales, could then be more productive in exploring ways of governing that 
transcend scales.   
More than just in intervention scholarship, power in general cannot be theorised on 
clear-cut scales.65 It is my argument here that insisting on conceptual clarity in regard to 
scale, might actually be hurting, rather than helping our analyses. In their seminal essay, 
Ferguson and Gupta warn that choosing the demarcations of scale is in itself a political 
choice, rather than a phenomenological fact,66 not least because our construction of those 
lines may hide the workings of the global and the international within societies.67 By choosing 
to study the local application of intervention or looking for rules that differently govern the 
international, we are losing sight of the ways that these scales are not only co-created, but 
also of all the hierarchies that are implied in those terms. Instead of asking what scale 
governmentality is applied on, it would be useful to ask how scales are used in governing, 
and how governmentality connects these different scales. Chapters 4 and 5 have thus asked 
not at what scale are youth and agriculture governed, but how the images of scales are used 
in governing. How does the idea of a backward local subject work in intervention? How 
                                               
62 Hameiri, Regulating Statehood State Building and the Transformation of the Global Order, 208. 
63 Hameiri, 210–12. 
64 Thiemann, ‘State Relations’, 149, 33. His examples specifically refer to “how the assemblage of the Yugoslav 
welfare state was historically co-produced by international, national, and local actors translating socialist, social 
democratic, and liberal welfare traditions,” and how “international human security discourses were adopted 
locally in negotiations of neediness and deservingness.” Another example is in Vetta’s study of the 
implementation of a “community-based approach” in the Community Revitalization through Democratic 
Action program funded by USAID. Vetta, ‘“Democracy Building” in Serbia’. 
65 Vrasti, ‘Universal but Not Truly “Global”’, 53; citing Walker, Inside/Outside; Beier, International Relations in 
Uncommon Places. In anthropology, see Gupta and Ferguson, ‘Spatializing States’. 
66 Gupta and Ferguson, ‘Spatializing States’. 
67 Darby, ‘Pursuing the Political’, 9. 
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does the image of a “modern Europe” frame political action? How are these scalar images 
(re)produced?  
Yet, stating the scale that is used by actors is not enough. This might give us insight 
into politics of scale as defined by Hameiri and Jones—they uncover the strategic uses of 
scale and help make sense of empirical realities.68 I however, would like to move beyond just 
identifying scale and ask a larger question about the relationship between the local and the 
global. A useful approach is presented by Heather Johnson who uses ethnography to 
“narrate entanglements” of the local and the global that are accessible through quotidian 
experience. In her approach, the separation is not only complicated, but embraced in an 
argument that the “everyday lives and decisions” of her interlocutors, migrants, “call into being 
a global politics that engages fundamental question of political agency, of exclusion and 
marginalization, and of power and resistance.”69 In this view, the local and the global are not 
opposed, nor just strategically used, but they are simultaneous and can be approached as 
such.  The global here is not simply an “amalgamation of the local,” nor is the local an instance 
of the vernacularization of the global. On the contrary, they are conceptualised “as mutually 
constitutive, as calling each other into being.”70 This echoes Li’s warning that even when we 
study something so “fine grained” as to be ethnographically approachable, our study is not 
“bounded”— “[i]t is still composed of a set of elements that have varied spatial and temporal 
scope. It is also formed by elements that are weak or absent.”71 
 Hence, to understand either the local or the global, we must seek explanations across 
scales: instead of looking at the subjects of intervention as faulty post-socialist locals who 
slow the global march of democracy or capitalism, or seeking to explain everything by grand 
narratives that silence individual voices, we can allow a research project that would traverse 
different scales. Such a project is “more attuned to the complex political realities we inhabit” 
precisely because the worlds that we inhabit do not always support the heuristic devices we 
use to study them.72 In explaining the realities on the ground, it is imperative to both listen 
to voices that would usually be dismissed as micro, local, or everyday, and use the 
privileged/different position of theory to try to make sense of those voices. This approach to 
                                               
68 Hameiri and Jones, ‘Beyond Hybridity to the Politics of Scale’. 
69 Johnson, ‘Narrating Entanglements’, 384. 
70 Johnson, 385, 388. 
71 Li, Land’s End, 19. 
72 Vrasti, ‘Universal but Not Truly “Global”’, 53–54; citing Sassen, ‘Territory and Territoriality in the Global 
Economy’. 
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scale adds another layer to the discussion—theories are now somehow supposed to be above 
the messy attachments of the everyday, and we are ushered into a new set of dichotomous 
thinking between theory being able to analyse because of its removal and higher view, while 
fieldwork and experience remains subjective and unable to rise above its entanglements to 
form a valid analysis.73 
Views—whether they come from academic theories or everyday experiences are 
always partial—and putting them in conversation, rather than prioritizing one or the other is 
a more productive research avenue. 74  Using governmentality as a translating device can help 
this conversation. Rather than understanding governmentality as a form of power to be 
applied or a theoretical framework that seeks to definitively explain, we can treat 
governmentality as Foucault referred to it: a “point of view” and “method of decipherment” 
that can be useful for various scales.75  
As early as 2004, Jeremy Gould identified scale as one of the key constitutive 
tensions, along with positionality, of aidnographies. In his words, any attempt to understand 
aid, and I would add intervention, implies “transscalar observation” and needs a  “‘translating 
device’ for making data accumulated at different sites, and at localities within a site, mutually 
comprehensible.”76 This project has shown how governmentality can be used as a translating 
device—it can help guide and make sense of observations in fieldwork, but it can also ask 
new questions about things that seemingly do not make sense and tease apart what seems 
natural. Using the narrative of governmentality as a connection between effects, practices, 
and programs can help discern how the solutions to problems become so common-sense that 
even the questions we might ask are narrowly defined. Governmentality here translated 
between the experiences I heard about, projects they were engaged by, and bigger structural 
hierarchies that shaped them.  
Interpreting Part II of the thesis through a radical opening of scale regarding both 
application and explanation once again highlights that a critique that would remain both 
sensitive to the experience of the targets and open to systemic dynamics cannot be easily 
theorised as a methodological or analytical recipe. This thesis demonstrated the potential of 
                                               
73 Gramsci makes a similar case for philosophy remaining related to “the simple” in contact with which it should 
find “the source of the problems it sets out to study and to resolve.” Gramsci, Essential Classics in Politics, 636–
67. 
74 Li, Land’s End, 180. 
75 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 186. 
76 Gould, ‘Positionality and Scale’, 283. 
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ethnography to provide a materialist base to governmentality—not through reaching for 
grand narratives, but through a careful consideration of lived hierarchies—difference in both 
its material and cultural forms.77 In the debate on whether we need a “flat ontology,” or 
structural attentiveness, the perhaps unexciting answer is that we need both. It is true that 
we need more than governmentality’s flat ontology or the decolonial emphasis on experiential 
knowledge to start making sense of the world, but the answer is not going back to 
deterministic Foucauldian or Marxist narratives. The answer might be in the constant 
oscillation between the two, between the theory and the field, and between our own 
expectations and surprises. This enables a more reflexive understanding of scale and ways 
of studying.78 This way of studying can allow us to “think big” through ethnographic 
imagination to structures and hierarchies that make global politics, and force us to remain 
humble through practicing an ethnography that would not easily dismiss the interpretations 
of our interlocutors. 
iii. Beyond liberalism vs. authoritarianism—intervention and forms of rule 
More than just situating the effects of intervention in the wider political, social, and 
economic field, this thesis also raises an argument about government in general. 
Governmentality studies present a specific vision of (neo)liberalism as government through 
freedom. This assumption has a twofold effect. First, it underlines the discussions on scale 
because it divides the world into a domestic realm which has conditions of freedom, and the 
international that lacks it. The discussion above has focused on transcending this binary of 
local-international by undoing scalar thinking. However, it is also important to note how 
much this division is crucial for liberalism itself. In her analysis, Beate Jahn shows how the 
division between the domestic and the international is in fact a product of liberalism—one 
that allows liberalism as a universal idea to survive in a world where the international realm 
is imagined as an anarchical space and governed through non-liberal practices.79 As such, by 
                                               
77 For a discussion of ethnographic possibilities in regard to neoliberal governmentality, see Fairbanks, ‘On 
Theory and Method’, 557; Burawoy, ‘The Extended Case Method’; Gregory, Black Corona; Comaroff and 
Comaroff, ‘Millennial Capitalism’. 
78 This is not an argument for empiricism nor just a warning against the reification of theories that we use as 
tools for explaining the social world. As this thesis has shown, the tensions between the two are productive and 
these tensions cannot be present without the two meeting. If anything, this is an invitation for a perhaps braver 
and less certain embrace of these tensions—not to just limit and situate our theories and grand narratives, but 
to learn from their disruptions. 
79 Jahn, Liberal Internationalism, 31–32. 
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unreflexively subscribing to this vision of scales we are once again reifying this fragmentary 
nature of liberalism.80  
Second, while such an approach has been fruitful in helping us discern the 
impossibility of locating subjectivities as somehow outside power, it has also tended to over-
emphasise the benevolent, subtle, and indirect nature of that government. The difficulty is 
summarized well in William Walter’s recent reflection on governmentality studies, where he 
notes “the tendency in many studies of governmentality to focus on indirect forms of power 
while downplaying or overlooking the presence of relations of force, violence and struggle.”81 
Part II of the thesis highlighted the “force, violence and struggle” and showed that subjects 
are governed through both freedom and constraint.  It would seem logical to interpret forms 
of rule that diverge from enticing subjects along a particular path of freedom as a failure of 
governmentality. But this would be once again reifying the form of rule that we seek to 
critique. 
As Thomas Lemke powerfully argued in early 2000s, the unexpected results of liberal 
governmentality should be seen as constitutive elements of governmental practices. 
“Compromises, fissures, and incoherencies” are not signs of the failure of liberal programs, 
but the very “conditions of their existence.”82 These failures range from varied forms of 
resistance explored in both agriculture and youth politics, the constraining political economy 
of youth unemployment in Chapter 4, or the very authoritarian approach to neoliberalisation 
of agricultural government in Chapter 5. Yet instead of treating them as something external 
to government, they should be seen as constitutive of the way government unfolds in Serbia. 
This lesson is crucial for studies of intervention and studies of forms of rule: identifying 
success and failure or searching for if, where, or why liberal governmentality “works” will 
never be enough. While governmentality is useful for a focus on subjectivity that transcend 
scales by a focus on effects, practices, and programmes of government, it is incomplete if we 
imagine it to always work through freedom. Such an approach presupposes a vision of 
(neo)liberalism as a well-functioning system of governing through freedom and 
improvement. This view traps research in accounting for its failures, rather than exploring 
                                               
80 Jahn, 173. 
81 Walters, ‘The Microphysics of Power Redux’, 61; citing Allen and Goddard, ‘The Domestication of Foucault’. 
Elsewhere, Walters refers to this as the “liberal bias” of governmentality studies, Walters, Governmentality, 72–
74. Allen and Goddard here also bring out important points about politically situating governmentality studies 
and their relation to violence and struggle. 
82 Lemke, ‘Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique’, 57. 
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its effects more widely and putting in conversations its multiple compromises, fissures, and 
incoherencies. Moreover, such a view also comes dangerously close to buying into the 
ideological self-image of liberalism as something intrinsically positive, explaining its 
negatives as only distortions, and imagining solutions in the form of nostalgia for the good 
old days of the liberal social contract.83   
Once we abandon such a view, the challenge becomes to investigate liberalism as a 
lived reality, or what Vrasti referred to as “actually existing liberalism.”84  Recent approaches 
to interventions have emphasised “the interweaving and therefore the mutual constitution of 
liberal and non-liberal social formations”85 and conceptualised liberalism  “as a specific form 
of governmental reason and practice produced at the intersection of the European and non-
European worlds, […] always […] hybrid, encompassing within its project both ‘liberal’ and 
‘non-liberal’ spaces, practices and subjects.”86 Further inquiring into this logic of liberalism, 
Jahn traces the same foundational contradictions of liberalism in both pre-1989 
modernisation theories, and post-1989 democracy transition theories, thus connecting early 
development interventions to current democracy promotion and statebuilding paradigms.87 
The liberal intervention system in her account fundamentally depends on its core 
contradiction: “the universalist claim that all peoples are free and able to govern themselves, 
and the particularist philosophy of history which posits a developmental inequality between 
liberals and nonliberals and thus denies the latter these rights.”88 Through this, the system is 
able to externalize its own failures—the failures of peacebuilding, development, and 
democracy promotion are “subsumed under the existing paradigm and consequently blamed 
on the policy targets.”89 Liberalism then, does not depend on just governing through freedom 
but also on justifying the lack of a universal state of freedom by clearly separating those 
deemed to have the potential for freedom from the rest.90  
The failure of non-formal youth education to build a Western style civil society, the 
inability of Serbian agriculture to compete with the EU market, or the varied contestations 
                                               
83 Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism’, 268–69. See also Jahn’s comment on reifying this fragmentary nature 
of liberalism by accepting it. Jahn, Liberal Internationalism, 173. 
84 Vrasti, ‘Universal but Not Truly “Global”’, 66. 
85 Rampton and Nadarajah, ‘A Long View of Liberal Peace and Its Crisis’, 6. 
86 Laffey and Nadarajah, ‘The Hybridity of Liberal Peace’, 416. 
87 Jahn, ‘The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy (I)’; Jahn, ‘The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy (II)’. 
88 Jahn, ‘The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy (II)’, 224. 
89 Jahn, 221. For an explicit discussion of this self-referential loop of solving the failures of interventions with 
more intervention, see Koddenbrock, ‘Recipes for Intervention’. 
90 See also Hutchings, ‘Liberal Quotidian Practices of World Ordering’, 162. 
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and resistances uncovered in both policy areas, are then not just failures that we need to find 
causes for—they are crucial for the functioning of actually existing liberalism in Serbia. This 
complicates not only the usual reliance on the conceptualisation of intervention as an 
encounter between “liberal peace” and the “non-liberal” worlds,91 but also leads to new 
questions about ways of understanding forms of rule and individuals’ attachments to it.  
Examining this lived reality of liberalism is possible only once we give up on asking 
whether intervention works, or where governmentality can be applied. While Joseph is right to 
emphasise the very different realities facing the Global South and the Global North, the 
interveners and those intervened upon, it is not enough to “highlight the differences in its 
[global governmentality’s] realisation in different parts of the world.”92 Accepting them as 
completely different systems of rule would once again buy into the fragmentary nature of 
liberalism analysed by Jahn. The non-liberal is always somehow outside of liberalism, never 
theorised as its constitutive parts. It is a part of the international realm as opposed to the 
domestic one, it is found in “those” countries that are somehow a denigration of teleological 
development stories. Moreover, it is understood as a deformation of the present, thus 
temporally relegating the perfect completion of the liberal project to the continuously 
postponed future.93  
Approaches that rely on the existence of different systems and explanations of their 
geneses often employ teleological and linear understandings of development. They imagine 
forms of government outside “advanced liberal democracies” that depend on more coercive 
measures as existing outside liberalism and “revert[ing] back to something more basic.”94 In 
doing so, these approaches read difference in conditions as different “levels of development”95 
and inevitably fall back into thinking temporally unfolding levels. In anthropology, this is 
famously explored by Johannes Fabian who emphasised how anthropological production 
depends on a “denial of coevalness:” “a persistent and systematic tendency to place the 
referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of 
anthropological discourse.”96 Building onto his work within IR, David Blaney and Naeem 
Inayatullah have shown how this kind of thinking both enables social sciences as an 
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92 Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, 230. 
93 Jahn, Liberal Internationalism, 182–92. 
94 Joseph, 224–25. Emphasis added. 
95 Joseph, 230. 
96 Fabian, Time and the Other, 31. 
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endeavour of explaining difference between units, and how this process hides liberalism’s 
“lurking internal others—poverty, violence, disorder.”97 Thus, this separation of levels 
enables teleological readings of history that see all locations moving through the same 
universal developmental stages, paint difference as endogenous denigration, and support the 
view that sees these “denigrations” as outside of liberalism.  
On the contrary, it is more effective to consider how these different levels are not 
temporally separated, but horizontally connected. To do this, it is necessary to break with 
both state-centrism and the reading of the world as divided into the liberal West and the 
non-liberal Rest. They both consider states as homogenous containers of societies and far 
oversimplify the realities of inequalities on the ground. Here comes to fore the potential of 
focusing on subject production. While it is true that in many accounts of governmentality, 
including this one, there remains a “question concerning the level where government 
operates,”98 it is important to remember that power is dispersed—not just emanating from 
the state across society, but across what we usually imagine as levels.  So instead of having to 
look to other parts of the world, it is also possible to look at specific communities and the 
divisions in them to discover how different forms of power always operate on various 
exclusions and inclusions.  
While intervention techniques that promote entrepreneurship, civil society building, 
and democracy in Serbia are underlined by governmental ideals of the homo oeconomicus, it 
would be foolish to expect the development of a population, state, or economy that resemble 
the sources of that intervention—“global neoliberal government ... does not, and cannot, 
work on a truly global level.”99 However, that some populations are seemingly excluded from 
liberal ideas or subjected to non-liberal forms of power, does not mean that they are somehow 
outside of the liberal project, nor does it undermine the universal claims of that project.100 
Liberalism always works through inclusions and exclusion, through both freedom and 
imperialism.101 It promises universalism, yet its fragmentary nature and internal 
contradictions constantly produce inequality.102 
                                               
97 Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference, 89–93; Blaney and Inayatullah, 
Savage Economics, 9. 
98 Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, 228. 
99 Kiersey, ‘Neoliberal Political Economy and the Subjectivity of Crisis’, 385; cited in Vrasti, ‘Universal but 
Not Truly “Global”’, 64. 
100 Vrasti, ‘Universal but Not Truly “Global”’, 64. 
101 Vrasti, 56. 
102 Jahn, Liberal Internationalism, 186–88. 
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Thus, intervention as the promotion of liberalism is not constrained to policies 
promoted by international agencies as Dean would have us think.103  It works through a series 
of universals with material and representational attachments. While the majority of the thesis 
investigated this empirically in Part II, I hope the contribution to be greater than adding 
empirical detail. The “messiness” of these politics is not just an interesting ethnographic 
travelogue nor an accidental distortion of liberal rule—it is a constitutive part of power, 
alienation, and inequality that makes lived realties.104 The different forms of power are not 
somehow “reverting” to coercion or “going forwards” towards freedom. They work together 
to make the present. While most critical scholars of intervention denounce the idea of linear 
development, we are yet to engage with the fact that seriously giving up on linearity would 
mean radical coevalness. In that coevalness, we are forced to recognise that many different 
parts are contemporaneously connected. The differences cannot be explained by different 
stages of development, nor by invoking essentialisms that might justify them. The differences 
are a consequence of a much larger labouring of different racial, gender, ethnic, and regional 
classifications.105 Freedom does not come after constraint, as interventions from colonialism, 
modernisation, development, liberal peace, and transition have all told us—but they coexist. 
What does this focus on liberalism as lived reality tell us? First of all, it opens up the 
empirical detail that we need if we are to even begin to think about projects that reconstruct 
subjecthoods—whether of those deemed free, or those silenced already through the practices 
of the dark side of liberalism. Secondly, in this thesis, it points to limitations of the concept 
of intervention itself in trying to understand the effects that the practices of creating 
liberalism have on the targets. It is by now well-argued that promises of liberalism will never 
come—its fragmentary nature means that any attempt at achieving a “universal realisation 
of liberal principles is bound to fail.”106 This is an important lesson for studies of interventions 
that are underpinned by liberal theories, but it is not enough for the current project. Saying 
that liberalism failed/is failing/will fail does not help us explore the myriad of effects that 
these interventions have beyond the success/failure binary.  
                                               
103 Dean, ‘Liberal Government and Authoritarianism’, 53 cited in Joseph, ‘The Limits of Governmentality’, 
224. 
104 For a discussion of Foucauldian themes in relation to inequality, see Venn, ‘Neoliberal Political Economy, 
Biopolitics and Colonialism’. For a theoretical engagement with inequality from a decolonial perspective, see 
Boatcă, Global Inequalities beyond Occidentalism. For empirically informed studies, see the Special Edition of 
Current Sociology: Boatcă et al., ‘Dynamics of Inequalities in a Global Perspective’. 
105 Grosfoguel, ‘Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy’. The origin of these 
hierarchies is rarely discussed—I will come back to this later in this chapter.  
106 Jahn, Liberal Internationalism, 9. 
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This thesis argues that instead of explaining whether intervention works, and why, it 
is more useful to see how it works through its “core contradictions” of simultaneously arguing 
for a universal subject, and being dependent on a separation between subjects worthy of that 
universal status, and those who are not. These separations work both horizontally between 
countries, and vertically within particular societies—two axes intimately connected. The 
importance of such understanding does not lie only in its ability to tell us something about 
liberalism, but because it is a starting point to understanding forms of power and rule that 
shape lived experiences. This would be a case of studying liberalism as a lived reality—not 
as a pure form of liberal governmentality in which we expect everyone to enthusiastically 
work on self-improvement, but as an always already hybrid system of government that 
depends on nurturing freedom and constraint simultaneously. Once we can see connection 
across scales, locations, and populations, we can more easily discern the way the intervention 
is implicated in colonial difference. Interventions then should not be studied as differentiated 
between those coercive and those that govern through freedom, but examined as a struggle 
to negotiate the relations between the two.  
III From intervention to politics of improvement 
i. Dislocating intervention 
Trying to make sense of experiences by critically approaching politics of scale and 
exploring actually existing liberalism in the end dislocates the intervention itself. As 
Nadarajah and Rampton already argue, once we stop perceiving politics of intervention as 
somehow “up there” and stop reducing the local/everyday to being the “antithesis of the 
international,” we become open to “the historical co-constitution of the international, 
national, and local and the relations of power that connect these in both peace and conflict.107  
This “co-constitution” cannot be grasped by studying just intervention.  
Part I of the thesis started with a dissatisfaction of how the local is engaged with, 
represented, and theorised. But in trying to make sense of phenomena uncovered in Part II, 
it was faced not only with varied and complex subjectivities that complicate any idea of the 
local that one might have, but it also uncovered multiple manifestations of the international 
and global that are implicated in the lived realities of my interlocutors. The above section has 
dealt with how to move beyond, if not reconcile, the different demands one might have from 
governmentality studies and to keep theorising in a way that is useful for making sense of 
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real world problems. This section, however, will argue that careful engagement with the 
social realities the intervention works in results in dislocating the intervention itself. 
Intervention then becomes only one of many manifestations of the global that are implicated 
in the making of everyday political realities.  
Writing in 2006, Beatrice Pouligny warned that the intervention can never be 
understood on its own, saying that “[…] the action of international community can never be 
analysed in itself, it forms part of a local reality that grasps it partially, and that must be 
grasped.”108 Another body of literature uses a sociological approach to challenge the usual 
frameworks that treat statebuilding ahistorically, and ignore the international embeddedness of 
non-Western societies. These approaches frame international statebuilding efforts as just one 
factor in broader processes of state formation, and seek to “account for under-researched 
aspects of statebuilding and to bring local societies back into the scholarly discussion.”109 
Different approaches have moved in this direction: post-liberal peace theories that would 
remain open to indigenous inputs and lead to hybrid outcomes, ethnographic approaches 
that promised easier access to local realities, and recent efforts at decolonising intervention.110 
All of these approaches, however, are limited by their focus on the intervention itself. 
This section will point to the limitations of the concept of intervention through two points 
that build onto the issues that the thesis started with in Chapter 1—locating agency on the 
side of the local, rather than the international; and connecting that agency to global 
processes. These two points relate to the three disruptions presented earlier: a multiplicity of 
subjects, heterogenous power, and expanded fields of visibility. In relation to the location of 
agency, the thesis shows that an explicit desire to uncover authentically local agency falls 
into the same trap of an international/local binary that was discussed earlier in the chapter. 
I will thus emphasise the impossibility of clear subject positions between the local and the 
international which are constitutive parts of intervention. In relation to the conceptualisation 
of that agency within the international, it will become clear that to account for the 
connectedness and coevalness of that agency, we have to look beyond the intervention itself.  
a. Undoing the local and the international 
The most obvious way in which the concept of intervention is problematised is 
unthinking its constitutive categories: the local that is intervened upon, and the international 
                                               
108 Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below, 272. 
109 Bliesemann de Guevara, ‘Introduction: The Limits of Statebuilding’, 118. 
110 These literatures were discussed in Part I. For examples, see Richmond and Mitchell, Hybrid Forms of Peace; 
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that intervenes. Projects examined in this thesis cannot be easily critiqued as “foreign” 
intervention into “domestic” matters—many of those I encountered are implemented and 
desired by Serbian elites and public. One thing that many critics of development, 
peacebuilding, or democracy promotion might easily forget is that the recipients of these 
projects, even though they are silenced and at times actively exploited in these endeavours, 
often actually want development, peace, and democracy. While these liberal ideals are easy 
to unpack theoretically, once faced with real life it is much harder to argue against wanting 
to end war, improve living conditions, build a more just government, or advocate respect for 
human rights.111  Instead of wanting less intervention and escaping these projects, subjects I 
encountered were concerned with being seen by both international agencies and the Serbian 
state.112 Trying not to just give voice, but to learn from the subjectivities targeted by 
interventions means also learning that such aspirations are not so easily dismissed as 
accidental products of modernity. They also represent projects that subjects are attached to. 
Swiftly discarding these subjects who are attached to ideas of progress and development as 
“co-opted” by neoliberalism, having a false consciousness, or just “shaped by neoliberal 
governmentality,” is then a limiting shortcut. It is more productive to explore how the things 
desired become considered foreign, and how the paths to getting them are limited by global 
narratives and local circumstances. 
Projects that seek to build peace, development and democracy do not depend only on 
shaping subjects’ desires to fit the neoliberalisation of life, but also on a global project of 
casting those desires as always already liberal and foreign.113 This reading reifies these 
phenomena as endogenous products of the West, thus once again ignoring coevalness.114 For 
example, the entire region of Eastern Europe was diagnosed as lacking civil society, even 
though it was precisely civil society that ended communism.115 More practically, agricultural 
associations are now promoted in Serbia as something developed by the World Bank and 
FAO, even though associations were the founding pillar of Yugoslavian agriculture—
                                               
111 See Li’s discussion of this in relation to development in Indonesian highlands. Li, Land’s End, 43. 
112 For a similar argument of wanting to be seen by the state in a different context in Serbia, see Greenberg and 
Spasić, ‘Beyond East and West’, 319. 
113 The reading of these concepts as developing endogenously in Europe and then “spreading,” is fundamentally 
Eurocentric. For a discussion of terms such as nationalism in this light, see Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity: 
Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination, 22. 
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Jahn, Liberal Internationalism. 
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something that I heard again and again in tales of disbelief in interviews. When faced with 
governmental ideals, it is important to not buy into the divisions of local and foreign that are 
most easily available.116 By considering things like peace or justice as always external to 
societies in question, we remain trapped in thinking about local societies as somehow 
naturally prone to conflict and war—we are once again victims of the same politics of scale 
that we are supposed to question.  
A different issue, however, arises once we look into imagined paths to desired goals. 
When talking to very different people in Serbia, I was always faced with entrenched feelings 
of inferiority in relation to the imagined West. Such strong attachments to both projects of 
modernisation and the positionalities implied in them—namely the backward receiver and 
the enlightened intervener—were perhaps the most painfully obvious part of my fieldwork. 
The most horrible insults to the government and the most deprecating descriptions of 
segments of the population unable to become “civilised” were not presented to me by foreign 
NGO workers or employees of the World Bank. On the contrary, these diagnoses were 
voiced by domestic NGO workers, the liberal youth, the new emerging “modernised right,” 
and repeated on the streets in the most casual conversations.  
My fieldwork constantly reminded me of this hierarchy. In banal situations, like first 
introductions, in which my British affiliation automatically gave me an air of competence 
and impartiality, and everyday conversations about anything from public transport, hygiene, 
and recycling—I was faced with the same comparisons of “here” in malfunctioning Serbia, 
and “there” in the functioning West. The same division was obvious in ways in which critics 
of government imagined alternatives that always relied on the “ways things are done out 
there,” “European values,” and visions of “how they do it in normal countries.” These phrases 
capture the inability to think of ways of getting the things mentioned above outside of the 
paths prescribed by the global intervention apparatus. Peace, development, and progress are 
presented as developing and arriving externally.  
The relationship of the tutee and the tutor is a powerful regime with multiple 
dimensions. One dimension manifests in the intervention seeing its targets as backward, but 
                                               
116 An issue that remains unexplored here is the temporal novelty that we also expect in the narratives of 
transition and intervention. In the Yugoslavian example, we expect a story of repressive communism to 
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the seeming novel technique of governing through freedom is complicated once we take seriously worker self-
management which was the founding principle of Yugoslavian socialism. While there is no space to explore 
these continuities further, it is important to emphasise the relevance of continuities, rather than disjunctures.  
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another dimensions is visible in those same targets seeing themselves in that light. It is 
impossible to understand the relationship causally, but new tools are necessary to better 
appreciate how interventions do not translate only practices, ideas, and values, but also the 
hierarchies of political value and knowledge that further naturalise the tutee position.117 
The observation of imaginations trapped in the hierarchies that they should be 
criticizing is not unique to this thesis. In discussing peacebuilding in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kappler similarly notes that she:  
 
“[…] regularly found Bosnians telling [her] they thought that their own society 
needed external help or was incapable of bringing about change. This is often linked 
to the assumption that the conflict at stake was a result of deficient local structures, 
and a lack of local capacity to prevent the occurrence of violence. Such assumptions 
can be found in different types of research, by both outsiders and insiders.”118  
  
Likewise, the path from Serbian reality to an imagined “normalcy is overdetermined 
by the same assumptions that underline the projects explored in this thesis. Most obviously, 
this erases the distinction between the “bad” international and the “good” local—intervention 
projects these days are run by locals themselves, and their desires for progress cannot be 
simply dismissed as “bad” or as “false consciousness.”119 To an extent, such thinking can be 
explained by the “projectivization of politics” discussed in detail in Chapter 4, but its power 
cannot be understood without referring to global hierarchies that structure the relationship 
between projects of government and their subjects 
These global hierarchies are implied in most scholarship on intervention but stem 
from a much deeper running coloniality of contemporary power. For example, when defining 
intervention, John MacMillan talks about three “hierarchies of power that have generated 
logics and rationales for intervention over time.” These are Great Powers, economy, and 
culture (understood in “civilisational, racial and religious terms”).120 In the same issue, 
however, Robbie Shilliam argues that these three are not free-standing phenomena, but stem 
from the positing of colonial and racial difference that police the distinction between 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities. His interpretation of intervention “highlights the 
fundamental importance of slavery and colonialism in the constitution of transnational social 
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forces”121 This thesis contributes to the project of studying this difference and its embodiment 
in trans-scalar social forces in two ways. First, it explores how these transnational forces 
work in a region that is seemingly outside colonial dynamics. As Boatcã emphasises, even in 
its semi-peripheral position, the Balkan region reproduces European modernity as it strives 
to achieve it.122 And second, it showed that these transnational forces are both made in and 
make the everyday social realities around the world.  This formulation has consequences for 
both politics and scholarship. 
b. Undoing intervention as exclusive connection 
If we are to try to “grasp local reality” or “repopulate IR,”123 it is crucial that we more 
explicitly put into conversation not only the politics of intervention, but the larger context in 
which the intervention participates. In the case of improving Serbia, this meant not only 
recovering the local presence,124 but also staying open to connections that might lead to 
structures other than the intervention.125 While detailed studies of interventions have engaged 
with this,126 we need to more explicitly name these connections. Using the concept of 
intervention as a defined field of action in which the local and international meet risks 
reading interventions as the only connection between the West and the Rest, thus once again 
denying the coevalness and connectedness of different geographical areas.127 
To explain the experience of young people I met in NFE, I had to look beyond the 
practices that brought us there. I had to look to unemployment as a discourse and as a 
material reality, I had to look more widely in the historical transformations of civil society in 
Serbia, I had to explain the silences as well as enunciations, and I had to expand my view 
beyond NFE as a practice of neoliberal governmentality that seeks to govern through 
                                               
121 Shilliam, ‘Intervention and Colonial-Modernity’, 1133. 
122 Boatcã, ‘The Quasi-Europes’, 136–37. 
123 Vrasti, ‘The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations’, 65. 
124 For examples, see Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below; Heathershaw, Post-Conflict Tajikistan; 
Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention; Rutazibwa, ‘Studying Agaciro’. 
125 Millar comes close to this when he talks about multiple interventions always happening at the same time, 
but I will try to emphasise that the connections transcend the usual conceptualisations of intervention. Millar, 
‘Respecting Complexity’. Also, see Lai, ‘Transitional Justice and Its Discontents’, for an innovative connection 
between transitional justice, socioeconomic issues, and grassroots movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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freedom. In agriculture, I was similarly forced beyond the fields of visibility prescribed by a 
vision of intervention as EU accession. The stories of my interlocutors led me to structural 
inequalities, racist discourses, and land politics that were seemingly outside of my initial area 
of interest. It is these connections that politics of improvement captures.  
ii. Politics of improvement 
In discussing governmentality, Tania Li usefully offered three key concept that 
guided the analysis thus far: programs, practices, and effects of governing.128 Her own work, 
however, is not concerned with intervention as imagined in traditional IR scholarship. She 
tracks the “will to improve” through projects she calls improvement schemes.129 They range from 
different colonial administrations, rural development and conservation projects, to World 
Bank programs that promote accountability and transparency. The important thing to note 
is that understanding any of them means putting all of them in conversation “as they have 
layered up one upon the next and intersected with other processes to shape the landscapes, 
livelihoods, and identities of the […] population.”130 This is the crucial lesson for intervention 
scholarship: if we are to take into account effects as they are lived, we are forced to look 
beyond the definition and scales of international intervention. I suggest we do this by 
examining politics of improvement as they unfold around different subjects and policy fields. 
Using this concept requires some clarification. By using the word “improvement” I 
am in no way making a statement about the true or otherwise motives behind the practices I 
explore. Nor am I trying to judge their results and decide whether measurable improvement 
is the outcome of any specific intervention or larger program.  The concept allows me to trace 
different programs that are presented as improvement. What unites these projects is not the 
definition of an actor or delimitation of fields of action, but a teleological understanding of 
progress and the belief in human agency to facilitate this progression. It is where the will to 
govern and the will to improve intersect and open as a political field of study—it is precisely this 
will that unites projects from colonial administration to contemporary peacebuilding, 
statebuilding, and development efforts.  
The analytical strength of politics of improvement lies in remaining open to their 
wider effects, which are not confined to the purported or otherwise goals, but the result of 
“layering” from the above quote. By drawing the concept from Li’s will to improve, I hope to 
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open up interventions as parts of larger programs, or improvement schemes, that order things 
as varied as international interventions and investment plans, to personal life choices.131 
Additionally, and in contrast to Li’s approach, I also identify everyday actors not only as 
objects of the will to improve, but its agents that actively engage practices of improvement. 
This re-conceptualisation allows me to go beyond the two constitutive limitations of 
intervention highlighted in the previous section: the local-international dichotomy and 
thinking of other connections. Following the will to improve as it unfolds and engages 
different subjects, points to much more than the intervention that makes the politics of 
improvement.  
a. Subject positions along horizontal and vertical lines 
“The tragedy here is that we have all been led, knowingly or not, willingly or not, to 
see and to accept that image [distorted by Eurocentrism which renders us partial] as 
our own reality and ours only. Because of it, for a very long time, we have been what 
we are not, what we never should have been and what we will never be. And because 
of it, we can never catch our real problems, much less solve them, except in only a 
partial and distorted way.”132  
 
It is now a truism that categories of local-international should not be essentialized nor 
romanticised, but it still remains to be seen how to actually conduct empirical and theoretical 
practice without them. I argue that this is possible by exploring projects of improvement, as 
projects in which many different subjects are engaged, rather than interventions that rely on 
dichotomized accounts of subject positions. The above section showed how these positions 
were complicated in the thesis’ empirical practice. This section will show how thinking these 
contradictions through politics of improvement might open up new avenues for research. 
The first consideration is that complicating the local-international binary does not mean 
doing away with hierarchies that are constitutive of improvement schemes. All of these 
projects “depend on, as they confirm, a hierarchy that separates trustees from the people 
whose capacities need to be enhanced, or behaviours corrected.”133 This section argues that 
understanding the powerful work of this hierarchy means investigating what Obad refers to 
as horizontal and vertical axes.134  It is along these axes that colonial difference is translated. 
The above described process of personal attachment to global dreams shapes both 
the end goal of improvement, but it also translates its hierarchies to very personal 
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subjectivation. In decolonial scholarship, it is, in Quijano’s words above, “to see and to accept 
that image as our own reality and ours only”. More specifically, Alexander Kiossev 
developed the concept of self-colonisation to describe situations of “hegemony without 
domination” and “cultures [that have] succumbed to the cultural power of Europe and the 
west without having been invaded and turned into colonies in actual fact.”135 Boatcã similarly 
discusses imperial difference as not only shaping the “socioeconomic organization” of 
Eastern Europe, but also the “self-conceptualisation of its subjects.”136  
While powerfully connecting the issues of subjectivity to the colonial difference that 
structures improvement, these concepts can also be read as deceivingly linear and complete. 
Self-colonisation implies a finished process, and subjugation renders the target once again 
silent and passive. Without denying the importance of these concepts, it is useful to turn to 
anthropologists who have explored these relationships as a more active process of everyday 
navigation of social life. Stef Jansen finds similar self-positioning in his discussions of 
everyday orientalism in Serbia and Croatia in which terms like the Balkans and Europe were 
employed as “discursive material for connecting personal narratives with more general 
narratives of war and nationalism” and enabled distancing from experiences of war that were 
crucial for everyday functioning.137  In another specific case study of Serbian and Bosnian 
perceptions of the ability to travel under the strict visa regime before Serbia entered the 
“white Schengen”138 system in December 2009, Jansen refers to “everyday geopolitical 
discourse” as “a routine, non-official mode of representation of one’s collective place in the 
contemporary world” that helps us see how the “geopolitical becomes personal.”139 Obad 
tracks similar processes when exploring how geopolitical hierarchies work in 
Europeanisation in Croatia, both on the level of high politics, among the EU negotiators, and 
in everyday discourse.140 A more thorough understanding of this everyday geopolitical positioning 
is crucial for any effort to make sense of processes and experiences of subjectivation. Even 
though they are everyday, the action explored in this thesis “call into being” already 
discussed hierarchies of Great Powers, economy, and culture. 141 This experiential approach 
                                               
135 Kiossev, ‘The Self-Colonizing Metaphor’. 
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allows us to better appreciate how colonial difference makes and is made in everyday 
subjects. The transnational social forces mentioned above are not abstract notions reserved 
for state or international politics. They are also formed in and from everyday social worlds 
and the interactions in it. 
The hierarchies through which the intervention works, and which work through the 
intervention, are not isolated, they are permanent, and malleable, social structures around 
which individuals develop their understandings of self and others. The dynamic of 
protagonismo that Sabaratnam identifies and that sees donors as always inserting themselves 
into policy narratives to always and again confirm Western agency142 is not found only in the 
narratives of the interveners. In my experience, it is not just the interveners who wanted to 
insert themselves, it is also the recipients of aid, officials and the general public, who expected 
projects to be legitimized and materially supported externally. Everyone involved becomes 
implicated in the hierarchies of the will to improve and soon there can be no political action 
outside of “projects,” and any “project” requires international, in many cases meaning only 
foreign, approval for legitimacy. Teasing apart here means going beyond noting the 
Orientalising and self-Orientalising discourses to ask how they structure local realities.143 In 
the above observation by Kappler, there is no attempt to move beyond just observation. What 
are the sources of these assumptions about “needing external help” and being “incapable of 
bringing about change?” And what might be their consequences? To answer those questions, 
we must start revealing connections and complex interactions of hierarchy that make politics 
of improvement.  
Importantly, it is not enough to write against the West anymore, because the colonial 
difference also structures the relationships outside the West/non-West. I might have been 
shocked to hear someone differentiate Serbia from the “black countries” in which land 
grabbing is usual, but the differentiation is not surprising itself. There is a growing literature 
on internal, or nesting orientalism, that explains how the colonial difference is not used only 
in self-identification as an inferior to the West, but also as a superior to the East that always 
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space for actualising the identities of specific interveners and their world views, rather than working towards 
a common agenda set by the government or community.” Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention, 80. 
143 An important thing to note is that the self-orientalising discourse is also reproduced in academia. For a 
detailed engagement with these discourses, see Mikuš, ‘“European Serbia” and Its “Civil” Discontents’; 
Thiemann, ‘State Relations’, 99.  
 
Katarina Kušić 
Chapter 6 | 255 
 
somehow begins there, not here.144 The same lines that separate “us” from the more developed, 
are employed to distance “us” from the less developed. 
While the situations in the Balkans and in post-colonial state are not in any way the 
same, this thesis has shown how lessons on the workings of hierarchy that the scholarship 
from those locations inspires can explain things that Western modernisation, transition, and 
democratisation theories cannot grasp. More than trans-regional academic production, this 
kind of attachment has profound consequences for political praxis. When my interviewee 
juxtaposes Serbia to African victims of land-grabbing, she is not only refusing to learn from 
the experiences of similar techniques employed in Africa, but her imagined solutions remain 
trapped in the same paradigm that is driving land grabbing in the first place—namely the 
bifurcation of the world in those with the right to make endless profits on land, and those 
who cannot defend their rights. This is the challenge that any discussions of local political 
practice and resistance have to take on.   
Besides the already discussed literature on nesting orientalisms, there is a growing 
literature  that seeks to situate local subjectivities within global coloniality.145 Kilibarda 
analyses how the Otpor! democracy warriors were heavily invested in whiteness—this 
automatically limiting their claim to modernity with its “darker” side of racialized 
coloniality.146 Growing research on the Non-Aligned Movement and Yugoslav self-
management socialism is discovering their investment in teleological understandings of 
development.147 These translations happen in the everyday, but they are geopolitical 
horizontal gradations—judging nations and cultures on their closeness to Europe. In 
discussing different forms of resistance in chapters 4 and 5, I have similarly tried to 
emphasise the limitations of political practice that remains in the confines of the paradigm 
that marginalise it in the first place. 
Going beyond these scalar identity markers allows a fuller appreciation of Obad’s 
horizontal and vertical axes discussed earlier in the chapter. Understanding the power of 
hierarchies in agricultural improvement is impossible if we remain subscribed to ideas of 
local and international that are supposed to embody this difference—writing against EU 
policies will not comprehend how the individual producers, and the political action they 
                                               
144 Bakić-Hayden, ‘Nesting Orientalisms’. 
145 Razsa and Lindstrom, ‘Balkan Is Beautiful’. 
146 Kilibarda, ‘Non-Aligned Geographies in the Balkans’. 
147 For NAM, see Subotić and Vučetić, ‘Performing Solidarity’; and Kilibarda, ‘Non-Aligned Geographies in 
the Balkans’; for a discussion of Praxis, a distinctive Yugoslav Marxist humanism, see Karkov, ‘Decolonizing 
Praxis in Eastern Europe’. 
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engage in, are made by the same hierarchies that they seek to challenge. To understand local 
experiences, political practice, and try to grasp the realities that are so implicated in global 
imaginations, it is not enough to expose the internalisation of colonial difference as feelings 
of inadequacy, but also to tease apart ways in which it inspires new systems of oppression. I 
hope this to be only the beginning of this research. 
b. Coevalness  
While this focus on connections has already been argued for elsewhere,148 I want to 
focus on two aspects that a more open view allows: an appreciation of changes far more banal 
than large scale dispossession or highly visible UN peacebuilding operations, and a more 
meaningful engagement with subjects in their full complexity as political actors. First, a focus 
on connections beyond and around intervention opens the door for discussion of processes 
that are far less shocking than many critical scholars would lead us to expect. Tania Li 
emphasises this point strongly when she says that the emergence of capitalist relations which 
brought with them dramatic dispossession were decidedly undramatic—they were much 
more mundane and everyday.149 Neoliberalisation in Serbia is similarly mundane. The youth 
are not targeted by either disciplinary techniques or simply fostered through freedom into 
responsibilized subjects. They are slowly formed through a variety of social forces and 
guided towards believing in very specific form of progress—specific visions of what a 
successful young adult is, the promises of agriculture, ideals of work and discipline, and 
promises of meritocracy. Similarly, the land deals in Serbia that I explored are missing the 
dramatic evictions that accompany land grabs in Africa and Asia. They are a product of a 
much slower and less exciting process of years of industrial decline, rising corruption, and 
tolerance of an increasingly authoritarian government.  
And perhaps most importantly, resistance is then also less spectacular. All the 
subjects I spoke to are very well aware of the real problems they are facing, and often they 
look to be recognised by governmental practices, rather than to hide from them.150 The 
resistance I uncovered is more complicated than any theoretical framework allows: what 
exactly people resist, and how, is contextual and always both already shaped by the forces 
being resisted, and pregnant with the possibility of radical change.  
                                               
148 Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination. 
149 Li, Land’s End, 9. 
150 Li similarly observes that the highlanders she spoke to were perfectly aware of their poverty and wanted to 
change their situation. Li, 179. 
Katarina Kušić 
Chapter 6 | 257 
 
Second, more than just looking outside of the intervention, we have to allow our 
interlocutors to determine their own categories that sometimes go beyond the analytical 
confines of our research. Labelling actors as just “development actors”, “peacebuilders,” or 
“democracy actors” substantially alters how we might interpret their actions. While others 
have already criticized how the local is always seemingly concerned with the everyday, while 
the international remains the political actor,151 this needs to be even more strongly emphasised.  
In my fieldwork, this was perhaps most obvious when attending the Youth for Peace 
workshop that I retold in the Introduction. Throughout the week, we were interested in 
discussing Yugoslavia in ways that concerned us—people born close to its death. We were 
not interested in learning about techniques of negotiation and border dispute resolutions, 
nor were we entertained by trying to develop abstract peace agreements for made up 
countries—we wanted to talk about “post-conflict” as an experience, not as a concept. Post-
conflict there, without ever being labelled as such, meant wanting to talk about how promises 
of capitalism seemed removed from the realities in our countries, how democracy was 
reduced to party politics precisely through the peace agreement that we were supposed to 
now study in the abstract, and how peace means very little when we are a generation that is 
shaped only by the war’s aftermath. In other words, we did not understand ourselves as 
“peacebuilders” limited to the issues of ethnicity and borders that we were steered toward, 
but we considered ourselves political subjects, interested in locating our everyday problems 
within a political system not bound to any particular scale. Instead of focusing either on 
“ancient hatreds” or more recent “ethnic tensions,” we considered ourselves “as competent 
contemporaries caught up in complex problems of a wholly modern kind.”152  
Thinking back to this first encounter of my fieldwork, I cannot help feeling that this 
is the ultimate limitation of intervention scholarship—that it reduces the subjects to nothing 
more than the targets of those interventions, even when it tries to grasp their realities and 
experiences. It is precisely because of my own reliance on the conceptual confines of 
intervention—most visible in approaching my interlocutors as targets—that the disruptions 
that animate this chapter emerged. Being interested in political subjectivities involved in 
different improvement projects forced me to move beyond such conceptualisation and allow 
these actors to exist in a myriad of different ways, even when it led my research to things 
seemingly incompatible with a project on international intervention. And finally, being 
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labelled as a peacebuilder when I definitely did not feel like one, allowed me to feel a part of 
that limitation myself.153 
Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that the efforts to locate political agency on the side of the 
local rather than the international, and to conceptualise it as connected to, but not 
overdetermined by, international power, are doomed to fail if we remain with the conceptual 
confines of intervention. In the Introduction, we identified three characteristics of 
interventions that are implicit in scholarship that studies them: they depend on the separation 
of the intervener from those intervened upon along the local/international or 
domestic/foreign lines, they are considered as “discreet acts” that unfold in predefined orders 
and fields, and they are done to promote liberalism in places that lack it. This chapter has 
shown that in order to engage subjectivities that are targeted by intervention, we have to 
move beyond all three dimensions of that definition. 
This problematisation is captured in two moves that dislocate intervention: 
complicating subject positions and emphasising coevalness. Instead of the local and the 
international we see a multiplicity of differently situated subjects. Instead of discreet acts we 
are invited to see coevalness that goes beyond the intervention itself. And finally, this 
coevalness prevents easy divisions between liberal and illiberal parts of the world. As a way 
out the conceptual confines of intervention, the chapter presented the concept of politics of 
improvement—a notion which allows us to more fully engage local experiences and learn from 
them.  
In doing so, the chapter intervenes in two specific debates through a discussion of 
scale. The first one relates to a perceived tension between a focus on experiential critique 
that prioritises the subjectivities of our interlocutors, and a more structural approach that 
centres on power and institutions that make those subjectivities. The second refers to a 
debate on the nature of rule: in general, and as promoted in non-military international 
interventions. While the nature of rule is usually relatively clearly defined on a scale from 
liberal to non-liberal, it was particularly important in studies of neoliberal governmentality 
that depend on formal freedom through which subjects are made, and therefore conduct 
                                               
153 An important caveat here is due: by forwarding an argument for a wider appreciation of subject positions 
and experiences, I am in no way buying into the illusion of being able to “represent,” “give voice,” or “faithfully 
document” the complexity of political subjectivities we encounter. A project that is forwarded here is a reflexive 
attempt, rather than conclusive recipe.   
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conducted.  This dependence on formal freedom removed the international from discussion 
on governmentality due to its uneven nature, along with most non-Western places that have 
not developed into advanced liberal democracies.  
Politics of improvement, and their insistence on unthinking scale and theorising 
connections, intervenes in both of these issues. In relation to the issue of the starting point 
of critique, it argues that all critique has to move scales, oscillate between theory and the 
field, and stretch beyond both structures and experiences that we are presented with. Instead 
of choosing a “flat ontology” or being committed to analysing capitalism, the chapter 
advocates a less conclusive, yet more ambitious effort of thinking big while practicing 
humility. It is less conclusive because it does not provide diagnoses of success or failure, nor 
recipes for doing things better in the short-run. Nevertheless, it is more ambitious because it 
challenges us to think together things that are usually kept separate—global hierarchies, 
international politics, and everyday experiences. 
In relation to the debate on the nature of rule, it builds onto critiques of liberalism 
which see such separations—between the liberal rule of domestic relations and the lacking 
international, and between liberalism in the West and its illiberal outside—as reifying the 
liberal order and the exclusions and hierarchies that it entails. By complicating scale, it is 
obvious that any neat separation of the domestic and the international is impossible. One 
makes the other, and thus any account of power on a global level has to take into account 
both.154 By emphasising coevalness—connections between the West and its outside as going 
far beyond the intervention that makes one part of it—the chapter builds onto scholarship 
that argues against treating these spaces as outside liberalism. Such a view obscures the way 
that liberalism depends on creating its other—from early liberal political theory that 
depended on colonialism, to its current practices of nurturing subjects into modernity only 
to forever trap them as cheap labour for the production of modernity that belongs elsewhere.   
In this chapter, it becomes apparent that learning from the experiences of subjects of 
intervention necessarily moves beyond intervention itself. As we stop considering these 
people as only targets of interventions, we are invited to contemplate the complex politics 
                                               
154 Because I do not understand them causally, as one influencing the other, I stay away from literature that has 
tackled similar issues through studying interaction of two already existing levels: local/domestic and 
global/international. Even though these literatures provide important insight into many issues, they also work 
with an implicit understanding of levels as pre-existing the analysis of their interaction. Two bodies of literature 
are especially relevant. One is the second image reversed literature inspired by Gourevitch which discusses 
how domestic politics affect the international system, and the other is the EU normative power which studies 
the encounters between EU norms and local contexts. See Gourevitch, ‘The Second Image Reversed’; 
Björkdahl, Importing EU norms; Noutcheva, ‘Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance’. 
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that they navigate—how international politics descend into everyday lives, and how global 
power is made by individual decisions and dispositions. Moreover, this reorientation to 
thinking intervention and IR more generally from here helps us analyse international politics 
differently: as coeval, contemporaneous, and approachable through the lives of those usually 
not mentioned in IR textbooks. While situated in scholarship on intervention, the work done 
here has implications for a variety of literatures and efforts to produce knowledge—topics 
that will be pursued in the Conclusion.
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Conclusion 
 
At a dinner party towards the end of my PhD I was asked what exactly I study about 
the Balkans. I resorted to my easy answer: international intervention. By this time, I was 
fully aware of this answer’s failure to “change the subjects” of my study. In this formulation, 
I was still focusing on intervention, rather than on the experiences of the people living and 
breathing in spaces where interventions are launched. I ignored the slight feeling of 
discomfort, but another person at the table was fast to laugh off my seemingly easy answer, 
“ha, international intervention, the one thing that we all study in this region!” And it is true, 
the majority of English language literature about the Balkans seems to be interested in how 
the international intervenes in the local: what the EU does, how the local community 
complies or resists these measures, how opinions towards NATO change, etc. While the 
politics of funding and knowledge production could also explain topic selection around the 
Balkans, I think there is more to it. As critiques of Eurocentrism in knowledge production 
have shown, the knowledge produced in international academia gives agency to the 
international—the agency of those doing the improving, rather than those being improved.1 
This thesis started from the observation made by decolonial critiques of IR: IR is written 
about the West and from the perspective of the West, and the people living the reality of 
interventions are nothing else than “targets.” 
The simple answer that I had at the restaurant that night is that people in the Balkans, 
or in (semi-)peripheries more generally, cannot escape the realisation that everything they 
experience is an intervention of the international into their lives. From judicial reforms to 
personal choices about employment and migration, there is no issue that can sustain the 
veneer of isolation, no issue that can escape the need for catching up, no issue that is 
separated from what Li called the “will to improve.” Now, I do not believe that this 
imposition of the international on all aspects of life is different anywhere else—the global 
flows of ideas, capital, and people shape and have been shaping all corners of the world. But 
what is distinct about places that are outside of what we imagine as the West/North is that 
their view is directed to a goal that is not only absent from locations in the (semi-) peripheries, 
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but is actually present in others. To paraphrase József Böröcz, goodness, and I would add 
progress, is elsewhere.2 And the road to that progress is paved with projects that seek to 
empower and modernise, enable and build. It is paved with interventions in which 
programmers diagnose who is improvable, and design policies to help them. That was the 
starting point of this thesis: a wonder at the naturalised division between those who have 
peace, development, and democracy, and those who feel they lack them. Alongside realising 
the ubiquity of the division, I also had the feeling that the projects which engage this line are 
similarly omnipresent: judicial reforms, human rights schools, civil society trainings, summer 
camps, trade deals, technical assistance, reconstruction funds, and many others. These 
projects operate on all scales, target all aspects of life, and touch almost everyone. How they 
touch subjects is the question that animated this thesis.   
If I was allowed a longer answer that night, I would have said that I study how 
everyday lives are made in the intersection of scales, powers, and subjects. I wanted to 
discover the ways in which international intervention intersects with local contexts as it lands 
around the world, how it changes while it is changed, how it traverses and shapes, how its 
friction has a life of its own every time we invoke stability, markets, democracy, or progress.3 
I would say I explore how international intervention is made “our own,” how it is translated, 
stolen from policy documents, and turned into a structure that orients our actions and 
desires. I study the experience of “being improved.”  
I Chapter summary  
The thesis started with asking how we can approach subjectivities targeted by 
intervention and what we might learn by doing so. In response, it identified the limits of 
current approaches to local subjectivities and developed its own methodological and 
analytical approach. It practiced that approach in two empirical fields, and it discussed some 
analytical and methodological insights developed from the findings. 
Part I of the thesis contextualised the research question by emphasising the 
connection between subjectivities and forms of government, it reviewed some efforts to 
engage subjectivities that have been forwarded within IR thus far, and in conversation with 
their limitations developed my own analytical and methodological framework for doing so. 
                                               
2 Böröcz, ‘Goodness Is Elsewhere’. 
3 My reference to friction is to Tsing, Friction. 
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Chapter 1 brought to fore the “valorisation of the local” that has marked both practice 
and scholarship surrounding interventions. My own interest in the experiences of the targets 
is very much in line with the larger developments in practice and scholarship surrounding 
the local turn. However, the chapter problematised this literature in two ways. First, it 
challenged the novelty of the local turn by emphasising the long-term connection between 
subjectivities and government. This re-formulation raised the stakes of the research question 
by highlighting the link between local subjectivities and forms of rule that engage them. 
Second, the chapter defined specific shortcomings of the current approaches to the local. 
One is the location of agency, which is usually placed within the international, rather than the 
local. And the other is the embeddedness of local agency in international politics and the fact 
that we see intervention not only as the first engagement of the local with the international, 
but also as the only one. These two issues animate the rest of the thesis.  
Chapter 2 presented governmentality as a lens able to appreciate this connection 
between subjectivities and government. However, the chapter also presented critiques of 
governmentality studies which accuse it of erasing agency with its sole focus on power, and 
of erasing structures by its focus on capillary power and how it is practiced. Most 
importantly, governmentality pays insufficient attention to both agencies and structures that 
fall outside of government rationalities, which leads to an erasure of politics, contestations, 
and messiness that are constitutive of government as a lived experience.4 To ameliorate some 
of these problems, the chapter turned to ethnography as a methodology that allows access to 
the contingency that is usually erased from top-down studies. Moreover, the ethnographic 
orientation of the study used governmentality as a lens that focuses more on the subjectivity-
side of governing, rather than its rationality.  
The chapter drew from two loose bodies of literature—studies of international 
governmentality and anthropological discussions on the local. The fields are complementary: 
while IR moved downward through a focus on ethnography and practice in an effort to go 
beyond its fetishizing of “the international,” anthropology tried to move upwards beyond 
treating “the native” as an object isolated from the international. These discussions addressed 
the concerns of Chapter 1. Governmentality studies often fail to appreciate the location of 
political agency outside of the international because they focus on what is developed behind 
                                               
4 As already mentioned in Chapters 2 and 6, this project is also an effort to think about the way agency and 
structure are approached in IR. However, while remaining aware of the rich literature that approaches this 
problem conceptually within IR and more generally, the thesis provides a contribution as an example of 
empirical and analytical practice of thinking them together.  
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closed doors of supra-national bodies. On the other hand, ethnographic and other works that 
have turned to the local have a hard time conceptualising the local’s embeddedness within the 
international. Instead of offering a conclusive recipe, the chapter put the two literatures in 
conversation and thus provided ways to think about anticipated methodological and 
analytical issues. 
Part II went on to practice this framework. It started by situating Serbia in Chapter 
3 and went on to use governmentality as a guide for exploring how individual subjectivities 
are engaged by interventions in two fields in which various international projects target local 
transformation: non-formal youth education and agricultural governance.   
In the area of non-formal youth education, three subjects targeted by various NGOs 
and different European and US political foundations invoked different critiques of 
governmentalisation. These were the democratic guerrillas who needed direct funding without 
many strings attached, the political children who were invited to learn how to be politically 
active through building civil society capacities, and finally, the unemployed youth that were 
encouraged to learn how to invest in themselves in order to finally become a part of the 
“normal” international society. Following the temporal narration presented in Chapter 4, 
governmentalisation goes from giving money unconditionally, to slowly attaching conditions 
that guide, rather than coerce, subjects into becoming neoliberal citizens. These images were 
reconstructed for me in interviews and conversations, but the most obvious governmental 
techniques were discussed during workshop breaks, chats with participants, and 
conversations with young adults across Serbia and the region. These techniques required my 
interlocutors to turn themselves into enterprises in the form of continuous rankings, calls, 
and applications. Governmentality here points to the importance of concepts like 
entrepreneurialism, individualism, and responsibilisation.  
The chapter expanded this view of governmental practice and its economizing effect 
in two ways. First, the chapter highlighted that these individualising techniques both take 
part in and reflect a larger re-conceptualisation of the citizen, civil society, and the state. 
These changes were reflected in the ways that NFE and civil society developed. To 
demonstrate this, I built on ethnographies of civil-society-building in Serbia and Eastern 
Europe in order to argue that this translation resulted in projectivized politics. These 
projectivized politics use proceduralism and economism to purify politics of Balkan 
backwardness and socialist legacies, and usher them into the promised era of neoliberal 
capitalist modernity.  
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Second, the chapter paid attention to activation practices as well as to silences 
present. I observed these in the youth-produced document on unemployment, as well as in 
discussions about vocational education that were present both within the document and in 
the organisations I spoke with. In these settings, youth are not supposed to be striving for 
more, but are instead re-conceptualised as subjects who need to practice their market 
rationalities by getting factory employment through vocational education or by migrating 
out of the country.  It is this heterogeneity of scales, subjects, and power that is pursued 
further in Chapter 6.  
In agricultural governance explored in Chapter 5, the contemporary intervention 
implies the simultaneous transformation of three distinct subjects: the public servants that 
expected to transform the state along neoliberal lines using new institutionalism, the farmers 
themselves who are led to become entrepreneurs more responsive to the market, and the civil 
society that is supposed to participate in and mediate between the two.  Governmentality 
here is embodied in the subjects created in the project of agricultural modernisation. The 
public servants should competitively invest in themselves as human capital as they strive to 
build better institutions; the farmers should learn to respond better to market needs through 
innovation and adaptation to accomplish profits; and civil society should be there to both 
provide services abandoned by the state and to mediate between the state and the citizens.  
However, the ethnographic orientation of the study brought out two elements that 
would be missing from typical accounts of intervention. First, it uncovered the wider effects 
of intervention techniques that cannot be subsumed in the narrative of a successful or failed 
subject creation. It discussed issues like brain drain, experiences of working in the public 
sector, and the division between those producers who are expected to become entrepreneurs 
and those who are expected to disappear. These observations showed that tracking how 
government is rationalised is not enough to understand the experience of being improved. 
Instead, the chapter looked beyond programmes and practices of government and explored 
their wider effects. This did not only uncover experiences like the brain drain that complicate 
efforts of government, but it also pointed to the more implicit division between subjects who 
are approached by productive power and expected to improve, and those that are erased 
from policy and expected to be silent. Second, the chapter investigated land policy as a field 
which structures all other policies in agriculture (and thus the experiences of any 
intervention) but is technically removed from the concerns of the EU. In doing so, the 
chapter’s focus on subjectivity led beyond the fields of visibility prescribed by intervention 
itself. 
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Part III of the thesis stepped out of the field to see what might be learned from the 
thesis’ empirical practice. Chapter 6 pointed to disruptions that made me re-consider the 
constitutive concepts of the thesis. The disruptions refer to different subject positions, power 
relations, and fields of visibility that the empirical work highlighted, but that could not be 
subsumed under the narratives of intervention in the name of neoliberal governmentality. 
Specifically, Chapter 6 highlighted how both subjects and power are found in unexpected 
places, shapes, and scales.  
Subjects are problematised by stressing how the construction of the difference 
between Balkan subjects that need improving and their modern improvers gets translated 
internally within what we would consider “the local population.” This complicates the idea 
of governmentality working towards making the homo oeconomicus a universal anthropological 
fact. Instead, it is a very particular schema that works along other, more implicit 
subjectifications that visualize people making peace with their deteriorating situations, rather 
than being empowered. 
The concept of power was similarly unpacked. In this context, it could not be 
dispersed, subtle, and nurturing. Sometimes it was direct, determining who has the right to 
hope for a better life, and who does not. In its field of action, power became wider. Narratives 
of past projects still echoed in talks about markets, modernisation, and progress. This 
layering of projects beyond the official target goals permeated spheres of life seemingly 
removed from them.  
The fields of visibility prescribed by power itself were challenged as the thesis moved 
into personal lives of youth and their stories of migration and employment. In agriculture, it 
investigated how land policy is made at the intersection of local desires and global flows, and 
showed what a rich life the narratives of intervention have beyond the intervention itself. 
In making sense of these different understandings of the interaction between subjects 
and power, it became clear that my focus on the local was not enough. In the stories I tracked, 
I faced not only multifaceted local identities that could not be confined to an understanding 
of the local as offered in the local turn, but also an expression of the global and international 
that went beyond what my framework was prepared for. The international stopped being 
“above” everyday experience; it stopped being separate. It had a life of its own, not just in 
UN offices and EU missions, but in everyday lives. The people who I spoke to were 
navigating realities of late “transition,” and looking for their place in the world. 
These observations challenge the way we think about scale, and accordingly the 
chapter moved to distil different conceptions of scale. First, scale is discussed as identity, 
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which brings with it the binaries that juxtapose the traditional/illiberal/feminine/barbaric 
local to the modern/liberal/masculine/civilised global. However, scale also emerges in 
governmentality studies in a different way. Most notably, it emerges in debates around what 
exactly is governed by governmentality: individuals, populations, states, or the international? 
Lastly, scale surfaces around the expectations of our frameworks. Governmentality and 
ethnography are often relegated to a lower scale of explanation: governmentality because of 
its supposed commitment to a flat ontology, and ethnography because of its emphasis on the 
experiential critique. The discussion offered in Chapter 6 stepped outside of these debates to 
argue that conceptual clarity regarding scale might actually hurt, rather than help, our 
analyses. While it is important to stay attentive to the hierarchies implied in using the terms 
of local and global/international, and to discuss the politics of scale and how issues are cast 
at different levels of governance, it is also counter-productive to insist on an ontological 
separation of levels that would allow power or subjects to be contained to a specific scale. 
These conceptions of scale are themselves products of power, and as such, cannot be taken 
for granted.  
Such recasting of scale makes it possible to approach issues ethnographically, and 
simultaneously remain committed to learning about global processes. It allows us to navigate 
between understanding local experiences as mere expressions of global power and seeing 
them as removed from it. It allows us to see people as always the products of both their 
immediate environments, and of their global positionings—subjectivity is seen as not only 
experiential, but intimately connected to world politics.5 This has a direct consequence for 
the local turn literature. As we stop seeing the local as an alternative to the global and see 
the local and the global as constitutive of each other and “calling each other into being,”6 it 
becomes impossible to rely on the local as a simple “solution” for problems of intervention. 
Finally, drawing on the ways that power, subjects, and scale were problematised, 
Chapter 6 argued that the inability to resolve the issues of the location and embeddedness of 
agency is immanent to the concept of intervention itself. The three disruptions above go 
beyond the three defining characteristic of intervention: instead of discrete acts, we are 
forced to engage wider fields of action; instead of relying on the international intervening 
into the local, we locate a multiplicity of subjects that exist on multiple scales simultaneously; 
                                               
5 As already discussed in Chapter 1, here I do not make use of the different conceptualisations of “the 
international” and “the global.” Throughout the thesis, these terms are used as concepts of scale: I do not restrict 
them to the system of nation-states, nor do I subscribe to overly optimistic readings of “the global” as a novel 
cosmopolitan world order. 
6 Johnson, ‘Narrating Entanglements’, 385, 387. 
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and instead of liberalism as an ideal of freedom, we are faced with its heterogenous lived 
reality.  
Drawing on Tania Li’s work in The Will to Improve, the chapter presented the politics 
of improvement as a better conceptualisation of these processes. This conceptualisation helps 
us better appreciate the intersection of subjectivities and projects that target these 
subjectivities while promoting peace, development, and democracy. Politics of improvement 
involve a twofold shift: it approaches subjects and power beyond international/local binary, 
and it is attentive to trans-scalar connections outside the intervention itself—thus treating 
politics in different locations as coeval.  
The remainder of the Conclusion will once again summarise the answer to the 
question of how to approach local subjectivities of international intervention, and what we 
might learn by doing so. It will distil specific contributions that this discussion makes to a 
variety of literatures. These contributions include emphasising the importance of subjectivity 
and coeval thinking in IR, intervening in the debate around the appropriateness and 
possibility of governmentality frameworks, and highlighting the real promises and tenuous 
expectations of ethnographic methodologies. Finally, I highlight the thesis’ contribution to a 
specific reading of the Balkans with post-colonial and decolonial insights. 
II Thesis argument and contributions 
In answering the puzzle started in the Introduction, the thesis showed that we can 
approach subjectivities of those supposed to reap the benefits of international intervention 
by an ethnographic exploration of governmentality—reflexively studying the experiences of 
“being governed.” In doing so, we learned that the concept of intervention itself is limiting 
and will always be in tension with engaging experiences we are interested in. I argue that a 
more productive way of exploring the same processes might be through politics of 
improvement that do not depend on the usual scales of intervention.  
However, because the thesis advocated approaching both the researched and the 
researcher reflexively, the previous chapters also engaged a series of concepts: subjectivity, 
governmentality, liberalism as a lived reality, and post-colonial and decolonial contributions 
to studying IR. An aspect of ethnographic humility that the thesis advocates is treating these 
concepts not as finished “things” that we are free to employ, but allowing them to be in 
constant conversation with both our own expectations and observations from the field—this 
is meant by the imperative to think big by practicing humility. Because of this, the thesis 
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contributes to a range of literatures beyond intervention scholarship. The following section 
will highlight these contributions.  
i. Studying interventions differently 
Most obviously, studying these encounters as politics of improvement challenges the 
three defining features that the Introduction identified in the literature on international 
interventions: subject positions are more varied than that of local and the international, we 
cannot understand them by focusing on discrete acts, and instead of qualifying how liberal 
or illiberal their practices and outcomes are, we are invited to study liberalism as a lived 
reality. This changes both the objects and venues of critique. Most simply, the politics of 
improvement point to the less spectacular embodiments of international engagement with 
difference: there are no more bombings today in Serbia, there are no (direct) challenges to 
sovereignty, there are no white SUVs or secured international zones.7 What we see instead 
is a more ordinary, but vastly more pervasive process. We see liberalism as a lived reality 
that layers upon the Yugoslavian experiments with markets, corrupt transition, and IMF 
ideals. We see how the roles of the state, civil society, and individuals are constantly re-
negotiated through projects that cannot be described as purely local or international. We see 
complex hierarchies that serve to simultaneously position individuals within global 
geopolitics and local communities, and that aim at nothing less than normalising the level of 
hope that each individual is entitled to. These processes are not new exciting encounters with 
liberalism or spectacular instances of neoliberal dispossession; they are not broadcast on TVs 
and they do not fill the pages of IR textbooks. Instead of pointing to disjunctures through 
which we are used to conceptualising change, they point to continuity. Instead of pointing 
to difference and separation of units, they point to coevalness. These transformations that 
politics of improvement can examine are more subtle, but no less important.  
While the politics of improvement expand the range of critique to encompass more 
mundane aspects of political life, the re-conceptualisation could also be interpreted as halting 
critique. In arguing against the constitutive categories of intervention that I contend hide 
more than illuminate, there is a concern that getting rid of those categories will make the 
critique of international intervention more difficult. The majority of critical scholarship on 
intervention has focused precisely on the very real power imbalance that positions the local 
and the international in intervention—the international that intervenes in the local without 
                                               
7 For a similar point in Li’s work on land and the emergence of capitalist relations in Indonesia, see Li, Land’s 
End, 3. 
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legitimacy, in the wrong ways, and with adverse consequences. Seeing these processes as a 
politics of improvement points to a more difficult venue of critique, where everyone is in 
some way implicated, everyone incorporated in similar matrices of power, and where there 
is no “pure” resistance or authenticity that would present an unproblematic alternative. To 
paraphrase Li, we are faced with a world in which there are enough victims, but no easily 
identifiable villains.8  
The politics of improvement does not, however, preclude critique. Instead, it 
advocates a positional critique that is humble as it navigates between experiences of everyday 
people and the structures that make them, but that is also piercing as it avoids the 
straightforward divisions between the “good” and “bad.” In a way, it opens up the space to 
see that the “will to govern” is inevitable, but, as Li adds, it also creates space to examine the 
hierarchies of trusteeship that this will implies, and that we have to challenge.9  
ii. Subjectivity and coevalness in IR 
Another contribution of the thesis is an effort to change how we study “those being 
governed” in interventions.10 By focusing on subjectivities and how their experiences are 
made, the thesis included socio-economic questions to the usual “post-conflict” framing of 
the region. Moreover, it countered the depoliticisation brought by discourses that explain 
the failures of intervention by focusing on individual habits, mentalities, and norms. In 
Eastern Europe in general, and in Serbia in particular, the depoliticisation works not only 
through a focus on technocratic expertise and seemingly neutral economic theories, but it 
exports the very apparent failures to the subjectivities themselves. While it might be common 
in literature on the Balkans to focus on more spectacular issues of violence and war and 
ignore the reality of post-socialist economic transition, the socialist legacy is used to explain 
failures by invoking faulty values and norms. For example, attitudes toward public spending, 
a missing “entrepreneurial spirit,” and a general sense of entitlement are blamed for the 
failure to catch up with the West and the ideals that it stands for.11 A focus on how 
subjectivities are engaged by the politics of improvement complicates these readings and 
leads to new questions. 
                                               
8 Li, ‘Revisiting “The Will to Improve”’, 233. 
9 Li, 234. 
10 Stern, Hellberg, and Hansson, Studying the Agency of Being Governed. 
11 Jansen, ‘The Privatisation of Home and Hope’, 187. Makovicky, Neoliberalism, Personhood, and Postsocialism, 
especially the Introduction. 
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There are, however, issues that go beyond a more nuanced approach to subjectivity 
in studies of intervention. An image capable of including the quotidian enriches and even 
counteracts the “dehumanised” picture of IR that we are presented with: a picture populated 
by statesmen, high politics, experts, and interveners—people who we see as having political 
power, as opposed to everyone else.12 The bifurcation between the local and the global 
supports this view. As Heather Johnson argues, it “reproduces and concretizes the division 
between elite and marginalized, the powerful who sustain the dominant narrative, and the 
subaltern, who are silenced within it.”13 Writing about the “everyday,” Michael Niemann and 
Matt Davies similarly point out that it is precisely this imaginary of the international as the 
realm of “those people” that prevents asking questions that would “allow individuals to 
uncover the linkages between global politics and their everyday lives.”14 My focus on 
subjectivities in international politics captured precisely these linkages: how both the 
international and its subjects are made and remade in the interaction of international 
interventions and their targets. By using governmentality to focus on the connection of 
everyday subjectivities and forms of government, the thesis sought to not only enrich the 
existing accounts of intervention, but to “place international political life in all its quotidian, 
connected, and conflicted aspects at the centre of our research agendas.”15 This life, even 
though threatened by closures via teleological narratives of development, market 
rationalities, or the invocation of universals and expertise, is nevertheless political: it is an 
arena of contestation where claims are made from situated locations, alliances formed based 
on differing interests, and unexpected lines that divide or unite emerge.16 
Similarly to how political anthropology sought to find politics outside of the state and 
political parties, a project for which Foucault’s influence was crucial,17 a focus on subjectivity 
brings to fore the working of the international outside of high politics of states.18 Taken in 
this way, the experiences retold and interpreted in the preceding pages matter not only 
because they provide us with exciting new sites for studying concepts like intervention and 
neoliberal governmentality, but because they give us the opportunity to more fundamentally 
                                               
12 Vrasti, ‘Universal but Not Truly “Global”’, 65; see also Davies and Niemann, ‘The Everyday Spaces of Global 
Politics’, 561. 
13 Johnson, ‘Narrating Entanglements’, 384. 
14 Davies and Niemann, ‘The Everyday Spaces of Global Politics’, 55. 
15 Vrasti, ‘Universal but Not Truly “Global”’, 68–69. 
16 This vision of politics is in line with Walters, Governmentality, 80; Li, The Will to Improve, 23; Hindess, ‘Power, 
Government, Politics’. 
17 Curtis and Spencer, ‘Anthropology and the Political’. 
18 And outside the usual sites where we see the international challenged, like the refugee camp or transnational 
social movements. 
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ask how these things make the international into a lived reality. The international stops being 
something “outside.” We see it as something made in seemingly banal everyday situations—
it happens across multiple scales simultaneously.  
This corrective is an important contribution to the project of connecting subjectivity 
to the study of IR more generally. Asking “who the subjects of IR are” is important for 
scholars outside of intervention studies: many critics have pointed out the causes and 
consequences of the discipline’s orientation towards the perspectives and experiences of the 
West.19 Because of the centrality of the Western/modern subject, those outside of this 
position are relegated to frameworks such as transition, development, and modernisation, 
which see them in temporally separated levels of development—a development leading to a 
teleological culmination of capitalism, democracy, and peace. To use Johannes Fabian’s 
phrase, these subjects are “denied coevalness”—they are imagined as separate units that 
exists in a necessarily past historical epochs.20  
Read in this way, the difference between units is imagined as a temporal lag due to 
degeneration, something that can be fixed by a return to unity imagined as Western peace, 
development, and democracy.21  By approaching experiences of trying to “catch up with the 
West” as relevant for the study of contemporary political life, the thesis moves away from 
pursuing the “diagnosis” of what went wrong on their way to “Western” life and writes these 
experiences as coeval. The problems faced by my interlocutors are not consequences of 
belated developments that will be resolved with time, nor are they the expression of 
mysterious local propensities. On the contrary, they are products of contemporary political 
life.  
iii. Reconsidering liberalism 
It is this contemporaneity that forces us to re-consider readings of intervention as a 
meeting of the modern and the traditional, the liberal and illiberal.  As Nadarajah and 
Rampton pointed out, one of the consequences of the denial of coevalness is the story of the 
“encounter” between the modern, liberal West, and its traditional and illiberal counterpart. 
This story is made possible by a number of analytical shortcuts: a belief that the liberalism 
                                               
19 Arlene Tickner, ‘Seeing IR Differently’; Sabaratnam, ‘IR in Dialogue … but Can We Change the Subjects?’ 
20 Fabian, Time and the Other. 
21 Inayatullah and Blaney powerfully argue this point in their exploration of IR's failure to treat difference as 
anything else than a degeneration. They particularly draw on Fabian’s work that discusses “the denial of 
coevalness” that operates in anthropological explorations of “primitive cultures,” and Todorov’s work on 
difference seen as a degeneration of normalcy. Inayatullah and Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of 
Difference esp. Chapter 3.; Fabian, Time and the Other.  
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in the West and underdevelopment in the Rest are endogenous products of natural qualities, 
and a teleological narrative of development that centres on “catching up” and “evolution.” In 
the Balkans, this is usually retold as a tale of the East meeting the West, or sometimes in a 
slightly more nuanced rendering of the Balkans as a “bridge” or a “meeting point.” On the 
contrary, the preceding pages have shown that liberalism and illiberalism are 
contemporaneous. This builds onto existing projects that underscore the co-constitution of 
liberal and illiberal techniques. It also reconsiders liberalism as a temporality and as a quality.  
In regard to temporality, and along the lines of scholars who have emphasised how 
the East and the West are co-constitutive,22 the thesis problematised the idea that markets, 
democracy, and entrepreneurship are radically novel ideas that the Balkans first experienced 
with the “transition.” On the contrary, these ideas that so strongly oriented international 
intervention in the 1990s and continue to do so today are built upon histories of experiments 
with precisely these goals. Qualitatively, the thesis provides a contribution to those studies 
that argue that liberalism always works through a “heterogeneous character of rule.”23 
Perhaps most importantly, this tells us that any critique of liberal intervention, whether it is 
democracy promotion, development, statebuilding, or peacebuilding, has to account for 
contradictory processes that simultaneously nurture freedom and violently silence. Critiques 
dependent on finding exploitation will be faced with subjects who entrepreneurially embrace 
liberal freedoms and create pockets of prosperity. On the other hand, critiques that focus on 
dispersed government that nurtures freedom will be faced with violence, silencing, and 
exploitation. The power of liberal governance, and the interventions that it inspires, lies in 
the normalisation of the contemporaneous existence of freedom and constraint. This is a less 
conclusive, but I believe a more productive venue for critique. 
iv. Rethinking governmentality studies 
The thesis pushed governmentality studies in two ways: by complicating the 
success/failure narrative that finds “successful” governmentalisation in societies which 
operate without “illiberal” techniques, and by embracing the importance of both intent and 
reception of rule. This approach departs significantly from the IR debates on 
governmentality that focus on whether governmentality “works,” and on explaining those 
                                               
22 Collier, Post-Soviet Social; Hemment, Youth Politics in Putin’s Russia; Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism.  
23 Li, ‘Fixing Non-Market Subjects’, 43. Chatterjee makes the same argument when he describes how 
“governmentality always operates on a heterogenous social field, on multiple population groups, and with 
multiple strategies.” Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed, 60. 
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successes and failures. I did not set out to learn about specific phenomena in order to confirm 
or negate the “theory of governmentality” and accumulate expert knowledge applicable in 
different places. On the contrary, I set out to learn from events and ask how our new findings 
could make us reconsider what we thought we knew about governmentality, interventions, 
or local targets.24 Instead of asking how certain governmental interventions are carried out 
and how local actors, resistance, and knowledge are used, I asked how we might rethink 
social transformations through the local.  
In doing so, I stopped “looking for” governmentality and its conditions of possibility. 
Instead, I used the narrative of governmentality as a connection between effects, practices, 
and programs of improvement to help discern how the solutions to problems of improvement 
become so normalised that even the questions we ask are narrowly defined. Governmentality 
in this context translated between the experiences I listened to, the projects of improvement 
that engaged my interlocutors, and the bigger structural hierarchies that shaped their 
encounters. Moreover, instead of always pointing to practices that nurture freedom for its 
targets, it pointed to violence, silencing, and disappearance.  
This process uncovers the radical potential of governmentality studies as critique.  
Governmentality has a unique ability to converse between the micro and the macro, to 
connect subjectivities and global politics, to complicate the dichotomy between power and 
resistance. By highlighting how governance happens across scales and how it is always a 
combination of freedom and constraint, the thesis changes the questions from “looking for” 
governmentality, to inquiring how the politics of improvement can be illuminated by a focus 
on the ways that subjectivities are imagined and engaged in programmes of government. 
Focusing on effects rather than the success or failure of improvement projects does 
not make the gap between the intent of the improvement projects and the local reception of 
these projects obsolete. In Part II, it was very clear that government programmes and 
practices imagined a particular subject that would undergo a specific transformation. But it 
was also obvious that the effects of these practices go far beyond these planned fields of 
action. In making this distinction between government as a scheme and its reality as lived by 
its subjects, I join ethnographers like Li and Hemment who explore both intentions and 
receptions of different governmental projects.25 26 While I do not argue against those who 
                                               
24 This line of thinking is pursued in Mitchell, ‘Theory Talks’. 
25 Li, ‘Fixing Non-Market Subjects’, 35; Li, The Will to Improve, 282. 
26 Hemment, Youth Politics in Putin’s Russia, 38, 144. 
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emphasise that Foucault never intended to examine the real effects of government, this foray 
into the “real life” that Foucault intentionally eschewed is incredibly important.27 First of all, 
if we remained on the level of intent, we would never include those voices which are already 
erased. Secondly, we would not be able to make sense of the experiences of these intents that 
far surpass original plans and the scales we are used to.  
v. Ethnography 
Chapter 2 defined ethnography as a particular sensibility, stance, or orientation 
towards the manifold ways in which both the subjects of our research and the researcher 
herself are made and re-made. This becomes of the utmost importance when approaching 
improvement projects: they imagine subjects, engage them, scale and re-scale, and determine 
the ways in which we as researchers reach them. However, despite the important 
contributions of the ethnographic methodology that are presented in the preceding pages, 
the thesis also rejects ethnography as having unique access to reality or being a priori 
politically relevant because it “gives voice” to those usually ignored.  Others have emphasised 
that we cannot use ethnography as some kind of claim to “epistemic imperialism”28 or 
embedded into a universalist ontology which reduces it to a data-collecting tool.29 Because of 
this, I defined it as a stance, or sensibility, rather than a straightforward method. This stance 
allows us to question these concepts and our relationship with them, pushing beyond the 
limits of scalar thinking, intervention, and governmentality.   
However, we also cannot imagine that we are “giving voice” to anyone—voice, or 
agency, is not ours to give. In a recent critique of the (ab)use of anthropology and 
ethnography in Peace and Conflict studies, this was proposed as the ultimate goal when 
Philipp Lottholz argues that “giving voice” might replace “objectification.”30 While I agree 
wholeheartedly with the urgent need of disrupting power relations in research, I fear that 
assuming that we have the power to give voice might be committing the same mistake we 
sought to challenge—instead of assuming God’s view, this assumes a God-like omnipotence 
and an inappropriate political relevance of our research. Moreover, by assuming that we 
would want to give voice to everyone we meet falls in the old trap of romanticising of the 
local that was discussed in Part I of the thesis.  
                                               
27 This was addressed in Chapter 2.  
28 Dean, ‘Neoliberalism, Governmentality, Ethnography’, 360. 
29 Vrasti, ‘The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations’; Lottholz, ‘Critiquing Anthropological 
Imagination in Peace and Conflict Studies’. 
30 Lottholz, ‘Critiquing Anthropological Imagination in Peace and Conflict Studies’, 22. 
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Participatory approaches are the best-case scenarios in which we can be politically 
aligned with out interlocutors.31 I was largely unable to find those people. As Chapter 5 and 
its discussion of the complicated resistance to land deals in Serbia showed, the alliances I 
found challenged my own politics and forced me to re-examine my expectations and 
assumptions. Chapter 6 already discussed this by exploring the analytical tension between 
prioritising experiential critique, and the need to tease apart those critiques with the help of 
theories and other perspectives. However, remaining sensitive to the politics of location 
means that these tensions are not problems to be resolved, but productive disruptions. More 
than emotionally taxing, these differences were useful for contextualising the different 
positions that myself and my interlocutors brought to the discussions.  
Similarly to Hemment who discussed her collaboration with Russian colleagues and 
students, I was also preoccupied with the politics of representation (or the anxieties around 
them) more than my interlocutors.32 While I was afraid of “othering” the Balkans as corrupt 
or prone to violence, the people I spoke to rarely had such concerns. I was also more likely 
to examine these processes within global flows and narratives, while the people I spoke to 
were concerned with what the Serbian state does or does not do, and how that can be 
influenced by trans-national forces. Perhaps most importantly, just like in Hemment’s 
discussion of Russia, it was much easier for me to critique processes as the products of 
capitalism without acknowledging the radical right politics that have in many ways high-
jacked anti-imperialist politics in Serbia and Eastern Europe at-large. Explaining these 
differences helps, rather than hinders the discussion. 
Here lie the limits of an experiential critique that would always faithfully follow the 
analyses offered by our interlocutors. Anthropological discussions, contrary to what we 
might expect from a discipline so committed to the local, are aware of this. In juxtaposition 
to a Malinowskian tradition of fieldwork which views the local as knowing, and the 
anthropologist as the confused outsider, James Ferguson famously wrote that “none of the 
participants in the scene can claim to understand it all or even to take it all in.”33 In this world 
where “everyone is at least a little bit confused,” the question changes from that of who is the 
insider and outsider—what Chapter 2 addressed as cultural critique—to how different 
perspectives are made and what they “get” and “miss.” Accepting that the actors’ analyses is 
                                               
31 See Anupamlata and Nagar, Playing with Fire; Hemment, Youth Politics in Putin’s Russia, chap. 1. 
32 Hemment, Youth Politics in Putin’s Russia, 38. 
33 Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity, 208. 
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partial, however, cannot be productive without realising that the scholar’s is equally 
incomplete. In Donna Haraway’s famous formulation, “no insider’s perspective is privileged, 
because all drawings of inside-outside boundaries in knowledge are theorised as power 
moves, not moves toward truth.”34 Thus, the curiosity and ambition to know more than our 
immediate experience has to be paired with a humility that reminds us that more is never 
complete.35 
Admittedly, the cases where we can be politically aligned with our interlocutors are 
rare, and even when this is the case, trying to fit our interlocutors into the frameworks of our 
research and wider academia might be a waste of their time. But the added value of 
ethnography is in pointing out that the least we can do is allow ourselves to be truly 
overwhelmed by the complexity of human life that we encounter. It is a feeling that should 
not lead to paralysis or ethical dead-ends, but a feeling that should make us both curious and 
humble in our research and politics.  
vi. Methodology as a recipe and a tension  
The above reflection on the possibilities of ethnography as collaboration did not only 
help me “make sense” of my own positionality and feelings during fieldwork, but it became 
crucial in trying to write about the people and positions I encountered. Without writing 
“myself” into the research, this would not be possible. These disruptions are the key driving 
forces of the thesis. 
These disruptions included the challenge of reconciling my expectations with what I 
found, the juxtaposition between definitions from the literature and everyday 
understandings, and the anxiety that arose from the failure of the field to conform to the 
conceptual limitations of my framework. I did not do this only to write “myself” in the text 
(even though I believe this helped my case for “strong objectivity”) but I did so because these 
disruptions, tensions, and anxieties proved to be the fuel necessary for the analytical work 
offered in Chapter 6. It is through these disruptions and anxieties that it became clear that 
the experiences of those intervened upon cannot be subsumed to a study of intervention.  
And while I am sure that disruptions happen in all research, I wanted to explicitly 
state them here to open up space for a more general discussion about the confines of 
androcentric conceptions of science as always and already knowing. Rather than telling us 
                                               
34 Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges’. 
35 Li, Land’s End, 17. 
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“how we must see and what we must do when we investigate,” method can be recast as “slow, 
vulnerable, quiet, multiple, modest, or uncertain.”36 I hope that one of the contributions of 
the thesis is to complicate the view of methodology as a recipe unproblematically practiced—
not to argue against methodological rigour or consistency, but to argue against the hubris of 
prioritising concepts and frameworks over experiences. 
vii. Post-colonial and decolonial readings of the Balkans 
The thesis also presents a specific contribution to post-colonial readings of the 
Balkans, and discussions on coloniality more generally. First, it advocates for a deeper 
understanding of how different places are a part of the global system of coloniality even if 
they are outside of the usual colonised/coloniser dichotomy. And second, it studies how 
coloniality and difference are translated into everyday geopolitical positionings. By using 
concepts emerging from post-colonial and decolonial studies—such as administrative rule, 
colonial difference, and coloniality of power—the thesis shows how this body of literature is 
relevant even for spaces outside spaces that were directly colonised. Engagement with this 
literature is crucial for appreciating how forms of rule rely on hierarchies and exclusions. 
This literature is also invaluable for projects that seek to complicate teleological and linear 
understandings of social transformations. Importantly, using these concepts reflexively does 
not negate the specificity of colonial situations and the violence and suffering they wrought, 
but works to understand how central colonialism is for understanding contemporary 
constellations of liberalism and illiberalism, freedom and constraint.  
More than adding to the study of how this difference is produced between the 
seemingly liberal West and its illiberal counterpart(s), this thesis pried open the ways in 
which these hierarchies are translated and start operating on multiple scales both vertically 
and horizontally. In doing so, it builds onto a small, but powerful body of literature that 
tackles these issues through concepts of nesting orientalism, self-colonisation, and European 
and internal difference.37 It investigates how binaries of those deemed improvable, and those 
not worth investing in, are reproduced in narratives of improvement beyond the intervention 
itself. This was obvious in ways that young people made sense of inequality, and in visions 
of agricultural government that depended on one part of producers growing while the other 
was supposed to silently disappear. More than material inequality, these processes require 
                                               
36 Law, After Method, 4-5,11. 
37 Bakić-Hayden, ‘Nesting Orientalisms’; Razsa and Lindstrom, ‘Balkan Is Beautiful’; Kiossev, ‘The Self-
Colonizing Metaphor’; Böröcz, ‘Goodness Is Elsewhere’; Subotić and Vučetić, ‘Performing Solidarity’; 
Kilibarda, ‘Non-Aligned Geographies in the Balkans’. 
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the normalisation of this division in government. And the normalisation happens by a 
complex process of everyday geopolitical positioning that does not stop at state borders. It is 
this new life of old hierarchies that we have to engage if we are to makes sense of 
contemporary forms of rule. 
These oppressions, exclusions and exploitations are not invisible—internal 
hierarchies produce the lived experience of actually existing liberalism in Serbia. Many in 
Serbian civil society decry the treatment of Roma, the corrupt business deals, the subhuman 
treatment of workers that wear diapers because they are not allowed bathroom breaks. We 
hear about the racist treatment of refugees and the on-going othering and discrimination of 
Albanian and Kosovar Muslims. Yet, the critiques of these processes turn their gaze to 
Europe as a solution—as an entity both endowed with and dispensing goodness.38 The same 
Europe that first gave birth to racial thinking during colonisation is expected to teach others 
how not to be racist. The same Europe on whose shores tens of thousands are left to die 
every year is expected to teach compassion. The same Europe that fuelled its development 
of capitalism with colonial conquest and genocide is expected to teach law and benevolence. 
In writing this, I do not want to once again re-inscribe agency to Europe, nor do I 
aim to point to faulty EU policies. I write this because I want to highlight the devastating 
effect that the idea of Europe as a sight of goodness has for political imaginaries. This is the 
Europe that is imagined by youth when they condemn the Serbian educational system. This 
is the Europe that is invoked when dreaming about huge farms that are worked by drones 
instead of people. And this is the Europe that has to be tackled as we embark on projects of 
engaging with non-Western subjectivities. A Europe that hides its own coeval histories of 
development and dispossession, and its own heterogeneous character of rule. Imagining 
subjectivities outside these moral geopolitics equates to a denial of their agencies and 
connectedness.  
Moreover, this delusional vision of liberalism and the interventions that promote it 
are dangerously paired with the emphasis on “stability,” the defining feature of the region in 
the current international discussions. This vision of liberalism hides its exclusions and ways 
in which the betterment of human condition was always won through struggle, rather than 
the teleological march of history. “Stability” precludes any such efforts. Without offering 
policy advice, it is worth warning about the dangers of these practices that reshape, however 
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imperfectly, politics into projects and paradoxically remove them from the institutions, 
rather than the everyday.  
In the same essay that introduced the concept of European internal difference as a 
counterpart to colonial difference, Böröcz concludes that within the existing rule of 
European difference “any attempt at achieving autochthons goodness is futile”—goodness is 
seen as residing in Europe, and the only progress is imagined as emulation.39 While seemingly 
removed from practical discussion, the implication of this line of thought is great: there can 
be no local ownership, there can be no empowerment, and there can be no reformed liberal 
peace or development without a fundamental rethinking of the ways that colonial difference 
structures politics in every sense of the word. And the added value of post-colonial and 
decolonial voices is precisely this fundamental rethinking.40 
End note 
While we are highly critical of expert practitioners who travel around the world, 
delivering their de-contextualized, seemingly universal knowledge on a particular aspect of 
intervention, we still remain wedded to the idea that, unlike them, we can study a narrowly 
defined intervention. By paying attention to only intervention, narrowly defined, we can 
easily lose sight of what is important. Interventions, or improvement schemes, are presented 
as nothing less than transformation, betterment, increased happiness, or human progress. In 
an effort to measure and improve, we have broken down these large concepts into smaller 
units that we can “manage.” This process, while undoubtedly advancing both the scholarship 
and practices of intervention, is extremely dangerous. 
By focusing on that which we can manage, we lose sight of everything else. It is by 
ignoring the outside of intervention that we can talk about agricultural policy without talking 
about land, that we can talk about market liberalisation but not wonder what will happen 
with thousands of semi-subsistence producers in new EU member states, that we can talk 
about migration as a solution to economic problems that sees people who are migrating as 
rootless and mobile. It is only by ignoring the tremendous complexity of what remains out 
                                               
39 Böröcz, 130. 
40 Once again, this discussion also implies a different understanding of structures and agencies in IR. In short, 
this is because coloniality of power is ultimately a structural explanation but cannot be fully appreciated without 
the experiences of those who are erased, silenced, exploited, and harmed by it.  
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of sight that we can convince ourselves in our prescriptive authority of knowing what is good 
for others.41 
Like these experts who would benefit from thinking in a more problem-oriented way, 
scholars might benefit from pursuing the same path. Being problem-oriented would not 
imply being suddenly concerned with how and if an intervention will be successful, but 
instead pursuing the problem of engaging, and perhaps even improving, the issues we are 
interested in: whether that is constitutional ordering, security practices, agriculture, or youth 
participation. Truly starting from a problem would mean staying open to the idea that the 
intervention itself might not be the crux of the problem, even if it was intervention that 
originally animated our research.  
Perhaps the biggest struggle of this thesis has been the paradoxical realisation that I, 
like much of the literature I critique, also started from naïvely looking for “intervention.” 
Yet, the tension between the theoretical limitations of this concept and the politics of 
improvement I was faced with serve to highlight the potential of thinking with and beyond an 
ethnography of governmentality. Such thinking with an ethnographic attention to the 
experiences of those targeted by projects of improvement does not mean to imply “purer” or 
“better” knowledge. Paradoxically, it should motivate us to think big to frameworks needed 
to explain those experiences and remain humble when those same frameworks are 
challenged by the real world.
                                               
41 Inayatullah, ‘Why Do Some Know What’s Good for Others’. 
Katarina Kušić 
 282 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abazi, Enika, and Albert Doja. ‘International Representations of Balkan Wars: A Socio-
Anthropological Account in International Relations Perspective’. Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, February 2016, 1–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2015.1118998. 
———. ‘The Past in the Present: Time and Narrative of Balkan Wars in Media Industry 
and International Politics’. Third World Quarterly 38, no. 4 (15 July 2016): 1–31. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1191345. 
‘About the National Convention on the EU’. Accessed 23 February 2018. 
http://eukonvent.org/eng/about-national-convention-on-the-eu/. 
Abrahamsen, Rita. ‘African Democracy – Still Disciplined after All These Years?’. 
International Relations 27, no. 2 (1 June 2013): 241–46. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117813489655c. 
———. Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa. London ; 
New York, N.Y: Zed Books, 2000. 
Abul-Magd, Zeinab. ‘Occupying Tahrir Square: The Myths and the Realities of the 
Egyptian Revolution’. South Atlantic Quarterly 111, no. 3 (1 July 2012): 565–72. 
https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-1596290. 
Abu-Lughod, Lila. ‘Writing Against Culture’. In Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the 
Present, edited by Richard Gabriel Fox, 137–54. Santa Fe: School of American 
Research Press: Distributed by the University of Washington Press, 1991. 
Adler, Emanuel, and Vincent Pouliot, eds. International Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011. 
Ahmad, Ali Nobil. ‘Whose Underground?: Asian Cool and the Poverty of Hybridity’. Third 
Text 15, no. 54 (March 2001): 71–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/09528820108576901. 
Albæk, Erik. ‘Between Knowledge and Power: Utilization of Social Science in Public Policy 
Making’. Policy Sciences 28, no. 1 (1 March 1995): 79–100. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01000821. 
Albert, Mathias, and Peter Lenco, eds. ‘Forum—Foucault and International Political 
Sociology’. International Political Sociology 2, no. 3 (1 September 2008): 265–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2008.00049_1.x. 
Katarina Kušić 
 283 
 
Allen, Ansgar, and Roy Goddard. ‘The Domestication of Foucault: Government, Critique, 
War’. History of the Human Sciences 27, no. 5 (December 2014): 26–53. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0952695114538990. 
Amit, Vered. Constructing the Field Ethnographic Fieldwork in the Contemporary World. London; 
New York: Routledge, 2000.  
Angelovski, Ivan, Lawrence Marzouk, and Emma Graham-Harisson. ‘Tony Blair Advising 
Serbian Government 16 Years After Bombing of Belgrade’. BIRN and The Guardian. 
18 February 2015. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/tony-blair-advising-
serbian-government-16-years-after-bombing-of-belgrade. 
Anupamlata, and Richa Nagar. Playing with Fire: Feminist Thought and Activism through Seven 
Lives in India. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006. 
Anthias, Floya. ‘New Hybridities, Old Concepts: The Limits of “Culture”’. Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 24, no. 4 (1 January 2001): 619–41. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870120049815. 
Apostolov, Dunja. ‘On the Importance of a Strong Work Ethic: Etho-Politics in Serbia | 
Lefteast’. LeftEast (blog), 11 May 2015. http://www.criticatac.ro/lefteast/ethic-etho-
politics-in-serbia/. 
Appadurai, Arjun. ‘Discussion: Fieldwork in the Era of Globalization’. Anthropology and 
Humanism 22, no. 1 (1 June 1997): 115–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/ahu.1997.22.1.115. 
———. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Public Worlds, v. 1. 
Minneapolis, Minn: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. 
———. ‘The Production of Locality’. In Counterworks: Managing the Diversity of Knowledge, 
edited by Richard Fardon, 204–25. The Uses of Knowledge. London; New York: 
Routledge, 1995. 
Aradau, Claudia, and Jef Huysmans. ‘Critical Methods in International Relations: The 
Politics of Techniques, Devices and Acts’. European Journal of International Relations 
20, no. 3 (1 September 2014): 596–619. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066112474479. 
Asad, Talal, ed. Anthropology & the Colonial Encounter. Reprint. London: Ithaca Press, 1975. 
Autesserre, Séverine. ‘Going Micro: Emerging and Future Peacekeeping Research’. 
International Peacekeeping 21, no. 4 (8 August 2014): 492–500. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2014.950884. 
———. Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
Katarina Kušić 
 284 
 
Åslund, Anders, and Simeon Djankov, eds. The Great Rebirth: Lessons from the Victory of 
Capitalism over Communism. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2014. 
Ayers, Alison J. ‘Imperial Liberties: Democratisation and Governance in the “New” 
Imperial Order’. Political Studies 57, no. 1 (1 March 2009): 1–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00723.x. 
Baker, Catherine. The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. Studies in European History. London, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 
———. ‘The Care and Feeding of Linguists: The Working Environment of Interpreters, 
Translators, and Linguists During Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina’. War & 
Society 29, no. 2 (October 2010): 154–75. 
https://doi.org/10.1179/204243410X12674422128993. 
———. ‘The Local Workforce of International Intervention in the Yugoslav Successor 
States: “Precariat” or “Projectariat”? Towards an Agenda for Future Research’. 
International Peacekeeping 21, no. 1 (January 2014): 91–106. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2014.899123. 
Bakić-Hayden, Milica. ‘Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia’. Slavic Review 
54, no. 4 (1 December 1995): 917–31. https://doi.org/10.2307/2501399. 
Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group. ‘The Crisis of Democracy in the Western 
Balkans. Authoritarianism and EU Stabilitocracy’. Policy Paper, March 2017. 
Barkawi, Tarak. ‘“Defence Diplomacy” in North-South Relations’. International Journal: 
Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 66 (1 September 2011): 597–612. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201106600305. 
Bartlett, Will, James Ker-Lindsay, Kristian Alexander, and Tena Prelec. ‘The UAE as an 
Emerging Actor in the Western Balkans: The Case of Strategic Investment in Serbia’. 
Journal of Arabian Studies 7, no. 1 (2 January 2017): 94–112. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21534764.2017.1322753. 
Becker, Howard S. Tricks of the Trade. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.  
Behr, Hartmut, and Yannis A. Stivachtis, eds. Revisiting the European Union as an Empire. 
London: Routledge, 2015. 
Beier, Marshall. International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology, and the Limits 
of International Theory. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
Berkum, S. van, and Natalija Bogdanov. Serbia on the Road to EU Accession: Consequences for 
Agricultural Policy and the Agri-Food Chain. Cambridge: CABI, 2012. 
Katarina Kušić 
 285 
 
Bhabha, Homi K. The Location of Culture. London; New York: Routledge, 2004. 
———. ‘The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism’. 
In Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures, edited by Russell Ferguson, 
Martha Gever, Trinh T. Minh-ha, and Cornell West, 3. print., 71–88. New York, 
NY: New Museum of Contemporary Art, 1992. 
Bhambra, Gurminder K. Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
Bieber, Florian. ‘The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition 
in Serbia’. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 17, no. 1 (2003): 73–90. 
Biebuyck, William. ‘Food Supply and Government: A “Victualized” Reading of European 
Modernity’. Comparative European Politics 14, no. 4 (1 July 2016): 477–503. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2015.35. 
Bilić, Bojan. ‘A Concept That Is Everything and Nothing: Why Not to Study (Post-
)Yugoslav Anti-War and Pacifist Contention from a Civil Society Perspective’. 
Sociologija 53, no. 3 (2011): 297–322. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1103297B. 
———. ‘Europeanization, LGBT Activism, and Non-Heteronormativity in the Post-
Yugoslav Space: An Introduction’. Southeastern Europe 40, no. 1 (13 March 2016): 1–
12. https://doi.org/10.1163/18763332-03903012. 
———. LGBT Activism and Europeanisation in the Post-Yugoslav Space: On the Rainbow Way to 
Europe. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.  
———. We Were Gasping for Air: (Post-)Yugoslav Anti-War Activism and Its Legacy. Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2012. 
Bjelić, Dušan I., and Obrad Savić, eds. Balkan as Metaphor: Between Globalization and 
Fragmentation. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002. 
Björkdahl, Annika, ed. Importing EU norms: conceptual framework and empirical findings. Cham: 
Springer, 2015. 
Björkdahl, Annika, and Ivan Gusic. ‘“Global” Norms and “Local” Agency: Frictional 
Peacebuilding in Kosovo’. Journal of International Relations and Development 18, no. 3 (1 
July 2015): 265–87. https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2015.18. 
Björkdahl, Annika, Kristine Höglund, Gearoid Millar, Jair Van der Lijn, and Willemijn  
Verkoren, eds. Peacebuilding and Friction: Global and Local Encounters in Post Conflict-
Societies. Taylor and Francis, 2016.  
Björkdahl, Annika, and Stefanie Kappler. Peacebuilding and Spatial Transformation: Peace, Space 
and Place. Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2017. 
Katarina Kušić 
 286 
 
Blaney, David L., and Naeem Inayatullah. Savage Economics: Wealth, Poverty, and the Temporal 
Walls of Capitalism. London; New York: Routledge, 2010. 
Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit. ‘Intervention Theatre: Performance, Authenticity and Expert 
Knowledge in Politicians’ Travel to Post-/Conflict Spaces’. Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding 11, no. 1 (2 January 2017): 58–80. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2016.1260208. 
———. ‘Introduction: The Limits of Statebuilding and the Analysis of State-Formation’. 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4, no. 2 (1 June 2010): 111–28. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970903533652. 
———. ‘Journeys to the Limits of First-Hand Knowledge: Politicians’ On-Site Visits in 
Zones of Conflict and Intervention’. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10, no. 1 
(2 January 2016): 56–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2015.1137394. 
Boatcă, Manuela. Global Inequalities beyond Occidentalism. Farnham, Surrey, England; 
Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate, 2015. 
———. ‘The Quasi-Europes: World Regions in Light of the Imperial Difference’. In Global 
Crises and the Challenges of the 21st Century: Antisystemic Movements and the Transformation 
of the World-System, edited by Tom Reifer, 132–53. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 
2012. 
Boatcă, Manuela, and Vilna Bashi Treitler. ‘Dynamics of Inequalities in a Global 
Perspective: An Introduction’. Current Sociology 64, no. 2 (1 March 2016): 159–71. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392115614752. 
Bockman, Johanna. Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism. 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011. 
Bockman, Johanna, and Gil Eyal. ‘Eastern Europe as a Laboratory for Economic 
Knowledge: The Transnational Roots of Neoliberalism’. American Journal of Sociology 
108, no. 2 (September 2002): 310–52. https://doi.org/10.1086/344411. 
Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna, James Ker-Lindsay, and Denisa Kostovicova. Civil Society and 
Transitions in the Western Balkans. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=1122686. 
Borras, Saturnino M., Ruth Hall, Ian Scoones, Ben White, and Wendy Wolford. ‘Towards 
a Better Understanding of Global Land Grabbing: An Editorial Introduction’. The 
Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 2 (1 March 2011): 209–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2011.559005. 
Katarina Kušić 
 287 
 
Böröcz, József. ‘Goodness Is Elsewhere: The Rule of European Difference’. Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 48, no. 1 (2006): 110–38. 
Böröcz, József, and Melinda Kovács, eds. Empire’s New Clothes: Unveiling EU-Enlargement. 
Central Europe Review, 2001. 
Böröcz, József, and Mahua Sarkar. ‘What Is the EU?’ International Sociology 20, no. 2 
(October 2006): 153–173. 
Boulding, Elise. Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History. Syracuse University Press, 2000. 
Bradaš, Sarita. ‘Statistika i Dostojanstven Rad: Kritička Analiza Političkog Tumačenja 
Statistike Rada [Statistics and Decent Work: A Critical Analysis of Political 
Interpretation of Labour Statistics]’. Belgrade, Serbia: Fondacija centar za 
demokratiju [Foundation Center for Democracy], 2017. 
http://www.centaronline.org/userfiles/files/publikacije/fcd-analiza-statistika-i-
dostojanstven-rad.pdf. 
Brady, Michelle. ‘Ethnographies of Neoliberal Governmentalities: From the Neoliberal 
Apparatus to Neoliberalism and Governmental Assemblages’. Foucault Studies, no. 18 
(17 October 2014): 11–33. 
———. ‘Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethnography: A Rejoinder’. Foucault Studies, 
no. 20 (2015): 367–71. 
Brenner, Neil. ‘The Limits to Scale? Methodological Reflections on Scalar Structuration’. 
Progress in Human Geography 25, no. 4 (1 December 2001): 591–614. 
https://doi.org/10.1191/030913201682688959. 
Brenner, Neil, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore. ‘Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, 
Modalities, Pathways’. Global Networks 10, no. 2 (April 2010): 182–222. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0374.2009.00277.x. 
Bridoux, Jeff, and Milja Kurki. Democracy Promotion: A Critical Introduction. London; New 
York: Routledge, 2014. 
Brigg, Morgan. ‘Post-Development, Foucault and the Colonisation Metaphor’. Third World 
Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1 June 2002): 421–36. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590220138367. 
Bröckling, Ulrich., Susanne. Krasmann, and Thomas. Lemke. Governmentality: Current Issues 
and Future Challenges. New York: Routledge, 2011. 
Brown, Keith. Transacting Transition the Micropolitics of Democracy Assistance in the Former 
Yugoslavia. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2006. 
Katarina Kušić 
 288 
 
Brown, Wendy. Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. First Edition. New York: 
Zone Books, 2015. 
Bruch, Elizabeth M. ‘Hybrid Courts: Examining Hybridity Through a Post-Colonial Lens’. 
BU Int’l LJ 28, no. 1 (2010): 1–38. 
Bruff, Ian. ‘The Totalisation of Human Social Practice: Open Marxists and Capitalist Social 
Relations, Foucauldians and Power Relations’. The British Journal of Politics & 
International Relations 11, no. 2 (2009): 332–51. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
856X.2009.00366.x. 
Buckley Zistel, Susanne. ‘Frictional Spaces: Transitional Justice between the Global and 
the Local’. In Peacebuilding and Friction: Global and Local Encounters in Post Conflict-
Societies., edited by Annika Björkdahl, Kristine Höglund, Gearoid Millar, Jair Van 
der Lijn, and Willemijn Verkoren. Taylor and Francis, 2016. 
Buden, Boris. ‘Children of Postcommunism: Transitology and the Infantilization of 
Postcommunist Societies’. Radical Philosophy, no. 159 (February 2010). 
Bueger, Christian, and Frank Gadinger. ‘The Play of International Practice’. International 
Studies Quarterly 59, no. 3 (1 May 2015): 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12202. 
Bunce, Valerie, and Sharon L. Wolchik. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist 
Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011. 
Burawoy, Michael. ‘The Extended Case Method’. Sociological Theory 16, no. 1 (1998): 4–33. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/0735-2751.00040. 
Burawoy, Michael, and Katherine Verdery, eds. Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change 
in the Postsocialist World. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. 
Campbell, Susanna, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam. ‘Introduction: The Politics of 
Liberal Peace’. In A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peacebuilding, edited by 
Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam, 1–9. London; New 
York: Zed, 2011.  
Carothers, Thomas. ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’. Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 
(2002): 5–21. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0003. 
Cervinkova, Hana. ‘Postcolonialism, Postsocialism and the Anthropology of East-Central 
Europe’. Journal of Postcolonial Writing 48, no. 2 (May 2012): 155–63. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17449855.2012.658246. 
Cerwonka, Allaine, and Liisa H. Malkki. Improvising Theory: Process and Temporality in 
Ethnographic Fieldwork. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
Katarina Kušić 
 289 
 
Chambers, Robert. Rural Development: Putting the Last First. London: Pearson Education Ltd, 
2003. 
———. ‘The Origins and Practice of Participatory Rural Appraisal’. World Development 22, 
no. 7 (1 July 1994): 953–69. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(94)90141-4. 
———. Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last. London: Intermediate Technology, 2003. 
Chandler, David. Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton. 2. ed. London: Pluto Press, 2000. 
———. ‘Critiquing Liberal Cosmopolitanism? The Limits of the Biopolitical Approach’. 
International Political Sociology 3, no. 1 (March 2009): 53–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2008.00063.x. 
———. Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building. London; Ann Arbor: Pluto, 2006. 
———. ‘Globalising Foucault: Turning Critique into Apologia—A Response to Kiersey and 
Rosenow’. Global Society 24, no. 2 (1 April 2010): 135–42. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600821003626120. 
———. ‘“Human-Centred” Development? Rethinking “Freedom” and “Agency” in 
Discourses of International Development’. Millennium - Journal of International Studies 
42, no. 1 (1 September 2013): 3–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829813492184. 
———. International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance. 2. London; New York: 
Routledge, 2010. 
———. ‘Peacebuilding and the Politics of Non-Linearity: Rethinking “Hidden” Agency and 
“Resistance”’. Peacebuilding 1, no. 1 (1 March 2013): 17–32. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2013.756256. 
———. ‘Race, Culture and Civil Society: Peacebuilding Discourse and the Understanding 
of Difference’. Security Dialogue 41, no. 4 (August 2010): 369–90. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610374314. 
Chandler, David, and Oliver Richmond. ‘Contesting Postliberalism: Governmentality or 
Emancipation?’ Journal of International Relations and Development, 27 June 2014. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2014.5. 
Chari, Sharad, and Katherine Verdery. ‘Thinking between the Posts: Postcolonialism, 
Postsocialism, and Ethnography after the Cold War’. Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 51, no. 01 (January 2009): 6–34. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417509000024. 
Chatterjee, Partha. ‘Empires, Nations, Peoples: The Imperial Prerogative and Colonial 
Exceptions’. Thesis Eleven 139, no. 1 (April 2017): 84–96. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513617700040. 
Katarina Kušić 
 290 
 
———. The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World. Leonard 
Hastings Schoff Memorial Lectures. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. 
Cheah, Pheng. ‘Biopower and the New International Division of Reproductive Labor’. 
Boundary 2 34, no. 1 (1 March 2007): 79–113. https://doi.org/10.1215/01903659-2006-
028. 
Chesterman, Simon. ‘Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN 
Statebuilding Operations’. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1, no. 1 (1 March 
2007): 3–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970601075873. 
Chow, Rey. Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. 
Clarke, John, ed. Making Policy Move: Towards a Politics of Translation and Assemblage. Bristol: 
Policy Press, 2015. 
Clifford, James. The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988. 
Clifford, James, and George E. Marcus, eds. Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. 
Cohen, Roger. ‘Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?’ The New York Times, 26 November 
2000. http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/26/magazine/who-really-brought-down-
milosevic.html. 
Cohn, Carol. ‘Motives and Methods: Using Multi-Sited Ethnography to Study US National 
Security Discourses’. In Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, edited by 
Brooke A. Ackerly, Jacqui True, and Maria Stern, 91–107. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511617690.007. 
———. ‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals’. Signs 12, no. 4 
(1987): 687–718. 
Collier, Stephen J. Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2011. 
Comaroff, Jean, and John Comaroff. ‘Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second 
Coming’. In Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism, edited by Jean 
Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, 1–56. Durham: Duke University Press, 2001. 
———. ‘Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South African 
Postcolony’. American Ethnologist 26, no. 2 (1 May 1999): 279–303. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/ae.1999.26.2.279. 
Katarina Kušić 
 291 
 
———. ‘Ethnography on an Awkward Scale Postcolonial Anthropology and the Violence of 
Abstraction’. Ethnography 4, no. 2 (1 June 2003): 147–79. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/14661381030042001. 
———. ‘Reflections on Youth: From the Past to the Postcolony’. In Makers and Breakers: 
Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa, edited by Alcinda Honwana and Filip De 
Boeck, 19–30. Oxford: James Currey, 2005. 
———. ‘Reflections on Youth, from the Past to the Postcolony’. In Frontiers of Capital, by 
Douglas R. Holmes and George E. Marcus, 267–81. edited by Melissa S. Fisher and 
Greg Downey. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 
https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822388234-013. 
Cooke, Bill, and Uma Kothari. ‘The Case for Participation as Tyranny’. In The Case for 
Participation as Tyranny, edited by Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari, 1–15. London: Zed 
Books, 2004. 
‘Country Report: Serbia’. Study on the State of Agriculture in Five Applicant Countries. 
Arcotrass GmbH for the European Comission, 2006. 
Cox, Kevin R. ‘Representation and Power in the Politics of Scale’. Political Geography 17, no. 
1 (January 1998): 41–44. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-6298(97)00051-6. 
Crehan, Kate A. F. Gramsci’s Common Sense: Inequality and Its Narratives. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2016. 
Cruikshank, Barbara. The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1999. 
Curtis, Bruce. ‘Taking the State Back Out: Rose and Miller on Political Power’. The British 
Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (1 December 1995): 575–89. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/591572. 
Curtis, Jennifer, and Jonathan Spencer. ‘Anthropology and the Political’. In The SAGE 
Handbook of Social Anthropology, edited by Richard Fardon, 168–82. Los Angeles: 
SAGE, 2012. 
Dakowska, Dorota. ‘Beyond Conditionality: EU Enlargement, European Party Federations 
and the Transnational Activity of German Political Foundations’. Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society 3, no. 2 (1 May 2002): 271–96. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15705850208438837. 
Darby, Phillip. ‘Pursuing the Political: A Postcolonial Rethinking of Relations International’. 
Millennium - Journal of International Studies 33, no. 1 (1 January 2004): 1–32. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298040330010101. 
Katarina Kušić 
 292 
 
Dardot, Pierre, and Christian Laval. The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society. 
Translated by Gregory Elliott. London; New York: Verso, 2013. 
Dauphinée, Elizabeth. The Politics of Exile. Interventions. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013. 
Davies, Matt, and Michael Niemann. ‘The Everyday Spaces of Global Politics: Work, 
Leisure, Family’. New Political Science 24, no. 4 (December 2002): 557–77. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0739314022000025390. 
Deacon, Bob, and Paul Stubbs, eds. Social Policy and International Interventions in South East 
Europe. Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2007. 
Dean, Mitchell. Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. 2nd ed. London: SAGE, 
2009. 
———. ‘Liberal Government and Authoritarianism’. Economy and Society 31, no. 1 (January 
2002): 37–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140120109240. 
———. ‘Neoliberalism, Governmentality, Ethnography: A Response to Michelle Brady’. 
Foucault Studies, no. 20 (19 December 2015): 356–66. 
Death, Carl. ‘Counter-Conducts as a Mode of Resistance: Ways of “Not Being Like That” 
in South Africa’. Global Society 30, no. 2 (2 April 2016): 201–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2015.1133566. 
———. ‘Governmentality at the Limits of the International: African Politics and 
Foucauldian Theory’. Review of International Studies 39, no. 3 (July 2013): 763–87. 
Debrix, François. ‘We Other IR Foucaultians’. International Political Sociology 4, no. 2 (1 June 
2010): 197–99. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2010.00100_2.x. 
Diez, Thomas. ‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering `Normative 
Power Europe’’. Millennium - Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 (1 June 2005): 
613–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298050330031701. 
Diković, Jovana. ‘Neither Peasant, Nor Farmer: Transformations of Agriculture in Serbia 
after 2000’. Martor. Revue d’Anthropologie Du Musée Du Paysan Roumain, no. 19 (2014): 
149–62. 
———. ‘The Practices of Land Ownership in Vojvodina: The Case of Aradac’. In Property in 
East Central Europe: Notions, Institutions, and Practices of Landownership in the Twentieth 
Century, edited by Hannes Siegrist and Dietmar Müller, 268–88. New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2015. 
Dillon, Michael, and Julian Reid. ‘Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex 
Emergency’. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 25, no. 1 (2000): 117–43. 
Katarina Kušić 
 293 
 
Dirlik, Arif. ‘The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism’. 
Critical Inquiry 20, no. 2 (1994): 328–56. 
‘Dokumenti Poslaničkih Pitanja u Julu [Documents of MPs’ Questions in July]’. Archival 
Centre of ‘Vreme’. Nedeljnik Vreme, 1 August 2014. 
http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1218140. 
Donais, Timothy. Peacebuilding and Local Ownership Post-Conflict Consensus-Building. New York: 
Routledge, 2012. 
Dorondel, Stefan. Disrupted Landscapes: State, Peasants and the Politics of Land in Postsocialist 
Romania. New York: Berghahn Books, 2016. 
Doty, Roxanne Lynn. Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996. 
Dragojlo, Saša. ‘Dualno Obrazovanje Kao Subvencionisanje Investitora [Dual Education as 
Subsidising Investors]’. Bilten (blog), 13 July 2016. http://www.bilten.org/?p=14349. 
Dragojlo, Saša, and Nemanja Rujević. ‘Strah i Nada Zbog Dolaska Tenisa [Fear and Hope 
around the Arrival of Tönnies]’. Javno, 3 March 206AD. 
http://javno.rs/istrazivanja/strah-i-nada-zbog-dolaska-tenisa. 
Dragović-Soso, Jasna. ‘The Impact of International Intervention on Domestic Political 
Outcomes: Western Coercive Policies and the Milošević Regime’. In International 
Intervention in the Balkans since 1995, edited by Peter Siani-Davies, 120–35. London; 
New York: Routledge, 2003. 
‘Dualno Obrazovanje Prioritet Vlade i Privrede [Dual Education Is a Priority for the 
Government and the Economy]’. Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia, 12 
September 2016. http://www.pks.rs/Vesti.aspx?IDVestiDogadjaji=21005. 
Duffield, Mark. Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples. 
Cambridge: Polity, 2007. 
———. ‘Getting Savages to Fight Barbarians: Development, Security and the Colonial 
Present: Analysis’. Conflict, Security & Development 5, no. 2 (August 2005): 141–59. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800500170068. 
———. Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. London; 
New York: Zed Books, 2001. 
Dunford, Robin. ‘Peasant Activism and the Rise of Food Sovereignty: Decolonising and 
Democratising Norm Diffusion?’ European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 1 
(4 November 2015): 145–67. 
Katarina Kušić 
 294 
 
———. The Politics of Transnational Peasant Struggle: Resistance, Rights and Democracy. London; 
New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016. 
Dunn, Elizabeth C. Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of Labor. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2004. 
Edkins, Jenny. Whose Hunger?: Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002. 
Ejdus, Filip. ‘Local Ownership as International Governmentality: Evidence from the EU 
Mission in the Horn of Africa’. Contemporary Security Policy, 16 October 2017, 1–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1384231. 
Eliasoph, Nina. Making Volunteers: Civic Life after Welfare’s End. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011. 
Emerson, Robert M., Rachel I. Fretz, and Linda L. Shaw. Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes. 2nd 
ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011. 
Enloe, Cynthia H. Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. 
Second edition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014. 
Enroth, Henrik. ‘Governance: The Art of Governing after Governmentality’. European 
Journal of Social Theory 17, no. 1 (1 February 2014): 60–76. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431013491818. 
Erdmann, Gero. ‘Hesitant Bedfellows: The German Stiftugen and Party Aid in Africa’. In 
Globalising Democracy: Party Politics in Emerging Democracies, edited by Peter J. Burnell. 
Warwick Studies in Globalisation. London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2006. 
Escobar, Arturo. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
———. ‘The Limits of Reflexivity: Politics in Anthropology’s Post-Writing Culture Era’. 
Journal of Anthropological Research 49 (1993): 377–91. 
Euler, Dieter. ‘Dual Vocational Education and Training in Serbia: Feasibility Study’. 
Belgrade: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, 
2015. 
European Commission, ed. Youth Work and Non-Formal Learning in Europe’s Education 
Landscape: A Quarter of a Century of EU Cooperation for Youth Policy and Practice. 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015. 
Fabian, Johannes. Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014. 
Katarina Kušić 
 295 
 
Fairbanks, Robert P. ‘On Theory and Method: Critical Ethnographic Approaches to Urban 
Regulatory Restructuring’. Urban Geography 33, no. 4 (May 2012): 545–65. 
https://doi.org/10.2747/0272-3638.33.4.545. 
Feldman, Gregory. ‘If Ethnography Is More than Participant-Observation, Then Relations 
Are More than Connections: The Case for Nonlocal Ethnography in a World of 
Apparatuses’. Anthropological Theory 11, no. 4 (1 December 2011): 375–95. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499611429904. 
Ferguson, James. The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development,’ Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power 
in Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. 
———. Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian 
             Copperbelt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. 
———. ‘Transnational Topographies of Power: Beyond “the State” and “Civil Society” in 
the Study of African Politics’. In Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order, 
89–112. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. 
Fleming, K. E. ‘Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography’. The American 
Historical Review 105, no. 4 (2000): 1218–33. https://doi.org/10.2307/2651410. 
Forsey, Martin Gerard. ‘Ethnography as Participant Listening’. Ethnography 11, no. 4 (1 
December 2010): 558–72. https://doi.org/10.1177/1466138110372587. 
Forsey, Martin Gerard, and Jenny Hockey. ‘Ethnography Is Not Participant Observation: 
Reflections on the Interview as Participatory Qualitative Research’. In The Interview: 
An Ethnographic Approach, by Jonathan Skinner, 69–104. London: Berg, 2012. 
Foucault, Michel. ‘About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at 
Dartmouth’. Political Theory 21, no. 2 (1 May 1993): 198–227. 
———. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan. 2nd Vintage 
Books ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. 
———. ‘Governmentality’. In The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures 
by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and 
Peter Miller, 87–104. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
———. ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress’. In Michel Foucault, 
beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow, 
and Michel Foucault, 2nd ed., 372–340. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. 
———. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78. Edited by Michel 
Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007. 
Katarina Kušić 
 296 
 
———. ‘Subject and Power’. In Power, edited by James D Faubion, 326–48. New York; 
New York: New Press, 2000. 
———. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79. Edited by Michel 
Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008. 
———. ‘The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom’. In Ethics: 
Subjectivity and Truth, edited by Paul. Rabinow and James D. Faubion. New York: 
New Press, 1997. 
———. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1978. 
———. The History of Sexuality: The Care of the Self. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: 
Pantheon, 1986. 
Foucault, Michel, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. The Foucault Effect: 
Studies in Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
Fougner, Tore. ‘Neoliberal Governance of States: The Role of Competitiveness Indexing 
and Country Benchmarking’. Millennium - Journal of International Studies 37, no. 2 (1 
December 2008): 303–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829808097642. 
Fox, Richard Gabriel, ed. Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present. Santa Fe, New 
Mexico: School of American Research Press, 1991. 
Franco, Jennifer, and Saturnino M. Borras. ‘Land Concentration, Land Grabbing and 
People’s Struggles in Europe’. Transnational Institute, 2013. 
Frauley, Jon. ‘The Expulsion of Foucault from Governmentality Studies’. In Critical Realism 
and the Social Sciences: Heterodox Elaborations, edited by Jon Frauley and Frank Pearce, 
258–72. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007. 
———. ‘Towards an Archaeological–Realist Foucauldian Analytics of Government’. British 
Journal of Criminology 47, no. 4 (1 July 2007): 617–33. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azm010. 
Freedman, Rosa, and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, eds. Hybridity: Law, Culture and Development. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2017. 
Friedman, Jonathan. ‘Global Crises, the Struggle for Cultural Identity and Intellectual 
Porkbarrelling: Cosmopolitan versus Locals, Ethnics and Nationals in an Era of de-
Hegemonisation’. In Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multicultural Identities and the Politics 
Katarina Kušić 
 297 
 
of Anti-Racism, edited by Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood. Critique, Influence, 
Change. London: Zed Books, 2015. 
Füle, Štefan. ‘TAIEX and Twinning Activity Report 2012’. Belgium: European Union, 2013. 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/financial_assistance/institution_building/2015/act-
reports/11476_taiex_ibu_2012_english.pdf. 
Gabay, Clive, and Carl Death, eds. State-Building and Civil Society in Africa: Liberal Interventions 
and Global Governmentality. London; New York: Routledge, 2014. 
Geertz, Clifford. ‘Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight’. Daedalus 101, no. 1 (1972): 
1–37. 
———. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: Basic Books, 1973. 
———. ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’. In The Interpretation 
of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: Basic Books, 1973. 
Ghodsee, Kristen. ‘Feminism-by-Design: Emerging Capitalisms, Cultural Feminism, and 
Women’s Nongovernmental Organizations in Postsocialist Eastern Europe’. Signs 
29, no. 3 (2004): 727–53. 
Gilbert, Andrew. ‘Foreign Authority and the Politics of Impartiality in Postwar Bosnia-
Herzegovina’. PhD Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of 
Chicago., 2008. 
Gilbert, Andrew, Jessica Greenberg, Elissa Helms, and Stef Jansen. ‘Reconsidering 
Postsocialism from the Margins of Europe: Hope, Time and Normalcy in Post-
Yugoslav Societies’. Anthropology News 49, no. 8 (1 November 2008): 10–11. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/an.2008.49.8.10. 
Gilroy, Paul. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Nachdr. Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 2000. 
Giordano, Christian. ‘The Ethnicization of Agrarian Reforms:  The Case of Interwar 
Yugoslavia’. Martor. Revue d’Anthropologie Du Musée Du Paysan Roumain, no. 19 (2014): 
31–42. 
Gluščević, Slađana. ‘Obećali Veće Prinose i Profit, a Upropastili Karađorđevo [They 
Promised Higher Yields, but Ruined Karađorđevo]’. VOICE. Vojvođanski 
Istraživačko-Analitički Centar ‘VOICE’ (blog), 15 May 2016. 
http://voice.org.rs/obecali-vece-prinose-i-profit-a-upropastili-karadordevo/. 
Goldberg, David Theo. ‘Heterogeneity and Hybridity: Colonial Legacy, Postcolonial 
Heresy’. In A Companion to Postcolonial Studies, edited by Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta 
Katarina Kušić 
 298 
 
Ray, 72–86. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2005. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470997024.ch4. 
Goldsworthy, Vesna. Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998. 
Golubović, Zagorka. ‘Objektivna ili subjektivistička interpretacija “Otpora:” U povodu 
teksta S. Naumovića: “Otpor kao postmoderni Faust” [Objective or subjective 
interpretation of Otpor: A reply to S. Naumović “Otpor as the Postmodern Faust”]’. 
Filozofija i drustvo 32, no. 1 (2007): 215–18. 
———. ‘Šta je normalna nauka? Odgovor na drugi deo teksta Slobodana Naumovića u 
„Filozofija i društvo“ 3, 2007. [What is normal science? A reply to the second part of 
Slobodan Naumović text in “Philosophy and Society” 3, 2007]’. Filozofija i drustvo 35, 
no. 1 (2008): 325–30. 
Gordon, Colin. ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’. In The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, edited by 
Michel Foucault, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
Gordon, Edmund T. ‘Anthropology and Liberation’. In Decolonizing Anthropology: Moving 
Further toward an Anthropology of Liberation, edited by Faye Venetia Harrison, 2nd 
edition., 149–67. Arlington: Association of Black Anthropologists, American 
Anthropological Association, 1997. 
Gorton, Matthew, Carmen Hubbard, and Lionel Hubbard. ‘The Folly of European Union 
Policy Transfer: Why the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Does Not Fit Central 
and Eastern Europe’. Regional Studies 43, no. 10 (1 December 2009): 1305–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00343400802508802. 
Gould, Jeremy. ‘Positionality and Scale: Methodological Issues in the Ethnography of Aid’. 
In Ethnographies of Aid: Exploring Development Texts and Encounters, edited by Jeremy 
Gould and Henrik Secher Marcussen, 263–90. Roskilde: The Graduate School, 
International Development Studies, 2004. 
Gourevitch, Peter. ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic 
Politics’. International Organization 32, no. 4 (1978): 881–912. 
 
Graef, Julian. Practicing Post-Liberal Peacebuilding: Legal Empowerment and Emergent Hybridity in 
Liberia. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 
Katarina Kušić 
 299 
 
Gramsci, Antonio. Selection from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Edited and translated 
by Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Smith. Electric Book, 1999. 
Greenberg, Jessica. After the Revolution: Youth, Democracy, and the Politics of Disappointment in 
Serbia. Stanford University Press, 2014. 
———. ‘On the Road to Normal: Negotiating Agency and State Sovereignty in Postsocialist 
Serbia’. American Anthropologist 113, no. 1 (1 March 2011): 88–100. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1433.2010.01308.x. 
———. ‘“There’s Nothing Anyone Can Do about It”: Participation, Apathy, and 
“Successful” Democratic Transition in Postsocialist Serbia’. Slavic Review 69, no. 1 
(2010): 41–64. 
Greenberg, Jessica, and Ivana Spasić. ‘Beyond East and West: Solidarity Politics and the 
Absent/Present State in the Balkans’. Slavic Review 76, no. 02 (2017): 315–26. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/slr.2017.80. 
Gregory, Steven. Black Corona: Race and the Politics of Place in an Urban Community. Princeton 
Studies in Culture/Power/History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1998 
Greverus, Ina-Maria, and Regina Römhild. ‘The Politics of Anthropology at Home: Some 
Final Reflections’. Anthropological Journal on European Cultures 8, no. 2 (1999): 191–98. 
Grosfoguel, Ramón. ‘Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and Global Coloniality 
in the Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System’. Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 25, 
no. 3 (2002): 203–24. 
———. ‘Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: 
Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality’. Transmodernity: 
Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 1, no. 1 (2011). 
Gruffydd Jones, Branwen. Explaining Global Poverty: A Critical Realist Approach. London: 
Routledge, 2009. 
Guillaume, Xavier, ed. ‘Forum: The International as an Everyday Practice’. International 
Political Sociology 5, no. 4 (2011): 446–446. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-
5687.2011.00145_1.x. 
Gupta, Akhil. Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2003. 
Gupta, Akhil, and James Ferguson, eds. Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a 
Field Science. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. 
Katarina Kušić 
 300 
 
———. ‘Culture, Power, Place: Ethnography at the End of an Era’. In Culture, Power, Place: 
Explorations in Critical Anthropology, edited by Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 1997. 
———, eds. Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1997. 
———. ‘Discipline and Practice: “The Field” as Site, Method, and Location in 
Anthropology’. In Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science, by 
Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. 
———. ‘Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality’. 
American Ethnologist 29, no. 4 (1 November 2002): 981–1002. 
Gvozdenović, Nenad, and Zoran Knezevic. ‘Implementation of Improved LC Model in 
Serbia in Accordance with the Best EU Practice’, 584–94. Belgrade, Serbia, 2016 
Gusterson, Hugh. ‘Ethnographic Research’. In Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A 
Pluralist Guide, by Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, 93–113. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009. 
Hameiri, Shahar. Regulating Statehood State Building and the Transformation of the Global Order. 
Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230282001. 
Hameiri, Shahar, Caroline Hughes, and Fabio Scarpello. International Intervention and Local 
Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108242141. 
Hameiri, Shahar, and Lee Jones. ‘Beyond Hybridity to the Politics of Scale: International 
Intervention and “Local” Politics: International Intervention and “Local” Politics’. 
Development and Change 48, no. 1 (January 2017): 54–77. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12287. 
Hammond, Andrew. ‘Balkanism in Political Context: From the Ottoman Empire to the EU’. 
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 3, no. 3 (2006): 6–26. 
———, ed. The Balkans and the West: Constructing the European Other, 1945-2003. Aldershot; 
Burlington: Ashgate, 2004. 
———. The Debated Lands: British and American Representations of the Balkans. Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 2007. 
Hann, Chris. ‘Introduction: Political Society and Civil Anthropology’. In Civil Society 
Challenging Western Models, edited by Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn, 1–24. London; 
New York: Routledge, 1996. 
Katarina Kušić 
 301 
 
———, ed. Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies, and Practices in Eurasia. London; New York: 
Routledge, 2002. 
Hann, Chris, and Elizabeth Dunn. Civil Society Challenging Western Models. London; New 
York: Routledge, 1996. 
Hansen, Lene. Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War. London: Routledge, 
2006. 
Hansson, Stina, Sofie Hellberg, and Maria Stern, eds. Studying the Agency of Being Governed. 
Interventions. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2014. 
Haraway, Donna. ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective’. Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1 October 1988): 575–99. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3178066. 
Harding, Sandra. ‘Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is “Strong Objectivity?”’ The 
Centennial Review 36, no. 3 (1992): 437–70. 
Hatzopoulos, Pavlos. ‘“All That Is, Is Nationalist”: Western Imaginings of the Balkans since 
the Yugoslav Wars’. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 5, no. 1 (May 2003): 
25–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461319032000062633. 
Heathershaw, John. Post-Conflict Tajikistan: The Politics of Peacebuilding and the Emergence of 
Legitimate Order. 16. London: Routledge, 2011. 
———. ‘Towards Better Theories of Peacebuilding: Beyond the Liberal Peace Debate’. 
Peacebuilding 1, no. 2 (June 2013): 275–82. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2013.783260. 
———. ‘Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding 
Discourses’. Millennium 36, no. 3 (May 2008): 597–621. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298080360031101. 
Hemment, Julie. Youth Politics in Putin’s Russia: Producing Patriots and Entrepreneurs. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015. 
Heredia, Marta Iñiguez de. ‘Escaping Statebuilding: Resistance and Civil Society in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 6, no. 1 (1 
March 2012): 75–89. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2012.655567. 
———. Everyday Resistance, Peacebuilding and State-Making: Insights from ‘Africa’s World War’. 
New Approaches to Conflict Analysis. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2017. 
Katarina Kušić 
 302 
 
———. ‘Resistances and Challenges to Liberal Peace Processes’. Millennium - Journal of 
International Studies 42, no. 2 (1 January 2014): 515–25. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829813518256. 
Higgins, Vaughan, and Geoffrey Lawrence, eds. Agricultural Governance: Globalization and the 
New Politics of Regulation. London; New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Hilgers, Mathieu. ‘The Three Anthropological Approaches to Neoliberalism’. International 
Social Science Journal 61, no. 202 (December 2010): 351–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2451.2011.01776.x. 
Hindess, Barry. ‘Power, Government, Politics’. In The Blackwell Companion to Political 
Sociology, edited by Kate Nash and Alan Scott, Nachdr., 40–48.. Malden: Blackwell, 
2006. 
———. ‘Citizenship and Empire’. In Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, 241–56. 
Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005. 
———. ‘Politics as Government: Michel Foucault’s Analysis of Political Reason’. Alternatives 
30, no. 4 (1 October 2005): 389–413. https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540503000401. 
Hirblinger, Andreas T. ‘Land, Political Subjectivity and Conflict in Post-CPA Southern 
Sudan’. Journal of Eastern African Studies 9, no. 4 (2 October 2015): 704–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2015.1105443. 
Hirblinger, Andreas T., and Claudia Simons. ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Powerful: 
Representations of the “Local” in Peacebuilding’. Security Dialogue 46, no. 5 (1 
October 2015): 422–39. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010615580055. 
Hobson, John M. The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization. Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Horne. ‘Continuity and Change in the State Regulation and Schooling of Unemployed 
Youth’. In Youth, Unemployment, and Schooling, by Stephen Walker and Len Barton, 9–
28. Milton Keynes; Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1986. 
Horvat, Branko. The Yugoslav Economic System: The First Labor-Managed Economy in the Making. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2016 
Howell, Alison. ‘Resilience as Enhancement: Governmentality and Political Economy 
beyond “Responsibilisation”’. Politics 35, no. 1 (2015): 67–71. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.12080. 
Katarina Kušić 
 303 
 
Hughes, Caroline, and Vanessa Pupavac. ‘Framing Post-Conflict Societies: International 
Pathologisation of Cambodia and the Post-Yugoslav States’. Third World Quarterly 26, 
no. 6 (1 January 2005): 873–89. 
Hutnyk, John. ‘Hybridity’. Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no. 1 (1 January 2005): 79–102. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987042000280021. 
Huysmans, Jef. ‘A Foucaultian View on Spill-over: Freedom and Security in the EU’. 
Journal of International Relations and Development 7, no. 3 (1 October 2004): 294–318. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800018. 
———, ed. ‘Forum’. International Political Sociology 1, no. 3 (1 September 2007): 296–97. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2007.00019.x. 
Hutchings, Kimberly. ‘Liberal Quotidian Practices of World Ordering’. In Liberal World 
Orders, edited by Tim Dunne and Trine Flockhart, 157–72. British Academy, 2013. 
https://doi.org/10.5871/bacad/9780197265529.003.0009. 
Igarashi, Motomichi. ‘Genealogical Analysis of the Dispositive of 
Humanitarianism/Trusteeship: From Colonial Administration to Peacebuilding’. 
PhD thesis, University of Sussex, 2013. 
Ignatieff, Michael. Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. London: 
Vintage, 2003. 
Inayatullah, Naeem, ed. Autobiographical International Relations: I, IR. Interventions. London: 
Routledge, 2011. 
———. ‘Why Do Some Know What’s Good for Others’. In Global Politics: A New Introduction, 
edited by Jenny Edkins and Maja Zehfuss, 450–71. London; New York: Routledge, 
2014.  
Inayatullah, Naeem, and David L Blaney. International Relations and the Problem of Difference. 
New York: Routledge, 2004. 
Insajder. ‘O dualnom obrazovanju: Sindikati i aktivisti protiv, Janković traži povlačenje 
Nacrta zakona [About Dual Education: Unions and activists against, Janković 
demands the withdrawl of the Draft Law]’. Insajder, 6 June 2017. 
//insajder.net/sr/sajt/drustvo/5179/. 
———. ‘Arapsko ulaganje u poljoprivredu: Dobit šest puta manja nego što je bila pre dolaska  
investitora [Arab investment in agriculture: Profit six times smaller than it was before  
the investors arrived]’. Insajder, 24 July 2017. 
//insajder.net/sr/sajt/istrazivackeprice/6021/. 
Katarina Kušić 
 304 
 
‘Izveštaj o Konsultativnom Sastanku Ministarstva Prosvete [Report from the Consultative 
Meeting of the Ministry of Education and CSOs]’. The Office for Cooperation with 
Civil Society, 12 May 2016. http://civilnodrustvo.gov.rs/vest/izve%C5%A1taj-o-
konsultativnom-sastanku-ministarstva-prosvete-sa-ocd.37.html?newsId=725. 
Jabri, Vivienne. ‘Peacebuilding, the Local and the International: A Colonial or a Postcolonial 
Rationality?’ Peacebuilding 1, no. 1 (2013): 3–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2013.756253. 
Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science 
and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics. London; New York: Routledge, 2011. 
Jahn, Beate. ‘IR and the State of Nature: The Cultural Origins of a Ruling Ideology’. Review 
of International Studies 25, no. 3 (1999): 411–34. 
———. Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice. Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
———. ‘The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, Statebuilding 
(Part I)’. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1, no. 1 (March 2007): 87–106. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970601075931. 
———. ‘The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, Statebuilding 
(Part II)’. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1, no. 2 (June 2007): 211–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970701302847. 
Jansen, Stef. ‘After the Red Passport: Towards an Anthropology of the Everyday 
Geopolitics of Entrapment in the EU’s “Immediate Outside”’. Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 15, no. 4 (December 2009): 815–32. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9655.2009.01586.x. 
———. ‘Svakodnevni orijentalizam: Doživljaj “Balkana”/"Evrope" u Beogradu i Zagrebu 
[Everyday Orientalism: Experiences of “Balkan’/Europe” in Belgrade and Zagreb]’. 
Filozofija i društvo, no. XVIII (2011): 33–71. 
———. Antinacionalizam: etnografija otpora u Beogradu i Zagrebu [Antinationalism: An ethnography  
of resistance in Belgrade and Zagreb]. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek, 2005. 
———. ‘The Privatisation of Home and Hope: Return, Reforms and the Foreign 
Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina’. Dialectical Anthropology 30, no. 3/4 (2006): 177–
99. 
Jansen, Stef, Čarna Brković, and Vanja Čelebičić. ‘Introduction: New Ethnographic 
Perspectives on Mature Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina’. In Negotiating Social 
Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Semiperipheral Entanglements, by Stef Jansen, Čarna 
Katarina Kušić 
 305 
 
Brković, and Vanja Čelebičić, 1–27. London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2016. 
Jarstad, Anna K., and Roberto Belloni. ‘Introducing Hybrid Peace Governance: Impact and 
Prospects of Liberal Peacebuilding’. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and 
International Organizations 18, no. 1 (1 January 2012): 1–6. 
https://doi.org/10.5555/1075-2846-18.1.1. 
Johnson, Heather L. ‘Narrating Entanglements: Rethinking the Local/Global Divide in 
Ethnographic Migration Research’. International Political Sociology 10, no. 4 
(December 2016): 383–97. https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olw021. 
Joseph, Jonathan. ‘Governmentality of What? Populations, States and International 
Organisations’. Global Society 23, no. 4 (2009): 413–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600820903198685. 
———. ‘Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism: A Governmentality Approach’. Resilience 1, 
no. 1 (14 March 2013): 38–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2013.765741. 
———. Social in the Global: Social Theory, Governmentality and Global Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Pres, 2014. 
———. ‘The Limits of Governmentality: Social Theory and the International’. European 
Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (1 June 2010): 223–46. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066109346886. 
Joseph, Jonathan, and Milja Kurki. ‘The Limits of Practice: Why Realism Can Complement 
IR’s Practice Turn’. International Theory 10, no. 1 (March 2018): 71–97. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297191700015X. 
Joseph, Jonathan, and Colin Wight, eds. Scientific Realism and International Relations. 
Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Jovanić, Tatjana, ed. ‘Režimi sticanja svojine na poljoprivrednom zemljište [Regimes of 
acquiring property in agricultral land]’. Student Economic Law Review 4, no. 1 (2014 
2013). 
Jovanović, Vitomir, Jasminka Črkić Marković, Kresoja Milena, Savić Mirko, and 
Živadinović Ivana. ‘Social Dimension of Studying in Serbia’. Belgrade: University of 
Belgrade, March 2016. 
Jović, Dejan. ‘Disintegration of Yugoslavia: Critical Analysis of Current Interpretations’. 
Reč 8, no. 62 (1 January 2001): 91. 
Kaplan, Robert D. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History. New York: Picador, 2005. 
Katarina Kušić 
 306 
 
———. ‘The Necessary Empire’. The New York Times, 5 May 2017, sec. Opinion. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/opinion/robert-kaplan-european-union-
balkans.html. 
Kappler, Stefanie. Local Agency and Peacebuilding: EU and International Engagement in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Cyprus and South Africa. Houndmills, Basingskoke, Hampshire: 
Macmillan, 2014. 
———. ‘The Dynamic Local: Delocalisation and (Re-)Localisation in the Search for 
Peacebuilding Identity’. Third World Quarterly 36, no. 5 (4 May 2015): 875–89. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1025740. 
Kappler, Stefanie, and Oliver Richmond. ‘Peacebuilding and Culture in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Resistance or Emancipation?’ Security Dialogue 42, no. 3 (1 June 2011): 
261–78. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611405377. 
Karkov, Nikolay. ‘Decolonizing Praxis in Eastern Europe: Toward a South-to-South 
Dialogue’. Comparative and Continental Philosophy 7, no. 2 (4 May 2015): 180–200. 
https://doi.org/10.1179/1757063815Z.00000000061. 
Kelly, Mark G. E. The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Kiersey, Nicholas J. ‘Neoliberal Political Economy and the Subjectivity of Crisis: Why 
Governmentality Is Not Hollow’. Global Society 23, no. 4 (October 2009): 363–86. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600820903198644. 
Kiersey, Nicholas J., and Jason R. Weidner, eds. ‘Special Issue: Foucault and International 
Relations’. Global Society 23, no. 4 (1 October 2009): 353–61. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600820903198602. 
Kilibarda, Konstantin. ‘Non-Aligned Geographies in the Balkans: Space, Race and Image in 
the Construction of New “European” Foreign Policies’. In Security beyond the Discipline: 
Emerging Dialogues on Global Politics: Selected Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Conference 
of the York Centre for International and Security Studies, edited by Abhinava Kumar and 
Derek Maisonville, 27–57. Toronto: York Centre for International and Security 
Studies, York University, 2010. 
Kiossev, Alexander. ‘The Self-Colonizing Metaphor’. Atlas of Transformation, 2011. 
http://monumenttotransformation.org/atlas-of-transformation/html/s/self-
colonization/the-self-colonizing-metaphor-alexander-kiossev.html. 
Klein, Naomi. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Picador/H. Holt 
and Co., 2008. 
Katarina Kušić 
 307 
 
Knaus, Gerald, and Felix Martin. ‘Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Travails of the 
European Raj’. Journal of Democracy 14, no. 3 (2003): 60–74. 
Knezevic, Irena. ‘Free Markets for All: Transition Economies and the European Union’s 
Common Agricultural Policy’. In Globalization and Food Sovereignty: Global and Local 
Change in the New Politics of Food, edited by Peter Andrée, Jeffrey McKelvey Ayres, 
Michael J. Bosia, and Marie-Josée Mássicotte. Toronto; Buffalo; London: 
University of Toronto Press, 2014. 
Koddenbrock, Kai. ‘Recipes for Intervention: Western Policy Papers Imagine the Congo’. 
International Peacekeeping 19, no. 5 (1 November 2012): 549–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2012.721987. 
———. ‘Strategies of Critique in International Relations: From Foucault and Latour 
towards Marx’. European Journal of International Relations, 26 August 2014, 
1354066114538854. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066114538854. 
‘Komisija Zaseda, Njive Idu Investitorima - Agro Politika [Committe in Session: Land Going 
to Investors]’. AgroSmart, 11 January 2016. http://www.agrosmart.net/agro-
politika/komisija-zaseda-njive-idu-investitorima.html. 
Kozić, Svetlana. ‘Отимање Земље и Како Се Одбранити [Land Grabbing and Ways of 
Defending]’. Dosta je bilo, 29 September 2015. http://dostajebilo.rs/otimanje-zemlje-
land-grabbing/. 
Kraidy, Marwan M. ‘Hybridity in Cultural Globalization’. Communication Theory 12, no. 3 (1 
August 2002): 316–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2002.tb00272.x. 
Krishna, Sankaran. ‘The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical 
International Relations Theory’. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 18, no. 3 (1 July 
1993): 385–417. https://doi.org/10.2307/40644781. 
Kulpa, Robert. ‘Western Leveraged Pedagogy of Central and Eastern Europe: Discourses 
of Homophobia, Tolerance, and Nationhood’. Gender, Place & Culture 21, no. 4 (21 
April 2014): 431–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2013.793656. 
Kunda, Gideon. ‘Reflections on Becoming an Ethnographer’. Journal of Organizational 
Ethnography 2, no. 1 (19 April 2013): 4–22. https://doi.org/10.1108/JOE-12-2012-
0061. 
Kurki, Milja. Democratic Futures: Revisioning Democracy Promotion. Interventions. New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2013. 
———. ‘Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion: The European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights and the Construction of Democratic Civil Societies: 
Katarina Kušić 
 308 
 
Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion’. International Political Sociology 5, 
no. 4 (December 2011): 349–66. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2011.00139.x. 
Kurki, Milja, and Adriana Sinclair. ‘Hidden in Plain Sight: Constructivist Treatment of 
Social Context and Its Limitations’. International Politics 47, no. 1 (1 January 2010): 
1–25. https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2009.29. 
Kurowska, Xymena. ‘Practicality by Judgement: Transnational Interpreters of Local 
Ownership in the Polish-Ukrainian Border Reform Encounter’. Journal of 
International Relations and Development 17, no. 4 (2013): 545–65. 
Kürti, László, and Peter Skalník, eds. Postsocialist Europe: Anthropological Perspectives from 
Home. New York: Berghahn Books, 2009. 
Kutay, Acar. Governance and European Civil Society: Governmentality, Discourse and NGOs. 
London: Routledge, 2014. 
Laffey, Mark, and Suthaharan Nadarajah. ‘The Hybridity of Liberal Peace: States, 
Diasporas and Insecurity’. Security Dialogue 43, no. 5 (1 October 2012): 403–20. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010612457974. 
Lai, Daniela. ‘Transitional Justice and Its Discontents: Socioeconomic Justice in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Limits of International Intervention’. Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding 10, no. 3 (2 July 2016): 361–81. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2016.1199478. 
———. ‘Transitional Justice as Redistribution: Socioeconomic (In)Justice and the Limits 
of International Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Department of Politics and 
International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2017. 
Larner, Wendy. ‘Neo-Liberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality’. Studies in Political 
Economy 63, no. 0 (2000): 5–25. 
Larner, Wendy, and William Walters, eds. Global Governmentality: Governing International 
Spaces. London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2004. 
Law, John. After Method: Mess in Social Science Research. London: Routledge, 2007. 
Lazić, Milan. Poljoprivredna proizvodnja u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji (1919-1940. godine) [Agricultural 
Production in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1919-1940)]. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i 
nastavna sredstva, 1999. 
Lederach, John Paul. Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures. Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse Univ. Press, 2008. 
———. The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005. 
Katarina Kušić 
 309 
 
Lemke, Thomas. ‘Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique’. Rethinking Marxism 14, no. 3 (1 
September 2002): 49–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/089356902101242288. 
Lendvai, Noemi. ‘Europeanization of Social Policy? Prospects and Challenges for South 
East Europe’. In Social Policy and International Interventions in South East Europe, edited 
by Bob Deacon and Paul Stubbs, 1–21. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007. 
Lendvai, Noémi, and Paul Stubbs. ‘Assemblages, Translation, and Intermediaries in South 
East Europe’. European Societies 11, no. 5 (1 December 2009): 673–95. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14616690802475504. 
Levi-Strauss, Claude. ‘Anthropology: Its Achievements and Future’. Current Anthropology 7, 
no. 2 (1 April 1966): 124–27. https://doi.org/10.2307/2740022. 
Lewis, David, and David Mosse. Development Brokers and Translators: The Ethnography of Aid 
and Agencies. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2006. 
Ley, David. ‘Transnational Spaces and Everyday Lives’. Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 29, no. 2 (2004): 151–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-
2754.2004.00122.x. 
Li, Tania Murray. ‘Beyond “The State” and Failed Schemes’. American Anthropologist, New 
Series, 107, no. 3 (1 September 2005): 383–94. 
———. ‘Fixing Non-Market Subjects: Governing Land and Population in the Global  
South’. Foucault Studies, no. 18 (17 October 2014): 34–48. 
———. ‘Governmentality’. Anthropologica 49, no. 2 (1 January 2007): 275–81. 
———. Land’s End: Capitalist Relations on an Indigenous Frontier. Durham; London: Duke 
University Press, 2014. 
———. ‘Revisiting “The Will to Improve”’. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 
100, no. 1 (January 2010): 233–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/00045600903423790. 
———. ‘Social Reproduction, Situated Politics, and The Will to Improve’. Focaal 2008, no. 
52 (1 December 2008): 111–18. https://doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2008.520107. 
———. The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2007. 
Lidén, Kristoffer. ‘Building Peace between Global and Local Politics: The Cosmopolitical 
Ethics of Liberal Peacebuilding’. International Peacekeeping 16, no. 5 (1 November 
2009): 616–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310903303255. 
Lie, Jon Harald Sande. ‘Challenging Anthropology: Anthropological Reflections on the 
Ethnographic Turn in International Relations’. Millennium - Journal of International 
Katarina Kušić 
 310 
 
Studies 41, no. 2 (1 January 2013): 201–20. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829812463835. 
Lippert, Randy K, and Michelle Brady. Governing Practices: Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and 
the Ethnographic Imaginary. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016. 
Lipschutz, Ronnie D., and James K. Rowe. Globalization, Governmentality and Global Politics 
Regulation for the Rest of Us? London; New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Lottholz, Philipp. ‘Critiquing Anthropological Imagination in Peace and Conflict Studies: 
From Empiricist Positivism to a Dialogical Approach in Ethnographic Peace 
Research’. International Peacekeeping, 18 July 2017, 1–26. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2017.1350576. 
Löwenheim, Oded. ‘Examining the State: A Foucauldian Perspective on International 
“Governance Indicators”’. Third World Quarterly 29, no. 2 (February 2008): 255–74. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590701806814. 
Ludden, David. ‘Orientalist Empiricism: Transformations of Colonial Knowledge’. In 
Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament Perspectives on South Asia, edited by Carol 
Appadurai Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, 250–78. Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1993. 
Lukač, Dragan, and Branislav Gulan. ‘The Agroindustry of the Republic of Serbia and 
European Integrations’. In Development of Agriculture and Rural Areas in Central and 
Eastern Europe, edited by Danilo Tomić and Miladin Ševarlić, 657–64. Novi Sad, 
Serbia, 2007. 
Lukić, Aleksandar, and Orlanda Obad. ‘New Actors in Rural Development - The LEADER 
Approach and Projectification in Rural Croatia’. Sociologija i Prostor 54, no. 1 (22 April 
2016): 71–90. https://doi.org/10.5673/sip.54.1.4. 
Luković, Jovica. ‘The Country Road to Revolution: Transforming Individual Peasant 
Property into Socialist Property in Yugoslavia, 1945–1953’. In Property in East Central 
Europe: Notions, Institutions, and Practices of Landownership in the Twentieth Century, edited 
by Hannes Siegrist and Dietmar Müller, 163–90. New York: Berghahn Books, 2015. 
MacGinty, Roger. ‘Everyday Peace: Bottom-up and Local Agency in Conflict-Affected 
Societies’. Security Dialogue 45, no. 6 (1 December 2014): 548–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614550899. 
———. International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
Katarina Kušić 
 311 
 
———. ‘Introduction: The Transcripts of Peace: Public, Hidden or Non-Obvious?’ Journal 
of Intervention and Statebuilding 7, no. 4 (1 December 2013): 423–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2012.727535. 
———. ‘Where Is the Local? Critical Localism and Peacebuilding’. Third World Quarterly 36, 
no. 5 (4 May 2015): 840–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1045482. 
MacGinty, Roger, and Oliver P Richmond. ‘The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical 
Agenda for Peace’. Third World Quarterly 34, no. 5 (1 June 2013): 763–83. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.800750. 
MacMillan, John. ‘Intervention and the Ordering of the Modern World’. Review of 
International Studies 39, no. 05 (December 2013): 1039–1056. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210513000223. 
Madra, Yahya M., and Ceren Özselçuk. ‘Jouissance and Antagonism in the Forms of the 
Commune: A Critique of Biopolitical Subjectivity’. Rethinking Marxism 22, no. 3 (1 
July 2010): 481–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2010.490409. 
Makovicky, Nicolette, ed. Neoliberalism, Personhood, and Postsocialism: Enterprising Selves in 
Changing Economies. Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2014. 
Malinowski, Bronislaw. Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and 
Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea. London: Routledge, 2002. 
Malmvig, Helle. ‘Free Us from Power: Governmentality, Counter-Conduct, and Simulation 
in European Democracy and Reform Promotion in the Arab World’. International 
Political Sociology 8, no. 3 (1 September 2014): 293–310. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ips.12055. 
Mani, Lata. ‘Multiple Mediations: Feminist Scholarship in the Age of Multinational 
Reception’. Feminist Review, no. 35 (1990): 24–41. https://doi.org/10.2307/1395398. 
Marc DuBois. ‘The Governance of the Third World: A Foucauldian Perspective on Power 
Relations in Development’. Alternatives 16, no. 1 (1 January 1991): 1–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/030437549101600101. 
Marcus, George E. ‘Contemporary Problems of Ethnography in the Modern World System’. 
In Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, edited by James Clifford and 
George E. Marcus, 165–93. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1986. 
———. ‘Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited 
Ethnography’. Annual Review of Anthropology 24, no. 1 (1995): 95–117. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.an.24.100195.000523. 
———. Ethnography through Thick and Thin. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2010. 
Katarina Kušić 
 312 
 
———. ‘How Short Can Fieldwork Be?’ Social Anthropology 15, no. 3 (1 October 2007): 353–
57. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0964-0282.2007.00025_1.x. 
Marcus, George E., and Michael M. J. Fischer. Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An 
Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1986. 
Marcus, George E., and Judith Okely. ‘Debate Section’. Social Anthropology 15, no. 3 (1 
October 2007): 353–67. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0964-0282.2007.00025_1.x. 
Marković, Kristina. Postdiplomski Tutanj. Belgrade, Serbia, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L84cLDtmSvk. 
Marotta, Vince P. ‘The Hybrid Self and the Ambivalence of Boundaries’. Social Identities 14, 
no. 3 (1 May 2008): 295–312. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630802088052. 
Marston, Sallie A. ‘The Social Construction of Scale’. Progress in Human Geography 24, no. 2 
(1 June 2000): 219–42. https://doi.org/10.1191/030913200674086272. 
Marston, Sallie A, John Paul Jones, and Keith Woodward. ‘Human Geography without 
Scale’. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30, no. 4 (1 December 2005): 
416–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2005.00180.x. 
Massey, Doreen B. For Space. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE, 2005. 
McNay, Lois. ‘Self as Enterprise: Dilemmas of Control and Resistance in Foucault’s The  
Birth of Biopolitics’. Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 6 (1 November 2009): 55–77. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276409347697. 
McVicker, Charles P. ‘Chapter 6: Major Agricultural Reforms’. In Titoism: Pattern for 
International Communism, 107–35. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd, 1957. 
Melegh, Attila. On the East-West Slope: Globalization, Nationalism, Racism and Discourses on 
Eastern Europe. New York: Central European University Press, 2006. 
Mercer, Claire. ‘NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization: A Critical Review of the 
Literature’. Progress in Development Studies 2, no. 1 (1 January 2002): 5–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1191/1464993402ps027ra. 
Merlingen, Michael. ‘Applying Foucault’s Toolkit to CSDP’. In Explaining the EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy, edited by Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer, 188–211. 
Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
———. ‘Monster Studies’. International Political Sociology 2, no. 3 (September 2008): 272–74. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2008.00049_5.x 
———. Two Modes of Empirically Exploring the Arts of Global Governance: 
Poststructuralist and Realist Historical Materialist’, n.d. 
Katarina Kušić 
 313 
 
https://www.academia.edu/10435862/Two_Modes_of_Empirically_Exploring_the_
Arts_of_Global_Governance_Poststructuralist_and_Realist_Historical_Materialist. 
Merlingen, Michael, and Rasa Ostrauskaite. European Union Peacebuilding and Policing 
Governance and the European Security and Defence Policy. London; New York: Routledge, 
2006. 
Miklian, Jason, Kristoffer Lidén, and Åshild Kolås. ‘The Perils of “Going Local”: Liberal 
Peace-Building Agendas in Nepal’. Conflict, Security & Development 11, no. 3 (July 
2011): 285–308. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2011.593809. 
Mikuš, Marek. ‘Civil Society and EU Integration of Serbia: Towards a Historical 
Anthropology of Globalizing Postsocialist Europe’. In Rethinking Ethnography in 
Central Europe, edited by Hana Cervinkova, Michal Buchowski, and Zdenek Uherek, 
147–71, 2015.  
———. ‘Civil-Society Building, “Advanced Liberal” Governmentality and the State in 
Serbia’. Working Paper. QEH Working Paper Series. Oxford: Department of 
International Development, University of Oxford, 2011. 
———. ‘“European Serbia” and Its “Civil” Discontents: Beyond Liberal Narratives of 
Modernisation’. Working Paper. Graz: Center for Southeast European Studies, June 
2013. 
———. ‘Informal Networks and Interstitial Arenas of Power in the Making of Civil Society 
Law in Serbia’. Sociologija 57, no. 4 (2015): 571–92. 
https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1504571M. 
———. ‘Public Advocacy in Serbia: Translating Democratisation in a Double 
Semiperiphery’. Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Paper 
Series. Halle/Saale: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2017. 
———. ‘The Justice of Neoliberalism: Moral Ideology and Redistributive Politics of Public-
Sector Retrenchment in Serbia’. Social Anthropology 24, no. 2 (May 2016): 211–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8676.12267. 
———. ‘What Reform? Civil Societies, State Transformation and Social Antagonism in 
“European Serbia”’. PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political 
Science, Department of Anthropology, 2013. 
Mikuš, Marek, and Goran Dokić. ‘“Nobody’s Stronger Than the State”: Crisis and Hope 
Among Serbian NGO Workers and Veterans’. Ethnologia Balkanica, no. 18 (2016): 
265–78. 
Katarina Kušić 
 314 
 
Millar, Gearoid. An Ethnographic Approach to Peacebuilding: Understanding Local Experiences in 
Transitional States. London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. 
———. ‘Knowledge and Control in the Contemporary Land Rush: Making Local Land 
Legible and Corporate Power Applicable in Rural Sierra Leone’. Journal of Agrarian 
Change 16, no. 2 (1 April 2016): 206–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12102. 
———. ‘Local Experiences of Liberal Peace: Marketization and Emergent Conflict 
Dynamics in Sierra Leone’. Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 4 (1 July 2016): 569–81. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316632580. 
———. ‘Respecting Complexity: Compound Friction and Unpredictability in 
Peacebuilding’. In Peacebuilding and Friction: Global and Local Encounters in Post Conflict-
Societies., edited by Annika Björkdahl, Kristine Höglund, Gearoid Millar, Jair Van 
der Lijn, and Willemijn Verkoren, 32–47. Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2016. 
———. ‘“We Have No Voice for That”: Land Rights, Power, and Gender in Rural Sierra 
Leone’. Journal of Human Rights 14, no. 4 (2 October 2015): 445–62. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2015.1032219. 
Millar, Gearoid, Jaïr van der Lijn, and Willemijn Verkoren. ‘Peacebuilding Plans and Local 
Reconfigurations: Frictions between Imported Processes and Indigenous Practices’. 
International Peacekeeping 20, no. 2 (1 April 2013): 137–43. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2013.791556. 
Mitchell, Audra. International Intervention in a Secular Age: Re-Enchanting Humanity? 
Interventions. London: Routledge, 2014. 
———. ‘Quality/Control: International Peace Interventions and “the Everyday”’. Review of 
International Studies 37, no. 04 (October 2011): 1623–1645. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000180. 
Mitchell, Katharyne. ‘Different Diasporas and the Hype of Hybridity’. Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 15, no. 5 (1 October 1997): 533–53. 
https://doi.org/10.1068/d150533. 
Mitchell, Timothy. ‘Everyday Metaphors of Power’. Theory and Society 19, no. 5 (1 October 
1990): 545–77. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00147026. 
———. Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. University of California Press, 2002. 
———. ‘Theory Talk #59: Timothy Mitchell’. Theory Talks, 25 October 2013. 
http://www.theory-talks.org/2013/10/theory-talk-59.html. 
Mohan, Giles, and Kristian Stokke. ‘Participatory Development and Empowerment: The 
Dangers of Localism’. Third World Quarterly 21, no. 2 (2000): 247–68. 
Katarina Kušić 
 315 
 
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. ‘Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial 
Discourses’. Feminist Review, no. 30 (1 October 1988): 61–88. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1395054. 
Moore, David Chioni. ‘Is the Post- in Postcolonial the Post- in Post-Soviet? Toward a Global 
Postcolonial Critique’. PMLA 116, no. 1 (2001): 111–28. 
Mosse, David, ed. Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International 
Development. New York: Berghahn Books, 2011. 
———. Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice. London; Ann Arbor, 
MI: Pluto Press, 2005. 
———. ‘The Anthropology of International Development’. Annual Review of Anthropology 42, 
no. 1 (2013): 227–46. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-anthro-092412-155553. 
Müller, Martin. ‘Education and the Formation of Geopolitical Subjects’. International Political 
Sociology 5, no. 1 (1 March 2011): 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-
5687.2011.00117.x. 
Nadarajah, Suthaharan, and David Rampton. ‘The Limits of Hybridity and the Crisis of 
Liberal Peace’. Review of International Studies 41, no. 01 (January 2015): 49–72. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210514000060. 
Nader, Laura. ‘Up the Anthropologist: Perspectives Gained From Studying Up.’ In 
Reinventing Anthropology, edited by Dell H. Hymes, 284–311. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1972. 
Nandy, Ashis. The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism. 2nd ed., 4th impr. 
Oxford India Paperbacks. New Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2010. 
Narayan, Kirin. ‘How Native Is a “Native” Anthropologist?’ American Anthropologist 95, no. 
3 (1 September 1993): 671–86. https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.1993.95.3.02a00070. 
Naumović, Slobodan. Fields of Paradox: Three Case Studies on the Europeanisation of Agriculture in 
Serbia. Belgrade: ‘Srpski genealoški centar’; Odeljenje za etnologiju i antropologiju 
Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu, 2013. 
———. ‘„Otpor!“ Kao Postmoderni Faust: Društveni Pokret Novog Tipa, Tradicija 
Prosvećenog Reformizma i „izborna Revolucija“ u Srbiji ["Otpor" – A Postmodern 
Faust: New Social Movement, the Tradition of Enlightened Reformism and the 
Electoral Revolution in Serbia]’. Filozofija i Drustvo 17, no. 3 (2006): 147–94. 
———. ‘Was Faust a Member of ′Otpor′? On Subjectivistic Objectivism and Objectivistic 
Subjectivism in the Interpretation of (Post)Modern Social and Political Movements’. 
Filozofija i Drustvo 18, no. 3 (2007): 117–45. https://doi.org/10.2298/FID0703117N. 
Katarina Kušić 
 316 
 
Neumann, Cecilie Basberg, and Iver B. Neumann. ‘Uses of the Self: Two Ways of Thinking 
about Scholarly Situatedness and Method’. Millennium 43, no. 3 (June 2015): 798–
819. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829815576818. 
Neumann, Iver B. At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry. Ithaca: Cornell 
Univ. Press, 2012. 
———. ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy’. Millennium - 
Journal of International Studies 31, no. 3 (1 July 2002): 627–51. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298020310031201. 
‘Nismo Davali 10.000 Evra Po Radnom Mestu [We Did Not Give 10.000 Euros per 
Employee]’. Istinomer. Accessed 12 April 2018. 
http://www.istinomer.rs/ocena/3576/Nismo-davali-10000-evra-po-radnom-mestu. 
Njaradi, Dunja. ‘The Balkan Studies: History, Post-Colonialism and Critical Regionalism’. 
Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 20, no. 2–3 (December 
2012): 185–201. https://doi.org/10.1080/0965156X.2013.765252. 
Noutcheva, Gergana. ‘Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the EU’s 
Normative Power in the Western Balkans’. Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 7 
(1 October 2009): 1065–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760903226872. 
Obad, Orlanda. ‘How We Survived Europe (and Never Laughed): The Role of Liberal-
Humanitarian Utopia in Croatia’s Accession to the EU’. In EU, Europe Unfinished: 
Mediating Europe and the Balkans in a Time of Crisis, edited by Zlatan Krajina and 
Nebojša Blanuša, 183–200. Radical Cultural Studies. London; New York: Rowman 
& Littlefield International, 2016. 
———. ‘Lessons from Europe’s Antechamber for Balkanist Criticism (and Its Critics)’. 
Filozofija i Drustvo 24, no. 1 (2013): 458–76. https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1301458O. 
Ortner, Sherry B. ‘Fieldwork in the Postcommunity’. Anthropology and Humanism 22, no. 1 (1 
June 1997): 61–80. https://doi.org/10.1525/ahu.1997.22.1.61. 
———. ‘Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal’. Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 37, no. 1 (1 January 1995): 173–93. https://doi.org/10.2307/179382. 
———. ‘Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties’. Comparative Studies in Society and History 
26, no. 1 (1 January 1984): 126–66. https://doi.org/10.2307/178524. 
Osborne, Thomas. ‘Techniken und Subjekte: Von den “Governmentality Studies” zu den 
“Studies of Governmentality”’. In Governmentality studies: Analysen liberal-
demokratischer Gesellschaften im Anschluss an Michel Foucault, edited by Wolfgang 
Pircher and Ramon Reichert, 33–43. Münster: Lit, 2004. 
Katarina Kušić 
 317 
 
Ostojić, Mladen. Between Justice and Stability: The Politics of War Crimes Prosecutions in Post-
Milošević Serbia. Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014. 
Otten, Justin M. ‘Responses to EU Rural Development Initiatives in the Transitioning 
Republic of Macedonia’s Tikveš Wine Region’. South East European University Review 
8, no. 2 (2012). https://doi.org/10.2478/v10306-012-0018-1. 
———. ‘The Neoliberal “Katastrofa”: Privatisation, Development and a Changing Economy 
in Macedonia’s Tikveš Wine Region’. Doctoral thesis, School of Anthropology & 
Conservation, University of Kent, Canterbury, 2015. 
‘Otvoren Konkurs Za Zakup Državnih Njiva Na 30 Godina [Open Call for Leasing State 
Agricultural Land for 30 Years]’. AgroSmart, 13 February 2017. 
http://www.agrosmart.net/vesti/otvoren-konkurs-zakup-drzavnih-njiva.html. 
Pader, Ellen. ‘Seeing with an Ethnographic Sensibility’. In Interpretation and Method: Empirical 
Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn, by Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-
Shea, 161–75. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2006. 
Paffenholz, Thania. ‘International Peacebuilding Goes Local: Analysing Lederach’s Conflict 
Transformation Theory and Its Ambivalent Encounter with 20 Years of Practice’. 
Peacebuilding 2, no. 1 (2 January 2014): 11–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2013.783257. 
———. ‘Unpacking the Local Turn in Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment towards an 
Agenda for Future Research’. Third World Quarterly 36, no. 5 (4 May 2015): 857–74. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1029908. 
Palairet, Michael. The Balkan Economies c. 1800 - 1914: Evolution without Development.. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002. 
———. ‘The Economic Consequences of Slobodan Milošević. Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 6 
(2001): 903–19. 
Parry, Benita. Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2004. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203420539. 
Paris, Roland. ‘Ordering the World: Academic Research and Policymaking on Fragile 
States’. International Studies Review 13, no. 1 (1 March 2011): 58–71. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.00998.x. 
Petrović, Tanja. A Long Way Home:  Representations of the Western Balkans in Political and Media 
Discourses. Translated by Olga Vuković. Mediawatch. Ljubljana: Peace Institute, 
2009. 
Katarina Kušić 
 318 
 
———, ed. Mirroring Europe: Ideas of Europe and Europeanization in Balkan Societies. Leiden; 
Boston: Brill, 2014. 
———. Yuropa: Jugoslovensko Nasleđe i Politike Budućnosti u Postjugoslovenskim Društvima. 
Beograd: Fabrika knjiga, 2012. 
Phillips, Ann L. ‘Exporting Democracy: German Political Foundations in Central-East 
Europe’. Democratization 6, no. 2 (June 1999): 70–98. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510349908403612. 
Popović, Dragan. ‘Youth Labor Action (Omladinska Radna Akcija, ORA) as Ideological 
Holiday-Making’. In Yugoslavia’s Sunny Side: A History of Tourism in Socialism (1950s-
1980s), edited by Hannes Grandits and Karin Taylor, 279–302. Budapest ; New York: 
Central European University Press, 2010. 
Pouligny, Béatrice. Peace Operations Seen from below: UN Missions and Local People. London: 
Hurst, 2006. 
Pouliot, Vincent. ‘“Sobjectivism”: Toward a Constructivist Methodology’. International 
Studies Quarterly 51, no. 2 (1 June 2007): 359–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
2478.2007.00455.x. 
Povinelli, Elizabeth A. Economies of Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late 
Liberalism. Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2011. 
Prelec, Tena. ‘New Privatisation Wave: Serbia Has Enough Mistakes to Learn From’. LSEE 
- LSE Reserach on South Eastern Europe (blog), 12 September 2014. 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsee/tag/privatization/. 
‘Proizvodnja Se Srozala, Mljekare Guše Uvoz i Dugovi [Production down, Dairies 
Suffocated by Imports and Debt]’. Poslovni dnevnik, 18 January 2017. 
http://www.poslovni.hr/hrvatska/proizvodnja-se-srozala-mljekare-guse-uvoz-i-
dugovi-323115. 
Pugh, Michael. ‘The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective’. 
International Journal of Peace Studies 10, no. 2 (2005): 23–42. 
Pupavac, Vanessa. ‘Securing the Community? An Examination of International 
Psychosocial Intervention’. In International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995, by 
Peter Siani-Davies, 158–71. London; New York: Routledge, 2003. 
Quijano, Aníbal. ‘Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality’. Cultural Studies 21, no. 2 (March 
2007): 168–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/09502380601164353. 
———. ‘Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America’. International Sociology 15, 
no. 2 (June 2000): 215–32. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580900015002005. 
Katarina Kušić 
 319 
 
Rajaram, Prem Kumar. Ruling the Margins: Colonial Power and Administrative Rule in the Past and 
Present. New York: Routledge, 2015. 
Rajković, Ivan. ‘Commodification from below: Reforming the National “Work Ethic” in 
Serbia’. Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. Resilience and Transformation 
in Eurasia (blog), 23 April 2018. 
https://www.eth.mpg.de/4785494/blog_2018_04_23_01. 
———. ‘Concern for the State: “Normality”, State Effect and Distributional Claims in 
Serbia’. Glasnik Etnografskog Instituta 65, no. 1 (2017): 31–45. 
https://doi.org/10.2298/GEI1701031R. 
Rampton, David, and Suthaharan Nadarajah. ‘A Long View of Liberal Peace and Its Crisis’. 
European Journal of International Relations, 16 June 2016, 1–25. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066116649029. 
Rancatore, Jason P. ‘It Is Strange: A Reply to Vrasti’. Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies 39, no. 1 (1 August 2010): 65–77. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829810370938. 
Randazzo, Elisa. Beyond Liberal Peacebuilding: A Critical Exploration of the Local Turn. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2017. 
———. ‘The Paradoxes of the “Everyday”: Scrutinising the Local Turn in Peace Building’. 
Third World Quarterly 37, no. 8 (2 August 2016): 1351–70. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1120154. 
‘Raste Interesovanje Srpskih Kompanija Za Dualno Obrazovanje [Growing Interest of 
Serbian Companies for Dual Education]’. Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
Serbia, 17 March 2017. http://www.pks.rs/Vesti.aspx?IDVestiDogadjaji=22175. 
Razsa, Maple, and Nicole Lindstrom. ‘Balkan Is Beautiful: Balkanism in the Political 
Discourse of Tudman’s Croatia’. East European Politics and Societies 18, no. 4 (1 
November 2004): 628–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325404266939. 
‘Report on State-Owned and Cooperative Land in the Privatization Process’. Belgrade: The 
Anti-Corruption Council, 2012. http://www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs/en-
GB/reports/cid1028-2157/report-on-state-owned-and-cooperative-land-in-the-
privatization-process. 
Rexhepi, Piro. ‘From Orientalism to Homonationalism: Queer Politics, Islamophobia and 
Europeanization in Kosovo’. Southeastern Europe 40, no. 1 (13 March 2016): 32–53. 
https://doi.org/10.1163/18763332-03903014. 
Rich, Adrienne. ‘Notes Towards a Politics of Location’. In Blood, Bread, and Poetry: Selected 
Prose, 1979-1985, 210–31. New York: Norton, 1986. 
Katarina Kušić 
 320 
 
Richmond, Oliver P. ‘A Pedagogy of Peacebuilding: Infrapolitics, Resistance, and 
Liberation’. International Political Sociology 6, no. 2 (2012): 115–131. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2012.00154.x. 
———. A Post-Liberal Peace. Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution. Abingdon, 
New York: Routledge, 2011. 
———. ‘Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-Local Hybridity via the 
Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding’. Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding 3, no. 3 (1 November 2009): 324–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502970903086719. 
———. ‘Critical Agency, Resistance and a Post-Colonial Civil Society’. Cooperation and 
Conflict 46, no. 4 (1 December 2011): 419–40. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836711422416. 
———. ‘Foucault and the Paradox of Peace-as-Governance Versus Everyday Agency’. 
International Political Sociology 4, no. 2 (1 June 2010): 199–202. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2010.00100_3.x. 
———. ‘Peace Formation and Local Infrastructures for Peace’. Alternatives: Global, Local, 
Political, 19 December 2013. https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375413512100. 
———. Peace in International Relations. London; New York: Routledge, 2008. 
———. ‘Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace’. Millennium - Journal of International Studies 
38, no. 3 (1 May 2010): 665–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829810365017. 
———. ‘The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace: Negative or Positive?’ Cooperation and Conflict 50, 
no. 1 (1 March 2015): 50–68. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836714537053. 
———. ‘The Problem of Peace: Understanding the “Liberal Peace”’. Conflict, Security & 
Development 6, no. 3 (1 October 2006): 291–314. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800600933480. 
———. The Transformation of Peace. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
Richmond, Oliver P., and Jason Franks. Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and 
Peacebuilding. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.  
Richmond, Oliver P., Stefanie Kappler, and Annika Björkdahl. ‘The “Field” in the Age of 
Intervention: Power, Legitimacy, and Authority Versus the “Local”’. Millennium - 
Journal of International Studies 44, no. 1 (1 September 2015): 23–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829815594871. 
Richmond, Oliver P., and Audra Mitchell, eds. Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to 
Post-Liberalism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
Katarina Kušić 
 321 
 
Roberts, Adam. ‘NATO’s “Humanitarian War” over Kosovo’. Survival 41, no. 3 (January 
1999): 102–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339912331342943. 
Robinson, William I. ‘Globalization, the World System, and “Democracy Promotion” in U. 
S. Foreign Policy’. Theory and Society 25, no. 5 (1 October 1996): 615–65. 
———. ‘Promoting Polyarchy: 20 Years Later’. International Relations 27, no. 2 (1 June 
2013): 228–34. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117813489655a. 
Robinson, William I. Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Rose, Nikolas S. Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Rosenberg, Tina. ‘Revolution U’. Foreign Policy. Accessed 18 May 2016. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/17/revolution-u-2/. 
Rosenow, Doerthe. ‘Decentring Global Power: The Merits of a Foucauldian Approach to 
International Relations’. Global Society 23, no. 4 (October 2009): 497–517. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600820903198891. 
Rutazibwa, Olivia Umurerwa. ‘Studying Agaciro: Moving Beyond Wilsonian 
Interventionist Knowledge Production on Rwanda’. Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding 8, no. 4 (2 October 2014): 291–302. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2014.964454. 
Sabaratnam, Meera. ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism in the Critique of the Liberal Peace’. Security 
Dialogue 44, no. 3 (1 June 2013): 259–78. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010613485870. 
———. Decolonising Intervention: International Statebuilding in Mozambique. London: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2017. 
———. ‘IR in Dialogue … but Can We Change the Subjects? A Typology of Decolonising 
Strategies for the Study of World Politics’. Millennium - Journal of International Studies 
39, no. 3 (1 May 2011): 781–803. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829811404270. 
———. ‘Re-Thinking the Liberal Peace: Anti-Colonial Thought and Post-War Intervention 
in Mozambique’. PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2011. 
Sadiki, Larbi. ‘Towards a “Democratic Knowledge” Turn? Knowledge Production in the 
Age of the Arab Spring’. The Journal of North African Studies 20, no. 5 (20 October 
2015): 702–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2015.1081461. 
Katarina Kušić 
 322 
 
Salter, Mark B. ‘The Ethnographic Turn: Introduction’. In Research Methods in Critical Security 
Studies: An Introduction, edited by Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu, 51–57. New 
York: Routledge, 2012. 
Sampson, Steven. ‘From Forms to Norms: Global Projects and Local Practices in the Balkan 
NGO Scene’. Journal of Human Rights 2, no. 3 (September 2003): 329–37. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1475483032000133015. 
———. ‘Too Much Civil Society? Donor-Driven Human Rights NGOs in the Balkans’. In 
Revisiting the Role of Civil Society in the Promotion of Human Rights, edited by Lis 
Dhundale and Erik André Andersen, 197–220. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for 
Human Rights, 2004. 
———. ‘Weak States, Uncivil Societies and Thousands of NGOs: Benevolent Colonialism 
in the Balkans’. In The Balkans in Focus: Cultural Boundaries in Europe, edited by Sanimir 
Resic and Barbara Törnquist Plewa, 27–44. Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2002. 
Sassen, Saskia. ‘Territory and Territoriality in the Global Economy’. International Sociology 
15, no. 2 (June 2000): 372–93. https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580900015002014 
Schatz, Edward. ‘Ethnographic Immersion and the Study of Politics’. In Political Ethnography: 
What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power, edited by Edward Schatz, 1–22. 
Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
Schmidt, Jessica. ‘Democracy Promotion in a Post-Political World’. PhD thesis, University 
of Westminster, 2013. 
———. ‘From Transformation to Reality: The Role of Local Context in EU Democracy 
Promotion’. International Relations 27, no. 2 (1 June 2013): 246–52. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117813489655d. 
Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine, and Dvora Yanow. Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and 
Processes. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. 
Scott, David. ‘Colonial Governmentality’. Social Text, no. 43 (1 October 1995): 191–220. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/466631. 
Scott, James C. Weapons of the Weak Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven, 
London: Yale University Press, 1985. 
Selby, Jan. ‘Engaging Foucault: Discourse, Liberal Governance and the Limits of 
Foucauldian IR’. International Relations 21, no. 3 (1 September 2007): 324–45. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117807080199. 
Katarina Kušić 
 323 
 
Shani, Giorgio, and David Chandler, eds. ‘Forum - Assessing the Impact of Foucault on 
International Relations’. International Political Sociology 4, no. 2 (1 June 2010): 196–
97. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-5687.2010.00100_1.x. 
Sharma, Aradhana. Logics of Empowerment: Development, Gender, and Governance in Neoliberal 
India. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008. 
Shilliam, Robbie. ‘Intervention and Colonial-Modernity: Decolonising the Italy/Ethiopia 
Conflict through Psalms 68:31’. Review of International Studies 39, no. 5 (December 
2013): 1131–47. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021051300020X. 
———. ‘What the Haitian Revolution Might Tell Us about Development, Security, and the 
Politics of Race’. Comparative Studies in Society and History 50, no. 3 (July 2008): 778–
808. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417508000339. 
Shohat, Ella. ‘Notes on the “Post-Colonial”’. Social Text, no. 31/32 (1992): 99–113. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/466220. 
Siani-Davies, Peter, ed. International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995. London; New York: 
Routledge, 2003. 
Siegrist, Hannes, and Dietmar Müller. ‘Introduction’. In Property in East Central Europe: 
Notions, Institutions, and Practices of Landownership in the Twentieth Century, edited by 
Hannes Siegrist and Dietmar Müller, 1–28. New York: Berghahn Books, 2015. 
Skinner, Jonathan. ‘A Four-Part Introduction to the Interview’. In The Interview: An 
Ethnographic Approach, edited by Jonathan Skinner, 1–49. London: Berg, 2012. 
Smith, Neil. Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space. New York: 
Blackwell, 1984. 
Slootmaeckers, Koen. ‘The Litmus Test of Pride: Analysing the Emergence of the Belgrade 
“Ghost” Pride in the Context of EU Accession’. East European Politics, 23 August 2017, 
1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2017.1367290. 
Sörensen, Jens Stilhoff. ‘Balkanism and the New Radical Interventionism: A Structural 
Critique’. International Peacekeeping 9, no. 1 (1 March 2002): 1–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/714002702. 
———. State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery: Political Economy, Ethnicity and  
Development in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo. New York: Berghahn Books, 2009. 
Spasić, Ivana, and Tamara Petrovic. ‘Varieties of “Third Serbia”’. In Us and Them: Symbolic 
Divisions in Western Balkan Societies, edited by Ivana Spasić, Predrag Cveticanin, and 
Réka Krizmanics, 219–44. Belgrade: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory. 
University of Belgrade, 2013. 
Katarina Kušić 
 324 
 
Spasić, Ivana, and Milan Subotić, eds. R/Evolution and Order: Serbia after October 2000 ; 
[Proceedings of the International Conference ‘Social and Political Changes in Serbia 
/Yugoslavia: Prospects and Limitations’, Belgrade, 2 - 3 March 2001]. Disput. Belgrade: 
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 2001. 
Spaskovska, Ljubica. The Last Yugoslav Generation: The Rethinking of Youth Politics and Cultures 
in Late Socialism. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017. 
Special Report No 6/2003 Concerning Twinning as the Main Instrument to Support 
Institution-Building in Candidate Countries Together with the Commission’s 
Replies’. Official Journal of the European Union. European Court of Auditors, 2003. 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3c1f13ff-bf47-
4fd7-94ee-7503c79d1314/language-en. 
Spoerri, Marlene. Engineering Revolution: The Paradox of Democracy Promotion in Serbia. 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. 
Spoerri, Marlene, and Mladen Joksic. ‘From Resistance to Revolution and Back Again: 
What Egyptian Youth Can Learn from Otpor When Its Activists Leave Tahrir 
Square’. Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, 2011. 
https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/0087. 
Srećković, Milenko. ‘Istorijat agrarnih reformi i posledice privatizacije u poljoprivrednom 
sektoru [History of Agrarian Reforms and concequnces of privatisation in the 
agicultural sector]’. In Bilans stanja – doprinos analizi restauracije kapitalizma u Srbiji, by 
Darko Vesić, Miloš Baković-Jadžić, Tanja Vukša, and Vladimir Simović, 509–73. 
Centar za politike emancipacije, 2015. 
———. ‘The Case of Serbia’. In Land Concentration, Land Grabbing and People’s Struggles in 
Europe, by Jennifer Franco and Saturnino M. Borras, 194–97. Transnational 
Institute, 2013. 
‘Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and Their 
Member States on One Part, and the Republic of Serbia, on the Other Part’, n.d. 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/serbia/key_document/saa_en.pdf. 
Stepputat, Finn, and Jessica Larsen. Global Political Ethnography a Methodological Approach to 
Studying Global Policy Regimes. DIIS Working Paper. Copenhagen: DIIS, 2015. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122296. 
Katarina Kušić 
 325 
 
Stojanović, Svetozar. ‘Democratic Revolution in Serbia’. In R/Evolution and Order: Serbia after 
October 2000, edited by Ivana Spasić and Milan Subotić, 25–34. Belgrade: Institute for 
Philosophy and Social Theory, 2001. 
‘Strategija poljoprivrede i ruralnog razvoja Republike Srbije za period 2014-2024. godine 
[Strategy for agriculture and rural development of the Republic of Serbia for the 
period 2014-2024]’. Službeni glasnik RS, no. 85 (2014). 
Strsoglavec, Stela, and Nataša Vukmirović. ‘Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju i 
obaveze Srbije u domenu liberalizacije kretanja kapitala odnosno trgovine 
poljoprivrednim zemljištem [Stabilisation and Association Agreement and Serbia’s 
obligation in the domain of capital movement liberalisation or trade of agricultural 
land]’. Belgrade: Mreža za održivi razvoj Srbije (MORS), 2014. 
http://eukonvent.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/SSP-i-trgovina-poljoprivrednim-
zemljistem.pdf. 
Stubbs, Paul. ‘Flex Actors and Philanthropy in (Post-)Conflict Arenas: Soros’ Open Society 
Foundations in the Post-Yugoslav Space’. Croatian Political Science Review 50, no. 5 
(2013): 114–38. 
———. ‘Networks, Organizations, Movements: Narratives and Shapes of Three Waves of 
Activism in Croatia’. Polemos: Journal of Interdisciplinary Research on War and Peace XV, 
no. 30 (27 December 2012): 11–32. 
———. ‘Performing Reform in South East Europe: Consultancy, Translation and Flexible 
Agency’. In Making Policy Move: Towards a Politics of Translation and Assemblage, by John 
Clarke, 65–93. Bristol: Policy Press, 2015. 
———. ‘Stretching Concepts Too Far? Multi-Level Governance, Policy Transfer and the 
Politics of Scale in South East Europe’. Southeast European Politics 6, no. 2 (2005): 66–
87. 
Stubbs, Paul, and Bob Deacon. ‘Transnationalism and the Making of Social Policy in South 
East Europe’. In Social Policy and International Interventions in South East Europe, edited 
by Bob Deacon and Paul Stubbs, 1–21. Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2007. 
Subotić, Jelena, and Srdjan Vučetić. ‘Performing Solidarity: Whiteness and Status-Seeking 
in the Non-Aligned World’. Journal of International Relations and Development, 2 August 
2017. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0112-2. 
Sukarieh, Mayssoun. ‘On Class, Culture, and the Creation of the Neoliberal Subject: The 
Case of Jordan’. Anthropological Quarterly 89, no. 4 (2016): 1201–25. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/anq.2016.0073. 
Katarina Kušić 
 326 
 
Sukarieh, Mayssoun, and Stuart Tannock. Youth Rising?: The Politics of Youth in the Global 
Economy. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015. 
Sum, Ngai-Ling, and Bob Jessop. Towards a Cultural Political Economy: Putting Culture in Its 
Place in Political Economy. Cheltenham, Northampton: Elgar, 2013. 
Sundhaussen, Holm. ‘Die Verpasste Agrarrevolution: Aspekte Der Entwicklungsblockade 
in Den Balkanländern Vor 1945’. In Industrialisierung Und Gesellschaftlicher Wandel in 
Südosteuropa, by Ronald Schönfeld, 45–60. München: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 
1989. 
‘Sustainable Recruitment of Nurses (Triple Win)’. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit [German Corporation for International Cooperation GmbH]. 
Accessed 6 April 2018. https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/41533.html. 
Swinnen, Johan F. M., and Liesbet Vranken. ‘Review of the Transitional Restrictions 
Maintained by New Member States on the Acquisition of Agricultural Real Estate’. 
Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010. 
Tagma, Halit Mustafa, Elit Kalaycioglu, and Emel Akcali. ‘“Taming” Arab Social 
Movements: Exporting Neoliberal Governmentality’. Security Dialogue 44, no. 5–6 (9 
October 2013): 375–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010613500512. 
‘The Cases | International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’. United Nations -. 
Accessed 24 January 2018. http://www.icty.org/en/action/cases/4. 
Thiemann, Andre. ‘“It Was the Least Painful to Go into Greenhouse Production”: The Moral 
Appreciation of Social Security in Post-Socialist Serbia’. Contemporary Southeastern 
Europe 1, no. 2 (2014): 23–41. 
———. ‘Shrinking Capitalism, “Milky Ways”, and the Moral Appreciation of Serbia’s 
“Living Village”’. Glasnik Etnografskog Instituta 65, no. 2 (2017): 387–402. 
https://doi.org/10.2298/GEI1702387T. 
———. ‘State Relations: Local State and Social Security in Central Serbia’. PhD thesis, The 
Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Historical Cultural Studies of the Martin 
Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, 2016. 
Tickner, Arlene. ‘Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World’. Millennium 32, no. 2  
(1 June 2003): 295–324. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298030320020301. 
Thomas, Margo, and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, eds. Public Policy Making in the Western 
Balkans. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2015. 
Tochitch, Desimir. ‘Collectivization in Yugoslavia’. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
41, no. 1 (1959): 26–42. 
Katarina Kušić 
 327 
 
Todorova, Mariia Nikolaeva. ‘Balkanism and Postcolonialism, or On the Beauty of the 
Airplane View’. In In Marx’s Shadow: Knowledge, Power, and Intellectuals in Eastern Europe 
and Russia, by Costică Brădățan and S. Ushakin. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010. 
———. Imagining the Balkans. Updated ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Tomasevich, Jozo. Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia. New York: Kraus 
Reprint Co, 1975. 
Traynor, Ian. ‘Young Democracy Guerrillas Join Forces: From Belgrade to Baku, Activists 
Gather to Swap Notes on How to Topple Dictators’. The Guardian, 6 June 2005. 
Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt. Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005. 
Turner, Victor W., and Edward M. Bruner, eds. The Anthropology of Experience. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1986. 
‘Uredba o uslovima, načinu i postupku za ostvarivanje prava prvenstva zakupa, 
kriterijumima za utvrđivanje visine zakupnine za pravo prvenstva zakupa, kao i 
dokumentaciju koja se dostavlja uz zahtev za ostvarivanje prava prvenstva zakupa 
[Bylaw on conditions, ways, and procedures for establishing the right to first lease, 
criteria for rent, as well as the documentation requested]’. Službeni glasnik RS 56/16, 
16 June 2016. http://www.mpzzs.gov.rs/download/Uredbe/UREDBA-
ZEMLJISTE.pdf. 
Uvalić, Milica. Serbia’s Transition: Towards a Better Future. Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
Van Maanen, John. Tales of the Field. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011. 
Vejzagić, Saša. ‘The Importance of Youth Labour Actions in Socialist Yugoslavia (1948 - 
1950): A Case Study of the Motorway “Brotherhood-Unity”’. MA thesis, Central 
European University, 2013. 
Velickovic, Vedrana. ‘Belated Alliances? Tracing the Intersections between Postcolonialism 
and Postcommunism’. Journal of Postcolonial Writing 48, no. 2 (1 May 2012): 164–75. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17449855.2012.658247. 
Venn, Couze. ‘Neoliberal Political Economy, Biopolitics and Colonialism: A Transcolonial 
Genealogy of Inequality’. Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 6 (November 2009): 206–
33. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276409352194. 
Verdery, Katherine. The Vanishing Hectare: Property and Value in Postsocialist Transylvania. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. 
Katarina Kušić 
 328 
 
Verkoren, Willemijn, and Mathijs van Leeuwen. ‘Civil Society in Peacebuilding: Global 
Discourse, Local Reality’. International Peacekeeping 20, no. 2 (1 April 2013): 159–72. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2013.791560. 
Vetta, Théodora. ‘“Democracy Building” in Serbia: The NGO Effect’. Southeastern Europe 33, 
no. 1 (1 July 2009): 26–47. https://doi.org/10.1163/187633309X421148. 
———. ‘“Let’s Get Up!”: NGOs, Class and Culture in Serbia: An Anthropology of 
Democracy Aid’. PhD thesis, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2013. 
———. ‘“Nationalism Is Back!” Radikali and Privatization in Serbia’. In Headlines of Nation, 
Subtexts of Class: Working Class Populism and the Return of the Repressed in Neoliberal 
Europe., edited by Don Kalb and Gabor Halmai, 37–56. New York: Berghahn Books, 
2011. 
———. ‘NGOs and the State: Clash or Class? Circulating Elites of “Good Governance” in 
Serbia’. In Democracy at Large: NGOs, Political Foundations, Think Tanks and International 
Organizations, edited by Boris Petrić, 169–90. Sciences Po Series in International 
Relations and Political Economy. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
———. ‘Revived Nationalism versus European Democracy: Class and “Identity Dilemmas” 
in Contemporary Serbia’. Focaal 2009, no. 55 (1 January 2009). 
https://doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2009.550106. 
Vidanović, Aleksandra. ‘Support Was out There!’ In Young People at the Heart of Europe: A 
Decade of the European Youth Centre Budapest: 10 Years EYC, EIK, CEJ Budapest, by Yael 
Ohana. Council of Europe, 2006. 
Visoka, Gëzim. Shaping Peace in Kosovo: The Politics of Peacebuilding and Statehood. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 
Volčič, Zala. ‘The Notion of “the West” in the Serbian National Imaginary’. European Journal 
of Cultural Studies 8, no. 2 (1 May 2005): 155–75. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1367549405051842. 
Volk, Tina, Emil Erjavec, and Kaj Mortensen. Agricultural Policy and European Integration in 
Southeastern Europe. Budapest: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, 2014. 
———. Poljoprivredna politika i evropske integracije u Jugoistočnoj Evropi. Budapest; Skoplje: Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations : Stalna radna grupa za 
regionalni ruralni razvoj, 2015. http://seerural.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/05/FAO-SWG-Book_FINAL_Serbian-language.pdf. 
Vorbrugg, Alexander. ‘Governing through Civil Society? The Making of a Post-Soviet  
Katarina Kušić 
 329 
 
Political Subject in Ukraine’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33, no. 1 
(February 2015): 136–53. https://doi.org/10.1068/d13055p. 
Vrasti, Wanda. ‘Dr Strangelove, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying about Methodology 
and Love Writing’. Millennium - Journal of International Studies 39, no. 1 (1 August 
2010): 79–88. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829810371017. 
———. ‘The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations’. Millennium - Journal 
of International Studies 37, no. 2 (1 December 2008): 279–301. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829808097641. 
 ———. ‘Universal but Not Truly “Global”: Governmentality, Economic Liberalism, and 
the International’. Review of International Studies 39, no. 01 (2013): 49–69. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210511000568. 
———. Volunteer Tourism in the Global South: Giving Back in Neoliberal Times. London; New 
York: Routledge, 2013. 
Vučić: Novi Pogoni i Više Rada Neophodni Za Mir i Stabilnost Srbije [Vučić: New Factories and More 
Work Crucial for Peace and Stability in Serbia]. YouTube video. Official YouTube 
Channel of Aleksandar Vučić, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Sofuf0TUcs. 
Vučić: Tenis Želi Da Ulaže u Srbiji [Vučić: Tönnies Wants to Invest in Serbia]. YouTube video. 
Accessed 25 January 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KCqwbQwqTQw. 
‘Vučić u Nemačkoj Sa Vlasnikom „Tenisa” [Vučić in Germany with Tönnies Owner]’. 
Politika Online, 7 September 2016. http://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/363054/Vucic-u-
Nemackoj-sa-vlasnikom-Tenisa. 
Vujačić, Veljko. Nationalism, Myth, and the State in Russia and Serbia: Antecedents of the Dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139696517. 
Vukov, Tamara. ‘Seven Theses on Neobalkanism and NGOization in Transitional Serbia’. 
In NGOization: Complicity, Contradictions and Prospects, edited by A. A. Choudry and 
Dip Kapoor. London, New York: Zed Books, 2013. 
Walker, R. B. J. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century 
Paradigms. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001. 
Walters, William. Governmentality: Critical Encounters. Critical Issues in Global Politics. New 
York: Routledge, 2012. 
Katarina Kušić 
 330 
 
———. ‘The Microphysics of Power Redux’. In Foucault and the Modern International: Silences 
and Legacies for the Study of World Politics, edited by Philippe Bonditti, Didier Bigo, and 
Frédéric Gros, 57–75. The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political 
Economy. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 
———. ‘The Political Rationality of European Integration’. In Global Governmentality 
Governing International Spaces, edited by Wendy Larner and William Walters, 155–74. 
London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2004. 
Walters, William, and Jens Henrik Haahr. Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and 
European Integration. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Wedeen, Lisa. ‘Reflections on Ethnographic Work in Political Science’. Annual Review of 
Political Science 13, no. 1 (May 2010): 255–72. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.052706.123951. 
Wedel, Janine. Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe. 
Updated edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Trade, 2001. 
———. Shadow Elite: How the World’s New Power Brokers Undermine Democracy, Government, and 
the Free Market. New York: Basic Books, 2009. 
———. ‘“Studying Through” a Globalizing World. Building Method through 
Aidnographies’. Occasional Paper, no. 24 (1 January 2014): 149–74. 
———. ‘USAID to Central and Eastern Europe, 1990–1994: An Analysis of Aid Models 
and Responses’. East-Central European Economies in Transition, 1994, 314. 
Werbner, Pnina. ‘Introduction: The Dialectics of Cultural Hybridity’. In Debating Cultural 
Hybridity: Multicultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism, edited by Pnina Werbner 
and Tariq Modood. London: Zed Books, 2015. 
Werbner, Pnina, and Tariq Modood, eds. Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multicultural Identities 
and the Politics of Anti-Racism. Critique, Influence, Change. London: Zed Books, 2015. 
West, Rebecca. Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia. Penguin Classics, 
2010. 
‘What Is TACSO?’ TACSO - Technical Assistance for Civil Society Organisations, 8 March 
2017. http://www.tacso.org/Content/Read/15?title=ŠtajeTACSO? 
Wilder, Gary. ‘Practicing Citizenship in Imperial Paris’. In Civil Society and the Political 
Imagination in Africa, edited by John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
Katarina Kušić 
 331 
 
Wilén, Nina. ‘Capacity-Building or Capacity-Taking? Legitimizing Concepts in Peace and 
Development Operations’. International Peacekeeping 16, no. 3 (1 June 2009): 337–51. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310903036392. 
Williams, David. ‘Development, Intervention, and International Order’. Review of 
International Studies 39, no. 05 (December 2013): 1213–1231. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210513000260. 
Williams, Glyn. ‘Evaluating Participatory Development: Tyranny, Power and 
(Re)Politicisation’. Third World Quarterly 25, no. 3 (1 March 2004): 557–78. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659042000191438. 
Wolff, Larry. Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment. 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1994. 
Wolford, Wendy, Saturnino M. Borras, Ruth Hall, Ian Scoones, and Benjamin White, eds. 
Governing Global Land Deals: The Role of the State in the Rush for Land. Chichester, West 
Sussex, United Kingdom: Wiley Blackwell, 2013. 
Woodward, Susan L. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War. Washington, 
D.C: Brookings Institution, 1995. 
———. Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945 - 1990. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1995. 
———. ‘The Long Intervention: Continuity in the Balkan Theatre’. Review of International 
Studies 39, no. 05 (December 2013): 1169–1187. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210513000284. 
Young, Robert. Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race. London: Routledge, 
2006. 
‘Youth in Action Programme’. European Comission. Accessed 11 April 2018. /youth/success-
stories/youth-in-action_en. 
Zamora, Daniel, Michael C. Behrent, and Michel Foucault, eds. Foucault and Neoliberalism. 
Cambridge, UK Malden, MA, USA: polity, 2016. 
Zanotti, Laura. ‘Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-Thinking Political Agency 
in the Global World’. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 38, no. 4 (1 November 2013): 
288–304. https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375413512098. 
———. ‘Normalizing Democracy and Human Rights: Discipline, Resistance and 
Carceralization in Croatia’s Euro-Atlantic Integration’. Journal of International 
Relations and Development 11, no. 3 (2008): 222–50. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2008.13. 
Katarina Kušić 
 332 
 
Zaum, Dominik. The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International Statebuilding. 
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Zielonka, Jan. Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union. Reprint. Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 2010. 
Zinaić, Rade. ‘The Scope of Violence: Elizabeth Dauphinée and the Neoliberal Moment’. 
The Slavonic and East European Review 94, no. 3 (2016): 401. 
https://doi.org/10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.94.3.0401. 
Zirakzadeh, Cyrus Ernesto. ‘When Nationalists Are Not Separatists: Discarding and 
Recovering Academic Theories While Doing Fieldwork in the Basque Region of 
Spain’. In Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power, by 
Edward Schatz, 97–118. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
Zivanovic-Miljkovic, Jelena, and Vesna Popovic. ‘Land Use Regulation and Property 
Rights Regime over Land in Serbia’. Spatium, no. 32 (2014): 22–27. 
https://doi.org/10.2298/SPAT1432022Z. 
Zürich, Swisscontact, 8005. ‘Donor Comittee for Dual Vocational Education and Training’. 
Swisscontact. Accessed 12 May 2018. https://www.swisscontact.org/nc/en/projects-
and-countries/search-projects/project-finder/project/-/show/dc-dvet-donor-
comittee-for-dual-vocational-education-and-training.html. 
‘Нaциoнaлни Прoгрaм Зaпoшљaвaњa Млaдих Дo 2020. Гoдинe [National Program for 
Youth Employment until 2020]’. Belgrade, September 2015. 
http://www.youseefor.me/images/policies/srb/Nacionalni_program_zaposljavanja_m
ladih_do_2020.pdf. 
‘Приватизација и Располагање Пољопривредним Земљиштем у Јавној Својини 
Републике Србије [Report on Privatization and Disposal of Publically Owned 
Agricultural Land in the Republic of Serbia]’. Belgrade: The Anti-Corruption 
Council, 2018. http://www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs/izvestaji/cid1028-
3259/izvestaj-o-privatizaciji-i-raspolaganju-poljoprivrednim-zemljistem-u-javnoj-
svojini-republike-srbije 
